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IntroductIon
Era of Negotiations 
(
IllustratIon 1: Chancellor Willy Brandt, Foreign Minister Walter Scheel and Minister of 
the Interior Hans-Dietrich Genscher (from right to left) during a Bundestag session  
in December 1972. 
Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, B 145 Bild-00114278,  
Photographer: Ulrich Wienke.
This image is not available in this open access ebook due to rights restrictions. 
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I was resented in the East for it, and not everybody in the West agreed with me 
either, when I said that the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 
a European security conference would be pointless if the relationship between 
the two parts of Germany had not been settled first. The Federal Republic had 
some leverage here; I did not overestimate it, but we had it. My argument: if a 
wedding is planned and the other half of the bridal couple does not turn up, the 
other partner will not be very happy about it.
– Willy Brandt in his memoirs1
This conference will simultaneously address the possibilities of cooperation and 
the questions of security. Between East and West, North and South, I see the 
possibility to create common interests and responsibilities in Europe through 
economic and other connections which can develop more security for everyone. 
– Willy Brandt’s Nobel Peace Prize speech, December 19712
In his seminal work on the German role in Europe during the Cold War di-
vision, Timothy Garton Ash points out that an attempt to fairly characterise 
the CSCE3 position of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) would be a 
‘mammoth’, bordering on a ‘virtually impossible’ task.4 Admittedly, Garton 
Ash’s comment refers to the entire duration of what became known as the 
Helsinki Process, whereas the focus here is restricted to the prehistory of the 
conference, with only the final chapter addressing the CSCE proper and its 
multilateral preparations. But the task is nonetheless ambitious.
This book analyses the role of the Federal Republic in the decade lead-
ing to the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE in 1975. It particularly concen-
trates on the multilateral Western framework of policy construction in the 
years of 1969–72. During that period, the CSCE policy of the FRG was 
characterised by a fascinating combination of the two complementary ele-
ments inherent in the quotes from Chancellor Willy Brandt above. On the 
one hand, Bonn was interested in instrumentalising the CSCE, attempting 
to use the FRG’s agreement to participate in the conference as a bargain-
ing chip in the game where the fulfilment of its bilateral Ostpolitik was the 
main target. In the beginning, it was this short-term tactical approach that 
prevailed. On the other hand, the Federal Republic was also increasingly 
interested in the conference itself, hoping to be able to achieve substantive 
national foreign policy goals multilaterally in the CSCE. Over time, this 
long-term strategic approach surpassed the emphasis on short-term link-
ages. When the actual CSCE was opened, the FRG was well prepared to 
defend its national interests in this new multilateral framework. 
In narrow terms, seen merely from the perspective of the FRG and the 
CSCE, this book embarks on a relatively uncharted territory. Existing schol-
arship on this particular case is sparse. Peter Becker’s book from the early 
1990s covers much the same substantive ground, but it employs a systemic 
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decision-making analysis rather than an historical approach. At times 
Becker provides a useful reference to the chronological development, but 
the book suffers from the complete lack of archival evidence to support it, 
leading to several factual mistakes and a relatively superficial analysis.5 Ste-
fanie Halle’s master’s thesis, in spite of its title, focuses almost exclusively 
on the Ostpolitik treaties as a backdrop for the FRG’s CSCE policy.6 Kristina 
Spohr Readman, in contrast, has written a compelling article on the politics 
of language in the CSCE policy of the FRG in 1972–75. Working partly with 
the same original documents as this book, Spohr Readman’s conclusions – 
highlighting the FRG’s pursuit of national interests and its key role in the 
West – fit well with and thus confirm the arguments put forward here.7 
West German CSCE policy has also been the topic of individual articles 
in edited volumes, including one by this author.8 Elements of the West 
German approach to the CSCE have also been touched upon in a num-
ber of excellent dissertations recently completed, but their focus has been 
broader, relating to actors, themes or time period.9 This book is therefore 
necessarily based on original research on recently released archival docu-
ments. However, it does not concentrate solely on the role of one par-
ticular state in a particular set of negotiations. Instead, it builds on and 
contributes to a scholarly discussion on three broader themes – European 
détente, the CSCE and West German foreign policy. I will next examine 
these three overlapping themes in more detail. 
European Détente
The late 1960s and early 1970s ushered in a new period in the Cold War. 
Although far from replacing the Cold War confrontation completely, dé-
tente brought about a genuine reduction of tension, literally Entspannung 
in German, into the East–West relationship. Nowhere was this more visi-
ble than in Europe, on the continent most directly affected by the post-war 
division. It is therefore all the more surprising that the dominant current 
in the scholarship on the history of détente has up to this day focused 
predominantly on bipolar superpower relations.10 A more diverse picture 
is emerging, fortunately.11
For a long time, the research that did exist on European détente was that 
in name only, never really breaking free from the dominant paradigm.12 
Only recently have more nuanced interpretations surfaced, with outstand-
ing general accounts of the global Cold War13 as well as of European post-
war history.14 Jeremi Suri has raised the exciting new argument of détente 
as a global force for stability, even counterrevolution, rather than change.15 
With the widespread thirty-year rule in archives, the front line of basic re-
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search with original documents has also moved well into the 1970s. This is 
reflected in a recent flow of conferences and subsequent edited publications, 
significantly broadening our understanding of détente in general, and Euro-
pean détente in particular.16 Piers Ludlow has drawn attention to the impor-
tance of bridging the divide between scholarship on European integration 
and that on the Cold War.17 All of this has brought détente scholarship closer 
to the general trend of ‘retroactive de-bipolarisation’ of Cold War history.18 
This approach should not be overworked, of course. Looking at the big 
picture, the United States and the Soviet Union did play a more significant 
role in the Cold War and détente than did, say, Belgium and Bulgaria. 
But that is not to say that the allies of the dominant superpowers, be they 
members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, were always merely passive ob-
jects. The relationships within the alliances were far from constant – the 
configuration of power changed back and forth over time. In fact, in many 
respects the rapid dynamics within the alliances during the détente years 
are more fascinating than the actual East–West development that often 
moved at a sluggish pace.19
 In the West, multilateral cooperation underwent a fundamental change 
in the decade beginning in the mid-1960s, with interaction between three 
institutional frameworks increasingly overlapping – especially in the 
CSCE context. Firstly, following the 1967 Harmel Report, NATO assumed 
a more outspoken political role than before, aiming to combine defence 
with détente.20 This element of NATO, transforming the military alliance 
into a political actor and into a political forum for multilateral negotiations 
among its members, has not yet received the scholarly attention it merits.21
Secondly, NATO soon received a serious challenger, as another intra-
Western forum for debating East–West policy emerged. As a result of the 
so-called Davignon Report in 1969, the six original members of the Euro-
pean Communities began to coordinate their foreign policy more closely, 
particularly in the areas of the Middle East and the CSCE. After the first 
Foreign Ministers’ meeting of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
in November 1970, the procedure was institutionalised in frequent meet-
ings on ministerial and bureaucratic levels, first among the six original 
members, but soon also including the four applicant countries.22 With 
the exception of a few early analyses,23 the literature has for a long time 
neglected these early years of the EPC’s development and glossed over 
them only as a prelude to what is now the common foreign and security 
policy of the European Union.24 Recently, however, Daniel Möckli’s bril-
liant volume on the years 1969–74 has underscored the importance of this 
formative period.25 Angela Romano has also contributed to a better under-
standing of the role of the EPC in the CSCE context.26 
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Thirdly, there was the extremely influential small circle called the Bonn 
Group. Consisting of representatives of the US, Britain, France and the 
FRG, this four-power consultation group had been set up in the mid-1950s 
as an informal forum to discuss issues pertaining to Berlin and Germany 
as a whole. During the high tide of Ostpolitik, however, the work of the 
Bonn Group swiftly intensified, with meetings taking place on various 
levels on a weekly basis, and sometimes every day. When its influence 
peaked in 1969–72, its de facto mandate was considerably broader than 
originally foreseen. On the Bonn Group, Helga Haftendorn remains the 
most authoritative scholar.27 
This book sets out to investigate the complex interplay within these 
Western frameworks from the perspective of the Federal Republic. As will 
be seen, the profoundly multifaceted nature of European détente becomes 
apparent. In the period covered here, all of these formations were devel-
oping, each expanding their efforts from their own niches – NATO from 
the military, the EC from the politico-economic, and the Bonn Group from 
the focus on Germany and Berlin – towards the centre of European dé-
tente. In this centre lay the CSCE. 
The CSCE
The concept of a pan-European conference on security issues was an old 
idea of the Soviet Union, suggested for the first time in 1954, shortly be-
fore the Federal Republic joined NATO. But the process towards the actual 
CSCE truly got under way in the late 1960s, with successive Warsaw Pact 
proposals and particularly the so-called Budapest Appeal in 1969. When 
an initiative of the Finnish Government to host such a conference brought 
a neutral terrain into the equation, NATO and the Warsaw Pact engaged in 
a curious three-year dialogue of communiqués about the conference. The 
direct negotiating contact between East, West and the neutrals was finally 
initiated in the multilateral preparations for the conference in the autumn of 
1972, and went on until the following summer, when the Foreign Ministers 
of the participating countries launched the CSCE proper in Helsinki. After 
two years of intensive negotiations in Geneva in 1973–75, the landmark Hel-
sinki Final Act was signed in the Finnish capital in the summer of 1975.28 
Given the significance of the CSCE in the general development of dé-
tente, the early years of the conference have so far been surprisingly little 
in the limelight. Within the research that exists, the years prior to the Final 
Act have usually merely been treated as a prologue to the ‘real’ history of 
the CSCE, beginning in 1975. Moreover, with the privilege of knowing the 
outcome of the Cold War and the role that the Helsinki Final Act, particu-
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
6   |   A State of Peace in Europe
larly its principles of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and the provisions on cooperation in humanitarian fields in the so-called 
Basket III, played in it, it is certainly a challenge to see the early CSCE 
years in historical context. Most of the post-1989 literature on the CSCE 
fails to avoid this ‘hindsight trap’, emphasising either the role of human 
rights or the general idea of dynamic change excessively, often leading to 
a touch of triumphalism.29
Another set of CSCE literature are the memoirs of former diplomats 
who had participated in the conference.30 These reminiscences provide 
fascinating inside information about the negotiations, especially in the 
Geneva phase of the CSCE. For the period leading up to the conference, 
however, they are of little use. Again, it has only been in the past few years 
that the archival situation has enabled historians to engage in thorough 
research on the early stages preceding the Final Act.31 The authoritative 
general history of the CSCE still remains to be written.  
This book aims to place the early period of the CSCE in its historical 
context, instead of looking at it through the prism of 1989. Conventional 
wisdom has it that most of the contents of the Helsinki Final Act were al-
ready in place after the multilateral preparatory talks in Dipoli, collected 
in the so-called Blue Book in the summer of 1973. Naturally, several cru-
cial details only emerged during the meticulous negotiations in Geneva in 
1973–75. Nonetheless, this book ventures to argue that a majority of the 
pieces had fallen into place already before the Dipoli phase of the confer-
ence. The formative years of the CSCE were in 1969–72, when the West 
attempted to get its own act together for the East–West talks. In that intra-
Western process, the FRG was a decisive actor. 
West German Foreign Policy
The third broad theme within which this book is written is that of the 
foreign policy of the Federal Republic during the Cold War. This was a 
curious construct, characterised by a ‘double containment’ – restricted by 
the burden of past horrors as well as by the East–West confrontation.32 
Accepting the external limits set to its sovereignty, the FRG nevertheless 
sought to expand its freedom of manoeuvre as far as those limits permit-
ted by an increasing multilateralisation of its foreign policy. Throughout 
the Cold War decades, the so-called German question constantly remained 
in the core of the foreign policy decision-making in Bonn. Regardless of 
the coalition in power at a given time, no option chosen could endanger 
the overarching principle of keeping the German question open and with 
it the possibility of reunification. This principle was best formulated in the 
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so-called ‘letter on German unity’ in connection with the Moscow Treaty 
in August 1970. In this letter, the Federal Government declared that the 
Moscow Treaty was in no contradiction with the political aim of the FRG 
to create ‘a state of peace in Europe in which the German people can re-
gain its unity in free self-determination’.33 It is from this sentence that the 
title of this book is drawn, too. 
Nevertheless, the ways in which this principle was implemented varied 
considerably over time. From the late 1960s, the inflexible Hallstein Doctrine, 
in effect refusing to recognise the existence of two German states, began to 
give way to new approaches to Deutschlandpolitik – West German policy to-
wards the GDR, as well as to Ostpolitik – West German policy towards the 
East in general. Small-step changes occurred during the Grand Coalition of 
Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger in 1966–69. But it was Kiesinger’s succes-
sor, Willy Brandt, who led the Federal Republic to the dramatic changes in 
its relations with the East. The credo of this policy had been expressed by 
Brandt’s aide Egon Bahr already in his 1963 landmark speech in Tutzing – 
Wandel durch Annäherung, change through rapprochement.34 
And change there was. In the time frame of a mere three years, the 
Brandt Government completed all the major Ostpolitik achievements. The 
FRG signed and ratified renunciation-of-force agreements with the Soviet 
Union and Poland, signed the so-called traffic accords with the GDR, and 
concluded the negotiations on the Basic Treaty with the GDR. The US, the 
Soviet Union, Britain and France also signed and ratified the Quadripar-
tite Agreement on the status of Berlin. On 19 November 1972, just three 
days before the beginning of the multilateral CSCE preparations, Brandt’s 
coalition won a decisive victory in the federal election, which was widely 
perceived as a plebiscite on Ostpolitik. When Brandt suddenly resigned in 
May 1974 due to the Guillaume spy affair, his successor, Helmut Schmidt, 
could pick up the leadership of West German foreign policy from a com-
pletely transformed starting point. 
There is naturally an abundance of first-rate literature on the foreign 
policy of the FRG in that era which Gottfried Niedhart has characterised 
as the second formative phase of the Federal Republic.35 General accounts 
of the history of Germany or the Western part of it have embedded for-
eign policy in a broader framework, taking also into account the domestic 
and societal developments.36 Volumes focusing on the foreign policy of 
the Federal Republic highlight the degree of continuity between the vari-
ous governments.37 Moreover, there is plenty of research focusing more 
specifically on the late 1960s and early 1970s, with a clear emphasis on the 
Brandt years at the expense of Kiesinger.38 And finally, all the research is 
substantiated by numerous memoirs of key politicians and officials.39 
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From the perspective of this book, however, there is one significant 
shortcoming in the existing literature. There has been a tendency to see 
the bilateral Ostpolitik and the multilateral CSCE process as separate de-
velopments, with the latter only having properly started once the former 
had been completed. The argument in this book is that the bilateral and 
multilateral elements were part of the same complex process and inter-
acted constantly from the very beginning. Ostpolitik and the CSCE were 
thus parallel, not consecutive phenomena. The time frame chosen here, 
concentrating largely on the ‘prehistory’ of the CSCE proper, serves the 
purpose of underscoring this early connection.
The Federal Republic was in many ways at the epicentre of the CSCE. 
On the one hand, the German question was both geographically and sub-
stantively at the heart of any considerations of enhancing European secu-
rity and cooperation. On the other, the exceptional position of the FRG as a 
full member in all of the three relevant frameworks – NATO, the EPC and 
the Bonn Group – gave it an ideal institutional setting to exert influence 
over common Western conference preparations.40 The CSCE provided the 
Federal Republic with unprecedented opportunities to utilise multilateral 
mechanisms to pursue its national interests. 
When those interests were defined in Bonn, the inner-German relation-
ship was always the core factor. From that perspective, finding ways to 
come to terms with the existing division of Europe was often at least as 
important as attempting to overcome it. As a result, West German inter-
ests were seen to lie in gradual and non-controversial steps towards more 
cooperation, accompanied by a considerable number of defensive mea-
sures to protect the provisional, modus vivendi nature of the status quo. 
As this book argues, the pursuit of those interests was to a large extent 
successful. But it was not a recipe for sudden change.
On Structure and Sources
In the past decade, the scholarly discussion about new approaches and 
new interpretations has led some historians to talk festively about a ‘new 
Cold War history’, following the traditionalist, revisionist and post-revi-
sionist phases of the ‘old’ one.41 Perhaps the most striking element of this 
discussion has been the way in which the importance of ‘ideology’ in ex-
plaining the Cold War has been en vogue.42 But in taking ideas, beliefs and 
perceptions seriously one should not forget the importance of old-fash-
ioned Realpolitik. It is often futile to try to find a clear-cut division between 
motives based on interests on the one hand, ideas and beliefs on the other. 
Instead, it is important to understand this interrelationship, to see how 
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interests and ideas influenced each other, leading to constant redefinition 
of both sides of the equation, before merging into policy. Neither interests 
nor ideas were carved in stone. Reactions to changes in the international 
environment reshaped interests as well as ideas and beliefs. Melvyn Lef-
fler’s thoughts on these dynamics have been inspirational for this book, 
although one of his latest books, with its focus on US and Soviet leaders, 
indirectly tends to consolidate a bipolar view of the Cold War.43 
The structure of this book also emphasises the interaction between 
interests and ideas. In the case at hand, bargaining with clear national 
interests in the form of linkages and leverages constantly merged with 
the approach based on the more elusive ideological concept of a Euro-
pean peace order. In fact, for the FRG this concept of a peace order was 
not purely ideological, either. As the potential ‘state of peace in Europe’ 
this peace order was intimately linked to Deutschlandpolitik interests. The 
general structure of the book is chronological, dividing the subject mat-
ter into five chapters in sequential order. Whereas chapter 2 also follows 
chronology internally, the following three chapters are clearly divided in 
two. Each of the chapters 3, 4 and 5 focuses first on the FRG’s ‘linkage’ 
policy approach to CSCE preparations, then on its agenda interests. As 
becomes apparent, the respective weightings changed over time, with the 
long-term strategy concentrating on the conference agenda surpassing 
the short-term tactics of instrumentalisation and linkage. Finally, chapter 
6 portrays the way in which the FRG tackled those issues at the CSCE 
proper which it considered to be in its immediate national interests. 
The chronological watersheds between the chapters arise genuinely 
from the developments in the foreign policy of the FRG and in the prepa-
rations for the CSCE. Chapter 2 covers the years 1966–69, the reign of the 
Grand Coalition in Bonn. At the same time as the Kiesinger Government 
slowly prepared ground for a sea change in Ostpolitik, the Western percep-
tion of the prospective CSCE changed from outright rejection to a more 
forthcoming scepticism.44 Chapter 3, addressing the years 1969–70, falls 
into the first year of the Brandt Government, ending with the signature of 
the landmark Moscow Treaty. On the CSCE front, following the Budapest 
Appeal and the Finnish initiative in 1969, the Western conference prepara-
tions started earnestly, albeit slowly, within NATO. 
Chapter 4 deals with the years 1970–71, and witnesses the shift from 
strictly bilateral Ostpolitik to the emphasis on the Quadripartite negotia-
tions on Berlin, which were completed in September 1971. Meanwhile, 
from the autumn of 1970 there was new movement in the Western CSCE 
deliberations, as the nascent EPC began to challenge NATO as the central 
Western framework. Chapter 5 leads us through the years 1971–72, with 
Bonn focusing on its negotiations with East Berlin on the Ostpolitik front. In 
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parallel, there was a completely fresh burst of West German activity on the 
CSCE track. West German interests were increasingly pursued by multilat-
eral means, defensively as well as offensively. Ultimately, chapter 6 moves 
from the landslide election victory of the Brandt–Scheel Government and 
the opening of the conference in Helsinki to track the unfolding of the West 
German CSCE policy under the new Schmidt–Genscher leadership. 
In addition to a reconsideration of ideological factors, another key fea-
ture of the ‘new’ Cold War history has been the growing emphasis on the 
need for multiarchival research. Much of the discussion about the novelty 
of that approach can safely be disregarded as unnecessary hype. Never-
theless, the discussion, originating from the end of the Cold War and the 
partial opening of archives in the former Eastern bloc, has had the im-
portant result of making scholars more generally alert than before to the 
opportunities of a multiarchival approach within the West as well. Even if 
the archives of the former Soviet Union for the time being remain by and 
large inaccessible for research on the 1960s and later periods, combining, 
say, French, German, American and British sources with each other en-
ables a more thorough picture of the Cold War years to be seen.
Also in this respect, this book joins in the ‘new’ debate. Concentrating 
on a multilateral conference project, a multiarchival approach has come 
in naturally. The perspective here is not only multiarchival but truly in-
ternational, making use of archives in eight countries.45 Since the focus 
is on the CSCE policies of the FRG, the most essential archives for my 
research are located in Germany. Of central importance is the archive of 
the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) in Berlin. The papers of the German Foreign 
Ministry are in principle accessible according to the thirty-year rule, but in 
effect this applies directly only to unclassified and low-rated confidential 
material. This deficiency is partly overcome by the excellent publication 
series Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD), 
which gives access to numerous secret and highly confidential documents, 
carefully edited and referenced.46 Moreover, the archive of the AA holds 
a far broader set of documents originally declassified for the editors of 
the AAPD series, afterwards microfilmed, organised chronologically and 
made accessible to all researchers in the collection B150. 
Put together, these documents provide a reasonably wide body of evi-
dence. Nonetheless, as far as the AAPD and B150 series are concerned, 
the arbitrary nature of the selection remains – someone else has made the 
choices. Requests for additional declassification have proved to be frustrat-
ing experiences. In Germany, further useful archives are the Bundesarchiv in 
Koblenz which, along with the papers of the Chancellery, also holds some 
interesting personal collections. At least as significant are the archives of the 
political parties, especially those of the SPD in the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in 
Bonn and the CDU in the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Sankt Augustin.
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In addition to Germany, national archives in two other countries of the 
Western alliance have provided important additional information. The US 
and UK sources have helped me enormously in putting the West German 
position into perspective. Regarding the published documents from these 
countries, the record is mixed. In the case of the US, the outstanding series 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) covers the Nixon and Ford 
years widely. The FRUS volumes dealing with European security on the 
one hand, and Germany and Berlin on the other, have been particularly 
valuable.47 The British equivalent to FRUS, Documents on British Policy 
Overseas (DBPO), pales in comparison, but offers nonetheless some useful 
additions to the documents accessible in the archives.48
As far as the Western organisations are concerned, the results from the 
EC archives in Florence were largely disappointing – since there was no 
permanent EPC secretariat, documents on the EPC process are far more 
prolific in the individual national archives. The opposite is the case with 
NATO documents. Without exception, official non-public NATO docu-
ments are removed from the files in the national archives before they are 
made available to researchers. Technically, a unanimous consensus of 
all NATO members is required before a declassification decision can be 
made. Thus, although the NATO archives in theory follow the thirty-year 
rule, in practice it has come to resemble forty years. Nonetheless, after 
persistent efforts over several years, in the winter of 2006 I was finally 
given access to a set of CSCE-related documents from the years 1969–72 in 
the NATO archives in Brussels. Those documents have been precious in 
substantiating my argument in this book.
Two obvious omissions in the archival evidence of this book stand out 
– the Soviet Union and France. Regarding the Soviet Union, as already 
indicated above, the situation is unequivocal. Foreign policy documents 
from the 1960s and 1970s are simply not available. Given the focus on the 
Western coordination in this book, this is less of a loss. To a certain extent, 
the problem can be circumvented by the use of East German and Finnish 
archives, which provide useful, albeit partial glances at Soviet thinking. 
Beyond that, on a more general level, the Finnish archives offer a helpful 
view on the CSCE from the perspective of the conference host. 
As far as France is concerned, taking into account the third Western 
country among the Four Powers responsible for Berlin and Germany as 
a whole, alongside the US and the UK, would undoubtedly be advan-
tageous. Originally, it was the notoriously difficult access to the French 
archives that led to the decision to exclude them. Later on, as the situa-
tion improved, I have corrected this omission at least superficially. Due 
to time constraints, however, the research in the French archives has not 
been even close to as comprehensive as elsewhere. 
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Finally, I have also benefited from a broad variety of interviews with 
Zeitzeugen –former diplomats and politicians who in their time were di-
rectly or indirectly involved with the CSCE. Although not all of the inter-
viewees have been included with explicit references in the footnotes, they 
have all provided me with invaluable insights and background informa-
tion. Simultaneously, their contributions have helped make the topic more 
lively to the author. Hopefully some of that liveliness is conveyed to the 
reader on the pages that follow.
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We hold the view that a mitigation and clarification of the relationship between 
the two parts of Germany is essential before the start of East–West conferences.
– Egon Bahr, September 19691
Governments and representatives of the economy and the sciences in East and 
West should already now be seeking ways of cooperation, so that useful discus-
sions can be had on as many areas as possible. Genuine progress in practical 
cooperation will also benefit European security.
– Willy Brandt, June 19692
By early 1967 at the latest, all the major parties in Bonn had come to under-
stand that the foreign policy pursued until then was only pushing the FRG 
into self-inflicted isolation – not only in the East, but also in the West. In-
stead of stubbornly holding on to the so-called Hallstein Doctrine, a new, 
more flexible approach towards the East, and especially towards the other 
German state, was badly needed.3 The partners of the Grand Coalition, 
the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD), as 
well as the liberal Free Democrats (FDP), now in opposition, were each 
eagerly discussing the prospects of a ‘European peace order’ (europäische 
Friedensordnung) as a possible solution to the impasse.4 To be sure, all of 
the parties had different ideas about such a future order. It remained a 
very elusive construction, since none of the parties was able to define the 
contents of this peace order in precise terms. Nevertheless, the thinking 
on foreign policy options was clearly in a state of flux. While this resulted 
in open controversies, and, towards the end of the decade, in an increas-
ing paralysis in the decision-making of the Grand Coalition, it was also of 
fundamental importance in ushering in new strategies and approaches. 
Anything but a mere passive lull between two eras, therefore, the years of 
the Grand Coalition had a considerable impact on the reformulation of the 
foreign policy of the Federal Republic.
This also applies to West German policies with regard to a possible 
European security conference. On the surface, the Grand Coalition was 
remarkably reluctant to make any moves in the nascent conference pro-
cess. However, as argued below, behind the scenes in Bonn things were 
certainly not dormant on the CSCE front. The focus in this chapter will be 
predominantly on the final six months of the Grand Coalition. A serious 
debate in Bonn on the prospects of a European security conference did 
not emerge until the spring of 1969, when the Warsaw Pact’s so-called 
Budapest Appeal in March and the subsequent Finnish initiative in May 
suddenly gave new impetus to the project. Simultaneously, the coalition 
partners in Bonn were finding it increasingly difficult to agree on a com-
mon position on foreign policy in general, and on the security conference 
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in particular. But in spite of this deadlock, vitally important groundwork 
for the future West German CSCE policy was done precisely during these 
six months, from March to September 1969. Initial ideas for both main 
tracks covered in the following chapters of this book – the instrumental as 
well as the substantive approaches to the CSCE – were already developed 
before the formation of the SPD-FDP Government in the autumn of 1969. 
The Early Years and the Eastern ‘Propaganda Circus’ 
Although the concept is, in retrospect, usually connected only with the 
Eastern Treaties accomplished by the subsequent Brandt–Scheel Govern-
ment, it was already the Grand Coalition’s Eastern policy that was labelled 
the ‘new Ostpolitik’ at the time. And in fact, the change of government in 
the middle of the electoral term in late 1966 brought about a clear change 
in tone to the foreign policy of the Federal Republic. In his government 
declaration on 13 December 1966, Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger laid 
out his commitment to pursue a European peace order.5 
While it was building on the peace note of the preceding Erhard Gov-
ernment and echoing even older ideas of Germany as a bridge between 
East and West, the suggested way forward was new. The European peace 
order was to be pursued by negotiating bilateral renunciation-of-force 
agreements with individual members of the Warsaw Pact. The Hallstein 
Doctrine was effectively given up during the first year of the Grand Co-
alition, beginning with the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Romania in January 1967 and finalised with the similar move towards Yu-
goslavia in December.6 Yet there were clear limits to how far the Grand 
Coalition was prepared to go. Although Kiesinger agreed to commence a 
correspondence with the East German premier Willi Stoph in the summer 
of 1967, at this stage a diplomatic recognition of the GDR, or any lesser 
action indicating such recognition, was completely out of the question for 
Kiesinger’s CDU and Brandt’s SPD alike. 
This, in turn, ensured that the Grand Coalition at first remained as 
sceptical as its predecessors to the idea of a European security conference. 
The latest Eastern call for a conference, issued at the Bucharest meeting 
of the Warsaw Pact in July 1966, had, in spite of some more forthcoming 
elements, included all the usual demands directed mainly at the Federal 
Republic, ranging from full diplomatic recognition of the GDR to a con-
solidation of the post-war borders in Europe.7 These preconditions alone 
were enough to make the security conference unacceptable in Bonn. 
And in the beginning of the Grand Coalition’s term in office, the Soviet 
Union did not make the acceptance of its own proposal any easier for the 
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West Germans. The Kiesinger–Brandt Government had its first direct en-
counter with Eastern suggestions for a security conference in April 1967. 
A conference of national leaders of twenty-four communist parties in the 
Czechoslovakian town of Karlovy Vary resulted in a very harsh and provoc-
ative ‘declaration for peace and security in Europe’.8 Resembling, as Helga 
Haftendorn has put it, a ‘treatise on moral rearmament’,9 this statement, 
while also repeating the call for the convocation of a European security con-
ference, was clearly a step or two in a less compromising direction than 
that of the Bucharest statement a year before. Not surprisingly, this Karlovy 
Vary statement, in essence a frontal attack against West German ‘imperial-
ism’ and ‘revanchism’, led to no official response from the Federal Republic. 
Among themselves, the Western Allies had been discussing the pros-
pects of a possible security conference ever since the Bucharest statement 
in 1966. At a meeting of the planning staffs of the US, British and West 
German Foreign Ministries in July 1967, the Allies more or less agreed 
that entering East–West negotiations in a security conference according to 
the Soviet proposals was not likely to result in anything more than a mere 
‘propaganda circus’. Although the idea of a security conference in general 
still deserved to be given further thought, it was considered necessary for 
all members of the Alliance to make it clear that they were not prepared to 
enter a conference under Soviet terms.10 
For the moment, the coalition partners in Bonn agreed in their eval-
uation of the Eastern conference initiatives. In December 1967, Foreign 
Minister Brandt was applauded by the Christian Democratic MPs at the 
Bundestag when he declared that the time was not yet ripe for a security 
conference.11 Instead, Western – and West German – détente efforts at that 
time were focused on two other major projects. First of all, since late 1966 
the NATO countries had been active in outlining the ‘future tasks of the 
Alliance’, as the second decade of its existence was drawing to a close. 
In December 1967 the result of this exercise, the Harmel report, named 
after the Belgian Foreign Minister, was approved at ministerial level.12 
The report emphasised the dual nature of defence and détente and, at the 
same time, also gave the military alliance a more outspoken political role 
than before. Secondly, partly as a response to the repeated Eastern pro-
posals for a security conference, NATO Foreign Ministers gave a common 
declaration in the Icelandic capital in June 1968, calling for mutual and 
balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe.13 This ‘signal of Reykjavik’ 
marked the beginning of the MBFR process which was to run in parallel 
with the CSCE for years to come. 
Significantly, the West Germans – Brandt himself and numerous offi-
cials of the Auswärtiges Amt – were actively involved in the drafting of the 
Harmel report as well as in the preparations of the Reykjavik MBFR initia-
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tive.14 But in all, these moves were not enough to block the growing inter-
est of certain NATO allies in the idea of a CSCE. In mid-March 1968, on 
The Netherlands’ initiative, the European security conference issue was 
again discussed in the political committee of NATO. The new instructions 
sent from Bonn to the West German NATO mission soon after that were 
unambiguous: for as long as the Soviets showed no sign of retreating from 
the maximal demands directed at the FRG, the Federal Government con-
sidered a European security conference to be an ‘unsuitable instrument’.15 
Nevertheless, during the spring of 1968, some, especially Belgium, Den-
mark and Norway, continued to argue in favour of moving forward with 
the conference idea.16
On the domestic level in Bonn, the FDP, the only opposition party in 
the Bundestag, was the first to develop a certain enthusiasm for a possible 
European security conference. The Free Democrats had started to revise 
their views on foreign policy immediately after the establishment of the 
Grand Coalition. The more progressive views in the party on foreign pol-
icy, especially on Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik, were articulated in a 
study drafted by Wolfgang Schollwer in January 1967. Schollwer, work-
ing for the press service of the FDP and a controversial figure within the 
party, had presented similar views in an earlier memorandum already in 
1962. In the internal struggle for the leadership of the party, two support-
ers of a new course in foreign policy, Walter Scheel and Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, finally gained the upper hand in the party conference in Janu-
ary 1968.17 Genscher, for his part, had spoken in favour of a European 
security conference, with the inclusion of the United States, as early as in 
1966.18 In a Bundestag debate in April 1968, Genscher once again argued 
that the Federal Government should actually be the main proponent of an 
all-European security conference, since it stood to gain the most from it: 
such a conference was, Genscher stated, ‘in the long run probably the only 
international organ in which it would be possible, with at least some hope 
of success, also to discuss the German problems’.19 
In his response to Genscher a few days later, Herbert Wehner (SPD), 
Minister for All-German Affairs and the true dynamo behind the Grand 
Coalition, warned of the danger of slipping into a ‘conference slope’, which 
had originally been set up only to make the FRG the scapegoat for all East–
West problems. However, Wehner implied that the Federal Government 
was considering possibilities to turn the tables and to make the conference 
useful for its own purposes.20 In June 1968, in another foreign policy debate 
in the Bundestag, Brandt declared that his recent discussions with foreign 
leaders, in the East and in the West, had confirmed his view that the time 
for a European security conference had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, both 
Brandt and Wehner now suggested that further discussion of the idea was 
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needed and that more emphasis should be given to developing a German 
contribution to a ‘security component of a European peace order’.21 
One highly controversial attempt at this kind of contribution was de-
livered only a week later, when Brandt’s trusted adviser, Egon Bahr, at 
this time head of the Auswärtiges Amt planning staff, finished his draft on 
possible conceptions of European security. This memorandum was later 
leaked to the West German press, and published in September 1973 under 
the provocative title ‘How Egon Bahr wants to neutralise Germany’.22 Bahr 
has consistently distanced himself from that label, but Alexander Gallus 
is correct in identifying certain neutralist tendencies in Bahr’s thinking 
at that time.23 Yet Anthony Nicholls makes a valid point in reminding us 
that the Ostpolitik of the FRG was never truly neutralist.24 Although Bahr 
clearly was toying with the idea of a neutral German role between East 
and West, one should not draw too far-reaching conclusions on the basis 
of this single planning-staff paper. As Timothy Garton Ash has argued 
in this very context, planners are indeed there to think the unthinkable.25 
Nevertheless, Bahr’s thoughts were certainly explosive at the time. In 
the paper, Bahr listed three different détente scenarios. In conception A, 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact were to remain antagonistic organisations 
but individual states in the East and the West were to seek a maximum of 
détente and disarmament. In conception B, NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
were to remain separate organisations but to lose their antagonistic nature 
because of their ‘enmeshment’ in common institutions, possibly leading to 
a ‘European security commission’ after a preceding European security con-
ference. In conception C, the alliances were to be dissolved and replaced 
by a completely new common European security system, guaranteed by 
the United States and the Soviet Union, but without their participation. In 
Bahr’s view, the third option was clearly the most promising one for the 
FRG, possibly creating suitable circumstances for reunification and at least 
leaving the solution of the German question open. Replacing NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact with a pan-European security system, the organs of which 
would be seated in Berlin, Bahr argued, would help to overcome the status 
quo and would be a move closer towards a European peace order.26 
However, to Bahr none of this seemed compatible at this stage with the 
idea of a CSCE. By contrast, for all the radical thoughts in the memoran-
dum, Bahr’s views on the European security conference remained fairly 
conventional. Bahr did suggest that the Western MBFR initiative, aired 
only a few days earlier in Reykjavik, might be useful in filling the Eastern 
conference idea with needed substance. But, he went on, it would be il-
lusory to think that the conference agenda could be limited to this topic. 
Instead, the Soviet Union would use the conference to push ahead its max-
imal demands, especially the recognition of the GDR. Therefore, Bahr ar-
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gued, for the time being any multilateral negotiations involving the GDR 
in general, and a European security conference in particular, especially as 
foreseen in his scenario B, were to be avoided. Since East German partici-
pation in a security conference was inevitable, Bahr reasoned, the GDR 
would as a result gain an immense enhancement in its international posi-
tion, without the West receiving anything in return.27 Thus, at this mo-
ment, Bahr joined the majority of decision-makers in Bonn in perceiving 
the security conference as harmful to West German interests.
The theoretical considerations of the future shape of East–West coop-
eration in Europe were rapidly overtaken by events in the night of 20–21 
August 1968. The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia dealt 
a crushing blow, not only to the reformists led by Alexander Dubcek in 
Prague, but to proponents of détente all over the world. The impact of the 
Prague invasion was also deeply felt in Bonn. In fact, it marked an impor-
tant watershed in the Grand Coalition’s time in office, since the conclusions 
drawn by the coalition partners were almost diametrically opposite to each 
other. Whereas Brandt, Bahr and their entourage stressed the importance 
of continuing détente efforts, Kiesinger was under increasing pressure 
from the ranks of his own party to take a harder line in foreign policy to-
wards the East. Thus, from August 1968 onwards, the mistrust and dis-
tance between Kiesinger and Brandt, to a certain extent inherent to begin 
with, started to grow dramatically.28 As Dirk Kroegel has pointed out, from 
then on Kiesinger was no longer prepared to publicly defend the views of 
his Foreign Minister, let alone be in any way influenced by them.29 
All the same, as far as the CSCE was concerned, the severely damaged 
working relationship between Kiesinger and Brandt was not seriously 
tested for a while. The events in Prague ensured that the idea of a Eu-
ropean security conference was temporarily off the table. Although the 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko repeated the suggestion for such 
a conference in his speech at the UN General Assembly in October 1968, 
the response in the West was lukewarm at best. And so it remained for 
the following months. It was not until March 1969 that a more serious dis-
cussion about the European security conference resurfaced. The decisive 
push came, once again, from the East.
The Budapest Appeal: ‘We Could Have  
Drafted it Ourselves’ 
As a result of the one-day summit meeting of its Political Consultative 
Committee in Budapest on 17 March 1969, the Warsaw Pact issued, in ad-
dition to the usual communiqué, an ‘appeal to all European states’. This 
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Budapest Appeal, as it became known, explicitly referred to the decla-
ration made in Bucharest in July 1966, calling again for a pan-European 
conference to address questions of European security and peaceful coop-
eration.30 But the tone of the appeal was new – implying that the Soviet 
attitude had changed significantly in a more conciliatory direction. Above 
all, this change was sparked by the Sino-Soviet border clashes on the Us-
suri River in early March 1969. Confronted with a potential conflict in the 
East, the Soviet Union needed stability in the West. Against this backdrop, 
the Budapest Appeal was in all likelihood an effort to offset the negative 
impact of the Prague invasion. 
Accordingly, the change in the Western response, compared with the 
very shallow attention given to the Karlovy Vary statement in the sum-
mer of 1967, was also quite remarkable. This time, in spite of the heavy 
burden of the recent Prague invasion, the Warsaw Pact document was 
carefully examined in Bonn, as in other European capitals. In the Federal 
Republic, the harsh attacks on West German militarism and ‘revanchism’ 
included in previous Warsaw Pact initiatives were naturally well remem-
bered. Therefore, the clearly less aggressive tone of the Budapest Appeal 
was greeted with a mixture of old suspicions of Soviet motives and careful 
optimism. It can fairly be said that the former mood was more prevalent 
within the CDU/CSU and in the Chancellery, the latter within the SPD, 
the opposition party FDP, and in the Auswärtiges Amt.31 After the Buda-
pest Appeal, for the remaining six months before the federal election, the 
discussion about the security conference was one – although certainly not 
the only – symptom of two simultaneous developments: the increasingly 
differing foreign policy views between the coalition partners on the one 
hand, the rapprochement of the ideas of the SPD and the FDP on the other. 
In the Foreign Ministry, the first planning staff analysis of the Budapest 
Appeal immediately after the Warsaw Pact meeting characterised the ap-
peal as a surprising change of course in Soviet foreign policy. The tone 
and contents of the appeal were substantially more conciliatory than those 
in the Bucharest proposal three years earlier. Although the Soviet insis-
tence on recognition of the European status quo was still visible in it, the 
appeal was seen as the ‘most positive general declaration heard from the 
East for a long time’. The memorandum even suggested that large sections 
of the appeal could in fact have been drafted in the Auswärtiges Amt.32
Foreign Minister Brandt followed suit in the foreign policy debate at the 
Bundestag on 19 March 1969. Whereas Rainer Barzel (CDU) left no doubt 
about his reservations regarding the latest Warsaw Pact proposal, Brandt 
argued that the appeal did constitute a surprising change of course, at 
least one of a tactical nature. Brandt noted the minimum of polemics con-
tained in the appeal, in comparison with the aggressive Karlovy Vary dec-
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laration. Nevertheless, in his Bundestag address, Brandt suggested that the 
initiative might also be a sign of a more active strategy of the Warsaw Pact 
– instead of waiting for an internal erosion of NATO, the Warsaw Pact 
might again be trying to weaken the coherence of the Alliance by address-
ing the European states separately.33 
In a statement given to the Hungarian news agency on the same day, 
Brandt’s tone was clearly more optimistic. While calling for concrete deeds 
instead of mere declarations, for example in the form of force reductions, 
and demanding that the conference had to be carefully prepared, Brandt 
supported the idea in principle: ‘We embrace this idea. The realisation of 
such a conference could bring closer the solution of the existing problems 
in Central Europe, and that would meet the interests of the German people 
and the countries in question.’34 Within the Auswärtiges Amt, this Hungar-
ian interview with the Foreign Minister became the first point of reference 
for an official West German position on the security conference.35
Ulrich Sahm, a key official in Brandt’s Foreign Ministry, struck a 
slightly more careful note in a memorandum which was also forwarded 
to Chancellor Kiesinger. In Sahm’s view, although the unusually realis-
tic tone of the appeal was remarkable and numerous points in it were 
‘compatible with the Ostpolitik of the Grand Coalition’, that change was 
unlikely to be anything other than a tactical move. Because of this, Sahm 
argued, at that moment a European conference as well as a suggested 
preparatory conference would be against West German interests. For the 
time being, a conference could only end in failure, for which the Federal 
Republic would be blamed. Nevertheless, Sahm continued, if the confer-
ence was convened ‘without preconditions, with the inclusion of the US, 
and if thorough preparation gave well-founded reason to expect success 
from it’, it was in the West German interest to declare Bonn’s readiness to 
it, in principle. Importantly, Sahm also noted that the surprisingly concil-
iatory tone of the appeal would almost certainly have an impact on the 
‘politically influential public of the West European states’, and therefore 
increase pressure on the respective governments to work in favour of a 
security conference.36
Sahm’s memorandum brilliantly highlights the dichotomy visible in all 
of the early reactions to the Budapest Appeal in the Auswärtiges Amt. On 
the one hand, the appeal was welcomed for being ‘unusually realistic’ and 
‘polemically abstinent’.37 Its demands for reduction of tension, renuncia-
tion of the use and the threat of force, and enhanced cooperation were rec-
ognised to be ‘strikingly moderate’ and ‘in accordance with the principles 
of our Ostpolitik’.38 But, on the other hand, the Soviet motives behind the 
appeal and their implications for the German question were deeply mis-
trusted. Conciliatory rhetoric alone was not enough to assure West Ger-
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man officials that a European security conference would be anything else 
than yet another instrument for the Soviet Union to pursue its old objec-
tives: cementing the status quo in Europe and the German division, reduc-
ing the American presence in Europe, and weakening the coherence of 
NATO.39 In the week following the Budapest Appeal, Brandt specifically 
instructed the top officials in the Auswärtiges Amt to deal with the initiative 
‘delicately’ and to ‘refrain from negative statements’.40 Thus, in spite of a 
fair amount of scepticism still making the rounds in the Auswärtiges Amt, 
by late March 1969 the Foreign Minister was clearly no longer willing to 
dismiss the CSCE offer. 
In Kiesinger’s Chancellery, by contrast, outright mistrust of the War-
saw Pact initiative continued to be the predominant mood. Immediately 
after Brandt’s Bundestag statement in March, Walter Boss from the foreign 
policy department of the Chancellery wrote a memorandum to Kiesinger, 
comparing the declarations issued by the Warsaw Pact in Bucharest and 
Budapest. In Boss’s view, the Bucharest declaration of 1966, to begin with, 
had not been as forthcoming as some in the West had interpreted it to be. 
Furthermore, Boss argued, as far as the German question was concerned, 
the Warsaw Pact took an even harder position in the Budapest Appeal 
than had been the case in Bucharest. Therefore he thought it was simply 
wrong to see the Budapest declaration as a ‘change of course’ in the So-
viet Union’s Western policy. In Boss’s view the latest appeal had also en-
countered ‘remarkable reservations’ in most Western capitals, especially 
in Paris, London and Washington.41
This view of strong Allied reservations was indeed supported in vari-
ous discussions of the Bonn Group in late March 1969. Jonathan Dean 
from the US embassy in Bonn expressed his worries of a ‘free two-year 
period of propaganda’ that a security conference would grant to the So-
viets. If a conference was ever to be convened, Dean argued, the least the 
West should do would be to secure notable concessions in return, for ex-
ample by linking the conference to progress on the Berlin situation.42 At 
the monthly quadripartite lunch, the Budapest Appeal was touched upon 
only briefly – but enough to make the State Secretary of the Auswärtiges 
Amt, Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, stand out with clearly a more positive 
attitude towards the conference idea than the three ambassadors.43 
In line with the scepticism of his advisors and the major allies of the 
FRG, Chancellor Kiesinger appeared to be utterly suspicious of the latest 
Warsaw Pact move. Actually, instead of openly criticising the conference 
proposal, he maintained an almost complete silence on the topic in the 
weeks following the Budapest Appeal. While Brandt referred to it in nu-
merous public statements, Kiesinger hardly mentioned the document at 
all. One of the rare exceptions was his visit to Vienna in late March. There, 
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the Chancellor stressed to his Austrian colleague Josef Klaus that, unlike 
Brandt, he did not consider that the appeal marked a change in Soviet pol-
icy. However, Kiesinger also told Klaus that he, too, was in favour of put-
ting the ‘hard core’ of the appeal, the part regarding Germany, to the test.44 
Kiesinger was certainly correct in identifying the actual core of the 
Budapest Appeal. Just like the preceding calls for a security conference, 
the Budapest Appeal included a long list of ‘main prerequisites (Haupt-
voraussetzungen) for safeguarding European security’, aimed directly at 
the Federal Republic. These included the inviolability of borders, recogni-
tion of the Oder-Neisse border, diplomatic recognition of both German 
states, renunciation of the FRG’s claim for sole representation of the Ger-
man people, German abstention from nuclear weapons, and recognition 
of the special status of West Berlin.45 For Kiesinger and for the CDU/CSU 
in general this list of demands was reason enough to reject the conference 
proposal altogether. By contrast, Brandt and his key advisors were, from 
the outset, interested in finding out the nature of these claims: were they 
to be understood as preconditions (Vorbedingungen) for convening a con-
ference or as a list of objects to be negotiated at a conference?46
To address this and other open questions regarding the Budapest Ap-
peal, Brandt arranged to have a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador in 
Bonn, Semjon Tsarapkin, on 1 April. Brandt stressed that clarification of 
the contents of the appeal was important for forming a West German posi-
tion on the issue before the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Washing-
ton. Rather circumspectly, Tsarapkin stated that although the conditions 
listed in the Budapest Appeal were prerequisites (Voraussetzungen) for 
safeguarding European security, that did not mean that the signatories of 
the appeal saw them as preconditions (Vorbedingungen) for convening the 
conference. As Brandt insisted on the importance of US and Canadian par-
ticipation, Tsarapkin evaded with the standard Soviet reply: European se-
curity was first and foremost a European question, and there were hardly 
any forces outside Europe that would have as strong an interest in it as the 
European countries. Brandt was also unable to receive an answer to his 
question on whether the Budapest Appeal’s references to arms limitation 
meant that the Warsaw Pact was willing to consider the MBFR initiative 
made by NATO in Reykjavik.47 
A sequel to this meeting followed only three days later, at Tsarapkin’s 
request. In between the Soviet Ambassador had obviously received new 
instructions from Moscow, and was prepared to meet Brandt closer to half-
way. Tsarapkin was determined to reassure Brandt that convening the se-
curity conference would not be connected with any kind of preconditions. 
He also told the Foreign Minister that the Soviet Government was fully 
prepared to engage in discussions and consultations on the entire complex 
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of issues related to the conference. Furthermore, the Soviet view on US 
participation had suddenly softened. Because European security was the 
issue, it was up to the European states to decide whether they welcomed 
US participation or not. Brandt welcomed this Soviet readiness for discus-
sion, but argued that careful preparation was needed. It was better not to 
have a conference at all than to have a failed one. Overall, however, Brandt 
seemed to be very content with the results of the meeting – the Warsaw 
Pact was not setting any preconditions for the conference and seemed to be 
interested in genuine improvements in East–West relations.48
The change of tone between these two meetings is actually quite re-
markable. Although Tsarapkin attempted, in the latter meeting, to suggest 
that other Western states were accusing the FRG of blocking the security 
conference with its rigid views, his behaviour rather indicated the oppo-
site. The Soviet Ambassador was at pains to convince the West German 
Foreign Minister of the viability of the European security conference, 
probably hoping that Brandt would be key to winning over the support 
of other NATO countries. If the security conference issue had been raised 
for propaganda purposes alone, the Soviets would hardly have signalled 
their willingness to negotiate with the West about its terms.
In any case, the two discussions between Tsarapkin and Brandt were 
crucial in forming the West German position on a security conference be-
fore the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Washington. Whereas the 
Chancellery had been very doubtful all along, the Auswärtiges Amt had 
from the outset drawn the conclusion that the West should signal its pre-
paredness for a European security conference, provided that four condi-
tions were met – there were no preconditions set for it, the United States 
and Canada would participate in it, the conference was carefully prepared 
and there was reason to expect some tangible results from it.49 Now, the 
irony of a West German ‘precondition for no preconditions’ notwith-
standing, Brandt’s meetings with Tsarapkin and reports from West Ger-
man embassies abroad indicated that the Soviet Union was prepared to 
meet the first two demands. The catch was obviously in the latter two, the 
ambiguous demand for careful preparations and tangible results, which 
in effect left open the possibility to hold back negotiations for as long as 
was considered necessary. In any case, Brandt and his trusted officials in 
the Auswärtiges Amt had reason to be optimistic about the prospects of a 
security conference. What they had to take into consideration, however, 
were the suspicions of their allies. As Sahm put it in a memorandum even 
before the Brandt–Tsarapkin meetings, it was important to avoid giving 
the impression that the Germans were suddenly trying, bilaterally with 
the Soviets, to rush ahead of their allies on the conference front.50  
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Consultations Abroad, Electioneering at Home
In the North Atlantic framework, the Budapest Appeal had, at German 
and Dutch requests, been on the agenda of the NATO Council in Brussels 
already on 24 March. Then, the French Ambassador had been the only one 
equipped with more detailed – and rather sceptical – instructions from his 
government. The majority of the representatives had agreed that the secu-
rity conference initiative should be discussed by the Foreign Ministers at 
their upcoming meeting in Washington.51
Prior to this twentieth anniversary gathering of NATO Foreign Min-
isters on 10–11 April, embassy reports from West German missions sig-
nalled that most NATO members had serious doubts about the security 
conference idea.52 Despite this disadvantageous starting point, Brandt did 
his best to make sure that the Budapest Appeal was high on the agenda 
in Washington. In bilateral and quadripartite discussions prior to the 
actual ministerial meeting, Brandt tried to convince his US, British and 
French colleagues William Rogers, Michael Stewart and Michel Debré to 
take the appeal seriously. While assuring his fellow ministers that he did 
not consider the security conference to be topical immediately, Brandt ar-
gued that bluntly rejecting the proposal would only strengthen ‘wrong 
elements’ in the Warsaw Pact. Although the three Allied Foreign Ministers 
were clearly more sceptical, at least the West German record shows them 
agreeing with Brandt that it would be unwise to respond to the Budapest 
Appeal negatively.53 
In his official statement in the Washington ministerial meeting, Brandt 
made the case strongly for ‘taking the Warsaw Pact countries at their 
word’. Instead of rejecting the proposal, Brandt argued, NATO members 
ought to respond to it by signalling their willingness to pursue a European 
security conference, while also reminding the Warsaw Pact of the MBFR 
initiative. This, Brandt pointed out, would be the best way to find out 
what motives lay behind the Warsaw Pact suggestion.54 Other delegations 
agreed with the West German view that a European security conference 
would only make sense if the United States and Canada took part in it, if it 
was carefully prepared, if tangible results could be expected from it, and 
if no preconditions were set for the conference and its results.55 Thus, the 
four West German ‘essentials’ regarding a possible CSCE, formulated in 
the Auswärtiges Amt soon after the Budapest Appeal, were adopted as a 
common NATO position.
In his final dispatch from the Washington meeting, Hans Ruete, Politi-
cal Director56 of the Auswärtiges Amt, concluded that Brandt’s statement 
was greeted with interest and general acceptance. Most of Brandt’s col-
leagues agreed that the moderate tone of the appeal was notable, and that 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
30   |   A State of Peace in Europe
the NATO Council should examine it in more detail.57 However, in the 
end the Budapest Appeal was not explicitly mentioned in the final com-
muniqué of the ministerial meeting.58 The main reason given for leaving 
the appeal out of the communiqué was the sharp declaration the Soviet 
Government had published on the twentieth anniversary of NATO. The 
Alliance could either discuss both documents or neither of them, Brandt 
later argued.59 
On the whole, it seems, Brandt was fairly successful in making his point 
understood among his colleagues. To be sure, most Foreign Ministers – 
with the exception of Italy’s Pietro Nenni – were somewhat more reserved 
in their attitudes towards the security conference than Brandt.60 But, as 
both Ruete and Brandt stressed after their return to Bonn, the ministers 
had unanimously agreed that the Budapest Appeal should not be rejected 
completely. In spite of the scepticism of many members, the Alliance had 
laid out its own ‘balanced and constructive’ position to the security con-
ference.61 And in fact, it was already in the Washington meeting that the 
Foreign Ministers agreed to begin discussions within the NATO struc-
tures about how to proceed in East–West negotiations. The Council was 
instructed to prepare a list of possible issues for fruitful negotiation and 
early resolution, and to report on the progress of that exploration at the 
following meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in six months.62 As Hart-
mut Mayer has pointed out, therefore, the Alliance basically accepted the 
idea of a CSCE already in April 1969.63
It was at home in Bonn that Brandt’s position caused greater con-
troversy. Throughout the ministerial meeting, the large national West 
German newspapers had reported disagreements between Brandt and 
his colleagues in Washington about a suitable line on the security con-
ference.64 This, as was to be expected, was not at all well received in the 
Chancellery. On 10 April, in a letter to Kiesinger, State Secretary Karl 
Carstens referred to the news reports as well as the protocols of the For-
eign Minister’s earlier discussions with Tsarapkin, and argued that Brandt 
had talked ‘too positively’ about the security conference.65 On the follow-
ing day, Kiesinger brought this criticism into the open in a public speech. 
Some Germans, the Chancellor said, had ‘unfounded illusions’ about the 
Budapest Appeal and the security conference. The Federal Government 
had continuously stressed that ‘a European peace order could not be cre-
ated by making the German people accept the Soviet demands for eternal-
ising the forced status quo in Europe’. Yet those hard and unconditional 
demands, Kiesinger argued, were exactly what were hidden behind the 
friendly-sounding sentences of the Budapest declaration.66 
Within the Chancellery, Carstens was especially active in attacking 
Brandt in this context. In a further memorandum to Kiesinger a few days 
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later, the State Secretary stressed that recent foreign policy developments 
in Bonn ‘filled him with great concern’. One of the main reasons for this 
was the positive statement on the security conference Brandt had made in 
Washington. In Carstens’ view, Brandt’s behaviour was difficult to under-
stand, since the Warsaw Pact wanted to use the conference first and fore-
most to weaken the position of West Berlin and the Federal Republic.67 To 
press his point, Carstens suggested that Kiesinger should take the matter 
up with Brandt personally, and also drafted a letter of his own to be sent to 
the Foreign Minister, highlighting their disagreements on the CSCE issue. 
In it, Carstens criticised Brandt for failing to tell the Soviet Ambassador 
in their recent meeting that the Federal Government did not approve of 
the suggestions of the Budapest Declaration regarding Germany and Ber-
lin. As for the NATO ministerial meeting in Washington, Carstens would 
have wished to hear Brandt declare there that the most important purpose 
of the conference for the Soviets was to seal the German division.68
Thus, the growing rift between the two views within the Grand Co-
alition on the European security conference was becoming increasingly 
apparent. Since the differences in the statements made by Kiesinger and 
Brandt were so easily discernible, Ruete’s attempt to assure a Soviet em-
bassy official in mid-April that the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister 
had agreed in their analyses about the situation ‘before, during and after 
the NATO conference’ was half-hearted and futile. Even more so, since 
Ruete added that the Soviet embassy should consider Brandt’s statements 
in a press conference on 14 April as the official West German position.69
The disagreements were no longer confined to the domestic arena, ei-
ther. In April Kiesinger told the Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander 
he did not believe that a European security conference would actually be 
convened. Whereas Erlander approved of the conference idea, provided 
that the United States took part in it, Kiesinger argued that the Americans 
simply did not want this kind of conference and that the only thing that 
could be advanced by it was the recognition of the European status quo. 
In Kiesinger’s view Brandt and Nenni had been the only exceptions to the 
otherwise reserved statements in the Washington meeting. Kiesinger also 
told the Swedish premier that prior to the NATO ministerial meeting he 
had warned Brandt ‘not to go too far’.70
Brandt defended his views at an SPD party conference in Bad Godes-
berg. Reminding his audience that there was no reason to overestimate the 
significance of the Budapest Appeal, he nevertheless stressed how impor-
tant it was to find out whether it had been meant to be taken seriously. In 
this view, Brandt declared, he had been fully supported by allies in Wash-
ington. ‘And I am certain’, he added, ‘that at the end of the day even the 
chairman of the CDU will not have any objections to it’.71 So far, however, 
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neither the Chancellor nor his subordinates showed any sign of changing 
their minds. Instead, Hermann Wentker, a specialist on Deutschlandpolitik 
at the Chancellery, strongly criticised Brandt’s views, calling it ‘politically 
inexpedient’ to enter a conference which would only suck the West Ger-
mans into the ‘maelstrom of Eastern ideas on the German question’. Fur-
thermore, Wentker considered attempts to present the Budapest Appeal 
as a serious proposal to be a deception of the general public.72
Towards the end of April, the security conference issue was also dis-
cussed in the parliamentary framework in Bonn – confidentially in the For-
eign Policy Committee of the Bundestag as well as publicly in the plenary 
debates. In the session of the Foreign Policy Committee on 24 April, Brandt 
told the members that he was certainly not expecting the conference to be 
convened ‘next week at 5 p.m.’. Nevertheless, Brandt declared, contrary to 
some press reports the Allies had supported him in Washington in the view 
that it was not advisable to reject the Eastern proposal completely. Instead 
of arguing about technicalities, the focus should be on the agenda of a pos-
sible conference. Agreement to coordinate the bilateral East–West contacts 
of individual NATO members in this respect had, in Brandt’s opinion, been 
the essential achievement of the NATO ministerial meeting.73
On the following day, in the plenary debate of the Bundestag, Brandt 
was again confronted with the alleged contradiction between his actions 
and the scepticism of his NATO colleagues regarding Soviet proposals for 
a ‘mammoth conference on European security’. Brandt, in his response to 
this question posed by a Christian Democrat MP, denied the allegation. 
On the contrary, he argued, there had been a high degree of agreement 
in principle on the judgement of the Budapest Appeal in Washington: 
‘In agreement with most of my colleagues, I consider it essential that the 
West does not allow itself to be pressed into a negative position or into a 
merely reactive role’. 74 In fact, for all their disagreements in the large for-
eign policy debate in the same Bundestag session, the leaders of all three 
parliamentary groups – Helmut Schmidt (SPD), Rainer Barzel (CDU/CSU) 
and Wolfgang Mischnick (FDP) – managed to agree that it would be use-
ful to sound out the Soviet proposal through diplomatic channels, in order 
to discover what it was truly made of.75
Purely in substance, then, there was hardly sufficient reason for the do-
mestic controversy about the West German position towards a possible 
CSCE, and especially about Brandt’s role in the NATO Foreign Ministers’ 
meeting. There were genuine differences of opinion, but by and large all 
the three major political parties agreed that if the necessary precautions 
were met, the idea of a European security conference was worth looking 
into further. However, those minor differences that did exist were dramat-
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ically sharpened by the overall state of the Grand Coalition. With still five 
more months to go until the federal election in September, the partnership 
between the CDU/CSU and SPD had already turned into rivalry, espe-
cially in foreign policy issues. The security conference provided the main 
contenders, Kiesinger and Brandt, with one possible issue to make their 
differences felt – at times leading both sides to an inadvertent exaggera-
tion of their own positions, as Waldemar Besson has noted.76 In addition, 
apart from being personal, between the Chancellor and the Foreign Min-
ister, the controversy about the prospective CSCE during the remainder of 
the Grand Coalition’s time in office was to a large extent also institutional, 
between key officials in the Chancellery and the Auswärtiges Amt. Short-
term electioneering and long-running institutional rivalries were central 
factors in the inability of the Grand Coalition to form a firm West German 
position towards the security conference. 
But on the international level, at the same time, Brandt and his Aus-
wärtiges Amt played an important role in initiating a serious discussion 
about the security conference within the West. Although most of Brandt’s 
colleagues were not as responsive to the Budapest Appeal as the West 
German Foreign Minister, the NATO ministerial meeting in April 1969 
marked the beginning of multilateral Western preparations for a possible 
East–West meeting. For the time being, admittedly, these preparations 
were very speculative in character, given that the Eastern proposals lacked 
any concrete ideas of procedure and timetable leading to the convening of 
a European security conference. This situation was soon to change, with a 
surprise move by the Finnish Government. 
Nobody Expects the Finnish Initiative
Following the instructions in the Washington communiqué (paragraph 5), 
the permanent NATO machinery in Brussels was engaged with the pro-
posed CSCE already in late April. At a Political Committee meeting on 22 
April, comparing their recent experiences, the representatives noted that 
especially Soviet, Romanian and Hungarian diplomats had been very ac-
tive in Western capitals lately, trying to promote the conference idea. This 
‘Soviet smile offensive’, as a French official called it, had failed to make a 
convincing impression.77 Nevertheless, the Allies started their discussion 
on a ‘list of issues for possible East–West negotiations’, as prescribed by 
the ministers in Washington.78 In the first Senior Political Committee (SPC) 
meeting, the West German representative argued for dividing the issues 
into three categories, to be approached chronologically in that order: (1) 
smaller steps to sound out the intentions of the Warsaw Pact countries and 
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to reduce suspicion on both sides; (2) discussion of topics in the cultural, 
scientific, technological and economic sphere; and (3) a wide range of dis-
armament and arms control issues, including balanced force reductions. 
Interestingly, the West German official concluded that a solution of the 
problems regarding Germany and Berlin could only be attempted at the 
end of all these negotiation rounds.79 In its report in early May, the NATO 
Council stressed the importance of ‘due caution and careful preparation 
of positions’.80 
But a completely new variable in the nascent debate about a European 
security conference was introduced on 5 May 1969, when Finland sud-
denly distributed an aide-mémoire to all European governments as well as 
to the United States and Canada. In the memorandum, the Finnish Gov-
ernment declared itself to be ‘favourably disposed to the convening of a 
conference on European security problems’ and offered to act as a host to 
such a conference as well as a possible preparatory meeting, ‘provided 
that the Governments concerned consider this as appropriate’. Arguing 
for their suitability to host the conference, the Finns especially stressed 
their ‘impartial attitude towards the most vital problem of European secu-
rity, the German question’.81 
In view of Finland’s problematic position as a neutral country under 
constant political pressure from its large Eastern neighbour, such a move 
coming from Helsinki was destined to raise suspicions in the West that 
Finland was acting merely as a Soviet puppet in Moscow’s pet project. The 
blunder of opening the memorandum with a direct reference to the Soviet 
Government82 was hardly helpful to the Finnish officials trying to avert 
Western suspicions. In the light of archival sources and recent scholarship, 
however, the assurances of the Finns at the time seem to have been well-
founded. The Soviets certainly put pressure on Finland to act in favour of 
the conference, more so than the Foreign Ministry in Helsinki was willing 
to admit openly. But the formulation, contents and timing of the memo-
randum were truly of Finnish origin. 
Clearly, both Finland and the FRG had a special position in the Soviet 
blueprint for a security conference. On 8 April, the Soviet Ambassador 
in Finland, Andrei Kovalev, showed up on the doorstep of Tamminiemi, 
President Urho Kekkonen’s residence in Helsinki. Kovalev called for 
Finnish support for the recent Budapest Appeal, explicitly arguing with 
the West German case. ‘If several European countries approach the pro-
posal positively, the Federal Republic of Germany can no longer take an 
opposing position.’83 Yet although Soviet suggestions always had to be 
taken seriously in Helsinki, the memorandum issued four weeks later was 
actually quite skilfully drafted to serve Finnish interests as well, in domes-
tic and foreign policies alike. Kimmo Rentola, a Finnish scholar, has put it 
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poignantly: ‘When bowing to Soviet pressure, Kekkonen clearly wanted 
to give the idea a touch of his own.’84 Moreover, from the Soviet perspec-
tive, at the turn of the decade the Finns were no longer such trustwor-
thy messengers as they had once been. As Rentola argues, in 1969–70 the 
Kremlin leadership was increasingly worried about Finland’s threatening 
‘slide’ away from its grip.85 
Interestingly, the Finnish initiative was not completely new in May 
1969. Paavo Keisalo, one of the key Finnish officials involved with the 
CSCE process in the 1970s, told the author that the Finnish Foreign Minis-
try had toyed with the idea of getting active in the CSCE context already 
a year earlier. Secretly prepared in the spring of 1968 for Kekkonen’s visit 
to the Soviet Union, the speech containing the original initiative to act 
as host for a security conference was, however, never made during that 
trip.86 Having been suppressed by the Prague events in August 1968, the 
idea was then rediscovered at a lunch between Kekkonen and the Finnish 
UN Ambassador Max Jakobson in Tamminiemi on 29 April 1969.87 
Paradoxically, the main goal behind the Finnish proposal was not the 
convening of a security conference. Instead, as Keijo Korhonen, then 
Deputy Political Director in the Foreign Ministry, has said, its main aim 
was to serve as a ‘driving anchor’ of Finnish policy towards the two Ger-
man states.88 At the time, Finland was the only country in Europe that 
had not fully recognised either of the German states yet maintained dip-
lomatic relations with both of them on equal footing – instead of embas-
sies, these relations were taken care of on the level of trade missions. In 
order to maintain this status as a cornerstone of the policy of neutrality, 
and to dodge growing domestic and foreign pressures to recognise the 
GDR, the conference initiative was intended to highlight the value of this 
exceptional Finnish position in the German question. This has also been 
confirmed by Jakobson, who argues that the CSCE initiative was only a 
diversionary move, intended to safeguard Finnish neutrality.89 Focusing 
on this instrumental value of their initiative, in May 1969 nobody in the 
Finnish leadership actually expected it to lead to anything substantial as 
far as the security conference was concerned. Yet only a few weeks later, 
faced with a flow of positive responses to the CSCE memorandum, ‘the 
magician himself was surprised’, as President Kekkonen wrote under his 
pen name.90
The West Germans, at the time, naturally did not know the complete 
background of the Finnish surprise move. Nevertheless, first analyses of 
the memorandum in the Auswärtiges Amt were relatively sober and posi-
tive. Having received the aide-mémoire on 5 May, Ruete told the head of 
the Finnish trade mission in Bonn that the West German view of a pos-
sible security conference was ‘fairly similar’ to that of the Finns. Ruete also 
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confirmed that Bonn did not oppose the participation of the GDR.91 The 
representatives of the FRG in Moscow and Helsinki concluded that the 
Finns seemed to have thought out their initiative more or less on their own. 
Although the Soviets had probably been consulted, ‘it would certainly be 
wrong to see the memorandum only as the extended arm of the Kremlin’.92 
Yet in spite of the general benevolence towards the Finnish move in the 
Auswärtiges Amt, it also posed the Federal Republic with a dilemma. At 
least temporarily, it complicated the emerging plans to make the confer-
ence project useful for the Deutschlandpolitik of the FRG. First hints of these 
plans can be seen in the widely noted speech Brandt gave in Hamburg 
on 7 May 1969, focusing precisely on the European security conference. 
Drafted before the delivery of the Finnish memorandum, the speech had 
been intended by Egon Bahr to be perceived as an ‘important political 
step’ by the audience in Hamburg as well as by the Soviet Union.93 
In his speech, Brandt underscored the implications of the Budapest Ap-
peal for inner-German relations. They were twofold. On the one hand, in 
Brandt’s view, the appeal indicated that it would be possible to overcome 
the ‘unrealistic preconditions’ for talks between Bonn and East Berlin. Be-
cause the GDR was among the signatories of the Budapest Appeal, Brandt 
argued, there was reason to believe that the East Germans finally agreed 
that solving the problems arising from the German division could not be 
treated as preconditions for entering inner-German talks, any more than 
for convening a security conference. On the other hand, Brandt went on 
to explain that for the Federal Republic it was even more important now 
than before to improve inner-German relations prior to a security con-
ference. Otherwise, the conference would be unnecessarily burdened by 
‘German quarrels’.94
This was a prime example of the paradoxical relationship the FRG had 
to the ‘Europeanisation’ of the German question. It was essential for Bonn 
to press the GDR to admit that the German division was a European prob-
lem, and that solving the problem by negotiations was in a general Eu-
ropean interest. But at the same time, the FRG insisted on tackling these 
problems bilaterally, not in a pan-European conference. Putting the solu-
tion of the German problem on the agenda of a multilateral forum was 
certainly one of the last things that any Federal Government in Bonn – re-
gardless of its composition – wanted. For as long as the allies of the FRG 
remained suspicious of the conference, however, Brandt and Bahr seem to 
have thought that it would be possible to delay its being convened long 
enough in order to make substantial progress in the inner-German rela-
tionship before that. Arguing with the threat of ‘German quarrels’ at a fu-
ture security conference, they hoped to put pressure on the GDR to agree 
to inner-German negotiations.
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And it was precisely here that the Finnish initiative contradicted West 
German interests. The move by a neutral country made the idea of a Eu-
ropean security conference more acceptable in the West than when it had 
been exclusive to the Warsaw Pact. Simultaneously, it dramatically accel-
erated the process from a speculative idea towards an actual conference. 
Moreover, it required every addressee to react to it.95 For the West Ger-
mans, even those who had so far been vocally in favour of a CSCE, this 
turned out to be a difficult task. In his Hamburg speech, given two days 
after the Finnish initiative, Brandt did not mention the Finnish memo-
randum at all. In subsequent weeks, the Auswärtiges Amt, let alone the 
Chancellery, was extremely reluctant to comment on the Finnish initiative 
publicly in any way. 
This silence clearly irritated the Soviet Union. In Bonn, the Soviet Am-
bassador even made the extraordinarily clumsy effort to persuade the head 
of the Finnish trade mission, Martti Salomies, to act on behalf of Moscow. 
At a meeting organised at very short notice in mid-May, Tsarapkin urged 
the Finn to contact State Secretary Duckwitz or other influential figures in 
the Auswärtiges Amt in order to ‘squeeze out’ at least a preliminary reply, 
and then to inform Tsarapkin of it. Salomies cautiously refused, arguing 
that he could neither put pressure on German officials, nor share confi-
dential information from third parties with Tsarapkin without permission 
from the Finnish Government.96 
Meanwhile, the NATO members had agreed to consult each other about 
the Finnish initiative and pledged that none of them would give a bind-
ing answer to the Finns before that. The issue was set on the agenda of the 
Political Committee and the Council for 13–14 May.97 In preparation for 
these consultations in Brussels, Ruete sent detailed instructions to the West 
German NATO mission. In the telegram, Ruete praised the ‘soberly bal-
anced’ text of the Finnish memorandum, which was considered to reflect 
the endeavours of the Finnish Government to maintain correct neutrality. 
However, Ruete was clearly concerned about the implications of the Finn-
ish initiative for the German question, especially its characterisation of the 
German question as ‘the most vital problem of European security’.98 
In the NATO Council meeting on 14 May, the Allies struggled to find a 
common position on the Finnish memorandum. The Scandinavian coun-
tries and Canada assessed the move in very positive terms, whereas the 
United States, supported by the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Turkey and 
Britain, suspected that the Finns were, first and foremost, advancing Soviet 
interests and increasing the propaganda effect of the Budapest Appeal.99 
The West German NATO Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe stood between 
these extremes. Following instructions, Grewe suggested that ‘no reply 
should be given to the proposal for preparatory work and a subsequent 
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conference, but that after consultation in NATO individual replies should 
be sent which could state interest in the Finnish proposal and agree that 
“detailed bilateral soundings” would be the necessary first stage’.100 Sum-
ming up the consultation, NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio declared 
that the members should reply to the Finnish initiative individually. The 
possibilities ranged from the British proposal (‘take note and undertake to 
bear in mind’) to the ‘more forthcoming’ West German view.101
Given a closer look, however, the position on the Finnish memoran-
dum in the Auswärtiges Amt was not too forthcoming either. The FRG was 
prepared to conduct ‘bilateral soundings’, but for the time being, there 
was not going to be an official reply to the Finns. Accordingly, in a press 
conference on 19 May in Bonn, Foreign Minister Brandt replied very eva-
sively to a question on the Finnish proposal. Brandt described the Finnish 
initiative as an important document, which would be taken into consider-
ation in the common consultations on European security in NATO.102 For-
tunately for the West Germans, the Finns did not seem to insist on a rapid 
response to their memorandum. At the end of May, Salomies said that 
Ruete’s oral comments at the delivery of the document were considered 
to be sufficient and that no further statement was required or expected.103 
The impact of the Finnish security conference initiative in May 1969 on 
the whole CSCE process was significant. In addition to raising the idea 
to another, more serious level from a one-sided Warsaw Pact action, it 
gave, as a chief US negotiator in the later CSCE has put it, the prospective 
security conference its first fixed element – the site.104 At this stage, how-
ever, fixed elements were not necessarily something that the West German 
decision-makers, not even those in principle in favour of a security confer-
ence, wanted. On the contrary, during the spring of 1969 Brandt, Bahr and 
a few key officials in the Auswärtiges Amt had started to see the instrumen-
tal value of the possible security conference: a means to lure the GDR into 
negotiations with the Federal Republic. This tactical approach required 
delaying the convening of the conference to meet a timetable suitable for 
Bonn. For as long as there was nothing more substantial around than a 
series of rather elusive Warsaw Pact proposals to respond to, this seemed 
manageable within the Alliance. With the Finnish move, however, the se-
curity conference idea became more presentable in the West. Thus, when 
a number of Western Allies also started to show interest in the conference, 
the process threatened to begin advancing too rapidly for West German 
tastes. But the acceleration of the progress towards a security conference 
was by no means just bad news for Brandt and Bahr. Over the summer 
of 1969 it started to become obvious that, in their view, the instrumental 
value was not the only side to the story. Especially Brandt was increas-
ingly manifesting genuine interest in the possible contents of a CSCE. 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
1966–69: Incubation of Strategies   |   39
Promises of East–West Cooperation or an  
Instrument of Deutschlandpolitik? 
With the federal election getting closer, in the summer months of 1969 the 
security conference became an increasingly controversial issue within the 
Grand Coalition. To be sure, the conference was nowhere near the top of 
the foreign policy agenda in Bonn. Other, more severe arguments within 
the government – most notably that over the response to the Cambodian 
decision to recognise the GDR – were the ones that brought the Grand 
Coalition deeper and deeper into a crisis. At the same time, these circum-
stances further diminished the likelihood of achieving an agreed official 
position on the CSCE.
Both abroad and at home, Brandt continued his active engagement in 
favour of the security conference. Increasingly, there were two strands si-
multaneously visible in Brandt’s argumentation. On the one hand, he em-
phasised the genuine promises for a European peace order provided by 
the conference. On the other, he presented progress in the inner-German 
relationship as a necessary prerequisite for the convocation of the CSCE. 
In the meeting of the Western European Union (WEU) in The Hague at the 
beginning of June, Brandt praised the Budapest Appeal as one of the most 
remarkable changes in East–West relations during recent years. Precisely 
because of indications that the Warsaw Pact countries were not merely en-
gaged in the conference project for the sake of tactical manoeuvring, Brandt 
stressed that the West should continue to ‘take the Eastern statesmen at 
their word’. In particular, the West German Foreign Minister was intrigued 
by the references in the Budapest Appeal to common projects dealing, for 
instance, with energy, traffic and the environment.105 At the meeting of the 
Socialist International, Brandt compared reading this section on East–West 
cooperation in the Budapest Appeal with ‘meeting an old acquaintance’. In 
the mid-1960s, as mayor of West Berlin, Brandt himself had suggested tak-
ing up similar pan-European infrastructure projects.106 In another speech 
in July, Brandt regretted that the positive importance of these elements, 
especially of economic cooperation, had so far been underestimated in the 
discussion about the European security conference.107 
Meanwhile, Brandt’s growing interest in the CSCE had also been evi-
dent in his decision to set up a specific CSCE working group in the Aus-
wärtiges Amt, to discuss issues related to the security conference. On 12 
June, Ulrich Sahm was appointed to lead the working group.108 During 
the summer, prior to submitting its final report shortly after the federal 
election in October, this working group was convened for at least eight 
sessions.109 One of the opening moves of the working group during the 
summer of 1969 was to widen its agenda. Instead of focusing on political 
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and security issues alone, it was considered necessary to include economic 
and cultural contacts as well as common projects on energy and traffic, for 
instance, in the working group meetings.110
Accordingly, in his speech to the Bundestag Foreign Policy Committee 
in late August, Brandt pleaded forcefully for serious consideration of the 
possibilities opened by the conference. Since not even the Soviets were 
counting on the conference to be convened in the near future, Brandt ar-
gued, ‘the West is rather stupid if it only ever talks about the label on the 
bottle, instead of focusing on what is supposed to be inside the bottle. 
The subject matter at stake here is more important than the procedural 
questions.’111 This emphasis on the softer elements of the proposed secu-
rity conference, increased East–West cooperation in a number of different 
fields ranging from large-scale economic cooperation to individual scien-
tific projects, was definitely a crucial part of the thinking of Brandt and 
Bahr. Instead of solidifying the East–West divide with uncompromising 
positions, the only way forward in Europe was to make the iron curtain 
more permeable. There was genuine interest in enhanced cooperation, 
as a means towards the ‘European peace order’. In fact, on this track the 
discussions within NATO on the ‘list of issues’ proceeded quite rapidly 
over the summer. Summing up the state of play so far, an SPC report in 
July grouped the topics under four categories: (1) measures to reduce ten-
sion and promote confidence; (2) arms limitations and disarmament; (3) 
measures for economic, technological and cultural cooperation; and (4) 
Germany and Berlin.112 
Yet the substantive interest in the security conference was only one 
dimension of Brandt’s and Bahr’s policies – tactical manoeuvring was at 
least as important. In addition to an endearment to the substance, Brandt 
was clearly also aware of the usefulness of the ‘bottle’ itself. Before anyone 
was allowed to taste its contents, the promise of a security conference was 
to be put to use in seeking a solution to the most pressing issue of West 
German foreign policy. Thus, throughout the summer, Brandt’s optimistic 
tones on East–West cooperation were constantly accompanied by refer-
ences to the need to bring clarity to the inner-German relationship prior to 
the convocation of the conference.
Already in his WEU speech in early June, Brandt had firmly under-
scored that the inner-German relationship had to be clarified before the 
conference, if it was to have a chance of success.113 Within the Auswärtiges 
Amt, Bahr went significantly further on these lines. In a high-level meeting 
in the ministry in June, Bahr admitted that the security conference itself 
would not be able to solve the German question – the conference should 
thus focus on enhancing security and economic links between East and 
West. But Bahr argued that the CSCE could be utilised for the purposes 
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of the German question. As far as Bonn’s Eastern policy was concerned, 
Bahr considered there to be three main obstacles to West German attempts 
at rapprochement with Eastern Europe: borders, nuclear issues and the 
GDR. The first two could be solved with a renunciation-of-force agree-
ment and with the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The security confer-
ence, in Bahr’s view, could provide the lever with which to deal with the 
third problem. Therefore Bahr argued for turning a solution to the inner-
German relationship into a prerequisite for the security conference. Most 
of Bahr’s colleagues, while agreeing with the goal, were hesitant to put 
such a controversial demand at the heart of the West German contribu-
tion, worried that Bonn would as a result be blamed for the postponement 
of the conference.114 Regardless of the sceptical reception, this meeting 
marked the first occasion when Bahr explicitly made the case for a direct 
linkage of the CSCE with progress in the inner-German relationship. 
In mid-June, Brandt reassured the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn that the 
Federal Government was still not setting any preconditions for the secu-
rity conference. At the same time, however, the Foreign Minister argued 
that during the lengthy preparations it would be very useful for every-
one involved if the relationship between Bonn and East Berlin could be 
improved before the actual convocation of the conference. Otherwise the 
German question would ‘considerably burden the work of the confer-
ence’.115 There certainly was also genuine concern in Bonn about the affect 
an unsolved German question might have on a CSCE, and vice versa.116 En-
suring that an eventual conference would not founder on the issue of GDR 
participation, with the blame for it put on the FRG, was ‘uppermost’ in the 
thinking of the Auswärtiges Amt, as a US embassy official was assured in 
Bonn.117 In late August, one paper drafted in the Auswärtiges Amt warned 
that even a substantial improvement in the inner-German relationship 
might not be enough to prevent problems arising from East German par-
ticipation. In fact, dreading as it was a ‘mammoth conference on German 
questions’, the rhetoric of the paper closely resembled that of Brandt’s 
fiercest critics from the CDU/CSU backbenchers a few months earlier.118 
Yet the motives behind constant references to the troublesome impact 
of the ‘German quarrels’ on the conference were also of a tactical nature. In 
view of the number of ‘third world’ countries that had recently recognised 
the GDR, what was left of the Hallstein Doctrine was rapidly crumbling. 
However, the FRG still wanted to maintain the initiative in regulating the 
relationship with its Eastern neighbour. And in this respect, by far the 
worst case scenario for Bonn was broad international recognition of the 
GDR and a European security conference with both German states par-
ticipating in it prior to an inner-German agreement. Therefore, as Bahr’s 
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planning staff argued in early July, it was essential to continue holding 
up all developments leading towards a general recognition of the GDR.119 
During the summer of 1969, Brandt and Bahr seem to have started to 
see the security conference not only as one of the symptoms of the prob-
lem, but also as a possible cure for it. In a meeting of European Socialist 
leaders in early July, Brandt told his colleagues that the participation of 
both German states in a security conference would not be a problem to 
him. But the time during the preparations of the conference, he argued, 
should be devoted to seeking some kind of modus vivendi between Bonn 
and East Berlin. Indeed, the approaching conference might be used to 
apply pressure on the East German Government to respond to earlier 
proposals. Significantly, Brandt asked for support from the Allies for this 
policy: ‘if West Germany’s friends could give the Russians similar advice 
on this it could be helpful’.120 
Unwilling to take the blame for slowing down the preparations, the 
Auswärtiges Amt and Brandt at its head were at pains to deny that they 
were setting their own preconditions for the conference. In fresh instruc-
tions sent to NATO Ambassador Grewe in late June, Ruete emphasised 
that the West German insistence on a resolution in inner-German rela-
tions was not a precondition, but that an improvement in that relationship 
was essential if any results were to be expected from the conference.121 
Bahr, on his behalf, argued that the West German position was merely an 
‘expectation’ – just as the Soviet Union took it for granted that the GDR 
would participate in the conference, the FRG took it for granted that the 
mutual relationship of the German states was clarified before it.122
Semantics aside, it was quite obvious that the West German officials 
were doing precisely what they denied: turning progress in the German 
question into a precondition for a security conference. No matter how 
careful and subtle the formulations were, they were making clear to their 
allies and to the Soviet Union that the FRG would insist on reaching at 
least some kind of agreement with the GDR before agreeing to enter a 
CSCE. Suitably, in a meeting of the CSCE working group of the Auswär-
tiges Amt on 22 July, Sahm stated that the main interest for the FRG in the 
security conference was to use it as a means to make advances in Bonn’s 
Deutschlandpolitik, and, as Bahr then added, to ‘unblock’ West German re-
lations with Eastern Europe.123 
Whereas a consensus was slowly emerging within the Foreign Ministry 
about the suitable line for the Federal Republic to take on the security 
conference, on the level of domestic politics it remained a controversial 
and potentially explosive issue in the run-up to the federal election in 
September. For its part, the opposition party FDP had been an outspoken 
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advocate of the CSCE already for some time. At their party conference at 
the end of June, the Free Democrats passed a resolution for the forthcom-
ing election, setting a European peace order as the central foreign policy 
goal of the FRG. In order to achieve this peace order, ‘a European security 
conference without preconditions’, in which members of both military al-
liances as well as other European states would take part, was needed.124
By contrast, Chancellor Kiesinger and his foreign policy advisors still 
refused to become entangled with the conference in any way. On the par-
liamentary level the disagreements between the CDU/CSU and the SDP 
over the security conference did not prevent attempts to discuss the mat-
ter, but the bridging of the divide between the Chancellery and the Aus-
wärtiges Amt turned out to be a next to impossible task. Kiesinger’s attitude 
towards the conference was apparent in the preparations for the Chancel-
lor’s Bundestag address on the ‘state of the nation in divided Germany’ 
on 17 June, commemorating the East Berlin uprising of 1953. In late May, 
Bahr’s planning staff had drafted a paragraph on the security conference 
to be included in the speech. In this draft, Bahr certainly did not paint too 
enthusiastic a picture of the CSCE, arguing that it was not certain whether 
the time was yet ripe for a conference: ‘The aim is not to hold a confer-
ence at any price. In other words, more important than all the formalities 
of a conference is its substance. A conference not resulting in any notable 
progress would be a setback for European security.’125 Yet this formula-
tion was not cautious enough for Kiesinger. In the coalition talks a week 
before his speech, Kiesinger made it clear that he was reluctant to mention 
the CSCE at all. It is worth noting that faced with the Chancellor’s op-
position, Brandt did not insist on its inclusion either, arguing that recent 
information from the Finns suggested that not even the Soviets counted 
on the conference being convened any time before 1971.126 Accordingly, in 
the declaration Kiesinger gave to the Bundestag on 17 June, there was not a 
single reference to the security conference.127
Nevertheless, in the Bundestag discussion following Kiesinger’s state-
ment the CSCE was brought up by the leader of the CDU/CSU group, 
Rainer Barzel. While offering assurances that his party also wanted a Eu-
ropean peace order, he went on to stress that the Christian Democrats 
were sceptical of the Warsaw Pact’s invitation to a European security 
conference since the words of the Budapest Appeal were contradicted 
by completely different deeds. Therefore, Barzel welcomed recent state-
ments by Brandt and the Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, both of 
whom had stressed the importance of progress on the German question 
before the conference would make any sense. In the ensuing discussion, 
Brandt replied that one had indeed to judge the Budapest Appeal with 
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a fair amount of scepticism. To Brandt, a core element in the appeal had 
been the abstinence from demanding a diplomatic recognition of the GDR 
as a precondition for the conference. In his view, if this claim were to be 
included retrospectively due to East German pressure, it would no longer 
be possible to take the Budapest Appeal seriously, regardless of how well 
it would fit in with ideas about a European peace order.128 
This fairly harmonious exchange between Barzel and Brandt was a far 
cry from the contradictions between the latter and Kiesinger. In numerous 
background briefings with German and international journalists during 
the summer, Kiesinger openly acknowledged this difference of opinion, 
adding, however, that Brandt did not sincerely believe in the conference 
project either. Although the Foreign Minister was talking about the con-
ference a lot more than the Chancellor would have preferred, Kiesinger 
explained that Brandt had assured him that he was using it only as a tacti-
cal means. In Kiesinger’s view, Brandt was using his positive statements 
on the CSCE to present himself as an important ‘peace politician’ and to 
win capital for his own party. As for his own position, Kiesinger stressed 
that he did not have any illusions about the security conference. For rea-
sons of Deutschlandpolitik it was unwise to reject it straight away, but in the 
Chancellor’s opinion there was not much to be expected from it.129 
The widening gap between Kiesinger and Brandt had not escaped West-
ern observers. ‘There was no fixed federal policy as yet on this matter’, a 
British memorandum noted in July.130 The US embassy in Bonn reported 
in June that the Christian Democrats remained far more sceptical of the 
conference than Brandt. However, the CDU had not yet launched a public 
offensive against Brandt, ‘perhaps because it suspects that there may exist 
latent support for the project among the Western German public’. 131 
But if the Christian Democrats were reluctant to confront Brandt openly 
at home, they did not have similar inhibitions when it came to making their 
view understood in Washington. At the end of June, the CDU parliamen-
tarian Kurt Birrenbach met the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, in 
Washington, conveying a message from Kiesinger. ‘Notwithstanding what 
he [Rogers] might hear from other quarters, the Chancellor firmly believed 
that a European security conference should come about only at the end of 
very careful preparations and negotiations and that the Federal Govern-
ment would strictly keep within the limits of the NATO resolution on this 
subject’.132 The West German Ambassador to Washington, Rolf Pauls, sup-
ported Kiesinger’s view, telling Henry Kissinger in July that ‘he did not 
think a European Security Conference was desirable at this time since it 
was bound to fail and produce a situation worse than the existing one.’133 
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During his state visit to the United States in early August, Kiesinger 
continued to sow suspicion about Brandt’s comments. When the Chancel-
lor met Nixon and Kissinger, he referred to the understandable need to 
make sanguine statements about the CSCE, if one wanted to improve rela-
tions with the East. But, Kiesinger told the US leadership, Brandt himself 
was convinced, and had told the Chancellor so, that the security confer-
ence would never be convened.134 Interestingly, in this respect Kiesinger 
spoke beyond the talking points prepared for him for the meeting. Al-
though sceptical of the conference, the points Carstens had drafted for the 
Chancellor did not include any references to Brandt. In fact, the Carstens 
paper was very close to the line represented by the Foreign Minister, argu-
ing as it was for using the CSCE to influence the East German leader: ‘If the 
Soviet Union is really interested in the security conference, it should put 
pressure on Ulbricht accordingly.’135 This element, however, was omitted 
by Kiesinger in his talks. 
In all, Kiesinger’s systematic efforts to downplay Brandt’s positive re-
marks about the security conference during the summer of 1969 are partly 
explained by the truly conflicting views of the Chancellor and his Foreign 
Minister, not to mention the accelerating election race between the coali-
tion partners. However, Kiesinger’s repeated references to Brandt explic-
itly admitting in private that he did not actually believe in the prospects of 
the conference do suggest that Brandt might in fact have done just that. In 
retrospect, Egon Bahr considers that this may well have been possible. It 
was a time, Bahr points out, when Brandt said one thing about the confer-
ence to the Chancellor to calm him down, and another to the Americans to 
encourage them to take it seriously.136
Brandt’s attempts to calm Kiesinger were obviously futile. But in the 
view of the allies of the Federal Republic – especially the smaller ones 
– the overtures of the West German Foreign Minister were also problem-
atic, for two reasons. On the one hand, Brandt’s statements had raised 
worries of the Germans ‘going it alone’. Echoing old Rapallo fears, refer-
ring to collusion of West Germany with Soviet Russia in a treaty signed in 
1922, some of the Western partners were afraid that the FRG was trying to 
bypass the Alliance structures completely in settling the most important 
European question, the inner-German relationship, in order to move for-
ward to the conference.137 In addition, the idea of having to wait for this 
inner-German agreement before a CSCE could be kicked off was also ir-
ritating to some of the smaller NATO countries. Perhaps partly due to the 
Finnish initiative in May, the interest in advancing the security conference 
was on the rise and pressures for a rapid drafting of a first version of the 
list of issues for East–West negotiations, as prescribed at the NATO min-
isterial meeting in April, were mounting. Already in June, other members 
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of the Alliance were criticising the Bonn Group members, and especially 
the West Germans, on the slow progress made in preparing the elements 
regarding Berlin and Germany. In Brussels, the West German NATO Am-
bassador ‘expressed irritation at what he said Bonn felt was undue pres-
sure on questions of vital concern to FRG’.138 Paradoxically, then, the West 
Germans felt they were being ‘attacked both for a “Rapallo deal” and for 
restrictive preconditions’.139 In other words, for moving too fast and too 
slowly at the same time.
But what mattered most to Bonn, naturally, was the mood of the three 
major Allies – the United States, Britain and France. During the summer, 
embassy reports confirmed that all of them remained strictly sceptical 
of the security conference.140 In trying to figure out whether the Soviet 
Union was using the Budapest Appeal to look for genuine détente or just 
to pursue its old goals and divert attention from the Prague invasion, all of 
the Three Powers considered the latter option to be more likely.141 During 
Kiesinger’s visit to Washington in August, leading State Department of-
ficials expressed their deep concern about the possible impacts a security 
conference might have on the coherence of the Western Alliance.142 
With the Three, who were anything but enthusiastic about the CSCE, 
implementation of the ‘linkage’ strategy hatched in the Auswärtiges Amt 
during the summer seemed to be possible, at least theoretically. For as 
long as the major Allies were not interested in a rapid convocation of the 
security conference, it was thinkable that the FRG could postpone the con-
ference long enough to enable some kind of progress in the inner-German 
talks before that. Furthermore, if the West Germans were in charge of the 
schedule leading up to the security conference, it could even be used to 
squeeze concessions from the East Germans in those talks.  
Yet there were several obstacles in the way of this plan. First of all, 
while Brandt certainly supported this ‘linkage’ strategy most strongly ad-
vocated by Bahr, he was also genuinely interested in the substantial ques-
tions to be dealt with at a conference. This led to a paradoxical situation for 
Brandt and many officials in the Auswärtiges Amt – like trying to have their 
cake and eat it, they wanted to support the process towards the conference 
because of its subject matter, yet wanted to slow down the same process 
because of its instrumental value. Moreover, even if the Foreign Ministry 
had been able to come up with a firm and unequivocal position, there was 
not much Brandt could accomplish without the support of Kiesinger. The 
visible disagreement between Chancellor and Foreign Minister in this par-
ticular matter, not to mention the general paralysis in the foreign policy of 
the Grand Coalition during the summer, ensured that such support was 
not to be expected. In addition, the criticism from Western Allies for going 
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either too fast or too slowly in the conference issue made the West German 
position all the more difficult. 
In these complicated circumstances, any moves concerning the CSCE 
during the final weeks before the election in late September were almost 
destined to lead to controversies in Bonn. The delivery of the West Ger-
man response to the Finnish security conference initiative, at first sight a 
routine diplomatic procedure, turned out to be a case in point.
Chancellery versus Auswärtiges Amt
Although the Finns had previously indicated to West German officials 
that they did not expect a formal reply to their initiative, in the late sum-
mer of 1969 the original oral acknowledgement given upon the delivery 
of the memorandum no longer seemed sufficient. In August, the Finnish 
Government informed recipients of the May initiative that it had already 
received positive replies from seventeen countries, including four NATO 
members (the UK, the Netherlands, Portugal and Norway) but not the 
Federal Republic.143 To the Auswärtiges Amt in Bonn, this situation started 
to feel awkward. According to Political Director Ruete, a formal response 
would only be an ‘unbinding act of political courtesy to the Finns’, and 
thus not harmful for the FRG. But in Ruete’s view the foremost reason 
in favour of giving an official reply at this stage was to avoid the risk of 
remaining among the few European governments who ‘had not even con-
sidered the Finnish peace gesture worthy of an answer’.144 Therefore, fear 
of isolation was a main motive for the decision to respond to the Finns. 
During the next few weeks a West German reply was drafted in the 
Foreign Ministry and on 9 September it was sent to Detlev Scheel, the 
new head of the FRG’s trade mission in Helsinki. Scheel was advised to 
present the text orally and to submit the text only as a non-paper.145 He 
carried out these instructions on 12 September. The text of the West Ger-
man reply which Scheel delivered at the Finnish Foreign Ministry did not 
contain anything dramatic – it merely welcomed the fact that the initiative 
had also been addressed to the North Americans, greeted its ‘construc-
tive spirit’ and emphasised the need for careful preparation of a confer-
ence.146 In fact, as Haftendorn has argued, the reply was characterised by 
a considerable lack of commitment, deliberately avoiding taking a definite 
position for or against the security conference.147 But, symptomatic of the 
lack of communication between the coalition partners as well as between 
the Chancellery and the Auswärtiges Amt, the delivery of the statement led 
to a minor storm within the government in Bonn.
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When Brandt made a public announcement of the West German reply 
to the Finns at a press conference in Bonn on 16 September, he argued that 
the Federal Government saw the Finnish initiative as a ‘constructive step 
towards the creation of a just and durable European security order, which 
we are also aiming at’.148 In fact, however, there had not been an official 
government decision about the response. Brandt, in both of his memoir 
volumes, has flatly rejected later accusations by the controversial leader 
of the Bavarian CSU, Franz Josef Strauss, according to whom Brandt as 
Foreign Minister had authorised a reply to the Finns without prior consul-
tation with Kiesinger.149 But the archival evidence suggests that Strauss’s 
claims were not completely unfounded. Due to a set of misunderstand-
ings, and with Brandt’s tacit approval, it seems, the Auswärtiges Amt did in 
the end take the matter into its own hands, giving the West German reply 
without explicit authorisation from the Chancellery.
The draft of the reply had already been completed in the Auswärtiges 
Amt by the end of August. On 1 September Brandt approved the text and 
decided that the next thing to do, before sending the instructions to Hel-
sinki, was to inform the Chancellery about the procedure. Nevertheless, 
Brandt added that if no response was received from the Chancellery within 
forty-eight hours, the instructions should be sent without further confir-
mation.150 On 4 September, State Secretary Duckwitz wrote a letter to the 
head of the Chancellery, Karl Carstens, arguing for the need to reply to the 
Finnish security conference initiative and attaching the text of the reply. 
Duckwitz also told Carstens that the West German mission in Helsinki 
would be instructed to deliver the text to the Finnish Foreign Ministry.151 
No date was mentioned, but it was clear from the letter that action would 
be taken soon. When there had been no response from the Chancellery by 
8 September, the head of Brandt’s bureau called the responsible desk of-
ficer in the Auswärtiges Amt and told him to proceed with the instructions 
to Helsinki on the following day.152 
On 11 September, however, Carstens wrote back to Duckwitz, arguing 
that the reply to the Finnish initiative was such an important question of 
foreign policy that it should be dealt with on cabinet level. No reply to 
the Finns should be given before that.153 By then, as we have seen, the in-
structions to Helsinki had already been sent. The Foreign Ministry made 
no last-minute efforts to stop Scheel from acting as previously instructed. 
Instead, Duckwitz replied to Carstens only ex post facto, after the statement 
had been delivered in Helsinki, explaining that the West German state-
ment did not include anything that had not already been said in the name 
of the Federal Government and that, lacking objections from the Chan-
cellery, the instructions had been sent according to the original plan.154 
Meanwhile, Carstens had himself learned from a telegram from Helsinki 
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that the statement had indeed been made, in spite of his insistence on 
a preceding cabinet decision. There was no longer anything to be done, 
but the sequence prompted a further bitter correspondence between the 
Chancellery and the Auswärtiges Amt. Although Carstens admitted that 
he had received Duckwitz’s letter on 4 September, he claimed that he had 
been promised by the Foreign Ministry that no steps would be taken be-
fore the Chancellor had commented on the matter.155 
Obviously, the election campaign did cast its shadow over this con-
troversy. More than about the lack of communication between Kiesinger 
and Brandt, however, the story is indicative of an institutional antagonism 
between the Chancellery and the Auswärtiges Amt. Whenever it came to 
foreign policy matters, these institutions had traditionally been battling 
for the top position. In addition, there certainly was no sympathy lost be-
tween the respective top officials, Carstens and Duckwitz. At least in part 
precisely because of its relatively unimportant and uncontroversial sub-
ject matter, the issue of responding to the Finnish security conference ini-
tiative provided the State Secretaries with a brilliant opportunity to teach 
each other a lesson. The controversy was, above all, a final showcase of the 
bureaucratic infighting within the Grand Coalition. 
Emphasis on Linkage: Bahr’s Foreign Policy Plans  
on the Eve of the Election
In the planning staff of the Auswärtiges Amt, Egon Bahr was not distracted 
by the intensifying election campaign. On the contrary, in the month of 
September alone, Bahr drafted a large number of long-term plans for the 
foreign policy of the Federal Republic, many of which addressed the se-
curity conference as well.156 Regardless of the strained situation within 
the government, Bahr maintains that they were written on the assump-
tion that the Grand Coalition would remain in office after the election.157 
In these memoranda, Bahr’s earlier idea of using the conference primar-
ily as an instrument of Deutschlandpolitik was crystallised and elaborated 
further. 
As far as an actual conference was concerned, Bahr’s long-term vision 
reserved only a transitional role for it. Bahr had for a long time been keen 
on making the distinction between a temporary security system (Sicherhe-
itssystem) and a permanent European peace order (Friedensordnung), the 
former being not an end in itself, but rather a necessary station on the road 
to the latter. Within this conceptual framework, Bahr considered the East–
West negotiations on a security conference to be useful in opening the way 
towards the first stage, a temporary security system.158 
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In the beginning of September, Bahr circulated a detailed memoran-
dum, laying out his vision for a Western – and West German – position 
on the European security conference, which is worth a closer look. In ad-
dition to the four essentials already agreed in NATO (no preconditions, 
thorough preparation, reason to expect useful results, participation of the 
US and Canada), Bahr stressed the importance of developing and pur-
suing Western goals for the procedure and agenda of the conference, as 
counterweights to Soviet suggestions. In the sphere of political security, 
he argued, the West should prepare a treaty focusing on renunciation of 
force and principles of sovereignty. On military security, Bahr suggested 
that the conference should result in a permanent eight-power disarma-
ment commission for Europe, which would, above all, deal with balanced 
force reductions. But as far as economic cooperation was concerned, Bahr 
was very reserved. Substantial advances could be expected only once 
progress had been made in the security issues.159
In all, Bahr did not have high hopes of the substance of the security 
conference. In his view, if the West were to insist on solving all important 
questions before the final CSCE, it would be easy for Eastern propaganda 
to put the blame on the West for a possible failure of the conference. Thus, 
Bahr argued for aiming at a conference that would issue only broad decla-
rations of intent, with the details then further developed in one or several 
permanent committees. ‘If these were not to achieve results later on, at 
least the actual conference would not have collapsed. A failed ESC would 
be a serious setback for Western détente policy.’  
Rather than multilateral security and cooperation, therefore, the true 
core of Bahr’s memorandum on the security conference was clearly its 
implications for the German question. He once again emphasised the need 
for mitigating the inner-German relationship before the beginning of a 
CSCE. Instead of being a precondition, he claimed, this was merely a part 
of careful conference preparations. Holding on to this principle, Bahr ad-
mitted, was going to be difficult – but possible, provided that the key Al-
lies backed it.
It will also depend on how manifestly we make the point that we will not take 
our seat at the table of an ESC without a preceding clarification of the relation-
ship between the two parts of Germany …. In the West, we cannot count on an 
understanding of our position from all states, whether part of the Atlantic Alli-
ance or not. But for as long as we have the support of the Three Powers, we can 
stay the course without larger difficulties.160
Moreover, Bahr also suggested that the West should propose a joint reso-
lution on the German question. To be signed by all the conference partici-
pants, this resolution would request the Four Powers responsible for Berlin 
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and Germany as a whole and the two German states ‘in the interest of 
European security, to conclude an agreement on the relationship between 
the FRG and the GDR as well as on the external relations of the two parts of 
Germany’, as an interim solution before a reunification.161 In other words, 
Bahr wanted to mobilise the preparations for a European security confer-
ence to put pressure on the GDR to enter inner-German negotiations.
Bahr presented some of these thoughts to his NATO colleagues in mid-
September, at the autumn meeting of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group, 
which focused on issues related to troop reductions and a possible se-
curity conference. Bahr’s idea of using the preparatory phase of a CSCE 
to improve the relationship between the German states was received ap-
provingly. Generally, the meeting was characterised by a common unease 
with the development towards the conference – the Soviet position was 
seen to be strong, the Western weak. The participants shared a concern 
about public opinion at home. ‘Especially the younger generation’ was 
clearly expecting some kind of détente gesture from the West.162
Less than two weeks before the federal election scheduled for 28 Sep-
tember, Bahr circulated two further significant foreign policy documents: 
an analysis of a future ‘framework agreement’ (Rahmenvertrag) with the 
GDR and a more general paper entitled ‘Reflections on the foreign policy 
of a future Federal Government’. These documents reflected Bahr’s de-
sire for using the security conference as a tool of Deutschlandpolitik. As 
far as inner-German relations were concerned, Bahr’s main message was 
that West German foreign policy had to come to terms with reality. While 
the German division would probably be sustained for an indefinite pe-
riod, the GDR would achieve world-wide recognition during the next few 
years, whether or not the FRG opposed it. Therefore, if the Federal Re-
public wanted to gain something in return for the enhanced international 
status of the GDR, it had to act quickly. ‘Abstaining from preventing the 
international recognition of the GDR is a reward we can offer the GDR 
only for as long as we are able to do so. …The sooner the GDR can expect 
to reach its goal without our involvement, the smaller will be the value of 
the reward.’163 
In Bahr’s view, this had direct and crucial implications for future West 
German foreign policy, including the policy on the security conference. 
Although Bahr was by no means certain that a CSCE would actually be 
convened, he was sure that the debate about it would continue with vary-
ing intensity. Regardless of the likelihood of success of the actual confer-
ence, Bahr was keen on the possibilities the process opened up for the 
Federal Republic. The Soviet conference proposal, he argued, should be 
‘instrumentalised’ for West German purposes: 
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we have to try to use it as an instrument for the realisation of our interests. It 
gives a possibility to submit suggestions aiming at a security system in Europe 
and creating … conditions for a peace order. Above all, we should use the con-
ference idea as a lever, forcing the GDR to agree to a rapprochement of the two 
German states. We should utilise the interest of the East European countries 
and, if necessary, of the Soviet Union in the ESC for this.164 
Thus, more explicitly than before, Bahr was making the case for a direct 
linkage of the European security conference and progress in the inner-
German dialogue. The ‘framework agreement’ between Bonn and East 
Berlin would in the end enable frictionless participation of both German 
states in the conference. But before agreeing to participate in the security 
conference, the Federal Republic should use it as leverage on the GDR. 
Or, to put it the other way round, Bonn should show the green light to 
the CSCE only after an inner-German treaty had been concluded. This 
crystallisation of the instrumental value of the security conference was 
crucially important for the FRG’s CSCE policy. Instead of perceiving the 
security conference as a threat and focusing on defensive preconditions 
to minimise the damage inflicted on Deutschlandpolitik, Bahr’s approach 
called for a more offensive strategy in which the FRG would actively use 
the conference as a bargaining chip to pursue its own interests.
This approach, outlined by Bahr in a memorandum concluded in New 
York during the UN General Assembly, where Brandt was meeting his 
colleagues, may have had an immediate impact on the Foreign Minis-
ter’s discussions. Bahr wrote later that Brandt, having read his foreign 
policy suggestions during the New York trip, had commented: ‘Not bad 
at all. I hope we can use this soon.’165 It is obviously very hard to distin-
guish between subtle changes in tone on the basis of the written record, 
but there seems to be a slightly more assertive touch than before in the 
way Brandt referred to the CSCE in New York. The Foreign Ministers of 
the three major Allies – Rogers, Stewart and Schumann – all agreed with 
Brandt that all possible attempts should be made to keep the conference 
free from the ‘German quarrels’, preferably through inner-German talks 
prior to the conference.166 In his discussion with the Soviet Foreign Min-
ister, Brandt also made the by then standard remark that ‘at the present 
stage the “German quarrels” would completely overshadow the confer-
ence’. More concretely, Brandt added that progress in Bonn’s negotiations 
with East Berlin on traffic and postal issues would be helpful. Gromyko 
stressed that no attempts to call for a change in the policy of the GDR as a 
precondition for the security conference would be acceptable. Yet Brandt 
did not back down: ‘We do not wish to nor will we set any precondi-
tions. We are only saying that elimination of difficulties on our soil, such 
as travel restrictions, would ease the way towards the conference.’167 
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Indeed, in his memoirs Brandt suggests that it was already around this 
time, shortly before the federal election of September 1969, that he realised 
that the security conference might actually provide the Federal Republic 
with some leverage.168 Yet given the disagreements between the coalition 
partners, none of these deliberations had any hope of being implemented 
for as long as the Grand Coalition was in office. Therefore, the result of the 
election on 28 September was of fundamental significance to the future 
CSCE policy of the Federal Republic.
Bonn and the Security Conference during the Interregnum
The federal election of 1969 was an extremely close-fought one. In fact, 
when the polls in West Germany had closed and the first results started 
pouring in, the US President Richard Nixon already called Kiesinger to 
congratulate him on his re-election. As it turned out, however, Nixon had 
been too hasty.169 Although the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU) suc-
cessfully defended all but one of their seats in the Bundestag and main-
tained their position as the largest parliamentary group, substantial gains 
(3.4 percentage points and twenty seats) made by the Social Democrats 
enabled Brandt to take the initiative. He chose to start negotiations with 
the Free Democrats, relying on a thin but sufficient parliamentary major-
ity for a ‘social-liberal’ coalition. The FDP, for its own part, had been the 
main loser in the election, scoring its worst result ever and only narrowly 
making it over the five-percent hurdle needed to enter the Bundestag.170 
This equation opened the way for the first fundamental change of govern-
ment in the twenty-year history of the Federal Republic. The Christian 
Democrats were left in opposition for the first time, and Brandt was set to 
become the first Social Democratic Chancellor of the Bonn Republic. 
In spite of the narrowness of the mandate, the West German electorate 
had clearly sent a message for change with its increased support for the 
Social Democrats. And in the autumn of 1969, the main motive for change 
was in the field of foreign policy. Catching the essence of this, Peter Pulzer 
has argued: ‘No election is ever decided by one single issue, but if any 
predominated in this one it was the question of relations with the East. It 
was an irony that foreign policy, the midwife of the Great Coalition, had 
become the grounds for divorce.’171 On the other hand, as Wolfgang Jäger 
has pointed out, the importance of foreign policy should not be overesti-
mated either – in the autumn of 1969 nobody could foresee just how rapid 
the advances in Ostpolitik were about to become.172 And for sure, while 
foreign policy may have tipped the balance in favour of Brandt instead of 
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Kiesinger, the question of the European security conference had certainly 
not been an issue at the election. 
In any case, although much of the transitional period between the elec-
tion and Brandt’s official appointment as Chancellor by the Bundestag on 
21 October was consumed by the intense coalition negotiations between 
the SPD and the FDP, foreign policy was not the bone of contention. And 
just as with Ostpolitik in general, the Social Democrats and Free Democrats 
also found it relatively easy to agree on the general line to take with regard 
to the CSCE. Freed from the controversies so dominant in the Grand Co-
alition, the foreign policy consensus between the new coalition partners 
finally promised to make the implementation of an agreed CSCE policy 
of the government possible. As it happened, Bahr and the leading foreign 
policy thinker of the FDP, Wolfgang Schollwer, did not really get on and 
were never engaged in a thorough exchange of opinions.173 All the same, 
although with different goals in mind, both saw opportunities for the FRG 
in the security conference. In October, Schollwer’s working paper on West 
German foreign policy positioned the preparation and convocation of a 
European security conference, respectively, at first place among both the 
medium- and long-term objectives.174 Bahr, for his part, continued to em-
phasise the instrumental value of the conference. In a draft foreign policy 
programme for the future government, presenting most of the central 
thoughts made public in the Chancellor’s government declaration a few 
weeks later, Bahr argued that the conference idea should be used to force 
the GDR to agree to an inner-German rapprochement.175 
On the institutional level, moreover, expectations for smoother coop-
eration were further supported by the personnel reshuffle resulting from 
the change of government. Brandt brought many of his trusted men at the 
Auswärtiges Amt to the Chancellery, including Egon Bahr as State Secretary 
and Ulrich Sahm as head of the department responsible for foreign policy 
and inner-German questions. In addition, Brandt had a close relationship 
with Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, who continued as State Secretary in 
the Foreign Ministry. In fact, Brandt’s hold on foreign policy issues was 
so strong that it took some time before the chairman of the FDP, Walter 
Scheel, could effectively take control of his own house as the new Foreign 
Minister. Not only during the early stages, but for a good part of the first 
year of the Social–Liberal Coalition, the making of West German foreign 
policy was clearly dominated by the Chancellery. 
Meanwhile, the Auswärtiges Amt was beginning to take a more careful 
position on the security conference. This was visible already in early Octo-
ber in the final report of the CSCE working group which had been set up 
in June. According to the detailed fifty-page report, the Budapest Appeal 
had already been a success for the Soviet Union. Moscow had been able 
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to set the agenda and the course of the discussion on European security, 
forcing the West to act as a demandeur if it wanted to achieve its own objec-
tives. Therefore, the mere proposal had given the Soviet Union substantial 
advantages. Regarding the participation of the German states in the CSCE, 
the report suggested the development of a model for a ‘qualified’, ‘all-
German’ participation. In order to avoid setting a dangerous precedent 
for the participation of the GDR in other international conferences and or-
ganisations, the representation of the two German states at the conference 
was to be subordinated to an institutional cooperation in specific com-
mittees consisting of the Four Powers, the FRG and the GDR. Some sort 
of regulation of the inner-German relationship before the conference was 
considered absolutely necessary, but the report included no hint of actu-
ally trying to use the CSCE process as a means to that end.176 By contrast, 
some officials in the Auswärtiges Amt predicted that the ongoing discus-
sion about the security conference would bring difficult times for main-
taining the unity of the Western Alliance. In particular, there was growing 
concern that the European security conference would turn into a general 
conference on Germany, in which decisions would be made more about 
the FRG, less with the FRG.177
But during the transitional period in October, these worries were over-
shadowed by Bahr’s enthusiasm for the instrumentalisation of the security 
conference. In his meeting with Kissinger in Washington in mid-October, 
Bahr gave Nixon’s national security adviser a broad outline of what was to 
be expected from the foreign policy of the new West German Government. 
Bahr told Kissinger that they wanted to see the inner-German relationship 
‘normalised’ before the security conference, although this could not of-
ficially be formulated as a precondition. If this condition was not met, the 
Federal Republic would rather not take part in a conference, including a 
preparatory conference, at all. To his surprise, Bahr wrote, the Americans 
did not object to this. Helmut Sonnenfeldt from the White House National 
Security Council, also present at the meeting, explained that while the 
United States did not reject the conference idea altogether, they consid-
ered that it was up to the Europeans to decide what to do about it.178 
The changing of the guard from the Grand Coalition to the SPD-FDP 
Government was completed on 21 October, when the Bundestag elected 
Brandt as the fourth Chancellor of the Federal Republic. One week later, 
Brandt gave his first government declaration to the Bundestag, laying out 
the main principles of the future policy of the Social–Liberal Coalition.179 
This declaration is best remembered for its section on Deutschlandpolitik, in 
which Brandt publicly accepted the existence of ‘two states in Germany’, 
but added that they could never ‘be foreign countries to each other’. The 
declaration also touched upon the proposed European security confer-
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ence. In it, Brandt declared on behalf of the Federal Government that it 
was committed to the position given in the official reply to the Finnish 
Government on 12 September. ‘After careful preparation’, the new Chan-
cellor continued, ‘such a conference can become an important leg on the 
road to greater security with less armament and to progress between the 
partners in Eastern and Western Europe’.180 Thus, the security conference 
was closely linked with the concept of a European peace order, a goal 
which the government pledged to work towards in the first sentence of 
the declaration.
The focus being on bilateral Ostpolitik, in October 1969 the security con-
ference was obviously not at the top of the foreign policy agenda of the 
new government. Nevertheless, the change of government had important 
repercussions on that front as well. Having secured at least the passive 
support of the major Western ally to proceed as they saw fit, and with 
no disagreements in principle with the junior coalition partner at home 
to worry about, there seemed to be no impediments for Brandt and Bahr 
to start implementing their version of a West German policy towards the 
CSCE. Albeit at first glance contradictory in nature, both tracks of the plans 
developed in the Auswärtiges Amt during the last six months of the Grand 
Coalition were now about to be united, shaping the official approach of 
the Federal Republic on the project of a European security conference in 
the first half of the 1970s. On the one hand, there was Bahr’s pet project, 
the tactical linkage approach. According to it, the West Germans should 
attempt to use their agreement to participate in the multilateral conference 
as a bargaining chip in order to receive concessions from the East in bilat-
eral negotiations. On the other hand, there was an interest in advancing 
the substantive elements of the security conference. Arrangements to im-
prove security in Europe and increased East–West cooperation promised 
to bring the elusive long-term goal, the European peace order, at least a 
few steps closer. The evolution of each of these halves of the West German 
policy during the CSCE preparations and at the conference itself will be 
analysed in the following chapters.
Conclusion
The short era of the Grand Coalition was significant for the formation of 
the West German CSCE policy in the 1970s. International as well as do-
mestic developments occurring during the Kiesinger–Brandt Government 
had an important impact on subsequent choices made in Bonn. To begin 
with, on the international level, the years 1966–69 witnessed a substantial 
change in Western perceptions of the idea of a European security confer-
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ence. Having been equally mistrustful of Warsaw Pact calls for a CSCE 
throughout the 1960s, the unity of the Atlantic Alliance began to crack to-
wards the end of the decade. Some of the smaller NATO members started 
to take the conference proposals more seriously, forcing them on the 
agenda of the NATO machinery in Brussels. Although détente was dealt 
a major setback by the Prague invasion in August 1968, two documents 
distributed in the following spring – the Warsaw Pact’s Budapest Appeal 
in March and the Finnish memorandum in May 1969 – speeded up the 
CSCE discussion in the West. In their semi-annual meeting in Washington 
in April, the NATO Foreign Ministers instructed the Political Committee 
to draft a list of issues for possible East–West negotiations before the end 
of the year, thus in effect starting multilateral CSCE preparations within 
the West. 
The West German role in these early Western discussions reveals two 
key characteristics that were also present later on. First of all, the secu-
rity conference was clearly an issue where it was possible for the Federal 
Republic to show initiative and assume a high profile. Given the impor-
tance of the German question for any deliberations on European security, 
West German opinions were carefully listened to in the Allied capitals. 
Especially during the final year of the Grand Coalition, Foreign Minis-
ter Brandt eagerly seized this opportunity, working hard to convince his 
more sceptical colleagues that the security conference could turn out to be 
useful for the West and would not just give a propaganda victory to the 
East. But on the other hand, the period dealt with here also showed the 
limitations – or rather perceived limitations – of the West German free-
dom for manoeuvre. Politicians and officials in Bonn were constantly very 
alert to even the smallest signs of Allies disagreeing with West German 
positions. Opposition from the smaller NATO members was something 
that could be lived with, but ending up at odds with one or more of the 
Three Powers (United States, United Kingdom and France) was imme-
diately seen as posing a danger of isolation within the Alliance. Thus, at 
times perhaps more than was actually needed, the West Germans felt they 
were dependent on finding a consensus with their three major allies.
Although these two main features of the Federal Republic’s interna-
tional role in the CSCE context – a new opportunity to exert influence, 
limited by heightened sensitivity to dynamics within the Alliance – were 
beginning to show already during the Grand Coalition, in 1966–69 the 
CSCE was first and foremost a question of domestic politics for the FRG. 
Due to the disagreements between the Chancellor and the Foreign Minis-
ter, the approaching federal election as well as the bureaucratic infighting 
between the Chancellery and the Auswärtiges Amt, the Federal Republic 
never had an official CSCE position during the Grand Coalition – no mat-
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ter how much Brandt discussed the security conference with his colleagues 
abroad. Then again, at the same time as the coalition partners were rap-
idly drifting apart, the SPD and the FDP began to find common ground 
in foreign policy issues, the CSCE included. This rapprochement laid the 
foundation for the foreign policy of the Brandt–Scheel Government.
But why was the European security conference such a contested issue 
within the Grand Coalition? As has been shown above, there clearly were 
genuine substantive disagreements about the security conference between 
the various actors on the domestic level. At the heart of these disagree-
ments were conflicting views about the correct way forward in addressing 
the German question. The long-term goal of a European peace order as a 
possible solution was shared by all major German parties, but their defini-
tions of the characteristics of such an order were not identical. And differ-
ent approaches called for different measures, also towards the CSCE. Yet 
at times the still hypothetical CSCE also provided the individuals, parties 
and institutions with a suitable excuse to argue. Because all the partici-
pants saw that the actual conference was not yet topical, they could afford 
to use it in the domestic power struggles. And as the federal election drew 
closer, these power struggles became more apparent. The election of Gus-
tav Heinemann as Federal President in March 1969, resulting from coop-
eration between the SPD and FDP to defeat the candidate of the Christian 
Democrats, was a sign of what was to be expected. For the remaining six 
months before the federal election, the Grand Coalition entered a ‘time of 
political paralysis’.181 The election battle started ahead of schedule, badly 
disrupting the work of the government for the rest of its term. 
One should also not neglect the impact of personal chemistry. There 
were more than enough examples of functioning cross-party cooperation 
within the coalition: Herbert Wehner and Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Karl Schil-
ler and Franz Josef Strauss, as well as Helmut Schmidt and Rainer Barzel, 
all got along reasonably well.182 But, with the most importance for foreign 
policy, there was never a similar meeting of minds between Kiesinger and 
Brandt, let alone between the Chancellor and Bahr. In fact, already in 1967 
Kiesinger confidentially told a West German journalist that he considered 
Bahr to be a ‘very dangerous man’, whose influence in the Auswärtiges 
Amt ought to be limited.183 Furthermore, shared ambitions played into the 
intensity of the rivalry. As Christian Hacke has argued, Kiesinger was one 
of the most passionately foreign-policy oriented Chancellors in the history 
of the Federal Republic.184 Bahr himself has admitted that the ‘misery of 
the Grand Coalition resulted from the abundance, not from the lack, of 
ambitious foreign-policy talents’.185 
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Despite the paralysing effect the domestic controversies had on the 
foreign policy of the Grand Coalition, these talents were not completely 
lost. Extensive planning work in Brandt’s Auswärtiges Amt had resulted 
in a ‘blueprint’ for a new foreign policy of the Federal Republic. After the 
election in September 1969, there were no longer any internal obstacles to 
its implementation. Regarding the European security conference, as has 
been shown in this chapter, the plans consisted of two main elements: 
instrumental and substantive approaches to the CSCE. This twin-track ap-
proach to the security conference is actually a perfect example of the two 
sides constantly present in the foreign-policy ideas put forward by Brandt 
and Bahr. The instrumental approach, to a larger extent Bahr’s contribu-
tion, was based on realpolitik and linkages. The substantive approach, then 
again, better represented by Brandt, was building on a more ideological 
view of cooperation and the vision of a European peace order. 
With the inauguration of the Brandt–Scheel Government in October 
1969, this blueprint was put to the test. As will be shown in the chapters 
below, the implementation of plans incubated during the Grand Coalition 
was by no means an easy and straightforward task. And in comparison 
with the preparations of the bilateral Ostpolitik treaties, which the Federal 
Republic was at least to some extent able to control, the development to-
wards a multilateral CSCE turned out to consist of a far greater number 
of variables. The decisive battles were fought within the West more often 
than between East and West. 
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Bilateral Leverages and European Security
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Brandt hopes to exploit the presumed Soviet interest in this project as a lever 
that may bring Moscow to put pressure on the East Germans to enter into ne-
gotiations with Bonn.
– US Ambassador in Bonn, Kenneth Rush, on the CSCE, January 19701
We see in the CSE a means to safeguard peace, to reduce tension in the East–
West relationship, and to overcome inner-German contradictions.
– Position paper of the Auswärtiges Amt, May 19702
The pace of West German foreign policy during the first year of the Brandt 
Government was breathtaking to say the least. Before the end of 1970, the 
Federal Republic had concluded two cornerstone agreements of its bilat-
eral Ostpolitik – the Moscow Treaty with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw 
Treaty with Poland. Official negotiating contacts had also been opened with 
the GDR, albeit so far with meagre results. On top of that, the Ambassadors 
of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union had 
started their negotiations on the status of Berlin. All these new leaps for-
ward in European détente and German Ostpolitik certainly kept the policy 
makers of the Federal Republic busy in the period covered in this chapter. 
But in spite of the understandable predominance of bilateral Ostpolitik, 
I will argue that the project of a European security conference also already 
figured on the political radar in Bonn. At first, the main emphasis in this 
respect was clearly on the instrumental use of the CSCE. As described in 
the preceding chapter, during the Grand Coalition the Auswärtiges Amt 
had developed meticulous plans for making use of the Soviet interest in 
the CSCE to receive concessions in return – in Ostpolitik in general and 
in Deutschlandpolitik in particular. Once in office, the Brandt Government 
did not hesitate to implement this linkage strategy. In the beginning, the 
atmosphere among the Western Allies was favourable for the linkage, and 
the Federal Republic felt relatively uninhibited in using the CSCE as a bar-
gaining chip in its bilateral negotiations. Appropriately, it was above all 
Egon Bahr, the main architect of the ‘linkage’ idea, who had the opportu-
nity to apply it in his negotiations in Moscow. But as soon as the leverage 
had been used once, its further application turned out to be problematic.
On the other hand, I will argue that the instrumental value of the CSCE 
was already during this period supplemented by a genuine interest in the 
agenda of the conference. The potential of the CSCE as a valuable tool in 
its own right in pursuing German objectives was realised in Bonn early 
on. Initial efforts of the FRG to influence the conference agenda in the 
multilateral Western preparations focused primarily on the inclusion of 
mutual and balanced force reductions. In the West German view, if a Eu-
ropean security conference was truly to live up to its name, it could not ne-
glect issues of hard security. The strong concentration on MBFR, however, 
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partly blinded the Federal Republic from seeing other possibilities for the 
CSCE agenda. This continued to impair the West German CSCE prepara-
tions into the latter half of 1970, when the Auswärtiges Amt slowly began to 
have a broader perspective on the conference agenda. 
Western Support for the Linkage of CSCE Plans  
with Deutschlandpolitik 
Among the first messages sent out from the Auswärtiges Amt after the So-
cial-Liberal Government had officially been sworn in was Foreign Minister 
Walter Scheel’s telegram to all FRG Ambassadors on 30 October 1969. Ex-
plaining the government declaration Chancellor Willy Brandt had given 
to the Bundestag a few days earlier, Scheel’s instructions underscored three 
new elements in the Deutschlandpolitik of the new government. In addition 
to setting the goal of negotiating a ‘regulated special relationship’ with the 
GDR as a central priority and renouncing the automatic consequences for 
third countries recognising the GDR, as had been prescribed in the Hall-
stein Doctrine, the instructions also introduced a new tactical approach. 
‘We will attempt to use the question of the GDR’s external relations as a 
means to advance an inner-German modus vivendi.’ 3 
As has been argued above, the Auswärtiges Amt had already during the 
end of the Grand Coalition held the view that an ‘improvement of climate’ 
between East and West – and particularly between the two German states 
– prior to the CSCE was an essential prerequisite for the success of the 
conference.4 This position was reflected also in a letter Hans Ruete, the 
Political Director of the Auswärtiges Amt, drafted for Brandt to send to the 
East German Prime Minister Willi Stoph immediately after the govern-
ment declaration. Ruete’s draft had the Warsaw Pact calls for a security 
conference as its starting point. Having affirmed Bonn’s genuine interest 
in a CSCE, the letter stated that efforts to pave the way for such a confer-
ence should not be ‘additionally burdened by unregulated questions in 
the relationship between the two parts of Germany’.5 
This argument, stressing the need to avoid ‘German quarrels’, was re-
peated by the Federal Republic, time and again, in discussions with their 
Western, Eastern and neutral counterparts during the autumn of 1969.6 
On the working level many of the Auswärtiges Amt officials hesitated to 
go beyond this position. Although bilateral negotiations were Bonn’s top 
priority, the argument went, ‘the impression should be avoided that we 
are making a successful conclusion of those discussions an unconditional 
prerequisite’ for European security negotiations.7 It was, above all, the 
concern of potential isolation in the West and of being blamed for the fail-
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ure of the security conference that called for more careful formulations.8 
Accordingly, in his first appearances as Foreign Minister, Walter Scheel 
preferred to refer to the possible bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union, 
Poland and the GDR as ‘test cases’, useful in estimating the possibilities 
of an eventual security conference, rather than presenting them strictly as 
formal preconditions.9 
But in confidential discussions with their allies, top FRG officials referred 
to the growing pressure to open the doors of international organisations 
and conferences for the GDR. In particular, the momentum of the CSCE dis-
cussion was clearly increasing. At the end of October in Prague, the Warsaw 
Pact issued yet another declaration calling for a rapid convening of an all-
European conference.10 If the CSCE was to be used as a bargaining chip for 
achieving some kind of inner-German solution, time was running out. As 
Ruete put it to a member of the British NATO delegation, ‘it was therefore 
necessary to use this bait fairly soon, or it might lose its value’.11 
Thus, the ‘linkage’ policy began to be implemented more actively. In-
stead of merely pointing to the favourable impact an inner-German rap-
prochement might have on the prospects of a CSCE, the FRG started to 
insist more openly that bilateral negotiations between Bonn and East Berlin 
were needed before a security conference could take place. This sent a new 
message to the Allies, as Haftendorn has accurately pointed out. Whereas 
some of the NATO members had at first been afraid that the FRG would 
move too far and too quickly in its Ostpolitik, they now started to suspect 
that the new Brandt Government wanted to put others’ détente policies on 
hold until it had found a suitable bilateral solution with East Berlin.12 
Such suspicions, if they did exist, were not unfounded. In instructions 
sent out to several West German embassies in mid-November, Ruete 
stressed the intention of the Federal Government to ‘make use of the dy-
namics of the European security discussion and of the Eastern interest in a 
European security conference’ in order to achieve an inner-German settle-
ment.13 In this context, it is worth mentioning that the East Germans were 
perfectly aware of these tactical considerations. In late December 1969, a 
memorandum prepared for the East German party leader Walter Ulbricht 
included lengthy verbatim quotations from Ruete’s instructions referred 
to above.14 Nevertheless, at a time when an official contact between Bonn 
and East Berlin had not yet been opened, it was in any case more impor-
tant for the West Germans to convince their allies of the ‘linkage’ strategy. 
And as far as the major allies were concerned, it turned out to be anything 
but a hard sell.
On 3 December, the Foreign Ministers of the FRG and the Three Powers 
met in Brussels for their traditional quadripartite get-together preceding 
the NATO ministerial meeting. Here the French Foreign Minister Mau-
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rice Schumann turned out to be the main advocate of the FRG’s linkage 
policy. Instead of being prepared to enter a CSCE without any precon-
ditions whatsoever, Schumann argued, the FRG should at first demand 
progress in the various negotiations that were about to begin – bilateral 
West German-Soviet negotiations, Allied soundings on the status of Ber-
lin, and inner-German talks. In Schumann’s words, ‘Germany was at the 
centre of this whole issue and it was for it to take the lead in formulating 
the conditions for Allied participation in a European Security Conference’. 
Since others in the quadripartite group more or less agreed with this view, 
the West German position was adopted without Scheel having to insist on 
it. On the contrary, in his statement Scheel continued to distance himself 
from setting firm preconditions, talking rather about the bilateral negotia-
tions as ‘substantive prerequisites’ for a CSCE, testing the Soviets’ willing-
ness to come to terms with the West at a possible conference.15 
Following the quadripartite dinner, the NATO Foreign Ministers’ au-
tumn meeting itself was unproblematic in this respect. Although the in-
dividual views that member states held of the CSCE varied considerably, 
with some of the smaller Allies seeing the conference in a more favourable 
light, there were no fundamental disagreements about the steps that were 
seen as the necessary preconditions for a conference.16 In the separate dec-
laration on the future development of East–West relations, issued by the 
ministers in addition to the usual final communiqué, the Alliance sup-
ported the bilateral initiatives of the FRG as well as the efforts to improve 
the situation in Berlin. Regarding the security conference, the Brussels 
declaration in December 1969 stated: 
Ministers consider that, as part of a comprehensive approach, progress in the 
bilateral and multilateral discussions and negotiations which have already 
begun, or could begin shortly, and which relate to fundamental problems of 
European security, would make a major contribution to improving the political 
atmosphere in Europe. Progress in these discussions and negotiations would 
help to ensure the success of any eventual conference.17
This circumspect statement could be – and was – interpreted in various 
ways. Some Allies saw the declaration, as Hartmut Mayer has argued, as a 
clear instruction for the FRG to achieve results on the German question in 
order to free the way for the security conference.18 This naturally applied 
in particular to those NATO members who were favourably inclined to 
the general idea of a CSCE. By contrast, those less enthusiastic about the 
conference project saw this as a means to procrastinate on the CSCE front 
as well as to control the pace of Brandt’s bilateral policies. In his memoirs, 
Henry Kissinger referred to the results of the NATO ministerial meeting 
in December 1969 as embedding Ostpolitik in a ‘matrix of negotiations’, 
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including the CSCE. Kissinger argued that this matrix not only enhanced 
the bargaining position of the FRG, but also set limits beyond which it 
could not go without an Allied consensus.19
The interpretation in Bonn was different. In the discussions with the 
Three Powers and within the wider NATO framework in early December 
the FRG had been encouraged, almost persuaded, by others to take the 
lead in setting Western preconditions for a CSCE. The West Germans saw 
this as a clear mandate to implement their ‘linkage’ policy – to utilise the 
prospect of a CSCE for bilateral purposes. With this fillip to their self-
confidence, the FRG approached the first real test of the linkage approach, 
the bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, with high hopes.
Horse-Trading in Moscow
The expectation, attached in Bonn to the CSCE, of it being a tactical tool in 
the bilateral negotiations with Moscow had been on the rise already before 
the December meeting of NATO. On 15 November 1969 Helmut Allardt, 
the FRG Ambassador in Moscow, delivered a verbal note from his govern-
ment to the Soviet leadership, formally suggesting the opening of bilateral 
discussions about a renunciation of force between the Federal Republic 
and the Soviet Union.20 The following day, the Romanian Deputy Foreign 
Minister, Gheorghe Macovescu, assured Egon Bahr in one of their secret 
meetings that the security conference was the key to the Soviet Union: ‘If 
the Federal Republic takes a positive attitude to the security conference, it 
will get the Russians on its side’.21 And a long discussion Scheel had with 
the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn gave the Germans further testimony of the 
importance the Soviet Union attached to the CSCE.22 
Equipped with this information, Chancellor Brandt felt encouraged to 
raise the security conference as one of the central issues of his letter to 
the Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin on 19 November. In this letter, 
pleading for the importance of bilateral renunciation-of-force agreements 
between the FRG and the Soviet Union, Poland and the GDR, Brandt also 
established a direct connection between these agreements and the pros-
pects of a European security conference. In Brandt’s view, these bilateral 
agreements could set an important example for the conference and, after 
their conclusion, ‘flow into a multilateral renunciation of force’.23 In his 
memoirs Bahr has underscored the significance of this letter, which in his 
view presented the ‘contours of the programme leading all the way to 
1975 in Helsinki’. Moreover, Bahr writes that the US President, Richard 
Nixon, who was confidentially informed about the contents of the letter, 
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expressed his gratitude to the Germans for holding back the process to-
wards a CSCE with it.24 
But Brandt’s letter also shows the understandable limitations the Ger-
mans faced in pursuing their strategy. In dealing with a superpower, 
imposing inflexible and unconditional preconditions was hardly a good 
opening move for the FRG. Answering questions in the Foreign Policy 
Committee of the Bundestag on 11 December, Foreign Minister Scheel 
admitted this rather frankly. Although the Federal Republic for the time 
being preferred bilateral East–West talks over multilateral ones, Scheel ex-
plained, ‘we cannot make a condition out of it. That would endanger our 
own negotiations.’25 
The linkage had to be presented in slightly more subtle terms. As the 
bilateral West German–Soviet contacts were opened in December 1969 
with three meetings between Ambassador Allardt and Foreign Minister 
Andrei Gromyko in Moscow, Allardt was consistently instructed to refer 
to the favourable impact that progress in and conclusion of the bilateral 
negotiations – with the Soviet Union, Poland and the GDR – as well as 
the Berlin talks would have for the prospects of a European security con-
ference. According to the instructions, the Federal Government did not 
want to impose an immediate link between the bilateral and multilateral 
processes, but insisted on seeing an ‘inner connection’ between them.26 
Yet sensitivity to such subtle messages at the negotiating table was hardly 
among the virtues of Gromyko. In his first two meetings with Allardt, 
the Soviet Foreign Minister responded furiously to any suggested connec-
tions between the CSCE and other negotiations, warning the Germans not 
to create ‘artificial difficulties’ – the establishment of such links was ‘nei-
ther appropriate nor useful’.27 In spite of this stonewalling, Allardt’s own 
estimate of the tactical situation after the first meetings was surprisingly 
optimistic: in his view Gromyko had clearly realised the significance the 
West German-Soviet negotiations would have for a CSCE.28 
It is essential to note that the West German-Soviet negotiations were by 
no means the only – although the most obvious and immediate – target 
of West German efforts to instrumentalise the CSCE in Moscow. Deutsch-
landpolitik objectives were constantly looming in the background. As one 
of Bahr’s subordinates in the Chancellery argued in early December, the 
Soviet Union was in any case needed to persuade the GDR to the nego-
tiating table – and for that purpose the inclusion of the CSCE in the offer 
could be helpful.29 In fact, the US embassy in Bonn, in a set of insightful 
telegrams at the end of December 1969 and in early January 1970, seems 
to have captured the essence of the situation. The FRG had indeed made 
the inner-German rapprochement ‘almost a precondition’ for its partici-
pation in the CSCE.30 According to the interpretation of the US embassy, 
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the Brandt Government considered the security conference to be a useful 
lever which might lure the Soviet Union to put pressure on the GDR to 
enter into inner-German negotiations.31 
In this context, it is particularly interesting that although the instruc-
tions to Allardt were formally sent out from the Foreign Ministry, all the 
sections containing elements of the link to the CSCE were – without excep-
tion – direct results of interventions from the Chancellery.32 In particular, 
the more complex attempt to use the CSCE card to persuade Moscow to 
put pressure on East Berlin was originally a brainchild of Brandt’s entou-
rage. At the request of the Head of the Chancellery, Horst Ehmke, one 
of the key sentences of the first set of instructions to Allardt read: ‘The 
clarification of the inner-German relationship would create the basis for 
a successful process of a European Security Conference.’33 Instead of the 
Auswärtiges Amt, the Chancellery was in charge. And in addition to Mos-
cow, the other addressee of the CSCE linkage policy was East Berlin. 
Although the Allardt–Gromyko talks ended in December after only 
three meetings without any concrete results to speak of, the belief in the 
potential impact of the CSCE leverage remained firm in the Chancellery. 
In yet another secret meeting with Macovescu, Egon Bahr told his Ro-
manian interlocutor that his goverment saw the security conference as a 
‘fundamental lever in the discussion with Moscow’.34 It did not take long 
before Bahr himself had the opportunity to test this lever in practice. After 
pulling the strings behind the scenes already during Allardt’s discus-
sions, the Chancellery completely took over the responsibility for the West 
German-Soviet discussions in January 1970, when Bahr was appointed to 
continue the ‘exchange of opinions’ with Gromyko. Before his departure 
for Moscow, Bahr presented an ambitious – and, as it turned out, realistic 
– timetable to Brandt. In Bahr’s opinion, the bilateral renunciation of force 
had to be completed, or at least its completion had to appear certain, be-
fore the early summer of 1970. According to Bahr, the time pressure call-
ing for such rapid progress in the West German-Soviet negotiations was in 
part due to the CSCE process: 
a) There will be no ESC without the Federal Republic. This is our lever. b) This 
lever serves the bilateral renunciation of force. c) This lever becomes the weaker 
the closer an ESC gets without us having the bilateral renunciation of force.35
In his idiosyncratic fashion, Bahr thus claimed to have identified an ex-
ceptional tactical momentum – yet in the same breath argued that the mo-
mentum was on the wane. If the FRG wanted to make use of the CSCE in 
Moscow, it had to act quickly. 
The first round of the Bahr–Gromyko talks was opened in Moscow in 
late January 1970. At the end of their first meeting, Gromyko took the ini-
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tiative and briefly returned to the link between the CSCE and the bilateral 
talks: ‘We do not want any horse-trading. It would not be good if you were 
to make your participation in the ESC conditional on the successful conclu-
sion of the current talks.’ Bahr merely replied that his party was not inter-
ested in horse-trading either.36 But the topic was covered more extensively 
in their following meeting. After another attack by Gromyko on ‘artificial 
connections’, Bahr defended the West German position, arguing that it was 
neither about horse-trading nor about setting preconditions. Instead, Bahr 
stressed, the West German-Soviet negotiations were an important part of 
improving security and détente in Europe. If the talks in Moscow were 
successful, the FRG would have a strong argument to convince the more 
sceptical Western powers of the possibilities of a security conference. But 
on the other hand, Bahr went on: ‘If we failed, the Three Powers would say: 
“Do you have bats in the belfry? You don’t get the one thing you want the 
most and now you are rushing there [into the conference]?”’37 
Apparently this approach, appealing to potential German influence on 
the CSCE discussions within the West, struck the right chord in Moscow. 
Gromyko immediately took it up, pointing out to Bahr that if the FRG 
made use of its influence on the Three Powers in the CSCE context, the 
Soviet Union would naturally see that in a positive light. After the meet-
ing, Bahr reported that Gromyko had appeared to understand the West 
German position completely.38 This optimistic evaluation of the potential 
leverage was also shared in the upper echelons of the Auswärtiges Amt.39 
Moreover, the NATO Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe even called for a stron-
ger West German initiative in the conference preparations of the Alliance, 
since ‘the influence that we are able to have on the development towards 
an ECS in the Western camp is significant for our negotiating chances in 
Moscow’.40 In other words, Grewe, an outspoken CSCE sceptic,41 sug-
gested a demonstrative increase in German CSCE activity in the NATO 
framework in order to further increase the momentum in the Bahr–Gro-
myko talks.
As the talks in Moscow resumed on 3 March 1970 after a two-week 
pause, Gromyko repeated Soviet suspicions of West German intentions 
to link the bilateral negotiations with the CSCE. Bahr reassured the So-
viet Foreign Minister that the position of the Federal Government in this 
respect remained unchanged.42 Only a few days later, Gromyko tabled a 
Soviet non-paper, in effect already containing the main elements of what 
would become the final Moscow Treaty and the so-called declarations of 
intent that supplemented it. In point number 10 of the Soviet document, 
the Soviet Union and the FRG pledged to ‘undertake the efforts needed to 
prepare and convene the all-European conference on questions of consoli-
dating security in Europe’.43 In their meeting on 10 March, Bahr told Gro-
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myko that he had been somewhat surprised to see the CSCE paragraph 
included in the non-paper but admitted that the question had indeed been 
touched upon in the negotiations. With certain reformulations, Bahr said, 
the West German side was prepared to agree to this part of the Soviet 
proposal. In Bahr’s counter-suggestion, the problematic ‘all-European’ at-
tribute (potentially implying the exclusion of the North American Allies) 
was dropped, the level of commitment slightly reduced and the element 
of cooperation introduced.44 Already, on the following day, the delega-
tions were able to agree on a compromise between the Soviet and West 
German versions of the non-paper. This working paper also included the 
declaration of intent regarding the CSCE, now in the form: ‘The FRG and 
the USSR welcome the plan for a conference on questions of consolidating 
security and cooperation in Europe and will do everything in their power 
for the preparation and successful implementation of this plan.’45 On 21 
March, Bahr and Gromyko gave their final blessing to this formulation.46 
The compromise about the CSCE paragraph was probably the easiest 
one to arrive at among the points in the working paper. And at first sight, 
compared with the historical proportions of the main clauses of the West 
German-Soviet renunciation-of-force agreement which was slowly begin-
ning to take shape, the declaration of intent to support a European secu-
rity conference might appear of minor importance. In fact it was far from 
insignificant. When Bahr appeared before the Bundestag Foreign Policy 
Committee in March to report on the latest state of the talks in Moscow, he 
referred to several official and unofficial discussions with Gromyko about 
the CSCE.47 The security conference was part and parcel of the Moscow 
talks, although Brandt for some reason was on many occasions at pains to 
belittle the influence of the CSCE in the Moscow negotiations.48
As a matter of fact, it seems that the Soviet Union was at least as keen 
as the Germans to establish a link between the CSCE and the bilateral 
talks. After all, it was a Soviet initiative to include the CSCE statement as 
one of the declarations of intent. A fascinating memorandum of the State 
Department from April 1970, based on US intelligence reports, claims that 
although Gromyko had consistently rejected the efforts by first Allardt 
and then Bahr to link the bilateral renunciation of force with West Ger-
man support for a security conference, ‘Bahr and Brandt have stated in 
private that it was the Soviets who had been suggesting that Bonn’s sup-
port for the CES would facilitate progress toward a renunciation of force 
agreement.’ According to these clandestine US sources, Bahr’s analysis of 
the situation already in late February was that the Soviets wanted Bonn 
to ‘make it clear to its own allies that it would unconditionally support 
the calling of a CES’ before a renunciation-of-force agreement could be 
discussed seriously.49 Later in the summer, in defence of the CSCE com-
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mitment, Auswärtiges Amt officials told their British colleagues that the 
Germans had ‘really had no option but to take a position in Moscow on 
what was a scheme of particular interest to the Soviet Government’.50
In any case, the ‘linkage’ policy was beginning to pay dividends. Al-
though it is impossible to pin down direct causality from the archival re-
cord, it is certainly plausible to think that the agreement reached on the 
CSCE formulation served as a useful additional lubricant to the progress 
of the negotiations in Moscow. Moreover, it may also have had the in-
tended triangular impact, via Moscow to East Berlin. Coinciding with 
the advances made in Moscow in March, there was a parallel develop-
ment on the inner-German front. On 19 March, at the end of the second 
round of the Bahr–Gromyko talks, Chancellor Brandt met Willi Stoph in 
Erfurt. After difficult preparations, a direct contact between the two Ger-
man states was finally established. As Mary Sarotte has pointed out, the 
breakthrough in the preparation of the Erfurt meeting was achieved after 
a Soviet intervention on 11 March, with immediate effect on the behaviour 
of the GDR.51 This, as we have seen, was the day when the compromise 
working paper in Moscow had been agreed on.
When Bahr and Gromyko met again on 12 May for the third and final 
round of their talks, the common undertaking of the FRG and Soviet Union 
to work towards the CSCE was no longer a contested issue.52 In Bonn, 
however, the legal department of the Auswärtiges Amt gave a harsh verdict 
on the working paper under review in Moscow: virtually all the guide-
lines were in the Soviet interest alone and it was impossible to achieve 
a balanced treaty on their basis. The CSCE paragraph was no exception. 
According to the legal experts, this declaration would mark a departure 
from the common CSCE consultations within NATO, committing the FRG 
to go it alone and support the conference in line with Soviet interests.53 
Nevertheless, making full use of his independent negotiating position in 
Moscow, Bahr kept his head. The CSCE formulation agreed in March re-
mained unchanged as the final declaration of intent in the end product of 
the Bahr–Gromyko talks, the document later known as the ‘Bahr Paper’.54 
And again, the end of a Bahr–Gromyko round in Moscow coincided with 
an inner-German summit. On 21 May Brandt and Stoph had their second 
meeting within two months, this time in Kassel. In contrast to Erfurt, how-
ever, there is no indication of a direct link between progress in Moscow 
and the timing of the Kassel meeting. 
But if the West German commitment to the CSCE in Moscow was 
indeed bearing fruit in facilitating the process towards a West German-
Soviet treaty, the Soviets were also quick to demand that the Federal Re-
public lived up to its word. The ink on the Bahr Paper was hardly dry 
when Ambassador Tsarapkin met Foreign Minister Scheel in Bonn to call 
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for further German efforts to promote the CSCE at the upcoming NATO 
Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Rome.55 In July, the Soviet Ambassador sug-
gested to Chancellor Brandt that bilateral West German-Soviet consulta-
tions about the CSCE should be opened.56 Brandt and Scheel were able 
to evade these approaches, but the Soviets clearly interpreted the CSCE 
formulations of the Bahr Paper as a genuine commitment. 
The Bahr Paper as a whole laid the ground for the actual negotiations 
for the Moscow Treaty between Scheel and Gromyko in July and August, 
but its final declaration of intent threatened to become a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, it does appear that Bahr was successful in using 
the CSCE lever in his discussions in Moscow more or less as planned. But 
on the other hand, whatever had been gained by Bahr in return for prom-
ises of support for the CSCE, that leverage was spent at the moment the 
commitment was locked into the Bahr Paper. From May 1970 onwards, 
that particular German-Soviet connection could only work the other way. 
Moreover, any hopes there may have been for using the security confer-
ence as a direct bargaining chip in the contacts with the GDR were dealt a 
severe blow precisely by the CSCE commitment made in Moscow. When 
the Scheel–Gromyko negotiations were concluded on 7 August with the 
initialling of the Moscow Treaty, the Foreign Ministers also exchanged 
initialled copies of the six final declarations of intent of the Bahr Paper. Al-
though these commitments were not officially part of the Moscow Treaty, 
they naturally did not go unnoticed in East Berlin, either. In a memoran-
dum of the GDR Foreign Ministry, the commitment of the Federal Repub-
lic to the CSCE project was greeted as a triumph. ‘This binding promise of 
the FRG can be used in the future to rebut its objections to and precondi-
tions for a security conference.’57 
With important repercussions for the later CSCE discussions about in-
violability of frontiers, the Germans also managed to get the Soviet Union 
to register the receipt of a separate ‘letter on German unity’ on the occa-
sion of the signing of the Moscow Treaty. In this letter, the Federal Gov-
ernment stated that the treaty did not contradict the aim of the Federal 
Republic to create ‘a state of peace in Europe in which the German people 
can regain its unity in free self-determination’.58
While the Federal Government, in its official statement regarding the 
Moscow Treaty, tried to give an assurance that ‘this declaration of intent 
does not interfere with the prerequisites the Federal Government consid-
ers indispensable for such a conference’59, the implications that commit-
ment had for any potential leverage on the GDR must have been obvious 
in Bonn as well. Already during the spring, the appropriate location for 
applying the CSCE linkage had been clearly perceived to be in Moscow. 
This was not only witnessed by the constant presence of the CSCE in the 
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Bahr–Gromyko talks, but also by the complete absence of the conference 
from the agenda of the Brandt–Stoph discussions. In his conversations 
with the East Germans, Brandt made no attempt, either in Erfurt or in 
Kassel, to use the security conference directly as a bargaining tool. The 
Moscow Treaty and the CSCE commitment attached to it emphasised fur-
ther that the inner-German element of the CSCE linkage strategy had to 
be thought of in triangular terms: going through Moscow in order to have 
an impact on East Berlin. Accordingly, in conjunction with the signing of 
the Moscow Treaty on 12 August, Brandt suggested to Kosygin that Soviet 
support in bringing about genuine inner-German negotiations would also 
help the preparations of a security conference – but did not present them 
as an absolute precondition.60 
With the Moscow Treaty signed, although still far from being ratified 
and entering into force, in less than a year after the inauguration of the 
Brandt–Scheel Government, Ostpolitik had got off to a flying start. Indeed, 
for many observers – foreign and domestic alike – the pace was too quick, 
resulting in unnecessary concessions by the West German negotiators in 
Moscow. Ambassador Allardt later bitterly criticised Bahr and Brandt for 
their premature use of the CSCE leverage: ‘Our agreement [to the confer-
ence] was of a very special value to the Kremlin. It was a trump card which 
would have deserved an adequate reward’.61 Allardt’s criticism is diffi-
cult to subscribe to completely, since the Moscow Treaty itself ought to 
have been more than enough of a reward. Given the historic weight of the 
German-Soviet agreement, if the commitment to the security conference 
helped in part to bring about the treaty, it was certainly a price Bonn could 
afford to pay. Yet there is also a kernel of truth in Allardt’s attack. Once the 
West German commitment to the CSCE was laid on the table in Moscow, 
its value as a lever elsewhere was dramatically diminished. 
Rethinking the Linkage Strategy
In the new situation after the Moscow Treaty, the West Germans basically 
had two alternative ways to continue using the CSCE leverage. On the 
one hand, the FRG could continue its attempts to have Moscow persuade 
East Berlin to come to the inner-German negotiating table, pointing out 
the advantageous impact that this would have on the CSCE. As shown 
above, there had been a consistent tendency in Bonn to see the CSCE lever 
on the GDR as most efficient when applied through Moscow. On the other 
hand, a perhaps more promising alternative was to try to multilateralise 
the linkage approach in the West, by focusing increasingly on the Berlin 
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talks instead of bilateral negotiations as further preconditions for a secu-
rity conference.
As the contents of the Bahr Paper were leaked to West German news-
papers in June 1970, the final declaration of intent of the Bahr–Gromyko 
agreement also came into the public domain. This naturally led to misgiv-
ings at home as well as abroad. Was the Federal Republic now acting as 
the advocate of Moscow in the CSCE discussions of the West? In an effort 
to dispel these suspicions, Egon Bahr appeared before the NATO Council, 
explaining the results of his negotiations with Gromyko and emphasising 
to the Allies that no promises regarding the security conference had been 
made in Moscow that went beyond agreements made in the NATO frame-
work, and that the CSCE policies of the Federal Republic in NATO were in 
no way prejudiced by the Bahr Paper.62 In Bonn, the Auswärtiges Amt made 
similar explanations, arguing that there was no absolute yardstick for the 
undertaking to do ‘everything in their power’ in favour of a CSCE. In par-
ticular, this commitment could not override the democratic principles of 
NATO decision-making – the FRG still had to respect majority decisions 
in the Alliance.63
Indeed, no matter how thoroughly planned, any FRG attempts to use 
the CSCE as a tool for its Ostpolitik could succeed only if they were backed 
by constant multilateral support from the NATO allies. From the spring 
of 1970, this support was no longer unanimous and unconditional. The 
changing situation within the Alliance was one factor contributing to West 
German reconsideration of the linkage strategy. 
As we have seen above, in December 1969, NATO Foreign Ministers 
had agreed that tangible progress in the Berlin question and in the inner-
German relationship had to be made before the opening of any multilateral 
discussions.64 Subsequently, it was increasingly the Berlin negotiations 
that were moving to the centre of attention in NATO. The French espe-
cially, eager to maintain their particular position as one of the Big Four, 
appeared to be ‘obsessed’ with Berlin. They were concerned that a de facto 
recognition of the GDR resulting from its participation in a CSCE would 
lead to significant deterioration of the Berlin situation, if that had not been 
regulated beforehand.65 The quadripartite talks about the situation in the 
divided city were started on 26 March 1970, with the first meeting of the 
three Western Ambassadors to Bonn and the Soviet Ambassador to East 
Berlin. But progress in these four-power Berlin negotiations during the 
spring of 1970 was minimal. Given the widespread consensus in the Al-
liance on the importance of the Berlin precondition, this also made rapid 
movements towards a CSCE unthinkable for the time being. 
But in the spring of 1970 there were signs of wavering in the NATO 
members’ willingness to support the FRG when it came to the bilateral 
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Ostpolitik negotiations – and in particular the inner-German talks – as 
preconditions for a CSCE. The French, especially, with a growing inter-
est of their own in the conference, began to voice their suspicions.66 Dur-
ing his visit to Moscow in January, Hervé Alphand, the top official of the 
French Foreign Ministry, had argued that the FRG should not be allowed 
to become the judge of the fate of the conference.67 In April, another high-
ranking official at the Quai d’Orsay delivered a similar message in Paris 
to the Finnish Ambassador Ralph Enckell, who was sounding out CSCE 
positions of potential participants.68 The French also turned directly to the 
Germans, asking whether the FRG still continued to hold to the view of 
demanding progress in inner-German negotiations before a security con-
ference.69 In response, the embassy in Paris was instructed to reconfirm 
the known West German position. The Federal Republic could agree to a 
CSCE only after concrete steps had been taken in the inner-German dis-
cussions. Additionally, the FRG continued to see its bilateral discussions 
with Moscow and Warsaw as well as the Berlin talks of the Four Powers 
as test cases of Soviet preparedness for genuine détente.70 
However, it was becoming clear that there was a significant internal 
shortcoming in the linkage strategy of the FRG. The West Germans them-
selves appeared unable to define precisely what constituted the degree 
of progress in the inner-German and Berlin talks required to justify West 
German agreement to enter a multilateral security conference. An FRG 
embassy official in London conceded as much in February 1970, saying 
that it was impossible to say how far such progress would have to go: 
‘The main thing was that it should have gone sufficiently far to make it 
certain that there would be no confrontation between the Germans at a 
conference.’71 In internal background papers the problem was recognised 
with greater clarity. ‘The Federal Government has not been able to deter-
mine what amount of inner-German development is considered sufficient 
for a CES.’ For the time being, the ambiguous West German line was to 
refuse to be drawn into a CSCE before the ‘necessary degree of maturity’ 
in the bilateral negotiations and the Berlin talks had been achieved.72 This 
hesitation was particularly awkward in a situation where most of the Al-
lies still agreed that due to the ongoing SALT and Ostpolitik negotiations, 
it was the United States and the FRG that held the keys to determining 
whether sufficient progress had been made to justify multilateral talks.73 
In the British view of the Western CSCE preparations ‘most of the cards 
were in Federal German hands’.74
In the short term, the Germans were able to play their hand well. 
Preparing the communiqué for the spring 1970 ministerial meeting, the 
NATO allies agreed that the opening of actual multilateral negotiations 
still continued to be conditional on the progress in the talks that were al-
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ready under way. However, the UK and Belgium, actively supported by 
the Scandinavians, argued that the ministers should balance this by ex-
pressing NATO’s preparedness already to enter ‘multilateral exploratory 
talks’ about a security conference – partly in order to keep public opinion 
at home satisfied.75 The FRG led the opposing camp, condemning this idea 
of an ambassadorial ‘tea party’ in Helsinki to sound out the prospects of 
a conference, dating back to a Belgian proposal from March 1970. In the 
West German view, such a ‘tea party’ would have the same collateral ef-
fects as a conference proper. Although this conflict was not resolved in 
time for the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Rome in May, the Ger-
mans were able to count on the support of the US in preventing the Anglo-
Belgian proposal from being accepted.76
According to the US NATO Ambassador, in the Rome meeting the FRG 
‘did its best to avoid taking a position on anything’, probably in order to 
maintain maximum flexibility in the sensitive phase of Ostpolitik.77 The 
French did most of the legwork in finding a compromise position, and in 
the end, the option for exploratory talks was not mentioned. Moreover, 
the relevant paragraph in the Rome communiqué referred, for the first 
time, explicitly to progress in the inner-German and Berlin talks as a pre-
requisite for the conference preparations: 
In so far as progress is recorded […] in the on-going talks – in particular on 
Germany and Berlin – the Allied Governments state that they would be ready 
to enter into multilateral contacts with all interested governments. One of the 
main purposes of such contacts would be to explore when it will be possible 
to convene a conference or a series of conferences on European security and 
co-operation.78
In short, the Germans had reason to be content with the outcome of the 
Rome meeting.79 Not only was the linkage between the inner-German 
talks and the CSCE maintained – it was also articulated in clearer terms 
than before. Nevertheless, the budding discontent within NATO during 
the spring of 1970 had made its presence felt: it was obvious that the Allies 
would not be prepared to grant the FRG a de facto veto on the CSCE prepa-
rations indefinitely, if this veto was based on bilateral German negotia-
tions alone. In June the Auswärtiges Amt estimated that it might be possible 
to hold this question open for a further six months, until the following 
NATO ministerial meeting in December 1970, but hardly any longer than 
that.80 This turned out to be a prophetic statement. 
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Berlin Surpasses Other Preconditions
During the summer of 1970, the West Germans’ own position on linkage 
of the Berlin talks with the CSCE was already on the move, yet still far 
from a firmly established new line. In their discussions with Allied col-
leagues, Auswärtiges Amt officials were prepared to soften the precondi-
tions required for a CSCE, conceding that they did not expect all of the 
Eastern treaties to be ‘signed, sealed and delivered’ before there could 
be progress towards a security conference. Simultaneously, however, the 
same officials continued to refer to the leverage the Soviet interest in the 
security conference gave to the West and to argue that the Alliance ought 
to see progress in the bilateral negotiations of the Federal Republic as a 
‘touchstone’ for deciding when to multilateralise contacts.81 Egon Bahr 
took this dialectical approach even further, saying in the same breath that 
on the one hand, the bilateral negotiations were not a precondition for a 
CSCE but that on the other hand, if they failed, the idea of a conference 
would be dead.82 Brandt, for his part, was more cautious, pointing to the 
inadvisability of creating hard and binding links between different areas 
of foreign policy.83
In fact, as the positions began to take shape, there was a fascinating di-
vergence of views between the views of the Chancellery and the Foreign 
Ministry during the autumn of 1970. Brandt’s Chancellery had reason to 
believe that there could be movement in Deutschlandpolitik even without 
the direct use of the CSCE leverage. On 29 October, an East German del-
egation – prompted by the Soviet Union – arrived in Bonn to meet Brandt, 
suggesting the reopening of talks between the FRG and the GDR.84 Brandt 
welcomed the idea, and a month later in East Berlin, Bahr and his GDR 
colleague Michael Kohl began their negotiations on transit questions be-
tween the two German states.85 The pace of these negotiations was admit-
tedly glacial in the beginning, but the six-month ‘pause for reflection’ in 
inner-German relations was nonetheless overcome. 
This also had important repercussions for the CSCE policy of the FRG. 
In an interesting shift, just when the Auswärtiges Amt leadership had ad-
opted the brainchild of Brandt and Bahr, the very creators of the linkage 
strategy were already beginning to depart from it. For the Chancellery, the 
CSCE linkage had already served its major purpose in the West German-
Soviet negotiations, and there was no longer much to be hoped for from it 
in the strictly bilateral inner-German context. The divergence between the 
Chancellery and the Auswärtiges Amt in late 1970 was further consolidated 
by the internal division of labour. During the first year of the Brandt Gov-
ernment, the Chancellery had effectively taken charge of all the bilateral 
issues considered to be the hard core of West German foreign policy – 
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the Moscow negotiations being a case in point.86 This had left the Foreign 
Ministry sidelined, with responsibility for less important issues, such as 
the emerging CSCE process. After a fairly weak first year in office, Foreign 
Minister Scheel, supported by the new State Secretary of the Auswärtiges 
Amt, Paul Frank, was now willing to make his presence felt.87 More or less 
excluded from the Chancellery-dominated Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpoli-
tik, Scheel and his subordinates attempted to make the CSCE a policy area 
of their own, in an effort to prove their independence.
To complicate matters further, the Auswärtiges Amt was not speaking 
with one voice. Over the summer, Scheel had tended to emphasise the Ber-
lin negotiations, at the expense of the inner-German talks, to the Soviets 
as the major test that needed to be passed before the CSCE.88 This corre-
sponded with the ideas of the less rigid elements in the Foreign Ministry. 
For example Berndt von Staden and Günther van Well, two high-ranking 
officials in the political department, were both of the view that although 
agreement on some kind of treaty with the GDR before a CSCE was de-
sirable, it was better to speak merely about a ‘clarification’ of the inner-
German relationship or a modus vivendi, in order to avoid the ‘impression 
of preconditions’ and damaging effects on Ostpolitik resulting from it.89 
In this line of reasoning, it was considered tactically advantageous to 
multilateralise the ‘linkage’ policy and to share the responsibility for de-
laying the CSCE by focusing on progress in the Berlin talks as the main 
prerequisite, rather than to appear as the sole demandeur blocking the road 
to the conference.90 This emphasis on Berlin instead of inner-German talks 
was also reflected in Scheel’s discussions in October 1970 with various 
interlocutors, whether Western, Eastern or neutral.91 Somewhat curiously, 
the Berlin precondition actually seemed to go down better in Moscow than 
in Brussels. Whereas the Soviet Union appeared, albeit grudgingly, to be 
prepared to accept the need for a Berlin agreement before a CSCE, a num-
ber of smaller NATO members increasingly voiced their discomfort about 
it. Their main concern was that the secretive handling of the Berlin nego-
tiations by the Bonn Group powers would also give them a monopoly on 
Western decision-making about the fate of the security conference.92
But in the autumn of 1970 there was a clear backlash from the hard-
liners in the Auswärtiges Amt, attempting to rescue and restore the link 
between inner-German talks and the CSCE.93 They considered it essential 
to hold firmly to the formulations of the Rome communiqué: no form of 
a multilateralisation of the CSCE preparations should be considered until 
substantial progress in the bilateral negotiations of the FRG and in the 
Berlin question had been recorded.94 In September 1970 the West German 
representative in the NATO Council declared that progress in the inner-
German negotiations continued to be the major yardstick for their deci-
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sion whether to take part in a CSCE.95 Against the backdrop of the West 
German CSCE commitment made in Moscow, this position was certainly 
‘stiffer than may have been expected’, as the US Ambassador to Bonn, 
Kenneth Rush, commented. Rush’s conclusion, that the unexpected firm-
ness was in part a German reaction to Western suspicions raised by the 
very same declaration of intent in the Bahr Paper, was probably not very 
far off the mark.96 
In the latter half of the autumn, the hardliners seemed to be getting 
the upper hand in the Auswärtiges Amt. In a meeting with Gromyko on 30 
October, Scheel surprised his Soviet colleague by returning progress in 
inner-German negotiations and other bilateral talks – on an equal footing 
with the Berlin negotiations – to the list of developments that ought to pre-
cede the security conference. Indeed, instead of just referring to ‘progress’, 
Scheel went further and suggested that practical preparations for a secu-
rity conference could commence when ‘circumstances for the accession 
of both German states to the United Nations had been created’. Gromyko 
immediately rebutted this suggestion as a West German attempt to create 
new preconditions for the conference.97 
It was precisely in this element that the views of the Chancellery and 
the Auswärtiges Amt were going in separate directions. In his comments 
to a Foreign Ministry working paper on the CSCE and Deutschlandpolitik, 
Egon Bahr in early November 1970 underscored that from a tactical point 
of view it was essential now to avoid the impression of posing new pre-
conditions.98 But at least in the short term the dominant Auswärtiges Amt 
view – prepared to risk that impression – prevailed. The working paper, 
with only minor modifications, was presented to the Bonn Group on 5 No-
vember, emphasising that in spite of the recent focus on the Berlin talks, 
progress was still also needed in the inner-German talks before a security 
conference. Moreover, this Auswärtiges Amt study for the first time made 
a clear distinction between multilateral conference preparations and the 
conference proper. Multilateral CSCE preparations had to be preceded 
by the ‘beginning of genuine negotiations between the two German gov-
ernments’. Before the actual conference, then again, these inner-German 
negotiations had to be underway and an agreement reached on the ‘essen-
tial features of an inner-German settlement’.99 Two weeks after the Bonn 
Group meeting, this West German position paper was also delivered to 
the other NATO allies.100 
The US saw this as a major shift in the West German approach: the FRG 
now wanted to see progress in the inner-German modus vivendi as well, in-
stead of only in the Berlin talks, before a CSCE.101 Although the West Ger-
man position was considered ‘entirely reasonable’ and received full US 
support, George Vest from the US NATO mission admitted that ‘this may, 
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as an apparently new and additional “precondition”, be hard to sell to 
some members of the Alliance. […] To switch emphasis to inner-German 
talks – or at least to argue that this was what was always intended – may 
be regarded as rewriting history’. Therefore Vest recommended that the 
FRG, to improve its chances of success, ought to seek support from the 
Bonn Group before the upcoming meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers.102 
This was precisely what the Auswärtiges Amt intended. At a quadripar-
tite meeting in mid-November 1970 the political directors of all the Three 
Powers agreed with the West Germans on the need to find a common 
position on the progress in the German and Berlin questions needed to 
justify a CSCE. The main argument for finding a consensus in the Bonn 
Group was the ability to speak with one voice to the remaining NATO al-
lies, although their sensitivities about being left out of the CSCE prepara-
tions were well known.103 Using the Bonn Group in the CSCE context was 
a powerful tool. Hans Otto Bräutigam, who was at that time a desk officer 
in the Deutschlandpolitik unit of the Auswärtiges Amt, has later stressed the 
extraordinary influence of the Bonn Group during the intensive coopera-
tion in the Berlin negotiations. If the Bonn Group agreed on something on 
the working level, it was very difficult for any of the four governments 
involved to reverse that decision later on.104 
When it came to actually finding substantive support for the West Ger-
man view in the Bonn Group, two thirds of the task were relatively easy. 
The United States and Britain had little reason to oppose West German 
insistence on a ‘clarification’ of the inner-German relationship before any 
multilateral conference preparations. The US had never been enthusias-
tic about the CSCE, but the reservations the UK had on the conference 
resulted from the change of government in June 1970. Under the lead-
ership of the new Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, the Brit-
ish Government focused its European policies on accession to the EC and 
assumed a distinctly more passive role in the CSCE discussion.105 This 
was spelled out clearly by Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home in December 
1970: ‘It is chiefly the Federal German Government who, in their wish to 
see progress in the Berlin negotiations and in the inner German talks, are 
pressing their allies to go slow on the question of the Conference. … When 
the Federal German Government are ready for a Conference on European 
Security, we shall not oppose it.’106
Whereas this change in Alliance dynamics was favourable for West 
German efforts to uphold the link between the inner-German negotiations 
and a CSCE, it was neutralised by a simultaneous change in the oppo-
site direction, that in Paris. In the autumn of 1970, convincing the French 
of the inner-German precondition for a security conference turned out 
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to be next to impossible. France was a very recent convert to the CSCE 
cause. The one-week visit of President Pompidou to Moscow in October 
1970 had marked the first occasion of a positive French statement about 
the proposed CSCE.107 But following that visit, the transformation was 
rapid. In a true volte-face, after previously being among the most sceptical 
Western voices, the French officials now spoke actively in favour of the 
conference project. At the same time, a successful conclusion of the Ber-
lin Agreement became the only precondition for a CSCE the French were 
willing to discuss. 
At first, the change in the French position did not diminish the confi-
dence with which the Auswärtiges Amt looked at the forthcoming West-
ern consultations. In preparation for the back-to-back Foreign Ministers’ 
meetings of NATO and the European Political Cooperation (EPC) due in 
early December 1970, the West German officials were certain that they 
could convince their allies of the need to achieve substantial progress 
in the inner-German talks, in addition to the Berlin negotiations, before 
multilateralisation of the CSCE preparations would be justified.108 The US 
Ambassador in Bonn reported that despite being acutely aware of the crit-
icism such a blocking position might incur, the FRG was prepared to ‘hold 
out for some progress on inner-German talks, even if this would mean … 
exercising a “veto” over the conference’.109 
Yet the French were not to be persuaded. In the EPC negotiations of the 
Ten on 2 December in Brussels, Scheel argued that certain prerequisites for 
the improvement of the political East–West climate were needed before a 
conference, and those included not only progress in Berlin, but also in the 
inner-German relationship. If not a conclusion of an inner-German treaty, 
then at least a ‘conclusive stage’ in those negotiations had to be achieved 
prior to multilateral preparations of a security conference.110 But reflecting 
the new French policy on the CSCE, Schumann now vehemently opposed 
this. In complete contradiction to his position a year earlier, the French 
Foreign Minister argued that progress in the Berlin negotiations should be 
the only Western precondition for a CSCE. Schumann added that a result 
in the Berlin talks would necessarily lead to an improvement of the inner-
German relationship, making a separate precondition unnecessary.111 Ac-
cordingly, in the final analysis of the EPC meeting, the Auswärtiges Amt 
was able to point to an agreement of the Ten only on the necessity of a 
Berlin agreement before a CSCE.112 Due to French opposition, the same 
could not be said about the inner-German precondition.
The same drama was replayed in the NATO ministerial meeting the 
following day, also in Brussels. The potential leverage on the Soviets, re-
sulting from the linkage of the Berlin negotiations and the CSCE, enjoyed 
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widespread support in the Alliance.113 In fact, the number of members 
calling for immediate multilateralisation of CSCE preparations had fallen 
since the previous ministerial meeting in Rome. Apart from the Scandina-
vian countries cautiously in favour of swift multilateralisation, the others 
now all agreed that the progress achieved in the form of the West German-
Soviet and West German-Polish treaties, welcome as it was, did not yet 
fulfil the conditions set in the Rome communiqué in May, since a Berlin 
agreement was still missing.114 
But when the discussion moved to other possible preconditions for a 
CSCE, Schumann showed no signs of retreating from the rigid position 
of his government: it was Berlin and nothing but Berlin. Although France 
was left alone in opposing the further inclusion of ‘progress in inner-Ger-
man negotiations’ as a prerequisite for a conference, not even US and Brit-
ish support for the West Germans was of any avail.115 Faced with French 
intransigence, Scheel had to budge. The West Germans had no option but 
to settle for a lukewarm compromise formulation on vaguely defined ‘on-
going talks’, inserted into the final communiqué on their behalf by the Bel-
gians.116 Consequently, the NATO communiqué signalled a clear priority 
given to the Berlin talks. The Berlin precondition was spelled out in stron-
ger terms than before (‘satisfactory conclusion’ rather than ‘progress’), but 
in contrast to the Rome communiqué six months before, the one agreed 
on in Brussels in December 1970 no longer explicitly mentioned the inner-
German talks. Instead, the ministers
affirmed the readiness of their governments, as soon as the talks on Berlin have 
reached a satisfactory conclusion and in so far as the other on-going talks are 
proceeding favourably, to enter into multilateral contacts with all interested 
governments to explore when it would be possible to convene a conference, or 
a series of conferences, on security and co-operation in Europe.117
Afterwards, when briefing the Finns about the Brussels meeting, Political 
Director Berndt von Staden explained that the communiqué negotiations 
had been straightforward and unproblematic, and that there had not been 
any major differences in opinion between the Allies.118 The Swedish em-
bassy in Bonn, reporting from a similar briefing, noted that the Auswär-
tiges Amt viewed the French lead in Brussels and the subsequent focus 
of the Alliance on the Berlin precondition ‘not without satisfaction’.119 
Moreover, in a memorandum written by the leading Auswärtiges Amt of-
ficial directly responsible for CSCE affairs, Götz von Groll,120 the ‘on-going 
talks’ clause was interpreted as including the need to reach a ‘conclusive 
stage’ in the negotiations between the FRG and the GDR before multilat-
eral preparations for a CSCE.121 
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But no upbeat explanations given in retrospect could change the fact 
that the Brussels meeting marked a clear defeat for the Federal Republic – 
or, to be precise, for the hardliners in the Auswärtiges Amt – within NATO. 
As Bahr had predicted already in September 1969, bargaining with the 
CSCE in order to achieve an inner-German arrangement was sustainable 
only for as long as the support of the Three Powers was secured.122 With 
France no longer behind the FRG in this, no measure of support by the 
other two – fairly passive in the case of Britain, somewhat more active 
in that of the US – was sufficient to persuade the Alliance to adopt the 
West German line. Having learned this lesson the hard way, the Auswär-
tiges Amt was quick to come back in line with the Chancellery. Within 
weeks after the December 1970 NATO ministerial meeting, West German 
demands for an inner-German agreement as a formal precondition for 
the CSCE preparations had disappeared completely from the diplomatic 
stage. However, in late 1970 it was already impossible to think about the 
CSCE merely in terms of linkage. Far from being only a theoretical War-
saw Pact propaganda initiative, the agenda of a future security conference 
had already in 1969 become a subject of serious European discussion. The 
Federal Republic was no exception. 
Discovering the Potential of the CSCE 
The focus of West German foreign policy in the first year of the Brandt 
Government was beyond doubt on bilateral Ostpolitik. Accordingly, as 
witnessed above, the approach to the CSCE in 1969–70 was also domi-
nated by attempts to utilise the conference project for that purpose. But 
in addition to being seen as a useful tool in pursuing the most immedi-
ate goals of the Eastern treaty framework, the CSCE in and of itself was 
increasingly given serious thought in Bonn. The latter half of this chapter 
will trace this development, starting again from October 1969. 
In 1969–70, the general momentum for the conference was clearly grow-
ing, as recurrent Warsaw Pact statements were supported by interventions 
from the neutral and non-aligned countries. The most notable move from 
outside the alliances came again from the Finns, who in February 1970 
appointed Ralph Enckell as a roving ambassador to sound out views on 
the CSCE held in European and North American capitals.123 In the broader 
policy considerations made in Bonn at the time, the possible CSCE was 
already seen as an integral part of West German foreign policy planning 
for the medium to long term, potentially also serving fundamental West 
German interests in the conference substance per se, not merely by its in-
strumental use.
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Already at this early stage of the discussions about a possible security 
conference, one defining characteristic of the CSCE policy of the Federal 
Republic was beginning to show: the policy-makers in Bonn were not 
expecting quick and immediate gains from it. The notion of the confer-
ence as a process (Prozesscharakter), something the longest-serving Foreign 
Minister in the history of the FRG, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, emphasises 
as the quintessential quality of the CSCE, was present in West German 
thinking from the outset.124 Rather than any sudden results, the West Ger-
mans hoped to gain something from the gradual yet dynamic develop-
ment the CSCE might bring about. As the Auswärtiges Amt CSCE working 
group, which had been set up under Foreign Minister Brandt in June 1969, 
presented its final report four months later, this process approach was 
already visible. The CSCE would not be a one-time event leading immedi-
ately to political results, the report stated, but part of a long-term process, 
probably consisting of a number of conferences. Along the lines drafted by 
Bahr during his time in the Auswärtiges Amt, the working group envisaged 
a CSCE contributing to a European security system, as a step towards a 
lasting European peace order.125 
Having moved to the Chancellery, Bahr continued to present his foreign 
policy concept as one entity, interweaving the bilateral treaties currently 
pursued with possible multilateral arrangements, leading to détente and 
peace in Europe.126 In the Chancellery, Brandt’s Parliamentary State Sec-
retary Katharina Focke took on the CSCE even more enthusiastically. In 
March 1970, Focke wrote to Brandt, Ehmke and Bahr, calling for a revision 
of the foreign policy strategy papers Bahr had drafted before the election. 
In Focke’s view, they were insufficient for the current government and 
more thorough groundwork was urgently needed. Interestingly, she ar-
gued that the CSCE itself should be the main point of reference for this 
new, cohesive German foreign policy concept, outlining the contours of a 
European security system and peace order alike. Focke argued that par-
ticular German interests in the CSCE context as well as suitable ways to 
pursue general German interests in the conference needed to be defined 
as clearly as possible – for it was the CSCE that would ultimately link the 
Western and Eastern policies of the FRG. Focke, suspicious of the compe-
tence in the Auswärtiges Amt planning staff after Bahr’s departure, even 
suggested convening a small special task force within the government to 
focus on this exercise.127
In public speeches as well as in internal memoranda the Chancellery 
continued to elaborate on the importance of the CSCE, in terms of the twin 
concepts of security system and peace order, but there is no evidence of 
the task force suggested by Focke ever being convened.128 When it came to 
the implementation of these larger schemes, at this stage the Chancellery 
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was simply too preoccupied and overstretched with the bilateral nego-
tiations to concentrate on the detailed preparations of the CSCE. It was 
symptomatic of the detachment of the Chancellery from the CSCE at this 
stage that Brandt, although in principle favouring the conference, on sev-
eral occasions in 1970 told his interlocutors that the conference probably 
would not amount to much more than the participants taking turns in 
reading aloud their prepared speeches.129 This situation left an opening 
for the Auswärtiges Amt to operate independently at the working level. 
Although free from the intra-governmental constraints in defining West 
German CSCE policy, the Auswärtiges Amt identified two major external 
factors, pulling in opposite directions, potentially having an impact on the 
position of the Federal Republic. Just like other NATO allies, the West Ger-
mans, too, paid attention to Soviet objectives on the one hand, and public 
opinion at home on the other. The new chief of the Auswärtiges Amt plan-
ning staff, Dirk Oncken, expressed this dilemma pointedly in May 1970: 
‘If we support the CES, we take the risk of supporting the Soviet status 
quo policy; if we reject the CES, we take the risk of isolating ourselves in 
the eyes of the Western public’.130 
The need to analyse Soviet motives behind its push for the CSCE had 
urgently resurfaced at the end of October 1969, as the Foreign Ministers 
of the Warsaw Pact states in their Prague meeting took the initiative yet 
again in plans for a conference. In the Czechoslovak capital, the Warsaw 
Pact Foreign Ministers presented two separate resolutions to be issued by 
the CSCE: one on the renunciation of force, the other on the expansion of 
cooperation in trade, economy, science and technology. The Prague dec-
laration, which the Soviets were actively promoting in Western capitals 
afterwards, also suggested convening the conference in Helsinki already 
in the first half of 1970.131 The West Germans considered the suggested 
timing to be intentionally completely unrealistic, attempting to put the 
West under pressure and to ‘mobilise public opinion in this propaganda-
efficient question’.132 The Prague declaration was seen as not only a ‘clever 
move to split the West’, but also a Soviet effort to undermine German bi-
lateral negotiations – making it possible for the Soviets to ‘put the noose of 
the European security conference around [the FRG’s] neck’ at every West 
German attempt to open political discussions.133 
But in the Auswärtiges Amt these suspicions were quickly turned into an 
asset for the West. Since an outright rejection of Eastern proposals could 
easily lead to the West being blamed for the failure of the conference, it 
was felt that constructive efforts to prepare an agenda that would meet 
Western interests should instead be accelerated. In order to return the ball 
to the Eastern court, Political Director Ruete in November 1969 suggested 
proposing human contacts and balanced force reductions as additional 
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topics to be covered by the CSCE.134 This approach, countering concerns 
over the reasons behind Soviet CSCE enthusiasm by focusing more in-
tensively on preparation of the agenda of the conference within the West, 
was quickly adopted as the standard West German line. And after the ne-
gotiations on a bilateral West German-Soviet renunciation of force agree-
ment started in December 1969, the attention given in the Auswärtiges Amt 
to pondering Soviet intentions receded noticeably. This indicates that in 
Bonn the CSCE was already in 1969 seen not only as a necessary evil, but 
also as a welcome development in European détente. 
Further evidence for the argument that the FRG took the CSCE seri-
ously early on is provided by the Federal German approach to the German 
question and the participation of the GDR in the conference. The constant 
underscoring of the need to clarify the inner-German relations before the 
CSCE could be convened was not merely an effort to link the two sets of 
negotiations together for instrumental purposes – it also reflected genuine 
concerns in Bonn about the procedure of the future conference. The prob-
lems provided by the German question were twofold. On the one hand, it 
was essential that the participation of the GDR in the conference should 
not prejudge the international recognition of the East German state. It is 
interesting here that the participation of the GDR in such a conference was 
never questioned by the Brandt Government, not even in the autumn of 
1969, when inner-German negotiations had not yet started. Instead, the 
focus was on efforts to rule out unwanted consequences of this participa-
tion.135 On the other hand, Bonn was concerned at having issues dealing 
with Germany as a whole discussed and handled at the conference. It was 
essential to ensure that the CSCE would not become a conference on the 
German question.136
A natural forum for regulating these problematic German issues was 
the Bonn Group. But the fact that the West Germans started to think about 
concrete measures in this respect as early as November 1969, when the 
idea of tasking the Bonn Group with drafting a disclaimer clause on GDR 
participation first came up, speaks volumes about the degree of serious-
ness with which the CSCE was regarded.137 In December 1969 the Three 
Powers accepted the West German proposal for preparing a disclaimer 
declaration, in effect stating that the participation of the GDR would not 
mean its recognition under international law by other participants. This 
declaration was to be issued, if possible, jointly with the Soviet Union at 
the beginning of the CSCE.138 This was no longer mere contingency plan-
ning – this was already a part of concrete preparations for the conference. 
Coming back to the other source of potential pressure Oncken referred 
to in May 1970, public opinion, its impact was in fact rather limited. When 
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the substantive preparation for the CSCE truly began, the West German 
decision-makers and Foreign Ministry officials did not feel under any 
pressure from their own public opinion.139 As the US embassy reported in 
late December 1969, the Auswärtiges Amt believed there was ‘little genuine 
popular interest in an ESC in Western Europe, certainly hardly any in the 
FRG itself’.140 This position was in striking contrast to many of their col-
leagues within the West, particularly in the UK. In the spring of 1970, Brit-
ish officials repeatedly referred to growing public pressure for the West to 
move towards a pan-European conference. This, particularly coming from 
the left wing of the Labour Party, was also one of the main reasons behind 
their initiative for a Standing Commission on East–West relations, an idea 
later quietly given up, as Wilson was succeeded by Heath.141 The British 
were not alone in their concern. In the ministerial meeting of NATO in 
Rome in May 1970, where the Allies agreed on the need to give a clear 
impulse to the improvement of East–West relations, several Foreign Min-
isters pointed to the need to demonstrate to the young generation at home 
that ‘NATO represented an important element of political progress’.142
In the larger Western context, the West Germans were not oblivious 
to these concerns either. But with regard to domestic opinion, the West 
Germans could state baldly: ‘We are not under pressure from public opin-
ion’.143 This was probably a fairly accurate estimate. With all the simulta-
neous negotiations of bilateral Ostpolitik, the Brandt Government hardly 
needed to worry about being blamed for lack of movement – if anything, it 
was accused of the reverse in some quarters. Ostpolitik in general was not 
opposed by public opinion.144 At the same time, it overshadowed other 
developments in the public perception. It was not only the government 
that was at times overstretched by Ostpolitik, the same also applied to the 
opposition, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary alike. In the Bundestag 
plenary debates, for example, the CSCE was referred to only occasionally. 
Interestingly, in one of the rare exceptions, when the CSCE was indeed 
discussed in the Bundestag in February 1970, several parliamentarians 
from the opposition CDU urged the government to contribute to the con-
ference by raising ‘security of human dignity’ and freedom of movement 
on the CSCE agenda, as a means towards a European peace order.145 
In all, the genuine interest in a CSCE in Bonn was limited to a small 
number of government officials. Therefore, West German policy-makers 
could take on the substantive preparations of the CSCE as a truly mul-
tilateral exercise within the West, fairly isolated from the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact countries on the one hand, and from their domestic 
constituency on the other. For the time being, the main arena for these 
preparations was the NATO framework.
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Conference on Security or Conference on Cooperation? 
Within NATO, the Allied discussions of the CSCE agenda were based on 
a Senior Political Committee report on the ‘list of issues for possible ne-
gotiations with the East’, the first version of which had been circulated in 
July 1969. This document identified four possible groups of themes: (1) 
measures to reduce tension and promote confidence; (2) arms limitations 
and disarmament; (3) measures for economic, technological and cultural 
cooperation; and (4) Germany and Berlin.146 In an updated report in Octo-
ber 1969, the Allies elaborated their views on these groups further, subdi-
viding them into categories according to their political attractiveness and 
‘negotiability’.147 The West Germans were keen on stressing that the list 
of issues discussed within NATO was not yet a suggested list of agenda 
items for a possible CSCE.148 While this was technically correct, given that 
the SPC reports did not specifically refer to a CSCE but only to ‘East–West 
negotiations’ in general, there was no denying that these documents al-
ready laid a substantial, wide-ranging and relatively advanced founda-
tion for what was to become the Western CSCE position, in particular on 
the security issues. Ranging from the renunciation of force and a ‘code 
of good conduct’ between states to the advance notification of military 
manoeuvres, it contained numerous elements that were to become vital 
Western positions in the forthcoming negotiations. 
From the autumn of 1969 onwards the ‘list of issues’ dominated the 
CSCE discussion within the Alliance – this was also visible in the declara-
tion of the NATO Foreign Ministers in December 1969. One interesting 
addition, however, which had not been mentioned in the Senior Politi-
cal Committee papers, was included in the ministerial declaration in De-
cember. Referring to cultural exchanges, the ministers declared that ‘more 
could be achieved by freer movement of people, ideas, and information 
between the countries of East and West’.149 The origin of this addition 
is hard to substantiate, but Takeshi Yamamoto has pointed out that the 
United States and France were both keen on similar formulations on the 
eve of the ministerial meeting.150 On the other hand, in the spring of 1972, 
the West Germans in retrospect claimed the credit for the insertion of this 
paragraph in the declaration.151 The suggestion of the Political Director 
of the Auswärtiges Amt to add human contacts as a reaction to the Prague 
declaration referred to above also speaks for the West German initiative.152
Whether or not the particular reference to freer movement originated 
from Bonn, it was obvious that the Federal Republic was beginning to 
step up its efforts in NATO at this time. In January 1970, the Auswärtiges 
Amt instructed the West German NATO mission to pay increased atten-
tion to procedural questions in the CSCE preparations. In order to steer 
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the conference in a suitable direction, the West should take the initiative 
both on content and on procedure.153 These instructions were backed by 
an intervention from the bureau of Foreign Minister Scheel in March. For 
the first time in the CSCE context, Scheel gave direct political guidance to 
his ministry, calling for more activity by the Federal Government in CSCE 
preparations, in questions of content as well as of procedure.154 
In their reaction to Scheel’s instructions, the Auswärtiges Amt officials 
responsible for the CSCE questions pointed to the importance of coordina-
tion of Western positions:
German proposals, were they not previously discussed and agreed within 
NATO, would be criticised from the West and possibly also be met with suspi-
cion from the East. … This leaves us only with the admittedly not very spect-
acular route of being particularly active and taking the initiative in preparing 
proposals within NATO.155
This ‘not very spectacular’ route began to be followed as early as Febru-
ary, with the circulation in NATO of a working paper on an ‘issue by issue 
approach to security questions’, the first substantial West German contri-
bution to the Alliance discussion on East–West negotiations. This working 
paper skilfully combined procedural and substantive elements, arguing 
that the two could not be separated from each other. In terms of the CSCE 
agenda, the paper specifically raised MBFR and cultural relations as suit-
able topics for multilateral negotiations.156 Although a number of other 
Allies also presented their views on the CSCE in the early spring of 1970, 
there was a qualitative difference. The FRG went further into discussion of 
the agenda than others, and was even criticised by some representatives in 
the SPC for not limiting its contribution to procedural questions alone.157 
However, the scope of West German initiatives soon narrowed. The 
West German CSCE policy in NATO in the spring of 1970 turned out to be 
a single-issue movement. All West German efforts were focused on MBFR. 
When it came to the general idea of multilateral East–West negotiations, 
the balanced force reductions in Europe were the top priority for the FRG. 
The West Germans were particularly keen to engage in MBFR in order to 
prevent unilateral troop reductions by the United States.158 In addition, in 
an interview with the author, Egon Bahr stressed that the West Germans 
considered the Soviet empire to rest on two pillars: one was ideology, the 
other ‘missiles and tanks’. The building of the Berlin Wall had already 
damaged the ideological pillar; MBFR was the means to get at the other 
pillar.159 The West German Defence Minister Helmut Schmidt was an espe-
cially enthusiastic proponent of MBFR, but he also had many supporters in 
the Auswärtiges Amt.160 Already in the autumn of 1969, the West Germans 
had argued that the East’s willingness to enter negotiations should be put 
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to the test by repeating and strengthening the signal of Reykjavik.161 The 
Allies had agreed, and MBFR was included in the ‘list of issues’.162 
In a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, who was not at all pleased 
with the idea, State Secretary Duckwitz had assured him in December 
1969 that it was not planned to put the specific MBFR issue on the agenda 
of a possible CSCE.163 But only two months later the West German NATO 
Ambassador Grewe launched an initiative aiming to do just that – to turn 
MBFR into the main theme of a CSCE. At a working breakfast of the NATO 
Ambassadors in February 1970, Grewe argued that the CSCE, or a series 
of conferences, should not be reduced to covering vague and general 
topics such as economic cooperation and trade. Instead, the conferences 
should be used to discuss genuine security issues. Expressing his personal 
opinion, Grewe stressed, he therefore called for the West to suggest MBFR 
as the topic of the first security conference.164 In a further elaboration of 
his proposal, Grewe pointed out that ‘genuine progress could only be 
achieved if the first European security conference truly made security in 
Europe the main topic of negotiations’.165 
Grewe had operated without instructions from the capital, but his 
idea enjoyed support within the government, as was apparent in the joint 
memorandum drafted by the Auswärtiges Amt and the Defence Ministry 
for the Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat)166 in early March. 
This paper, while highlighting the positive interest of the FRG in a CSCE, 
stated that such a conference would not fulfil its purpose if the actual se-
curity problems of the continent were excluded from it. Therefore, if a 
CSCE was to be convened, MBFR had to be on its agenda. The Federal Se-
curity Council fully endorsed this view.167 Admittedly, there were also dif-
ferences between Grewe’s position and that of the government: whereas 
Grewe wanted to limit the first CSCE to covering MBFR alone, the official 
West German line was to include MBFR in a broader CSCE agenda.168
Moreover, MBFR specialists in the Auswärtiges Amt as well as leading 
figures in the cabinet and in the Chancellery considered MBFR to be more 
important than the CSCE for the Federal Republic. From this perspective, 
too firm a link with the CSCE could jeopardise the prospects of MBFR 
negotiations.169 Accordingly, in April the FRG delegation in NATO was 
instructed not to link MBFR and the CSCE too closely together – force re-
ductions could also be discussed without a security conference. But on the 
other hand, if a CSCE was to be convened, it was essential to make sure 
that MBFR was a central issue covered in that framework as well.170 Fol-
lowing these lines, the West Germans delivered a memorandum in Brus-
sels, suggesting that members of the Alliance should raise MBFR ‘as the 
main topic of discussion for an initial conference on European security’.171 
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The United States had from the outset opposed combining MBFR and 
the CSCE in any form.172 But during the spring of 1970, the West German 
insistence in the NATO discussions seemed to pay off. When the NATO 
Foreign Ministers met in Rome in May 1970, MBFR topped the agenda. 
The separate MBFR declaration issued by the Foreign Ministers, the so-
called Signal of Rome, reinforced the call for force reductions in Europe.173 
In the actual communiqué, the ministers listed three broad groups of 
items that could be dealt with at a CSCE. Firstly, the principles governing 
relations between states, including the renunciation of force; secondly, the 
development of international relations with a view to contributing to the 
freer movement of people, ideas and information and to developing co-
operation in the cultural, economic, technical and scientific fields as well 
as in the field of human environment; and thirdly, the balanced force re-
ductions.174 While the connection between a CSCE and MBFR in the com-
muniqué language remained looser than the West Germans would have 
preferred, it was largely due to West German efforts that MBFR was still 
included among the topics of a CSCE in the NATO deliberations.
After the Rome meeting, the West German approach to the relationship 
of the CSCE and MBFR was clarified further during the summer of 1970. 
MBFR was an independent topic which could be discussed before, during 
or after a CSCE; but if there was a CSCE, MBFR had to be discussed there 
as well.175 This position was consolidated in the Federal Security Council 
in October, and from then on consistently repeated in various discussions 
the West Germans had with their allies.176 
For several months, the dominant focus on MBFR had overshadowed 
West German thinking on other possible elements of the CSCE agenda. 
But in the summer of 1970, coinciding with the CSCE commitment made 
in the Bahr Paper in Moscow, West German positions slowly began to 
change. Instead of focusing exclusively on MBFR as far as the possible 
agenda of the CSCE was concerned, the original idea of viewing the con-
ference in broad terms, as a long-term process possibly leading to the cov-
eted European peace order, was again gaining ground. In speaking notes 
and background papers of the Auswärtiges Amt, it was soon established as 
a standard line to take that the CSCE would contribute to safeguarding 
peace, reducing tension between East and West as well as overcoming in-
ner-German contradictions. This was also an argument used in favour of 
the conference, in defence of the undertaking to work towards the CSCE 
laid down in the Bahr Paper.177 As a specific West German position on the 
CSCE, in addition to a common NATO line, the West German Foreign 
Ministry highlighted the goal of ‘constructing a security system for Eu-
rope as a basis for a European peace order’.178
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This increasingly welcoming attitude to the conference project as such 
was also visible in the West German reaction to the Warsaw Pact decla-
ration given in Budapest in June 1970.179 The Budapest document of the 
Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers was a further step in the communiqué dia-
logue between the two blocs – on the one hand building on the Prague 
documents from the preceding October as a continuation of Warsaw Pact 
deliberations on the CSCE agenda, but on the other essentially a direct 
reply to the NATO communiqué of Rome. In the West German analysis 
the Budapest document was definitely a step in the right direction. Al-
though the Warsaw Pact did not refer to freer movement at all and the 
response to the MBFR suggestion was not yet satisfactory, the Auswärtiges 
Amt read it as seizing many of the substantive suggestions NATO had 
made in Rome.180 In the NATO discussion on the Budapest document, the 
West Germans were joined only by the Danes and Norwegians in this pos-
itive estimate – all others were distinctly more sceptical, arguing that the 
Warsaw Pact suggestions were nothing substantially new, only another 
attempt to undermine Western unity. Further discussions were called for, 
in order to find a common line on the Warsaw Pact proposals.181
In this respect, an important aspect in the West German CSCE policy 
was the conscious tendency to treat the Warsaw Pact as a single bloc. The 
officials in Bonn were well informed about the internal pressures in the 
Eastern alliance, reflected in the conflicting motives behind the enthusi-
asm for the CSCE of the individual Warsaw Pact members. If the Soviet 
Union was interested in consolidating the status quo, the primary mo-
tive for the GDR was to achieve international recognition, whereas other 
‘satellites’ wanted to use the conference to increase their contacts with the 
West. Nonetheless, from the spring of 1970 onwards the Auswärtiges Amt 
consistently acted as if these differences did not exist.182 Dealing with the 
Warsaw Pact as a unified, monolithic bloc in the CSCE context was in line 
with the overall Ostpolitik of the Brandt Government. Instead of approach-
ing the individual Warsaw Pact countries separately, as the Kiesinger Gov-
ernment had attempted, during Brandt’s reign Ostpolitik was primarily 
conducted via Moscow. Any moves that could be interpreted as encour-
agement for dissident members of the Warsaw Pact to act independently 
would have undermined this approach. In the CSCE context, it translated 
into a bloc-to-bloc approach, further emphasising the importance of the 
multilateral preparations within the West. 
In these Western considerations, for the time being, MBFR continued to 
be at the top of the West German wish list for topics to be dealt with at a 
CSCE. But as a sign of the changing perspective, when the NATO institu-
tions reconvened after the summer pause, the West German Ambassador 
promised that the FRG delegation would soon submit a working paper 
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on economic and cultural cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that 
further study of these elements would be needed in NATO, for example 
on the free movement of people.183 It was precisely in these fields that the 
West in general and the Federal Republic in particular were to show a 
completely new level of activity from the late autumn of 1970 onwards. 
Conclusion
The main characteristic of the CSCE policy of the Federal Republic in the 
period covered in this chapter is that of old-fashioned Realpolitik. The 
‘linkage’ approach – using the CSCE as a lever in the Moscow negotia-
tions – was a classic example of tit-for-tat, whereas the main item on the 
agenda of the possible CSCE the West Germans were interested in was 
military security in the form of troop reductions. However, on both of 
these tracks the West German approach was also undergoing fundamen-
tal change. Already in 1969–70 the direction of both of these changes was 
towards more multilateralism at the expense of bilateralism, more ideal-
ism at the expense of Realpolitik. The Moscow Treaty was an important 
watershed in this respect, further speeding up the transformation of West 
German CSCE policy.
As far as the Chancellery-driven ‘linkage’ strategy is concerned, after 
Bahr’s negotiations in Moscow a large amount of the capital of the bilateral 
leverage had been spent. But after initial hesitation the Federal Republic 
adapted to the new situation by turning towards a multilateral linkage – 
using the potential CSCE in order to achieve progress in the Four-Power 
Berlin negotiations. Henry Kissinger triumphantly described this situa-
tion in retrospect as the moment where the US had ‘harnessed the beast 
of détente’, making both the CSCE and ratification of the German Eastern 
Treaties dependent upon a Berlin agreement that met US objectives.184 
Seen from the Bonn perspective, this meant that Western multilateralism 
was the only option left for applying the CSCE linkage strategy, whether 
directly to the Berlin talks or indirectly to Deutschlandpolitik.
Regarding the agenda of the CSCE, the realm of the Auswärtiges Amt, 
the initial West German preoccupation with MBFR and hard security is-
sues also began to give way to softer elements of East–West cooperation 
and the broader idea of a European peace order. Here it was clear from 
the outset that the relevant discussions had to take place in a multilateral 
forum, first within Western institutions before moving on to the actual 
conference preparations between East and West and including the neutral 
countries. In this respect, the first year of the Brandt Government was a 
learning process for the West Germans in the art of Western multilateral-
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ism. As will be argued in the next chapters, these skills came in useful in 
the years that followed.
For the time being, NATO was the only significant Western forum for 
the CSCE preparations. But for over a year, NATO had been predomi-
nantly reactive, not proactive. With its Prague and Budapest documents, 
the Warsaw Pact had maintained the initiative in formulating the CSCE 
agenda. Discussion in the Alliance on the possible CSCE agenda had been 
surprisingly limited after the onset of Brandt’s Ostpolitik, only really be-
coming active in the weeks preceding the semi-annual meetings of the 
Foreign Ministers. It took a full year after the ‘list of issues’ document of 
1969, until October 1970, for the NATO Council to commission the po-
litical committee to prepare a further substantive report on East–West 
negotiations.185
A similar passivity was typical of the West German CSCE policy as 
well. Theoretically, interest in the CSCE agenda was clearly on the rise in 
the Auswärtiges Amt. But although the possible contents of a security con-
ference were constantly present in the paperwork the ministry produced, 
with the exception of the MBFR moves in the spring of 1970 its ideas were 
not yet translated into concrete actions within the Alliance. In fact, there 
was not a truly coherent CSCE strategy to speak of during the first year 
of Scheel’s reign in the ministry. A good indication of – and possibly one 
reason for – this lack of coordination was the fate of the internal CSCE 
working group in the Foreign Ministry. The original working group had 
completed its final report by early October 1969, but it was not until No-
vember 1970 that this group was reconvened within the Auswärtiges Amt. 
In the meantime, the period covered in this chapter, Bonn’s approach to 
the concrete CSCE preparations consisted mostly of uncoordinated actions 
of individual diplomats. The origin of the West German focus on MBFR as 
a solo project of Ambassador Grewe was a prime example of this. 
As will be argued in the following chapter, all of this was to change rap-
idly in the late autumn of 1970. Increased Western activity on the CSCE 
front in NATO as well as in the new framework of European Political Co-
operation accelerated the development of the West German CSCE approach 
towards multilateralism. At the same time, the Auswärtiges Amt started to 
invest considerably more time, effort and resources into the conference 
preparations. The substantive value of the CSCE began to surpass the in-
strumental value – a genuine West German CSCE policy was in the making. 
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[I]f the GDR showed the co-operation needed for the achievement of a satis-
factory Berlin agreement, the Federal Government would regard this as a suf-
ficient sign of grace to meet their earlier requirement about progress of the 
inner-German relationship.
– State Secretary Frank to the Bonn Group, March 19711
The CSE is a logical continuation of the policy that found its expression in the 
Moscow Treaty. The CSE will, regardless of the differences in the societies of 
the European states, determine the future of Europe for decades to come.
– Foreign Minister Scheel to Soviet Ambassador Falin, May 19712
At a high-level Anglo-German meeting in December 1970, the Deputy 
Under Secretary of the FCO, Sir Thomas Brimelow, told his West German 
interlocutors that in his view the FRG held the keys to the CSCE: ‘The 
Federal Government were the judges on Berlin and were conducting the 
inner-German talks. All questions regarding a European security confer-
ence were therefore dependent on the Federal Government’s view.’3 In 
identifying the potential for a West German lead within the West in CSCE 
matters, Sir Thomas was certainly not mistaken. As I will argue in this 
chapter, however, the consequences of this position in Bonn were twofold. 
Firstly, when it came to the timing of the conference and using it to 
draw concessions from the East, the West Germans were no longer so 
eager as before to rise to the occasion. Once the attempts to continue to 
hold on to the linkage of inner-German talks with the CSCE in the au-
tumn of 1970 had proved impractical in the face of French hostility, the 
Federal Republic gave up that objective without much resistance. A mul-
tilateral Western linkage focusing the attention on the Berlin talks, where 
the Soviet demands were countered by the positions of the three major 
Western Allies, was soon considered to be a better option than a strictly 
bilateral one. On the one hand, this decision, agreeing to transfer the main 
responsibility for the CSCE preconditions to the Three Powers and NATO 
in general, amounted to giving up part of the leverage on bilateral Ostpo-
litik which had originally been envisaged. But on the other hand, multilat-
eralising the leverage to include the Allies also amplified its influence – as 
a member of the Alliance the FRG was able to achieve more than when 
acting alone.
Secondly, in the preparations of the CSCE agenda the potential of the 
West German lead was actually utilised. Here, in the interplay of NATO, 
EPC and the Bonn Group, the German discovery of the virtues of Western 
multilateralism was even more apparent than in the attempts to instru-
mentalise the conference for linkage purposes. At first, this lead was above 
all reflected in the mediating role the FRG assumed between the French 
and US extremes, trying to avoid confrontation within the West in order to 
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make multilateral cooperation work as effectively as possible. But gradu-
ally, the Federal Republic also began to make its presence felt in pushing 
through its own CSCE objectives as common Western positions.  
Following the French Lead on the Berlin Connection 
As described in the preceding chapter, NATO had effectively given up 
the explicit precondition of completion of the inner-German talks before 
a CSCE in the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Brussels in December 1970. 
This did not escape the attention of the opposition in Bonn. At a meeting 
of the Bundestag Foreign Policy Committee in January 1971, the Parliamen-
tary State Secretary of the Auswärtiges Amt, Karl Moersch, was pressed by 
CDU parliamentarians to define the government line on the preconditions 
for a CSCE. While Moersch made clear that a conclusion of the Berlin talks 
was needed before the conference, his evasive reference to continuing Al-
liance discussions on whether ‘other on-going talks’ included the inner-
German negotiations was hardly convincing.4 
Admittedly, in early 1971 some of the middle-rank CSCE experts in 
the Auswärtiges Amt still harboured hopes of getting acceptance for West 
German views regarding the inner-German precondition in the Alliance. 
Von Groll, for instance, pointed out that France continued to be the only 
exception among the NATO Allies – if the going got tough, all the others 
were likely to support the West German preference that a CSCE should 
not be convened before a conclusive stage in the inner-German negotia-
tions had been reached.5 Wolfgang Behrends, head of the NATO unit in 
the Auswärtiges Amt, seconded von Groll and argued that the ‘moment of 
truth’ in the Alliance would arrive only shortly before the conclusion of 
the Berlin negotiations. Since such a conclusion was not in sight, there was 
no need yet to change the West German view on the inner-German pre-
condition.6 Accordingly, von Groll assured a US embassy official in Bonn 
that the West Germans saw the ‘other on-going talks’ in exactly the same 
way as the US did, and would therefore be firm in holding on to the inner-
German precondition in the upcoming Franco-West German summit.7
Yet the exact opposite occurred in Paris at the end of January 1971. As it 
turned out, the leading officials of the Auswärtiges Amt had already altered 
their views and had begun to align themselves with the French position. 
Shortly before the Franco-West German summit, Hans Ruete, the former 
Political Director who had just been appointed West German Ambassa-
dor in Paris, reported a persuasive argument used by Foreign Minister 
Schumann in their discussion. According to Schumann, focusing on the 
Berlin precondition alone, instead of presenting further prerequisites for 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
1970–71: Transition to Western Multilateralism   |   111
a CSCE, would be the best way to ensure Soviet readiness for concessions 
in the Berlin negotiations.8 
This argument seemed to be convincing enough to the West Germans, 
for in the bilateral consultations in Paris there was no trace of the bitter 
disagreements witnessed in the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meetings in 
Brussels less than two months earlier. As before, the Federal Republic and 
France agreed on the need for a satisfactory Berlin agreement before en-
tering a security conference. In addition, however, Brandt and Scheel both 
pledged to their French colleagues that the FRG would no longer insist 
on inner-German progress as a separate precondition for the multilateral 
preparations of a CSCE. The Chancellor as well as the Foreign Minister 
now argued that a Berlin agreement would already necessarily imply a 
partial normalisation of the inner-German relationship. Therefore, the 
Federal Government considered the conclusion of the Berlin negotiations 
to be sufficient – as soon as that had been achieved, multilateral prepara-
tions of the CSCE could be opened.9 
Immediately after the Franco-West German summit, this line was the 
subject of a long debate in the Auswärtiges Amt CSCE working group.10 
Subsequently, official instructions on this new position of focusing ex-
clusively on the Berlin precondition were circulated to West German em-
bassies in February. From then on, the standard West German line was 
that since a result in the Berlin negotiations by definition had to include a 
certain amount of progress in the negotiations between the two German 
states, no other preconditions for entering the CSCE preparations were 
necessary.11 Thus, forced to withdraw his previous assurances, von Groll 
admitted to his contact at the US embassy in Bonn that after the Brandt-
Pompidou meeting in January, the FRG had ‘undergone some shift to-
wards the French position’ in this matter. While the Federal Republic 
remained committed to maintaining a satisfactory Berlin agreement as a 
precondition, a ‘de-emphasis of other prerequisites’ was now favoured.12 
This French-inspired change in the West German approach also became 
apparent during Foreign Minister Scheel’s visit to the United States in 
February 1971. In Washington, Scheel told Rogers that the FRG wanted to 
concentrate on the Berlin precondition, because firstly, a Berlin agreement 
would also contain elements of improvement of the inner-German relation-
ship, and secondly, confronting the Soviet Union with further precondi-
tions would weaken the link between Berlin and the CSCE.13 In an adjoining 
discussion, Berndt von Staden openly told his State Department colleague 
that Scheel had been convinced by Schumann of this view. Echoing French 
tones, the West Germans now stressed that ‘if the linkage which NATO es-
tablished between a Berlin agreement and a CES was to be effective, then it 
was better to make Berlin the one and only precondition for a CES, and not 
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suggest to the Soviets that other unspecified pre-conditions exist[ed]’.14 In 
the West German memorandum of the discussion, this view presented to 
the Americans was explicitly referred to as ‘French argumentation’.15 
Whether this French argumentation on the Berlin precondition was 
going to prove fruitful was by no means certain during the early spring of 
1971. On the contrary, the hostility of the Soviet Union to the stricter for-
mulation of the Berlin precondition agreed on in the NATO communiqué 
in December 1970 was obvious – Moscow launched a broad diplomatic of-
fensive in NATO capitals against it.16 In the Auswärtiges Amt this Soviet crit-
icism was considered to be unjustified. In the view of the officials in Bonn, 
the linkage of Berlin with the CSCE was not a new precondition invented 
at the December ministerial, as Moscow seemed to imply – it had merely 
been formulated more precisely than before.17 The German Foreign Minis-
try concluded that the main motive behind the Soviet criticism appeared to 
be the attempt to sow dissension within the Alliance by approaching indi-
vidual NATO members differently, and particularly to win over the French 
as a separate partner.18 All the same, on the basis of the evidence at hand 
around January and February 1971, the Soviet Union seemed anything but 
willing to make concessions on Berlin in return for a CSCE.
The swift West German adaptation to the French line and the volun-
tary departure from the priority previously given to the inner-German 
precondition was a major surprise to the Allies. Even the British officials, 
although constantly confirming their preparedness to be guided by the 
West Germans in this matter, were perplexed by their sudden change of 
direction. As Rodric Braithwaite from the FCO put it to the US Ambas-
sador in London, they were ‘prepared to let Germans take lead in setting 
or not setting progress in inner-German talks as precondition for mul-
tilateral East-West discussions, but British want to make sure Germans 
know where they are going if they in fact are prepared to ease up on this 
precondition.’19 Moreover, US and UK officials suspected that the U-turn 
in Bonn might have been partly a result of a gross overestimate of the ex-
tent of French pressure. The US Ambassador in Bonn reported the British 
belief that ‘the Germans went unnecessarily far to meet French desires on 
this point’.20 
In any case, by March 1971 at the latest the West German shift was 
already complete and irreversible. And it had direct implications for West-
ern policy, making the convening of the security conference more immi-
nent. In an EPC meeting in the beginning of March, the Six agreed that 
the exclusive concentration on the Berlin precondition had an obvious 
flipside. As a result, as soon as the Berlin talks were concluded, it would 
be next to impossible to avoid going to Helsinki.21 The US NATO Ambas-
sador expressed his concern about this new, automatic element: once a 
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Berlin agreement was in place, he said, ‘I see little reason to believe we can 
avoid almost immediate Alliance movement to multilateral exploratory 
talks with the East.’22 
Nevertheless, although the West Germans had given up the inner-Ger-
man precondition relatively easily, they were determined to hold on to 
the need to complete the Berlin negotiations before the CSCE preparations 
could begin. The Auswärtiges Amt was highly sensitive, at times perhaps 
also overreacting, even to the smallest of indications of any of the Allies 
– particularly the French – distancing themselves from this position.23 In 
a Bonn Group meeting in March 1971, van Well strongly opposed any 
discussion in NATO about a ‘weakening or abandoning of the linkage’ 
of Berlin with the CSCE as harmful for the further course of the Berlin 
negotiations.24 In response, all of the Three Powers reconfirmed their com-
mitment to the Berlin precondition.25 As it turned out, French and Belgian 
ideas voiced in the NATO discussion, rather than suggesting abandoning 
the Berlin precondition altogether, had been aiming to make the Berlin 
precondition ‘operative’ and to encourage the Soviet Union to make con-
cessions in the stagnated Berlin talks – something that was certainly not 
against West German interests.26 
But if the perceived threat to the Berlin precondition from within the 
Alliance was, at least for the time being, a false alarm, there was a genu-
ine one coming from Moscow. As a sequel to the démarches distributed 
in Western capitals at the end of 1970, in March 1971 another round of 
Soviet approaches followed. This time, the Soviet Union called for imme-
diate practical steps towards the CSCE and accused ‘certain countries’ of 
trying to postpone the conference indefinitely with their preconditions.27 
Having received the memorandum from the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in 
Bonn, State Secretary Frank pointed out to him that the position of the 
Federal Republic remained very clear. As soon as the Berlin negotiations 
were concluded, the road to convening a CSCE would be open.28 How-
ever, the Auswärtiges Amt saw the Soviet memorandum as posing new 
and dangerous challenges to the maintenance of this position. On the one 
hand, the Soviet Union appeared to be trying to multilateralise the CSCE 
preparations through the back door, so to speak, by encouraging ‘multiple 
bilateral’ talks in Helsinki already before a completed Berlin agreement. 
On the other hand, the Soviet memorandum was seen as an attempt to 
reverse the linkage imposed by NATO – suggesting in turn that a Berlin 
agreement would only come about after ratification of the FRG’s Eastern 
Treaties and the convening of a CSCE.29 As it turned out, the Auswärtiges 
Amt was correct in this estimate – this kind of ‘reverse linkage’ was pre-
cisely what the Soviet Union introduced in the autumn of 1971.30 
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Defending the Berlin Precondition in Lisbon
Faced with the new Soviet threats, the FRG approached the preparations 
of the following meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Lisbon in June 
1971 with increased determination to defend the Berlin precondition – 
and that condition alone. In a joint position paper of the Auswärtiges Amt 
and the Chancellery in March 1971, the Federal Government confirmed 
its preparedness to enter multilateral preparations of a CSCE as soon as 
the Berlin negotiations had been concluded. If the issue was to be raised 
in the NATO communiqué text in Lisbon, the FRG could live with delet-
ing the previous references to ‘ongoing talks’ completely. But one red line 
was clear: under no circumstances would the Federal Republic agree to 
remove or weaken the Berlin precondition.31 In a Bundestag debate on 26 
March, Parliamentary State Secretary Moersch presented this line, mark-
ing the first time the government publicly declared that it was ready to 
enter CSCE preparations immediately after the Berlin Agreement had 
been concluded. In response, the Christian Democrats demanded fur-
ther explanation from the government for this sudden ‘reduction to the 
minimum’ of preconditions – if the government had changed its policy, it 
should be openly discussed in the Foreign Policy Committee as well as in 
the plenary sessions of the Bundestag.32 
The policy had indeed been changed for good. It was not to be reversed, 
not even when allies explicitly offered the possibility of doing so to the 
West Germans, as happened during the visit of the British Prime Minis-
ter Edward Heath to Bonn in April. In a meeting of the delegations, Sir 
Thomas Brimelow told Walter Gehlhoff, the Deputy Political Director of 
the Auswärtiges Amt, that it was up to the West Germans to decide whether 
they wanted to include the ‘other on-going talks’ as preconditions for the 
CSCE in the upcoming Lisbon communiqué. Either way, the UK was pre-
pared to follow Bonn’s lead. After a brief consultation with Chancellor 
Brandt, Gehlhoff replied that a satisfactory Berlin agreement was suffi-
cient – in the view of the Federal Government no other preconditions for 
a CSCE were needed.33
Not all the Allies were happy about this change of position. The Dutch 
in particular would have preferred to see the inner-German precondition 
for a CSCE maintained.34 The United States was also against changing the 
language of the December 1970 communiqué, including the intentionally 
imprecise reference to ‘progress in other on-going talks’.35 But, since the 
inner-German negotiations were for good reason considered to involve 
above all German interests, a British embassy official in Bonn spoke for 
most of the NATO members when he declared at a quadripartite meeting 
in April 1971 that his government was ‘prepared to be guided by the FRG 
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and would not take a tougher position than the FRG themselves’ in this 
matter.36 In May, the US was also coming round to this view.37
In May 1971, the West Germans presented their position coherently in 
all of the frameworks of Western cooperation. The German NATO mission 
was instructed to underscore that in order to emphasise the link between 
the CSCE and Berlin, the ‘other on-going talks’ should no longer be men-
tioned in the Lisbon communiqué.38 In Paris, at a Franco-West German 
meeting on the level of Political Directors, von Staden confirmed that the 
FRG would be content with the conclusion of the Berlin talks as the only 
precondition for a CSCE. The additional ‘escape clause’ suggested by the 
West Germans in NATO (‘barring unfavourable developments in other 
relevant fields’) had only been inserted to please the US and the UK.39 This 
West German position of focusing exclusively on the Berlin precondition 
was repeated at the EPC meeting of the Ten.40 Behind the scenes, some of 
the officials responsible for the CSCE in the Auswärtiges Amt continued to 
voice views critical of dropping the ‘on-going talks’, but in the end had no 
choice but to accept the views of their superiors.41
Meanwhile, however, the French showed further signs of wavering. 
During his visit to Moscow on 7 May 1971, Foreign Minister Schumann did 
precisely what the West Germans had feared after the March démarches 
of the Soviet Union – agreed to the idea of holding ‘multiple bilateral’ 
talks in Helsinki already prior to a conclusion of the Berlin negotiations.42 
In response, at an EPC meeting of the Six in mid-May, Scheel strongly em-
phasised the importance of getting the timing of the East–West multilat-
eralisation right. Scheel warned against ‘experimenting’ with it, since that 
could only weaken the connection between the Berlin talks and the CSCE 
preparations.43 Nevertheless, on 26 May the French representative in the 
NATO Political Committee, apparently following instructions directly 
from President Pompidou, declared that the French would firmly oppose 
a repetition of the Berlin precondition in Lisbon in the way it had been 
formulated in the previous ministerial communiqué.44 Indeed, as the West 
German NATO Ambassador pointed out in his preview of the June 1971 
Lisbon meeting of the Foreign Ministers, the views within the Alliance on 
this matter were increasingly diverging – with the French as well as the 
Scandinavians running out of patience in their desire to open multilateral 
preparations of the CSCE as soon as possible.45 
This momentum was obviously also recognised in Moscow. Only a 
week before the NATO Foreign Ministers met in the Portuguese capital, 
Valentin Falin, the new Soviet Ambassador in Bonn, delivered yet another 
memorandum on the CSCE, criticising attempts to link ‘questions of differ-
ent character and dimension’ and arguing instead for a parallel approach 
on the CSCE and Berlin.46 Replying to Ambassador Falin, State Secretary 
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Frank refused to accept the assertion that the questions at hand were of a 
different character, and again emphasised the nature of the Berlin negotia-
tions as a test. As soon as this test was passed, the road would be free for 
the CSCE. Frank assured Falin that once a Berlin settlement was concluded, 
the FRG would not establish any further obstacles to a security conference. 
Foreign Minister Scheel went even further and confided to Falin that in his 
view after a Berlin agreement the dynamics towards a CSCE would be so 
strong that nobody would be able to slow it down any longer.47
These statements made by Frank and Scheel to Falin on the eve of the 
Lisbon meeting reflected the increasingly pessimistic views in Bonn about 
the further leverage the West could hope to have on the Soviet Union and 
the GDR with the help of the CSCE.48 Another good example of this view 
is the working paper the influential German political scientist Richard 
Löwenthal sent to the Chancellery in early May 1971. In his paper, Löwen-
thal stressed the need for the Federal Republic to regain the initiative in 
East–West détente, especially in Deutschlandpolitik. Interestingly, however, 
Löwenthal argued that the CSCE was a particularly unsuitable bargaining 
chip in this respect, since there were hardly any means to make a con-
ference dependent on a preceding inner-German arrangement.49 By the 
late spring of 1971, this sentiment was widespread in the Auswärtiges Amt. 
The Western support for the necessity of an inner-German modus vivendi 
before a CSCE had already been lost for good. As a matter of fact, there 
was no longer even a Western consensus on the Berlin precondition. But 
as soon as a Berlin arrangement was achieved, it would be impossible to 
stop the dynamics of the CSCE – regardless of the situation in the inner-
German negotiations at that time.50 
Since the Berlin negotiations appeared to be the only issue left where 
the CSCE leverage held any promise for functioning as a bargaining tool, 
the West Germans considered it extremely important to find common 
ground with the French on it prior to the Lisbon meeting. At the end of 
May, Scheel and Schumann met in Bonn, trying bilaterally to come up 
with a suitable Berlin formulation for the NATO communiqué.51 These 
last-minute efforts produced no results, and the quadripartite meeting 
in Lisbon preceding the NATO meeting was anything but cordial on this 
issue. The French Foreign Minister insisted on a clearly softer formulation 
on the Berlin–CSCE linkage than that of any of his three colleagues, argu-
ing that instead of being presented with strict and explicit conditions, the 
Soviet Union should be encouraged by a more forthcoming language to 
allow further progress in the Berlin talks. After a lengthy debate, the four 
Foreign Ministers finally agreed on a compromise formulation, in which 
they 
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hope[d] that before their next meeting, the quadripartite talks on Berlin [would] 
have reached a successful conclusion and that multilateral conversations in-
tended to lead to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [might] 
then be undertaken.52
This compromise, arguably less confrontational than before but nonethe-
less maintaining the Berlin precondition, was adopted unaltered in the 
communiqué issued by the NATO Foreign Ministers.53 In sum, then, the 
Lisbon meeting confirmed the change in the Western approach to the 
preconditions for a CSCE, which had been in the making throughout the 
spring of 1971. In the end, even the United States agreed to give up the 
‘other on-going talks’, which were no longer mentioned in the Lisbon 
communiqué at all.54 Neither did the communiqué contain any form of 
the ‘escape clause’ which had been discussed by the Allies a few weeks 
earlier. A successful conclusion of the Berlin talks was now officially laid 
down as the only remaining condition set by the Alliance for the opening 
of multilateral CSCE preparations. 
Seen from a purely West German perspective, this change between two 
successive NATO ministerial meetings could hardly have been more re-
markable. Whereas in December 1970 the FRG strongly demanded the 
inclusion of ‘progress in inner-German talks’ as a precondition for the 
multilateralisation of the CSCE, during the preparations of the Lisbon 
meeting of June 1971 the West Germans were just as decisively against 
it as the French. In an internal analysis of the Lisbon communiqué, the 
Auswärtiges Amt was prepared to ‘fully agree’ with the main result of the 
meeting in this respect. As soon as the Berlin talks were concluded, the 
CSCE preparations would automatically follow.55 Presenting the Lisbon 
results to the Bundestag Foreign Policy Committee, State Secretary Frank 
argued that the previous ‘escalation of preconditions’ had indirectly hurt 
West German interests. It was better to concentrate on the only connection 
that truly mattered for the Federal Republic – that between the Berlin ne-
gotiations and the CSCE.56 
Nevertheless, it seems that in addition to a genuine satisfaction with 
this new position, concern about Alliance dynamics had continued to in-
fluence the West Germans’ behaviour. Immediately after Lisbon, Günther 
van Well, the Deputy Political Director of the Auswärtiges Amt, admitted 
to his US interlocutor in Bonn that ‘the [West] German posture during the 
whole exercise of drafting the communiqué had been heavily influenced 
by the need, as the [West] Germans saw it, to avoid a [West] German con-
frontation with the French’.57
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Divergent Interpretations of the ‘Successful Conclusion’
In the immediate aftermath of the Lisbon meeting, the impact of the 
NATO communiqué appeared to be far from what had been intended. 
Western reports from the quadripartite negotiations on Berlin on 9 June 
1971 recorded a decisive hardening of Soviet positions. State Secretary 
Frank brought this up in his meeting with Ambassador Falin. The West 
had kept its side of the bargain, Frank told Falin, by formulating the link 
between the Berlin talks and the CSCE in positive terms, as well as by 
dropping references to the ‘on-going talks’ from the communiqué. With 
their current behaviour, Frank argued, the Soviets were only providing 
ammunition for the critics of this softer Western policy, and thus running 
the risk of missing a great opportunity to improve East–West relations.58 
In addition to being worried about the possible failure of the Berlin 
talks, the West Germans were simultaneously concerned about the inter-
pretation of what would constitute the successful conclusion of those talks, 
and thus the crucial threshold for the opening of the multilateral CSCE 
preparations. The Four Powers responsible for Berlin and Germany as a 
whole had already agreed that the Berlin Agreement would eventually 
come about in three stages: first the quadripartite ‘umbrella’ agreement, 
then supplementary negotiations on the Berlin question between the two 
German states, and only after their conclusion the signature of the final 
quadripartite protocol. But as van Well told his Bonn Group colleagues 
at the end of June 1971, Chancellor Brandt was increasingly worried that 
the Soviets would try to exploit the first stage as a sufficient signal for 
multilateral conference preparations. ‘If this were to be the case, much of 
the FRG leverage on the GDR for successful negotiations on implementing 
details on access to inner-Berlin matters might be dissipated because of 
the GDR’s gain in international status through participation in multilat-
eral CES preparations.’ Therefore the West Germans were seeking support 
from the Bonn Group for their view that the multilateral CSCE prepara-
tions should begin only once the final quadripartite Berlin protocol had 
been signed by the Foreign Ministers.59 Interestingly, this statement im-
plied that, although the direct linkage of the CSCE with bilateral inner-
German negotiations on a modus vivendi had been given up, there were 
still some hopes attached to using the CSCE leverage in the inner-German 
negotiations on the implementation of the Berlin Agreement.
The United States fully agreed with this West German view, and 
pledged to support it in the Bonn Group as well as in NATO. George Vest 
from the US mission to NATO also argued that the West Germans should 
be encouraged to move quickly in order to convince other Allies: 
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Once first stage of a Berlin agreement is achieved, many of our allies, led by 
France, will argue that Berlin precondition has been satisfied. … If FRG tries 
only then to introduce apparently ‘new’ precondition of inner-German talks 
on Berlin it will be looked upon by allies as unacceptable for both policy and 
public relations reasons. … FRG must take the lead starting with France. The 
sooner the Germans begin to sell their position to the allies the better, since a 
long-term educational process will be required.60
For the time being, it seemed that the French were prepared to follow the 
West German lead in this matter. The US Ambassador in Paris reported 
that the Deputy Political Director of the Quai d’Orsay had ‘categorically 
reaffirmed that GoF [the French Government] will not oppose Brandt by 
pressing for multilateral CES preparations before entire Berlin accord 
wrapped up’.61 
Against this backdrop, the FRG responded to the Soviet memorandum 
Falin had delivered in May. In their response in late July 1971, the West 
Germans once again made clear that they considered the satisfactory re-
sult of the Berlin negotiations to be the decisive test case for the viability of 
a CSCE. If East Berlin were to cooperate in bringing about a Berlin agree-
ment, the FRG would consider this as a contribution to inner-German 
détente, and the multilateral CSCE preparations could be started.62 How-
ever, despite the earlier fears about Soviet interpretations, the statement 
Allardt gave to Gromyko in Moscow did not explicitly define the West 
German view of a ‘satisfactory conclusion’ of the Berlin talks. Internally 
in Bonn, by contrast, the distinction between the various stages of the Ber-
lin Agreement was given considerable attention. As von Staden wrote to 
Frank in mid-August, neither the ratification of the Eastern Treaties nor 
the multilateralisation of CSCE preparations could be started before the 
second and third stage of the Berlin talks were completed.63
All this talk about conflicting definitions was academic so long as none 
of the stages of the Berlin Agreement had been achieved. In this respect, 
the situation changed completely on 3 September 1971, when the Ambas-
sadors of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union signed 
the quadripartite Berlin Agreement. Although the inner-German Berlin 
Agreement and the subsequent final Four-Power protocol were still pend-
ing, the ‘moment of truth’ for West German CSCE policy had clearly ar-
rived. Only a few days after the signature of the quadripartite agreement, 
von Groll reported the latest French interpretation, according to which 
the completion of this first stage qualified as ‘successful conclusion’ of the 
Berlin talks.64 The mood favouring an immediate start of the multilateral 
preparations of the CSCE was rapidly spreading in the Western Alliance. 
Nevertheless, when the Secretary General of NATO, Manlio Brosio, asked 
Brandt shortly after the Berlin Agreement whether it had any implications 
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for the CSCE multilateralisation, the West German Chancellor stressed 
that the FRG still considered the completion of all the three stages to be 
necessary first.65
Indeed, in the new situation brought about by the quadripartite Ber-
lin Agreement, the Brandt Government had a clear-cut ‘roadmap’ for the 
preferred foreign-policy timetable for the near future. At first, the inner-
German negotiations on the Berlin arrangements were to be concluded, 
followed by the signature of the final quadripartite protocol on Berlin. It 
was only after that that the ratification procedure of the Eastern Treaties 
and the multilateral CSCE preparations could be opened simultaneously. 
Next on the list was the completion of an inner-German modus vivendi, 
which was then to be followed by UN membership of both German states 
and the convening of the CSCE proper.66 As can be seen in this plan, the 
distinction between conference preparations and the actual conference 
was gaining in importance for the decision-makers in Bonn. From Sep-
tember 1971 onwards the discussion about remaining preconditions for a 
security conference – within the West as well as between East and West – 
was beginning to diverge onto two different paths along these lines: multi-
lateral CSCE preparations on the one hand, the CSCE proper on the other. 
Meanwhile, however, Western preparations for the substance of the 
CSCE had accelerated dramatically. Fresh openings in the NATO discus-
sion on the possible CSCE agenda, spurred and supplemented by the 
introduction of the European Political Cooperation as a completely new 
Western mechanism for CSCE deliberations, had helped the West gain the 
initiative in the CSCE dialogue with the East. The Federal Republic played 
an important role in this increasingly active Western framework. Long be-
fore the CSCE proper, the West Germans were beginning to discover the 
CSCE preparations within the West as a suitable means for multilateralis-
ing Ostpolitik. 
Nothing Quiet on the Western Front
As has been argued in the previous chapter, for almost a year until the 
autumn of 1970 the Western preparations for the substance of a security 
conference had been somewhat half-hearted. Since October 1969, NATO 
had no longer proactively drafted Alliance positions on possible issues 
to be negotiated between East and West. Although potential topics had 
been listed in the semi-annual Foreign Ministers’ meetings, NATO’s ap-
proach had been predominantly reactive – in essence only responding to 
initiatives from the East. The change that occurred in this respect within 
a few weeks in October to November 1970 was remarkable, bringing in a 
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completely new level of activity and dynamism to Western planning and 
preparations for the CSCE – in NATO, as before, but now also in the new 
foreign-policy coordination framework of the EC Six. Simultaneously, the 
Auswärtiges Amt in Bonn stepped up its own efforts for more efficient in-
ternal coordination. 
First of all, there was new movement in NATO. In mid-October 1970, 
as part of the preparations for the next Foreign Ministers’ meeting in De-
cember, the Council commissioned a new report from the Political Com-
mittee. This time, the report was to analyse the essential questions for the 
state of East–West relations, thus broadening the scope from merely listing 
potential issues and calling for their more detailed elaboration.67 After a 
month of intensive negotiations in Brussels, the Senior Political Committee 
released the final product on 13 November 1970. This report on ‘East–West 
negotiations’ was an important qualitative step forward in the NATO prep-
arations for a CSCE. Although still structured as an analysis of and reaction 
to various Warsaw Pact proposals, the document was more than the pre-
liminary review it claimed to be – in fact it already significantly outlined 
future Western thinking on the CSCE agenda. The report divided the pos-
sible substance of the conference into four groups of topics: (1) principles 
which should govern relations between states, including the renunciation 
of force; (2) economic, scientific and technical East–West cooperation; (3) 
cultural relations and freer movement of people, ideas and information; 
and (4) confidence-building measures. A significant part of the report was 
also devoted to considerations of procedural aspects of a conference as 
well as to the possible East–West machinery following a CSCE.68 
In the intra-Alliance consultations preparing this report, the West Ger-
mans still took a fairly reserved role. It was the United States that most firmly 
demanded a clear agenda for the conference before any procedural decisions 
were made. As it turned out, the structure of the SPC report reflected by and 
large the proposals the US made at the beginning of the consultations.69 
The most controversial issue in the SPC discussions was that of the prin-
ciples governing relations between states. This was also precisely the area 
where a number of quintessential West German interests were at stake – 
the section on ‘principles’ in the report included several references to the 
German question, GDR participation and the formulations on renunciation 
of force in the Moscow Treaty. It is all the more surprising, then, that in the 
official records there are practically no signs of direct intervention in this 
field from the West German delegation.70 Behind the scenes, however, the 
FRG must have been defending its Deutschlandpolitik views. One indication 
of the success of influencing Allied positions indirectly is the fact that the 
report gave particular attention, as a specific consideration to be taken into 
account by the Allies, to ‘the political objective of the Federal Republic of 
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Germany to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German na-
tion will recover its unity in free self-determination’.71 This was exactly the 
same formulation used in the ‘letter on German unity’ the West Germans 
had delivered to the Soviets at the signature of the Moscow Treaty.72 
The second part of the report, covering possible areas of East–West co-
operation, was the only area to which the FRG had formally contributed. 
The West German working paper on the economic aspects of a CSCE wel-
comed in principle the idea of putting economic East–West cooperation on 
the conference agenda, especially if this facilitated true economic coopera-
tion rather than a mere exchange of goods. But the basic tone of the West 
German contribution was cautious, warning of Soviet-led disturbance to 
the further economic integration of Western Europe if subjects under the 
responsibility of the EC were dealt with in an East–West conference. Some 
of these concerns were also reflected in the Senior Political Committee re-
port, including the West German preference to include the United Nations 
Economic Committee for Europe (ECE) in Geneva as an existing organisa-
tion competent to deal with economic East–West questions.73 
As far as the ‘freer movement’ issues were concerned, the report un-
derlined their potential as a Western position, going well beyond just an 
expansion of existing cultural exchange programmes. A discussion of this 
topic before and at a CSCE would ‘put the Soviets on the defensive and 
focus public opinion on the closed nature of Communist regimes’. Essen-
tially, the freer movement items were seen as a possible bargaining lever 
for the West, since ‘by keeping up the pressure, the Allies may eventu-
ally obtain some meaningful concessions from the Soviets’.74 For the time 
being, the West Germans saw no need to oppose this approach within 
NATO. But as will be argued below, this was to change, as the West Ger-
mans became convinced of the advantages of a less confrontational posi-
tion towards the East in the CSCE context, particularly when it came to 
‘freer movement’.
In the November 1970 report of the SPC, the possibility of talking about 
confidence-building measures such as advance notification of military 
manoeuvres and exchange of observers in the CSCE framework was left 
open. But more importantly, mutual and balanced force reductions were 
beginning to be dealt with on a separate track from the CSCE. This de-
velopment was certainly contrary to West German preferences. During 
the preparation of the report, the West Germans had continued to insist 
on MBFR being included in all forms of a CSCE. If the conference were 
to become merely a propaganda event laden with atmospherics but de-
void of content, the risks contained would be ‘incalculable’. In the West 
German view a suitable means to prevent that happening was to insist 
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on MBFR being discussed in all East–West preparatory conferences and 
expert meetings connected with the CSCE.75 Against this background, the 
SPC report must have been a disappointment in Bonn.
But although still unsurpassed in importance, in the autumn of 1970 
NATO was no longer the only show in town in Western CSCE preparations. 
Simultaneous with the revival of discussions in NATO, there had been a 
completely new initiative on the European level, as the European Political 
Cooperation of the six members of the EC started. The foundation docu-
ment of this foreign policy coordination, the Davignon report, which was en-
dorsed by the EC Foreign Ministers in late October 1970, did not explicitly list 
themes to be discussed by the EC members in this framework, but the CSCE 
was from the outset chosen as one of the test balloons of EPC consultations.76 
Chancellor Brandt has been mentioned as the initiator of choosing 
the CSCE as a topic to be covered by the EPC.77 It seems more probable, 
however, that the initiative came from the Belgians, with active French 
support.78 In any case, on the working level in the Auswärtiges Amt first 
reactions to the inclusion of the CSCE on the EPC agenda were highly 
sceptical, pointing out the well-established technical mechanisms within 
NATO to deal with CSCE matters. Firstly, NATO consultations on the 
CSCE were seen as a valuable political adhesive within the Alliance, since 
the CSCE had finally provided a reason for the French to cooperate with 
other NATO members. Moreover, a joint approach of the EC members 
on the CSCE could raise suspicions in Washington, something the FRG 
wanted to avoid, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the Moscow 
Treaty. Therefore, the Auswärtiges Amt unit responsible for the CSCE 
recommended that political EC consultations on the security conference 
should be restricted to regular mutual briefings – harmonisation and 
agreement on joint positions should be left to NATO as before.79 While 
this level of resistance was not completely shared by the higher ranks of 
the Foreign Ministry, the potential of the EPC to spawn disagreements 
between Paris and Washington was certainly a valid observation. As will 
be argued below, the Germans later often found themselves as mediators 
between the French and the US as a result.
Since the FRG held the rotating six-month presidency of the EC, the 
first Foreign Ministers’ EPC meeting took place in Munich on 19 Novem-
ber 1970, partly also in the presence of the European Commission. Foreign 
Minister Scheel, hosting the meeting, argued that there were clearly going 
to be questions on the CSCE agenda that were part of the EC’s remit – in 
those issues the inclusion of the EC in preparations and actual negotia-
tions of the CSCE was essential. In this respect, the division of labour with 
NATO was clear. In Scheel’s view it was important to complement the 
on-going discussions within NATO with EPC preparations on economic 
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cooperation.80 With Scheel’s colleagues agreeing with this view, at its ini-
tial meeting the EPC mechanism did not yet present itself as competition 
for NATO. But once out of the starting blocks, the EPC was to gain in im-
portance rapidly during the following spring.
Coinciding with and in part resulting from the increased NATO and 
EPC activity, preparations for a CSCE were also stepped up in Bonn. The 
Auswärtiges Amt working group on the CSCE was reconvened on 24 No-
vember 1970 – over a year since the preceding working group had finished 
its job – to coordinate German positions and instructions on the security 
conference for discussions in NATO as well as in the EPC.81 Meeting ap-
proximately once a month, this working group became an important hub 
of the CSCE policy-making in the Auswärtiges Amt. In addition to the 
reconstitution of the working group, the growing attention given to the 
CSCE in Bonn at this stage is also reflected in the amount of material to be 
found in the archives of the Auswärtiges Amt. The number of detailed back-
ground papers on the conference and country-specific analyses of CSCE 
positions provided by West German embassies began to pile up signifi-
cantly in the late autumn of 1970.82 The enthusiasm of individual officials 
was also a significant factor contributing to the rising West German in-
fluence in Western preparations. Particularly, the promotion of Götz von 
Groll to head the unit responsible for the CSCE in the Auswärtiges Amt in 
late 1970 was to have important ramifications.83 
Preparing the first meeting of the CSCE working group, von Groll 
toyed with the idea of supporting the emerging EPC work by convening 
representatives of the Six in Bonn for regular round table discussions on 
the CSCE.84 This suggestion, in effect copying the existing Bonn Group 
mechanism and expanding it for the use of the EC Six in the CSCE context, 
was never followed up. But what the West Germans did was to try to en-
gage the Bonn Group more efficiently with CSCE matters. On 19 Novem-
ber 1970, the FRG proposal to arrive at a joint Bonn Group position on the 
relationship of the German question and the CSCE was discussed in the 
group at length.85 Despite initial doubts about allied reactions to this kind 
of separate discussion of a key issue of the CSCE, the Bonn Group took up 
the West German initiative – and only a few weeks later, the group issued 
its first study on the CSCE and the GDR. 
It was against this backdrop of rapidly expanding CSCE activity in all 
Western fora that the Finnish Government stepped in with a new pro-
posal. In their memorandum delivered to the potential CSCE participants 
on 24 November 1970, the Finns suggested that heads of the diplomatic 
missions in Helsinki could open bilateral or possibly even multilateral 
consultations with the Finnish Foreign Ministry – building on the idea of 
a diplomatic ‘tea party’ raised by the Belgians in the preceding spring.86 
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Timed shortly before the NATO Foreign Ministers’ autumn meeting, the 
Finnish move sparked a lively debate in the NATO Council. The delega-
tions agreed, however, that the Finnish memorandum should not be al-
lowed to influence the preparations for the Foreign Ministers’ meeting.87 
This reflected the increasing independence of the Western deliberations. 
The NATO approach on the conference was becoming more proactive, 
less reactive. And for the time being, in spite of the opening up of the EPC 
track, it was still the NATO framework that truly mattered as the domi-
nant Western forum for CSCE preparations. 
However, in the autumn of 1970 Bonn was not yet making full use of 
this forum. Although the West German NATO delegation in mid-Novem-
ber informed the Allies that the FRG was preparing a working paper on 
cultural relations in East–West negotiations,88 the West German proposal 
for the text of the upcoming ministerial declaration revealed the continued 
one-sidedness of the approach of the Federal Republic. In this proposal, 
the accent was again heavily on MBFR.89 Accompanying instructions from 
Bonn to the NATO delegation maintained the agreed German position. 
MBFR was a self-contained topic that could be addressed independently 
of a CSCE, but every form of a CSCE, including multilateral preparations 
for a conference, should also address the topic of MBFR.90 In the NATO 
Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Brussels in December 1970, Scheel brought 
the West German view to a point: ‘MBFR without CSCE yes! – CSCE with-
out MBFR no!’91 At least in the West German analysis of the discussions, 
Scheel’s colleagues concurred, and the principle of MBFR as a necessary 
agenda item of a CSCE continued to be accepted by the Allies.92 The min-
isterial communiqué, however, did not explicitly spell out such an agree-
ment. While it did include paragraphs on MBFR as a separate agenda item, 
the sections more directly related to the substance of a possible CSCE left 
force reductions unmentioned:
Ministers recalled that any genuine and lasting improvement in East–West rela-
tions in Europe must be based on the respect of the following principles which 
should govern relations between states and which would be included among 
the points to be explored: sovereign equality, political independence and terri-
torial integrity of each European state; non-interference and non-intervention 
in the internal affairs of any state, regardless of its political or social system; and 
the right of the people of each European state to shape their own destinies free 
of external constraint. … In the field of international co-operation, the contacts 
… might provide an opportunity to consider ways and means of ensuring clo-
ser co-operation between interested countries on the cultural, economic, techni-
cal and scientific levels, and on the question of human environment. Ministers 
reaffirmed that the freer movement of people, ideas and information is an es-
sential element for the development of such co-operation.93
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This text made it apparent that the decision-makers in Bonn had sidelined 
themselves with their almost exclusive focus on MBFR. On the whole 
broad range of potential issues for the CSCE agenda mentioned in the 
NATO communiqué, there had so far been hardly any genuine West Ger-
man contribution to Western objectives and positions. But from early 1971 
onwards, this slowly began to change. The West Germans started truly 
to discover the uses of Western multilateralism and the CSCE in pursu-
ing their substantive interests. A careful combination and interplay of the 
NATO and EPC frameworks was the means to this end. At first, the main 
emphasis was in NATO.
Broadening the German Horizon in the NATO Framework
Following up the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in December 1970, the North 
Atlantic Council commissioned a new study from the Senior Political 
Committee on 13 January. This exercise dominated the work on political 
questions in NATO during the spring of 1971, sparking a series of negotia-
tions in Brussels and finally resulting in a new report on substance and 
procedures of a CSCE in May.94 As the discussion was opened in the Po-
litical Committee in late January, the West German delegation signalled its 
willingness to contribute particularly to the issues of cultural relations and 
freer movement, possibly also to the relationship between the FRG’s bilat-
eral Eastern treaties and a multilateral renunciation of force agreement.95 
A few weeks later, the West German position was consolidated in in-
structions von Staden sent to the NATO mission. For the Federal Republic, 
MBFR was still the highest priority among issues to be addressed in a 
CSCE, but the Auswärtiges Amt now spiced up this position with a con-
siderably broader view. Regarding the ‘principles governing relations be-
tween states’, Bonn highlighted the problematic effect any agreement on 
borders would have on the German question. Since the agreement in a 
CSCE on a renunciation of force and on respect of existing borders would 
carry the signatures of the Four Powers (US, UK, France and the Soviet 
Union) as well as both German states, it could easily be misunderstood 
as a substitute peace treaty on Germany – something the Federal Repub-
lic could not accept under any circumstances. Measures should also be 
taken to ensure that the Four Powers’ responsibility for Berlin and Ger-
many as a whole would not be endangered by a CSCE. Regarding the 
cooperation elements of a conference, von Staden saw good prospects 
for both economic and cultural cooperation as well as for negotiations on 
environmental questions. But referring to freer movement, von Staden 
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cautiously stressed the need to differentiate between concrete short-term 
steps and long-term objectives.96 Based on von Staden’s instructions, the 
West German NATO delegation delivered a working paper to the Allies 
on 12 February, outlining the West German position on the substance and 
procedures of possible East–West negotiations.97
Although the working paper also had ‘procedures’ in its title, at this 
stage the West Germans were already mainly interested in the substance 
of the conference. The West German representatives argued constantly 
that a CSCE should not be exhausted in discussions over long statements, 
but should truly aim at suggesting concrete measures to enhance security 
and cooperation in Europe.98 This approach differed strikingly from that 
chosen by the French, who spent a considerable amount of effort in devel-
oping their three-stage conference model.99 In Franco-West German con-
sultations in March 1971, the West Germans held the view that procedural 
questions should be left in the background – what truly mattered was the 
agenda of the possible conference and a European security system.100 If 
the initiative was not to be left to the Warsaw Pact, NATO should concen-
trate seriously on the conference agenda.
Accordingly, in February 1971 the FRG raised its commitment to the 
CSCE agenda preparations to a new level. In fact, the position presented 
by the West German delegation to NATO included several significant 
guidelines of the CSCE policy of the Federal Republic which began to take 
shape during the spring of 1971. First of all, as an element of consistency, 
there was continued West German insistence to hold on to MBFR as a key 
topic of a future CSCE. Not even the resistance increasingly voiced by the 
major Allies was enough to discourage the West Germans from demand-
ing a place for force reductions on the CSCE agenda.101 In Bonn, MBFR 
continued to be seen as the appropriate Western addition and counter-
weight to the Eastern initiative for a CSCE. More than any other topic, it 
was MBFR that could make the CSCE useful for Western détente policy.102 
But whereas this position was consistently repeated in the working-level 
meetings,103 on the political level there were at first some visible contradic-
tions in the West German line. When Brandt met Prime Minister Heath in 
April in Bonn, the West German Chancellor assured his British counter-
part that the FRG was prepared to discuss MBFR in the CSCE framework, 
although this meant also including the neutral countries not directly af-
fected by the troop reductions. But when the West German and British 
delegations met for a concluding plenary discussion, Defence Minister 
Helmut Schmidt openly disagreed with Brandt, arguing that MBFR was 
not a suitable topic for a CSCE.104 For Schmidt, the main West German 
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advocate of MBFR, the force reductions were too important to be included 
in a CSCE – in his view MBFR deserved an exclusive forum. 
In addition to MBFR, the Federal Republic was beginning to pay more 
attention to the elements on the possible CSCE agenda grouped under 
the heading ‘principles governing relations between states’. Those ques-
tions dealing with respect for or recognition of existing borders in Eu-
rope, as well as those touching on the status of Berlin and Germany as a 
whole, were studied particularly carefully in Bonn. The resulting stance 
was predominantly defensive in nature. As a sort of damage control, the 
West Germans tended to prefer a provisional approach, aiming at a CSCE 
focusing on a temporary modus vivendi on a European scale rather than on 
fixed principles of inter-state relations. The overarching goal was to avoid 
even the remotest possibility of having the CSCE results interpreted as a 
substitute peace treaty on Germany.105 
In the NATO discussion, the most controversial question among the 
‘principles’ was the handling of European borders.106 By the end of April 
1971, the French and the Americans were badly at loggerheads over the 
issue, with the US refusing to discuss borders in a CSCE at all. In order 
to avoid further confrontation in front of other NATO members, the FRG 
suggested an advance mediation of the positions in the Bonn Group.107 
The representatives of the US, the UK and France agreed with the FRG 
that a four-power split on this issue was damaging, and that a common 
position should be sought in a smaller circle.108 In this context the argu-
ably most fundamental element of the German approach to the CSCE, that 
of seeking consensus behind the scenes in order to avoid open confron-
tations, became apparent in two respects simultaneously – unnecessary 
conflicts were to be avoided within the West as well as between East and 
West. In the Bonn Group meeting in late April van Well presented the 
West German preference to seek agreement on difficult issues, such as 
the question of borders, with the Soviet Union and the GDR at an earlier 
exploratory stage rather than risking an open collision at the conference 
proper.109 After the meeting, van Well instructed the West German NATO 
delegation to refrain from a discussion of the borders in the NATO frame-
work until a common position of the Bonn Group had been found – this 
was a question that needed to be solved by the powers responsible for 
Berlin and Germany as a whole.110 
On the other hand, the concern over quadripartite rights being under-
mined in the CSCE was balanced by the worry in the Auswärtiges Amt 
that the CSCE might actually strengthen the quadripartite rights over Ger-
many too much, leading to a loss of sovereignty for the Federal Republic. 
The ‘full powers of a sovereign state in its internal and external affairs’, 
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assured for the FRG in the post-war arrangements, had to be defended 
also in the CSCE framework.111 This concern over sovereignty was also 
the reason for West German reluctance to have the formulations on bor-
ders and on renunciation of force in the Moscow Treaty used as a model 
for the CSCE, as suggested by some of the NATO Allies. In the West Ger-
man view, the treaties negotiated with the Soviet Union and Poland were 
based on a specific and unique bilateral situation, and the formulations as 
such were not suitable for pan-European consumption. This position was 
also spelled out in clear terms to the Allies in the NATO Council.112
In addition to the ‘hard’ issues covered in the principles governing rela-
tions between states, the FRG had also discovered a greater interest in the 
‘softer’ questions concerning cooperation with the East in various fields, 
from economic to that of the environment.113 What arose as the main inter-
est of the FRG, however, was the topic of ‘freer movement of people, ideas 
and information’. It was in this field that the cautious principle of avoid-
ing East–West controversies and making gradual progress, a fundamental 
characteristic of West German CSCE policy, began to surface particularly 
clearly. This had been in the making for some time already. In November 
1970, the Auswärtiges Amt had argued that the West should not insist too 
strongly on freer movement at the beginning of an East–West dialogue, in 
part because the West itself was not yet fully prepared to receive the ‘peo-
ple, ideas and information’ from Eastern Europe without limitations.114 
Although the West Germans agreed with their allies that freer movement 
was an essential topic to be covered at a CSCE, they also underscored their 
view that the goal of a more liberal exchange between East and West could 
be achieved only very slowly.115 In the early spring of 1971, the West Ger-
mans considered enhanced cultural cooperation to be the most appropri-
ate way to address the question of freedom of movement.116
In von Staden’s instructions to the West German NATO mission in 
February 1971 the gradual approach to the freedom of movement was 
stressed. This was not a topic in which quick results should be expected. 
Instead, patience was called for: ‘The achievement of the free exchange 
of people, ideas and information with Eastern-European countries is our 
declared long-term objective.’117 In the British analysis, the West German 
preference to combine cultural relations with freer movement was con-
demned as both ‘muddled and complacent’.118 The United States, for its 
part, was also worried by the FRG’s desire to concentrate on cultural rela-
tions at the expense of freer movement.119 This was part of a more general 
concern in Washington about the Alliance drifting into a ‘hortatory con-
ference devoid of substance’.120 In the US analysis, the possible euphoria 
resulting from such a conference could be detrimental to the West, leading 
to high yields for the Soviet Union, and merely ‘meaningless atmospher-
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ics’ for the West. In short, as one of Kissinger’s key advisors wrote in May, 
the result would be a ‘disaster’.121
The West Germans were not willing to enter a conference lacking in 
substance either. But their perspective on the conference was different. 
For the FRG the CSCE was a long-term process, in which objectives would 
be best achieved by a gradual step-by-step approach.122 The freer move-
ment questions were a case in point. In March, von Staden explained to 
his French colleague that the West Germans wanted to move carefully in 
the CSCE. It was essential to avoid ideological confrontations – instead, 
one should aim at limited but concrete steps forward.123 Accordingly, in 
the NATO discussion based on competing French and US contributions, 
the Auswärtiges Amt sided with the French approach, aiming at the long-
term goal of liberalising East–West contacts through gradual improve-
ments in cultural cooperation. It was important not to raise suspicions in 
the Warsaw Pact of the West attempting to undermine their societies. This, 
in the West German view, was the case in the US proposal, which gave too 
much weight to propaganda by focusing on controversial elements such 
as travel restrictions and radio jamming.124
This budding controversy between the United States and the Federal 
Republic over the freedom of movement items had not yet fully materi-
alised, as the Senior Political Committee concluded its consultations in 
May 1971 with the presentation of its report on ‘substance and procedures 
of possible East–West negotiations’. This report, circulated on 17 May, was 
a significant update and expansion of the previous report of November 
1970. On over fifty pages, this report gave a detailed account of the state of 
play in the CSCE preparations of NATO. Now the substance of a possible 
CSCE agenda was divided into six categories: (1) principles governing re-
lations between states; (2) economic, scientific and technical cooperation; 
(3) cooperation to improve the human environment; (4) freer movement of 
people, ideas and information; (5) mutual and balanced force reductions; 
and (6) possible machinery for future East–West negotiations. In contrast 
to previous NATO reports on the CSCE preparations, the emphasis had 
now clearly moved to substance at the expense of procedure. In a number 
of issues, differences in opinion within the Alliance were already visible, 
since it had not been possible to achieve consensus in all agenda questions. 
On balanced force reductions, for example, the report merely referred to 
‘varying views’ of member states on the relationship between MBFR and a 
CSCE.125 This SPC report was presented to the NATO Foreign Ministers in 
their June meeting in Lisbon. The ministers instructed the SPC to continue 
its work, with the objective of achieving a unified view on the substance 
and procedures by the autumn of 1971.126 
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In a note circulated to West German embassies in late July, the Aus-
wärtiges Amt affirmed that the FRG was fully behind the latest CSCE re-
port of the SPC, having influenced the contents of the report significantly 
during its creation. The main positions of the Federal Republic had been 
adequately taken into consideration. Starting with the principles, the West 
Germans had won recognition for their argument that the Brezhnev Doc-
trine127 should not be the centre of attention. The Western focus should 
rather be on renunciation of force and peaceful settlement of disputes. On 
freer movement, the note presented a very sober view. In the long term 
the FRG naturally welcomed a more independent role for the individual 
Warsaw Pact states. However, if this trend were to get out of control, the 
uncertainty of the Soviet Union could lead to critical developments, which 
would not serve Western interests.128
Another Auswärtiges Amt analysis of the latest SPC report underlined 
the role the FRG had assumed in the NATO discussions, successfully 
building bridges between the ‘conservative’ (led by the US and the UK) 
and ‘progressive’ (led by the Belgians, Scandinavians and Canadians) ex-
tremes within the Alliance. West German mediation was mostly needed 
between the US and France, although the latter, because of its preference 
to move the CSCE preparations completely to the EPC of the Six, had been 
relatively passive in the actual discussions in the NATO Council.129 The 
need for West German mediation between the Allies had indeed grown 
dramatically because of the emergence of the EPC track.
From America’s Advocate to the Main Proponent of EPC
In parallel with the accelerating NATO preparations during the spring of 
1971, the work on the CSCE in the EPC framework had also truly started. 
In the consultations of the Six, the main West German concern at first was 
to maintain a clear division of labour between NATO and the EPC. There 
was ample reason for this, because of a new burst of French activity. 
In late January 1971, building on a Belgian working paper from the 
previous autumn, the French suggested that the EPC mandate on CSCE 
preparations be expanded to cover the whole range of CSCE issues. Ad-
ditionally, the French wanted to coordinate all CSCE positions of the Six 
prior to NATO consultations. Particularly the latter proposal met with stiff 
resistance from Bonn. Von Groll pointed out that this would necessarily 
lead to apprehension from the UK and the US, the main NATO partners 
outside the EPC. Moreover, the West Germans argued, the pace of the 
NATO deliberations was often so rapid that there would simply be no 
time for the Six to negotiate common positions for those consultations.130 
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On the other hand, the FRG supported France in the idea of opening up 
the EPC discussion on the whole range of the CSCE. In the West Ger-
man view the EC should in principle be free to discuss all elements of 
the CSCE, but in order to maintain the division of labour with NATO it 
was preferable to focus specifically only on those issues with particular 
relevance for the EC.131
France also pushed for an institutional strengthening of the CSCE prep-
arations in the EPC framework. Following the French initiative, the EPC 
political committee decided in February 1971 to establish a separate EPC 
working group on the CSCE.132 The constitutive session of this working 
group was held in Paris on 1 March. The mandate of the working group 
was broader than the West Germans had initially wanted, since the Six 
agreed that should there be problems in moving on in NATO discussions, 
it was possible to use joint instructions agreed in the EPC framework to 
‘enliven’ the NATO process, even if the topics discussed did not directly 
affect EC interests. As a countermeasure to avoid stepping on the toes 
of the NATO machinery, the West German delegation suggested that the 
EPC should come up with a ‘negative list’ of topics that were better left to 
the experts in NATO, such as disarmament and renunciation of force.133
This opening meeting of the CSCE working group of the EPC left the 
West Germans worried. France was apparently intending to create a 
strong and independent role for Western Europe in the CSCE. This was 
bound to lead the FRG into a difficult dilemma – having to choose be-
tween the US and France. The conclusions drawn in the Auswärtiges Amt 
were clear. It was up to the West Germans to make sure that US positions 
in all individual aspects of the CSCE were taken into consideration in the 
discussions among the Six. And on the other hand, the emergence of the 
Six as a serious actor in the Western CSCE preparations seemed to high-
light the need for the FRG to have regular bilateral consultation on CSCE 
matters with the United States.134 
In West German thinking, this became a central point. The EPC work 
on the CSCE should not be allowed to lead to the isolation of the US in the 
West. EPC coordination should focus only on matters of direct relevance 
for the EC, not for example on MBFR and renunciation of force, items 
clearly in NATO territory. The US positions should always be taken into 
consideration in the EPC discussions, for it was both inconsiderate and 
risky to present the most important guarantor of European security with 
a fait accompli. At most, the EPC should facilitate the decision making of 
NATO, not overtake it.135 As a result, the West Germans came to the con-
clusion that they had a genuine interest in assuming the mediating role 
between France and the US. In late March, after a meeting with a US em-
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bassy official, von Groll recommended taking up the US offer of bilateral 
exchanges of opinion on CSCE, since that would enable the West Germans 
to dispel US suspicions on the one hand, and to gain authority to represent 
the US position in the EPC on the other.136
The French, for their part, continued to be active in their attempts to ex-
pand the EPC mandate on the CSCE. In the Franco-West German consul-
tations of the Political Directors in March, Beaumarchais suggested that 
the NATO missions of the Six could be instructed to use the joint positions 
arrived at in the EPC discussions as ‘inspiration’ for the NATO debates. 
Von Staden replied that it was important to distinguish between two sets 
of questions in the CSCE context – those areas in which the Six as a com-
munity had genuine and specific interests, and those in which the Six were 
not yet addressed as a community. In the previous questions it was only 
natural that the Six had common positions, but in the latter it should be 
very carefully considered.137 But the French push in the EPC framework 
was a genuine concern for the Federal Republic. In fact, the NATO unit of 
the Auswärtiges Amt was already having second thoughts about the whole 
concept of the EPC working on the CSCE. Under the French presidency 
during the first half of 1971 the cooperation had been developing in a com-
pletely different direction than originally envisaged by the West Germans. 
In the West German view, there were more than enough suitable venues 
for discussing the CSCE in general, so that the EPC should do so only 
where the EC’s interests were directly at stake.138 Under no circumstances 
should the CSCE discussion in NATO be prejudged by the EPC.139
To alleviate these concerns, the West Germans voluntarily assumed the 
role of the advocate of the United States in bridging the EPC–NATO gap. 
Over the course of the spring of 1971, the West Germans had established 
regular contacts with the US diplomats to discuss the CSCE proceedings 
in the EPC. Due to French insistence, those NATO members outside the 
EPC Six, including the US, had only been informed very superficially and 
restrictively about EPC reports and discussions. The Auswärtiges Amt, 
however, consistently kept the US embassy in Bonn well informed about 
the material contents of the EPC report, even during its preparations. 
Technically speaking, EPC confidentiality had been maintained, since the 
actual texts had not been given to the Americans. In the West German 
view, satisfying the information needs of the US would be necessary for 
as long as the EPC discussions in parallel with those in NATO continued 
to irritate the Americans.140 Avoiding unnecessary irritants to the US-Eu-
ropean relationship was the primary cause for West German insistence 
on maintaining a clear division of labour between the EPC and NATO 
in the CSCE preparations. The Federal Republic firmly opposed all ideas 
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of broadening the scope of the EPC to include ideas clearly perceived to 
be in the NATO domain. Thus, for example, the Italian proposal to begin 
discussing MBFR in the EPC was dismissed from the outset.141 
But the active West German advocacy of US interests in the EPC frame-
work turned out to be a temporary state of affairs. The controversy be-
tween West German and US views on the best approach to the freedom 
of movement, which had already been developing for some time, became 
an open disagreement from the summer of 1971. In late August, von Groll 
laid the West German-US disagreement out in the open in a discussion 
with a US embassy official, expressing the ‘serious misgivings’ of the Fed-
eral Government. In the West German view, certain CSCE agenda items 
proposed by the US, especially cessation of radio jamming and greater 
movement between East and West, ‘seemed almost designed to ensure 
that a CES would fail’. While the Federal Republic also wished to achieve 
these objectives, they should follow later in the ‘evolutionary process of 
détente initiated by a CES’. Instead of tackling controversial issues at the 
outset of the process, one should rather focus on developing East–West 
relations for more realisable objectives, for example expanding cultural 
exchange programs.142
The disagreement with the US over the tactical approach to be taken on 
the freer movement items was a symptom of the increasing Europeanisa-
tion of West German CSCE policy. The division of labour between NATO 
and EPC was one thing, but when it came to the agenda of the conference, 
the West Germans had few reasons to be worried about the development 
in the EPC framework. In late April, the EPC Political Directors meeting in 
Paris agreed on a twenty-point document which was to become the intro-
duction to the first EPC report on the CSCE. This paper contained several 
ideas the West Germans held dear, such as the principle of formulating 
Western proposals in a way which would appear attractive to the East as 
well. Suitable areas of cooperation mentioned in the report ranged from 
industrial cooperation and trade to environmental protection and devel-
opment aid.143 
West German wishes to move on in the field of East–West cooperation 
were also met in the EPC Foreign Ministers’ meeting on 13–14 May. There 
the Six agreed that the procedure of the conference was secondary in im-
portance to the actual content. It was not enough simply to list topics for 
the agenda. Questions of content needed to be addressed seriously before 
the conference met. Questions of economic, cultural, scientific and techno-
logical cooperation all touched on vital interests of the European Commu-
nity. In order to prevent disturbances to the further development of the 
European Communities by the Eastern CSCE suggestions, the EPC needed 
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to be active in these fields. As a signal of this willingness to deepen sub-
stantive preparations, the ministers decided to convene an ad hoc group 
of the EPC working on economic questions of a CSCE.144 Although the 
deliberations on the cooperation items were fairly noncommittal at this 
stage, as a result of the Paris meeting there were two EPC bodies focus-
ing on the CSCE: the working group (or sub-committee, sous-comité) for 
general affairs and the ad hoc group specialising on economic questions. 
The Auswärtiges Amt had already for months been engaged in prepar-
ing various cooperation elements for the CSCE agenda. But in August 
1971 this was supported by a new opening from the Chancellery. In a 
detailed memorandum on the ‘civilian’ aspects of a CSCE, Per Fischer, 
one of the specialists on European policy in the Chancellery, stressed the 
importance of the role of the EC in pursuing the European peace order 
as a long-term goal. In the CSCE context, Fischer argued for a European 
approach founded on making attractive offers to the East (Angebotspolitik). 
In Fischer’s view, the West should present a wide variety of substantive 
offers, ranging from East–West trade to financial and scientific coopera-
tion, from transport, energy and development aid to culture and informa-
tion exchange. The European Political Cooperation was the best means 
to pursue this policy, for it was important that the Europeans spoke with 
one voice. By making these attractive offers to the Warsaw Pact, it was 
also to be expected that the Soviet Union would be more inclined to recog-
nise the EC as a negotiating partner.145 Fischer’s ideas went down well in 
the Auswärtiges Amt, since only a few days later the Foreign Ministry also 
spoke in favour of an active, coordinated and balanced Angebotspolitik of 
the West.146 
The essence of this new approach was spelled out in late August. In 
an inter-ministry CSCE meeting in Bonn, Fischer declared that ‘the CSCE 
provides the possibility of embedding the Ostpolitik efforts of the Federal 
Government in a “European Ostpolitik”’.147 As will be shown in the follow-
ing chapter, this idea of a ‘European Ostpolitik’ set the tone for the future 
West German CSCE policy, until the opening of the multilateral prepara-
tory talks in Helsinki in November 1972 and beyond.
Conclusion
The conclusion of the first stage of the quadripartite Berlin talks in Sep-
tember 1971 was, just as the Moscow Treaty had been a year earlier, an 
important milestone for West German CSCE policy. In terms of the link-
age approach, the second of the three major objectives the Federal Repub-
lic wanted to achieve before entering the CSCE preparations, the Berlin 
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Agreement, was getting closer. But the choices made in Bonn in order to 
facilitate the achievement of these two objectives – the commitment to the 
CSCE in the Bahr Paper and the exclusive focus on the Berlin talks as the 
only precondition for a CSCE – had diminished the possibilities of using 
the CSCE leverage to achieve the final and most important objective, the 
Inner-German Treaty. The agreement of the Federal Republic to follow the 
French lead and single out the successful conclusion of the Berlin talks as 
the final threshold before multilateral CSCE preparations was irreversible. 
The West Germans managed to hold to their interpretation of this ‘success-
ful conclusion’. At the same time it was clear that after the Berlin Agree-
ment it would no longer be possible to return to the linkage between the 
Inner-German Treaty and the CSCE, as originally envisaged by Bahr. As 
will be argued in the following chapter, in the end the Federal Republic 
became the victim of its own strategy in its efforts to instrumentalise the 
CSCE by linking it to other negotiations. Now time favoured the GDR, not 
the FRG. Instead of being able to hold back CSCE preparations until an 
Inner-German Treaty was in place, Bonn was now under pressure to con-
clude the inner-German negotiations before the CSCE preparations started.
However, rather than a sign of West German weakness and inability to 
pursue its own interests, this was a sign of a fundamental shift in priori-
ties in Bonn. Already in the period covered in this chapter, the importance 
attached to the substance of the conference had clearly overtaken the ex-
pectations of the instrumental value of the CSCE. West German policy-
makers had come to the conclusion that instead of bargaining with their 
CSCE participation, it was actually West German conference participation 
itself that held the more valuable promise for the future. Operating in the 
multilateral framework preparing the CSCE agenda in the West, the Fed-
eral Republic had in effect already multilateralised Ostpolitik. Defending 
its vital interests in the ‘principles governing relations between states’, 
emphasising elements of East–West cooperation, underscoring the need to 
avoid unnecessary confrontation both within the West and between East 
and West, and finally, by stressing the nature of the CSCE as a long-term 
process, the FRG was attempting to get its key objectives adopted by its 
allies. The following chapter will show that these attempts were to a large 
extent successful. 
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1971–72
Towards a European Peace Order? 
(
IllustratIon 5: Minister of Economics and Finance Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor Willy 
Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel (from left to right) at the EC Summit in Paris  
on 19 October 1972. 
Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, B 145 Bild-00017718,  
Photographer: Ulrich Wienke.
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There has been no other phase in diplomacy like the current one, with so many 
linkages and reverse linkages.
– State Secretary Frank to Soviet Ambassador Falin, December 19711
The FRG views it [the CSCE] as a long-range process seeking somehow to 
bridge the deep gap that exists between Eastern Europe and the Atlantic world. 
Much depends on whether we can find a way to begin this process without 
creating the impression in the USSR that we are trying to overthrow its regime.
– Political Director von Staden during his visit to Washington, March 19722
In September 1971 at the very latest, the CSCE ceased to be a theoretical 
construction looming in the distant future. The signature of the quadripar-
tite Berlin Agreement had fulfilled one further Western precondition set 
for the conference, and the opening of the multilateral preparatory talks 
(MPT) was increasingly imminent. Although complementary agreements 
were still needed for the Berlin Agreement to enter into force, this was only 
a question of time. As it became apparent even to the staunchest of sceptics 
that the process towards a CSCE could no longer be halted, the policy of 
the Federal Republic accelerated its shift, moving from attempts to instru-
mentalise the CSCE towards an active approach to the conference agenda. 
In terms of linkage, the position of the FRG changed dramatically. As 
the date for the opening of the MPT became de facto fixed, the FRG was 
under self-inflicted pressure to conclude the inner-German negotiations 
in time, thus reversing the original idea of linkage. Peter Becker has sug-
gested that Allied resistance forced the FRG to abandon its attempts to 
link the opening of the CSCE with the conclusion of the Basic Treaty.3 My 
argument goes a step further, stressing that the prospects of succeeding in 
a further linkage were considered to be so small that the FRG never even 
made the genuine effort. There was no longer any active linkage to speak 
of – the schedule of the CSCE set the conditions for the schedule of the 
inner-German negotiations, not vice versa.
But the CSCE policy of the Federal Republic had undergone a remark-
able change during the two years in office of the Brandt Government. In 
the period covered in this chapter, the policy of linking other negotiations 
with the CSCE preparations had already disappeared from the horizon of 
the key CSCE actors in Bonn. They sat in the Auswärtiges Amt, which was 
responsible for manoeuvring the increasingly complex multilateral West-
ern web of CSCE preparations. Even with the dawn of the conference, 
the preparations were still to a large extent an intra-Western affair. The 
EPC was gaining in importance, leading to occasional conflicts between 
the political cooperation among the EC members and among members of 
NATO. With MBFR on a separate track, several of the key competences in 
CSCE preparations actually no longer rested in NATO. 
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This development opened a new possibility for the Auswärtiges Amt to 
pursue West German interests in various multilateral combinations. Mul-
tilateralism per se was perceived to be in the West German interest. With 
its own bilateral options to a large extent exhausted, the FRG saw numer-
ous advantages in avoiding bilateralism in the future construction of East–
West affairs. The CSCE was a means to expand the Ostpolitik approach to 
a multilateral level, and the FRG strove for joint Western positions tak-
ing into account essential West German interests. It was a means to exert 
control over the development of détente, and to defend the fundamental 
achievements of Ostpolitik. There was also a close nexus between Deutsch-
landpolitik and the CSCE. Potential agreements made in the multilateral 
conference were seen as a way to achieve step-by-step improvements in 
inner-German affairs.
The Decline of the Linkage between the CSCE  
and the Inner-German Treaty 
In mid-September 1971, less than two weeks after the signature of the 
quadripartite Berlin protocol, Brandt paid a visit to Leonid Brezhnev in 
the Crimea. This unofficial meeting between the leaders of the FRG and 
the Soviet Union, organised at unusually short notice, caused a suspicious 
reaction in the West – again raising old doubts of bilateral West German-
Soviet bargaining behind the scenes.4 The West Germans were at pains 
to convince their allies that the invitation to the meeting had come from 
Moscow.5 After the trip, Brandt did his best to alleviate the concerns with 
personal letters to Nixon, Heath and Pompidou, outlining the contents of 
the discussions and assuring the three major Allies that he had not over-
stepped any positions agreed in the Alliance.6 
In terms of the CSCE linkage, the Crimean encounter was interesting 
precisely because of this fidelity to agreed Western lines. Prior to Brandt’s 
visit the Auswärtiges Amt had kept alive the idea of a linkage, treating the 
agreement of the FRG to ‘multiple bilateral’ talks on the CSCE as an ‘ex-
change object’, to be awarded in return for Soviet pressure on the GDR 
in the inner-German negotiations.7 Timothy Garton Ash has aptly dem-
onstrated Brandt’s and Bahr’s attempts to work the Bonn–Moscow–Ber-
lin triangle in Ostpolitik.8 But the German records from the meetings with 
Brezhnev show that in September 1971 Brandt made no efforts to play the 
triangle in this way in the CSCE context. 
Instead, Brandt told Brezhnev that if the Berlin talks were concluded 
in time, NATO Foreign Ministers would give the green light to the mul-
tilateral preparations in their forthcoming meeting in December 1971. 
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Brezhnev remarked that the fate of the final Berlin Agreement depended 
on the complementary inner-German negotiations connected to it.9 When 
Bahr briefed the US Ambassador in Bonn about the Crimean discussions, 
he noted that Brezhnev had clearly indicated that the Soviet Union ex-
pected the necessary progress to have been completed by December.10 
The joint final communiqué of the Crimean talks raised the CSCE as 
one of the most important items the two leaders had discussed. The com-
muniqué highlighted the willingness of the Soviet Union and the FRG 
to ‘accelerate the preparations’ for such a conference.11 This was a direct 
follow-up to the commitment made to the Soviets in the Bahr Paper and 
in the Moscow negotiations in 1970, and had been expected by the Aus-
wärtiges Amt in advance.12 Appearing before the Bundestag Foreign Policy 
Committee a few weeks later, Brandt explained that the language in the 
communiqué was not in contradiction with agreed Allied positions – ‘ac-
celeration’ simply meant attempting to move on from a bilateral to a mul-
tilateral phase, provided that the necessary conditions were met.13 
Nevertheless, the message from Crimea was clear. Without receiving 
any concrete concessions in return, Brandt pledged to accelerate the con-
ference preparations. The days of horse-trading were long gone. This was 
further highlighted by another simultaneous development, originating 
in the North-western neighbour of the Soviet Union. On 10 September 
1971, the Finnish Government suggested a package deal to address its 
relations with the FRG and the GDR simultaneously. This initiative had 
been secretly in preparation for some time, but had to be published sooner 
than planned because of an unfortunate slip of the tongue of the Finnish 
Foreign Minister. This opening transformed the German-Finnish relation-
ship, ultimately resulting in the establishment of full-scale diplomatic ties 
between Finland and both German states in late 1972.14 But in the short 
term, it also had potential consequences for the CSCE policy of the FRG. 
There had never been any widespread enthusiasm in Bonn for Helsinki 
as a conference location as such. It was Finland’s balanced approach to 
the two German states, below the level of full diplomatic relations, that 
had made it an acceptable candidate in Federal German eyes. Now that 
the Finns suddenly launched their initiative at such a critical juncture of 
the FRG’s Deutschlandpolitik, it would have been logical for Bonn to retali-
ate in the CSCE field. As a first reaction, the Auswärtiges Amt was not only 
irritated at not being informed about Finnish plans in advance, but also 
contemplated rethinking its position on the suitability of Helsinki to host 
the CSCE preparations.15 
But once the dust settled, it became obvious that Bonn was unwilling to 
create a direct link between the location of the MPT and Finnish policies to-
wards the two German states. Two weeks after the Finnish initiative, State 
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Secretary Sigismund von Braun instructed the FRG mission in Helsinki 
not to make an explicit connection between the two. It would be sufficient 
if the Finns indirectly felt that Helsinki had lost some of its attraction as 
an absolutely neutral capital.16 But as far as the official West German posi-
tion on the MPT site was concerned, the Finnish move had not changed 
anything. It was considered to be a separate development, not sufficient to 
question the suitability of Helsinki as a conference venue.17 
Both examples – the pledge for ‘acceleration’ in the Crimea and the re-
luctance to pull the plug from Finnish hopes of hosting the CSCE – reflected 
the change in West German thinking. There was no longer an interest in 
Bonn, either at the highest political level or at the working level in the Aus-
wärtiges Amt, to attempt to use the CSCE as a bargaining chip in bilateral 
contacts. And there was also a similar decline in the willingness to continue 
with the ‘linkage’ policy through the multilateral route in NATO, although 
here the West German position was still slightly more ambiguous. 
In the instructions sent out to embassies about the situation after the 
signing of the quadripartite Berlin protocol, State Secretary von Braun 
stressed that ‘the Federal Government does not insist on the conclusion 
of a general modus vivendi between the FRG and the GDR before entering 
the multilateral preparations of a CSCE’. According to von Braun’s in-
structions, not even the more modest bilateral traffic treaty with the GDR 
needed to be concluded before the opening of the MPT. In the view of 
the Auswärtiges Amt, the only remaining preconditions for the multilateral 
CSCE preparations were the completion of the Berlin Agreement and a 
secured legal position of the Federal Republic with respect to the partici-
pation of the GDR.18 
The reaction of the Allies to this West German position was twofold. 
On the one hand, they were surprised by the new flexibility. After the 
signature of the Berlin Agreement, the US had calculated that the FRG 
would be a major factor affecting European thinking on the timing of the 
CSCE. Bonn was expected to ‘wish to maintain some correlation’ between 
the pace of the CSCE and the sensitive question of the development of the 
inner-German relationship.19 On the other hand, now that this correlation 
turned out to be weaker than expected, even the minimum West German 
requirement of completing the Berlin negotiations was increasingly chal-
lenged within the Alliance. Pressure to enter multilateral CSCE prepara-
tions, or at least ‘multiple bilateral’ talks, as soon as possible was growing 
rapidly – particularly from the French side.20 
But this was a red line for the Federal Republic. The Berlin precondi-
tion for the MPT was not negotiable. The planning staff of the Auswärtiges 
Amt argued that it should be made clear to the Allies that Bonn still con-
sidered the timing of the CSCE to be a vital national interest. If necessary, 
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in extreme situations the FRG should also be prepared to block decision-
making in NATO and in the EPC, even at the risk of short-term isolation. 
In matters of such fundamental importance, the atmospheric losses would 
be outweighed by substantive gains.21 Accordingly, State Secretary Frank 
told the Finnish roving CSCE Ambassador Enckell that the FRG saw no 
significant difference between multilateral and ‘multiple bilateral’ prepa-
rations – the time would be ripe for them after the completion of all three 
stages of the Berlin talks.22 
On the MPT, thus, the West German position was unequivocal. Berlin 
was the only remaining precondition, but an absolutely necessary one. 
However, the Auswärtiges Amt also for a short time sent confusing signals 
about potential new linkages with the CSCE proper, proposing that the 
Federal Government wanted to have the modalities of the UN member-
ship of both German states negotiated before the actual CSCE could be 
convened.23 The US diplomats were surprised to hear this, and foresaw 
difficulties in convincing the French, since it might take years before UN 
entry would be achieved.24 
The French were indeed strongly against the idea. In a meeting of the 
CSCE working group of the EPC in mid-September, von Staden’s sugges-
tion that the UN modalitities needed to be clear before the GDR could take 
part in the CSCE at Foreign Ministers’ level resulted in an open Franco-
West German dispute. After the row in the EPC, von Staden argued for the 
urgent need to consolidate the West German position on this matter and 
to organise support for it in the Bonn Group.25 The French, who flatly de-
scribed the EPC discussion as ‘not successful’,26 returned to the question 
in a regular bilateral meeting with the West Germans in early October.27 
By then, however, the West Germans had dropped the idea. The Federal 
Government in Bonn had meanwhile decided to refrain from any further 
linkage of the inner-German relationship with the CSCE. 
In his telegram to London in late September, the UK Ambassador to 
Bonn, Roger Jackling, perceptively argued that with the French insisting 
on the conference, a number of smaller Allies also growing impatient and 
Brandt himself agreeing with Brezhnev to ‘accelerate’ progress towards 
the CSCE, a certain relaxation in the West German CSCE position and a 
less categorical presentation of it were to be expected.28
As it turned out, this change in the West German position was made 
on the very same day Jackling filed his report. A high-level meeting held 
at the Chancellery in Bonn on 26 September 1971 was the final nail in the 
coffin of West German CSCE linkage strategies. A small circle, consisting 
of Brandt, Scheel and the Minister for Inner-German Affairs, Egon Franke, 
as well as a handful of key officials, effectively decided to give up every-
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thing that was left of the plans to link progress in Deutschlandpolitik with 
the participation in and timing of the CSCE.29
The meeting had two main consequences for West German CSCE pol-
icy. Firstly, the Brandt-Brezhnev commitment in the Crimea to accelerate 
the CSCE process was to be interpreted literally – as soon as the necessary 
preparations made it possible, the conference should take place. In this 
view, it was explicitly mentioned, the FRG should closely support France. 
Secondly, as soon as the Berlin Agreement was in force, the Federal Re-
public would no longer raise any further reservations, neither concerning 
the multilateral preparations nor the conference itself. It was emphasised 
that this did not rule out the ‘disclaimer’ on GDR participation, to be is-
sued in due time.30 The inner circle in Bonn had arrived at the position 
that there was no longer any reason to procrastinate over the preparation 
of the CSCE. 
When von Staden formulated West German positions on the CSCE in 
preparation for an EC Political Committee meeting in mid-October, he 
referred to the decision made in the meeting in the Chancellery on the 
one hand, and to the ‘situation in the Alliance’ on the other. Both reasons 
rendered a further use of direct linkage between the CSCE proper and the 
inner-German modus vivendi impossible. The final Berlin Agreement had 
to be signed before multilateral East–West preparations of the conference, 
but that was all the West Germans could demand.31
In this question the Chancellor had taken the lead. In fact, Brandt’s 
retrospective account in his memoirs, referring precisely to this point in 
time, is revealing. Writing about linkages and reverse linkages, Brandt 
argues against imposing ‘political straightjackets’ on oneself and against 
the ‘fatal tendency’ in the political-diplomatic world to elevate a de facto 
relationship between two issues into a legal linkage. It was hardly a won-
der, Brandt points out, if others then followed suit.32 
And others certainly could play the linkage game as well. Just as the 
FRG had decided to let go of the particular link between the CSCE and 
inner-German relations, the overall picture of détente linkages took a fur-
ther turn towards more complication. During the opening week of the 
UN General Assembly in New York, the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 
publicly declared that the Soviet Union was prepared to sign the final 
protocol of the Berlin Agreement only once the Bundestag had ratified the 
Moscow Treaty. This Soviet ‘reverse linkage’, as it became known, had di-
rect implications for the CSCE as well. As Scheel told his French colleague 
in New York, this Soviet position could in effect block the ratification of 
the Eastern Treaties in Bonn as well as preparations for a security confer-
ence.33 The Soviet move changed the rules of the game once more. Instead 
of the familiar two-dimensional link between the Berlin Agreement and 
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the opening of the CSCE, the ratification of the Moscow Treaty was now 
added as a third element. 
Hesitating on the Berlin Precondition
When it came to maintaining the grip on the Berlin precondition for the 
CSCE, the West Germans continued to be able to rely on the support of 
the major European Allies. The British remained content with ‘taking their 
cue from the Germans’ on the timing of the CSCE, and openly told the 
West Germans they did not want to move ‘slower than Bonn or faster than 
Bonn’.34 The French were also remarkably calm, not willing to upset the 
plans on timing agreed in NATO.35 The need for the conclusion – mean-
ing the signature of the final protocol – of the Berlin Agreement before 
the multilateral CSCE preparations was also consolidated as a joint EPC 
position in October.36 
The firm line on the Berlin precondition was endorsed by the Auswär-
tiges Amt and approved by the Federal Government on 3 November 1971, 
the first time the CSCE was discussed in the cabinet as a separate agenda 
point.37 Gromyko’s reverse linkage had merely reinforced the Auswärtiges 
Amt view on the need to maintain the Berlin precondition unchanged. 
Multilateral preparations should be begun immediately after the signa-
ture of the quadripartite final protocol on Berlin – not sooner than that, not 
later than that.38 The West German NATO Ambassador gave assurances 
that an active and consistent West German policy in this matter would 
keep other NATO allies in line.39
But although this position was consistently presented as the joint view of 
the government,40 there remained an element of indecision behind the scenes. 
Talking to his British colleague after a Bonn Group meeting in late October, 
Klaus Blech, a key West German official, insinuated that not everybody in 
government circles was in agreement. According to Blech, some outside 
the Auswärtiges Amt seemed to be prepared to enter multilateral conference 
preparations even before the Berlin Agreement had been completed.41 
Indeed, there was growing disagreement in this matter within the gov-
ernment, between the FDP and Scheel’s Auswärtiges Amt on the one hand, 
the SPD and the Chancellery on the other. The SPD was clearly having sec-
ond thoughts on the advisability of holding on to the ‘Scheel Doctrine’42 
– the line of thinking where a third-party recognition of the GDR before 
the Inner-German Treaty was perceived as a hostile act – any longer. In an 
SPD presidium meeting on 27 October, it was Herbert Wehner who called 
for an immediate cessation of the blockage of GDR participation in in-
ternational organisations. Brandt agreed with Wehner that this would be 
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tactically wiser. Supported by Egon Franke, however, Brandt argued that 
this could lead to severe problems with the FDP and the Auswärtiges Amt, 
who continued to believe in the potential leverage of the current policy on 
East Berlin.43
Nevertheless, Egon Bahr stepped in with a new policy line in mid-No-
vember 1971. Leading the negotiations with his East German counterpart, 
Michael Kohl, on the inner-German part of the Berlin Agreement, Bahr 
was optimistic that the talks would lead to a favourable result in time 
for the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting.44 In a high-level meeting of the 
Bonn Group in Paris, Bahr argued that the current situation was a tacti-
cal dream-come-true, since the Soviets were putting pressure on the East 
Germans to conclude the inner-German part of the Berlin Agreement in 
order to allow for a positive NATO decision on the CSCE preparations.45 
In a restricted informal discussion, Bahr then suggested that if the existing 
linkages were to postpone the signing of the Berlin Agreement so that it 
would occur simultaneously with the ratification of the Moscow Treaty, 
the FRG would be prepared to enter the multilateral CSCE preparations 
immediately after the conclusion of the inner-German part of the Berlin 
Agreement. ‘It would not be our business to give the green light in this 
case, but we would not oppose such a NATO decision’, Bahr said.46 
This was a dramatic and sudden change in the West German position. 
Although Bahr stressed that he was merely stating his personal opinion, 
a British memorandum referred with certainty to a meeting in Bonn the 
preceding night, where Brandt, Bahr and ‘ministers directly involved’ had 
reviewed the situation.47 The change seemed to be genuine. All the more 
so, since von Staden from the Auswärtiges Amt supported Bahr, stating 
that the Federal Government was ‘conscious of the risk that they might 
incur criticism if they appeared to be holding up progress towards a con-
ference for reasons connected primarily with Federal German politics’.48
For the Three Allies, this change in the West German position was a 
complete surprise, and naturally resulted in different interpretations. 
France, for its part, had already for some time been openly in favour of 
beginning the multilateral preparations. Accordingly, the Quai was quick 
to pick up the argument Bahr had delivered them on a silver plate. Only 
two days later, Foreign Minister Schumann suggested to Scheel that the 
MPT should be opened as soon as the second stage of the Berlin nego-
tiations was completed.49 The UK Foreign Office, then again, was clearly 
irritated about the way in which it had been confronted by the change in 
West German thinking without any advance notice. Nevertheless, the UK 
continued to consider the CSCE timing to be primarily a West German af-
fair, and maintained its support for Bonn.50 
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All of a sudden, then, the United States was alone in the Bonn Group in 
opposing the accelerated procedure towards the CSCE preparations.51 The 
general view in Washington on the whole linkage situation had been cyni-
cal to begin with. Kissinger’s aide Helmut Sonnenfeldt argued that sooner 
or later the West Germans were bound to deliver the CSCE as the next ‘in-
stalment payment’ for the Moscow Treaty.52 Later, Sonnenfeldt made this 
point even more strongly, arguing that the West German Government had 
completely ‘mortgaged its freedom of action’ on the CSCE project during 
Brandt’s Crimean visit.53 All the same, the new situation was viewed with 
concern, and prompt steps were taken to restore West German support for 
the US view on the timing of the CSCE, that is, multilateral preparations 
only after the signature of the final quadripartite protocol.54
The US was not alone in being uneasy with Bahr’s move. The West 
German NATO Ambassador Franz Krapf characterised the current West 
German CSCE position to his US colleague simply as ‘a mess’. In spite of 
Bahr’s recent statements in Paris that were also well known in Brussels, 
the official instructions Krapf received from Bonn were unchanged, insist-
ing, as before, on a completion of the Berlin Agreement before the MPT. 
According to Krapf, Bahr had not informed the Auswärtiges Amt about his 
intentions in advance.55 In his official reports to Bonn, Krapf complained 
about this inconsistency and its repercussions on West German credibility 
within the Alliance.56 But whereas Krapf represented the sceptical wing of 
the West German diplomats, Götz von Groll, the main engine behind the 
CSCE policies of the Auswärtiges Amt in Bonn, enthusiastically took up the 
idea of endorsing the multilateral preparations already in the communi-
qué of the forthcoming NATO ministerial meeting.57
This apparent lack of coordination of the CSCE policy of the Auswär-
tiges Amt was in part due to Foreign Minister Scheel’s visit to Moscow 
at the end of November 1971. According to rumours making the rounds 
in Brussels and Bonn, Scheel considered using a more flexible approach 
to the linkage of the Berlin talks with the CSCE preparations as a bar-
gaining chip in his discussions with Gromyko. This concession would 
be made in return for Soviet agreement to drop the ‘reverse linkage’.58 It 
seems plausible that keeping this tactical option open was a reason for the 
Auswärtiges Amt to go along with Bahr’s more flexible line on the Berlin 
precondition. However, as Scheel arrived in Moscow, the Soviet Foreign 
Minister categorically refused to give in on the reverse linkage, arguing 
that it was impossible for the Soviet Union to sign the Berlin protocol be-
fore the Moscow Treaty was ratified. Moreover, Gromyko flatly rejected 
any attempts to include the timing of the CSCE preparations in the equa-
tion. In the Soviet view, the West was merely trying to set new obstacles to 
the security conference.59 Van Well later told the UK Ambassador in Bonn 
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that Gromyko had, ‘metaphorically speaking, shrugged his shoulders’ at 
Scheel’s proposal.60
The conclusions drawn from this in the Auswärtiges Amt were unequivo-
cal – for the Soviet Union the necessity to ensure ratification of the Moscow 
Treaty outweighed the need for a swift opening of the CSCE preparations.61 
Scheel had been prepared to bargain with the MPT timing in Moscow but, 
once he had failed, the Auswärtiges Amt gained the upper hand in the do-
mestic struggle about the line to take on the timing of CSCE preparations.62 
If the Soviet reverse linkage held and the difficult ratification debates in 
the Bundestag were linked with the final round of the Berlin negotiations, 
opening the MPT before they were both concluded would be an unneces-
sary burden on the domestic parliamentary process. This argument was 
the bottom line for Scheel’s briefings to Brandt and the cabinet about his 
Moscow trip. The FRG should prefer to cling to the full Berlin precondi-
tion at the NATO meeting.63 According to US sources, it was in the cabinet 
meeting on 1 December that Brandt accepted Scheel’s recommendation 
that the CSCE preparations should be postponed until the signature of 
the final Berlin protocol.64 On the following day, the Auswärtiges Amt sent 
out new instructions, confirming that the full Berlin precondition was to 
be maintained.65
The brief interlude resulting from Bahr’s solo act as well as from 
Scheel’s willingness to test the leverage on Gromyko was thus over, and 
the West Germans returned to their previous position. This was partly due 
to their own reasoning, but US views certainly had their impact as well.66 
As British officials noted, the West Germans were in the end aligning 
themselves with the US, not with the French, on this issue.67 The British 
themselves were remarkably indifferent to the question, a position which 
was succinctly formulated by their NATO Ambassador: ‘If the Germans 
feel it necessary to hold out until final signature, we agree. If they want to 
be more flexible we would not stand out against that. We don’t want to be 
more German than the Germans.’68
As the NATO Foreign Ministers met in Brussels in December 1971, the 
issue of multilateralisation of the CSCE preparations was one of the main 
questions on the agenda. The last-minute stagnation in the negotiations on 
the second stage of the Berlin Agreement gave the NATO meeting an ad-
ditional flavour – contrary to earlier expectations, the inner-German part 
had not been initialled before the Brussels meeting. France would have 
preferred a formulation in the communiqué that would allow for the MPT 
to begin as soon as the second stage of the Berlin talks was concluded, but 
the majority position, suiting West German preferences, prevailed. The 
ministerial communiqué merely reiterated the previous Lisbon statement, 
that is, readiness to undertake multilateral preparations ‘as soon as the 
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negotiations on Berlin had reached a successful conclusion’. On this basis, 
the ministers further declared, they would be ready to initiate such talks 
‘as soon as possible’.69 The ‘successful conclusion’ was still not explicitly 
defined, due to French resistance, but it was by now evident that it meant 
the signature of the final protocol.70 In a subsequent EPC meeting, all but 
the French delegation agreed that this was the case.71 Reports from Wash-
ington on the Nixon-Pompidou talks indicated that the French were also 
prepared to accept this.72 
With the NATO consensus more or less intact behind the Berlin pre-
condition for the CSCE, the West Germans argued that the Soviet ‘reverse 
linkage’ strategy was responsible for the delay inflicted on the CSCE prep-
arations. The three NATO members involved in the quadripartite Berlin 
Agreement were prepared to sign the final protocol as soon as the com-
plementary inner-German talks were concluded. It was the Soviet Union 
that had linked the signature with yet another, separate development, and 
thus postponed the possibility to enter multilateral CSCE preparations.73 
But it was also a part of this logic, as Scheel pointed out in a Foreign Policy 
Committee debate at the Bundestag, that the FRG no longer had an option 
to slow down the process towards a CSCE. As soon as the Berlin protocol 
was signed, the conference preparations would begin.74
Blackmailing the Finns?
The December 1971 meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers was clearly 
a turning point, as far as the linkages with the CSCE preparations were 
concerned. The case was closed, for NATO and the Warsaw Pact alike. 
The road for the multilateral preparations of the CSCE would be free after 
the signature of the final Berlin protocol, no sooner and no later. In the 
Anglo-West German consultations in late December 1971, Political Direc-
tor von Staden was already able to predict accurately the schedule for the 
coming spring. Ratification of the Eastern Treaties in the Bundestag and 
the parallel signature of the Berlin Agreement would occur in May 1972. 
Subsequently, the spring meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers would de-
clare that the Alliance was prepared to enter multilateral preparations for 
a CSCE.75 
Even the leading opposition parliamentarian in European security af-
fairs, Werner Marx (CDU), although sceptical of the CSCE as such, agreed 
to a large extent with this timetable.76 As a last effort, in the heated foreign 
policy debate in the Bundestag plenary in late February 1972, ex-Chancel-
lor Kiesinger openly criticised his successor for abandoning the linkage of 
an inner-German treaty with the CSCE. Brandt, however, could respond 
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by referring to a joint Allied position on the Berlin precondition. Brandt 
also added that the FRG had been wise not to create an additional connec-
tion between the ratification of the Moscow Treaty and the CSCE.77 
Instead of the timing of the opening of the MPT, the focus in West Ger-
man thinking was moving towards the duration of the multilateral talks. 
The ‘tea party’ stage would not have a significant impact on the interna-
tional status of the GDR, but the actual conference was a different story. 
Therefore, Bonn preferred a preparatory phase lasting long enough to 
allow an inner-German treaty on the modus vivendi to be completed before 
the actual conference. This tendency to stress the importance of ‘long and 
thorough multilateral preparations’ had been on the rise in West German 
thinking during the autumn of 1971.78 In December, the Auswärtiges Amt 
prepared a working paper on procedures of the multilateral preparations, 
suggesting that the road towards the CSCE should go through a complex 
three-stage model – first the preparation of the ‘tea party’ of ambassadors, 
then the ‘tea party’ itself followed by a consultation of expert delegations, 
and finally the preconference of deputy foreign ministers.79 
The working paper was discussed in the EPC and NATO in December 
1971 and January 1972.80 In it, the West Germans argued that the experi-
ence of the Ostpolitik negotiations had shown that ‘difficulties can only be 
overcome without pressure of time, step by step and by flexible negotia-
tions which are coordinated in all their stages’.81 As a matter of fact, by 
February 1972 at the latest both London and Washington had recognised 
the element of procrastination in West German thinking. Bonn’s ‘meticu-
lous plan’ to engage in thorough preparatory talks was seen as an attempt 
by the West Germans to continue controlling the pace of the process.82 
Additionally, the Federal Republic naturally wanted to avoid confront-
ing high-level representatives of the GDR in the CSCE preparations for as 
long as possible. 
In March 1972, the West German distinction between the MPT and the 
conference proper became clearer. Von Staden explained in Washington 
that the FRG was not yet committed to an actual conference. Possible 
problems in the inner-German negotiations would certainly have an ef-
fect on the procedure of the multilateral CSCE preparations.83 The West 
Germans were well aware of the delicacy of this, but seemed to be after 
some degree of linkage of the conference proper with their negotiations 
with the GDR.84 Asked about this in a NATO meeting in Brussels, van Well 
nonetheless denied the existence of such a linkage. According to him, the 
FRG merely hoped that ‘progress made in the general détente framework 
would also have an influence on the talks between Bonn and East Berlin’.85 
Once again, it was Bahr who spoke more plainly. He told a US diplo-
mat in Bonn that the FRG ‘did not wish at this point publicly to be seen to 
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make further political linkages in the Eastern policy context’. All the same, 
Bahr went on, because of the status the GDR would gain at a CSCE proper, 
it ‘should not take place until the FRG negotiations with the GDR were 
completed’.86 Later van Well confirmed this – it was indeed crucial for the 
FRG to ‘clarify its relationship’ with the GDR before a Foreign Ministers’ 
plenary at a CSCE. In van Well’s view, the means to achieve this was to 
engage in a lengthy preparatory stage, lasting well into the spring of 1973 
if necessary.87 As the UK Ambassador in Bonn reported in April, the FRG 
was by no means prepared to ‘get off the escalator of East–West talks’ al-
together. On the contrary, the West Germans had for quite some time been 
fully committed to a CSCE. What the Federal Government and the Aus-
wärtiges Amt in particular wanted was to maintain a maximum amount 
of flexibility in order to control the pace of the preparatory phase, ‘so that 
this [could] be lengthened or shortened to fit with the tactical require-
ments of their negotiations with the GDR’.88 
Regarding the timing of the MPT, the official CSCE policy guidelines 
for the FRG, approved by the Federal Government in mid-May, pointed 
out that the signature of the final Berlin protocol was the only remaining 
prerequisite for the multilateral CSCE preparations.89 In a Bonn Group 
discussion around the same time, the Three and the FRG agreed that there 
could no longer be any formal barriers to the opening of the MPT after the 
Berlin Agreement. Because of various fixed dates in the coming autumn, 
such as the presidential elections in the US and the European Summit, the 
end of November was considered to be the suitable time for the talks in 
Helsinki to begin.90 
The Bundestag ratified the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties on 17 May 
1972, and two days later the treaties also passed through the Bundesrat. 
In fulfilment of the ‘reverse linkage’, as the Eastern treaties entered into 
force on 3 June, the Final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin was signed on 
the same day. With that, all Western preconditions for the opening of the 
CSCE preparations had been met. In the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meet-
ing in Bonn at the end of May, the Western Alliance officially gave the 
green light to the MPT.91 This was also the first occasion when NATO for-
mally accepted the Finnish proposal to organise these talks in Helsinki. 
The date was left open, but the location was fixed.
Despite the positive echo in the NATO declaration in Bonn, the Finns 
continued to be uncertain about the West German position on Helsinki as 
a location for the MPT. ‘Bonn is blackmailing’, was President Kekkonen’s 
concise diary remark on the CSCE preparations at the end of May.92 In 
April 1972, as the Finns were concerned about rumours indicating that the 
FRG would refuse to participate in the MPT in Helsinki if Finland moved 
on with its initiative from September 1971 to recognise the German states, 
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officials from the Auswärtiges Amt on several occasions gave assurances 
that no such strings were attached.93 
The idea of such a linkage was not wholly unfounded. At the NATO 
meeting in May 1972, Scheel’s statement in favour of opening the MPT 
in Helsinki in the autumn was conditional – ‘provided that the Finnish 
Government did not make any unilateral move in respect of the GDR that 
would be contrary to the FRG’s efforts to achieve an inner-German modus 
vivendi’.94 Moreover, in the past six months, the head of the FRG mission 
in Helsinki had occasionally flashed the CSCE card in his dealings with 
the Finns, openly suggesting that unwarranted Finnish moves could jeop-
ardise the suitability of Helsinki to host the multilateral talks.95
In the general context of West German CSCE policy, however, the Finn-
ish initiative to recognise the German states was only of marginal impor-
tance. Moreover, the concerns that did exist in Bonn about the suitability 
of Helsinki were more efficiently conveyed through the NATO channel, 
multilaterally and indirectly rather than bilaterally and directly. As agreed 
in the NATO consultations, the Norwegians and the Danes, who were the 
first NATO members to engage in ‘multiple bilateral’ CSCE discussions 
with the Finns in January 1972, also raised these potentially disadvan-
tageous effects of unilateral Finnish moves with respect to the German 
states.96 When the Finns realised that Bonn’s position had broader support 
in NATO, they were quick to draw the conclusion that it was in their inter-
est not to irritate the Federal Republic unnecessarily.97 
In this way, with the help of its allies, the FRG was indeed able to use 
the CSCE card to exert influence on the Finns. It certainly contributed to 
the Finnish decision to accept a proposal for negotiations from the FRG in 
January 1972, although President Kekkonen on several occasions stressed 
that Finland’s policies could not be ‘in Bonn’s pocket’.98 As this example 
shows, Bonn conducted its CSCE policy multilaterally in NATO and in 
the EPC, not bilaterally in Helsinki. In fact, the mission in Helsinki was 
deliberately kept out of the CSCE loop for most of the time. Von Groll 
openly admitted as much in February 1972. The Auswärtiges Amt wanted 
to make sure that their man in Helsinki did not start to negotiate on CSCE 
issues directly with the Finns.99 It was only in March 1972, long after sev-
eral other Allies, that the FRG opened its official contacts with the Finnish 
Government on the modalities of the MPT in Helsinki.100 
In the German Ambassadors’ conference in June 1972, Foreign Minis-
ter Scheel pointed out that Helsinki was acceptable to the FRG as the site 
of the MPT. If Finnish circumstances were to change, they would natu-
rally be taken into consideration when the location of the CSCE proper 
was discussed. For the time being, Helsinki was one of several candidates 
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for hosting the actual conference.101 A few days later, at a meeting of the 
Socialist International in Vienna, Chancellor Brandt told the Finnish For-
eign Minister Kalevi Sorsa that the FRG would naturally prefer the Finns 
to wait with their recognition moves until the Basic Treaty between the 
two German states was concluded. However, Brandt added, if the Finnish 
Government did not consider this to be possible, it would not be the end 
of the world.102
The Chancellor’s forthcoming attitude was shared by the leading of-
ficials of the Auswärtiges Amt. The MPT would in any case be organised 
in Helsinki. As far as the location of the actual conference was concerned, 
von Staden argued in July, connecting it with any Finnish overtures in the 
German question should be carefully avoided. An impression of the FRG 
punishing the Finns would not be in the West German interest.103 As a 
result, the representative of the Federal Government in Helsinki remained 
isolated and unsuccessful in his efforts to turn Finnish sensitivities in the 
CSCE question into a means of defending Bonn’s Deutschlandpolitik.104 As 
it turned out, there was plenty of CSCE-related movement on the Deutsch-
landpolitik front in the summer of 1972. But the subject of the original link-
age strategy had become its object. 
An Inner-German Shotgun Wedding
At the end of May 1972, Foreign Minister Scheel admitted being fully 
aware that the GDR was expecting to enhance its international status with 
the help of the CSCE. ‘That is their trump card, and that is why we are 
under time pressure’, Scheel told his British colleague.105 For some reason, 
this situation led the West Germans to reconsider their position as far as 
the timing of the CSCE was concerned. As pointed out above, so far the 
idea had been to control the pace of the multilateral preparations and to 
make it meet the schedule of the inner-German negotiations. Multilateral 
preparations could be under way simultaneously with the negotiations 
for a Basic Treaty, as long as the Basic Treaty was concluded prior to the 
CSCE proper. Yet in June 1972 the patience and self-confidence in Bonn 
ran out in this respect. After the signature of the Berlin Agreement had 
lifted the final obstacle in the way of the CSCE preparations, the FRG de-
cided to play it safe and aim at concluding the Basic Treaty already before 
the opening of the MPT after all. 
The main argument of the Auswärtiges Amt for this change was an old 
one. As soon as the East German regime sat at the same table with other 
future participants of the CSCE to prepare the conference, its international 
status would be raised to a completely new level.106 But in an ironical twist, 
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in the new circumstances this decision turned the roles in the old linkage 
blueprint completely upside down. The original idea of linking the mul-
tilateral CSCE preparations with Deutschlandpolitik had been based on the 
perceived ability to influence the timing of the MPT. Back in 1970–71, this 
had been tried through the multilateral route, ending in failure. 
Now, after the signature of the Berlin Agreement, the option of post-
poning the MPT no longer existed. The date of the talks in Helsinki had 
in effect already been set for November 1972. If the FRG wanted to get 
anything in return for the GDR’s participation in Helsinki, time was run-
ning out – the inner-German negotiations had to be concluded rapidly, 
within the next six months. The pressure was on Bonn, not on East Berlin. 
The negotiations for the Basic Treaty, which were opened on 15 June 1972, 
were a race against time. In an interview with the author, Egon Bahr ad-
mitted that the Federal Government was afraid that the development was 
going to lead too quickly to the CSCE, before the basic relationship with 
the GDR was clarified. It was of fundamental importance for the FRG to 
be the gatekeeper for the GDR’s entrance onto the international stage.107 
In a meeting of the Bonn Group in late June, Bahr soberly described the 
complicated situation to the other three Allies. The GDR would certainly 
be tempted to drag its feet in the talks in order to wait for the impact of 
the CSCE. The FRG, then again, attempted to complete the negotiations 
before the conference, and even the multilateral preparations of the con-
ference, began. 
Negotiations on a Basic Treaty will become more difficult once the GDR takes 
part in a CSCE. … Nevertheless, the Federal Government is not thinking of 
establishing a link between these negotiations and the CSCE. We will not set 
new preconditions for it.108
This dilemma of no longer being able to use the CSCE leverage was charac-
teristic for Bonn’s position throughout the negotiations for the Basic Treaty. 
Bahr himself had fully understood that this was as inherent weakness that 
would only grow in importance as the opening of the MPT drew closer.109 
Nonetheless, as Foreign Minister Scheel told his French colleague in June, 
the FRG was firmly committed to concluding the Basic Treaty before the 
opening of the multilateral talks in Helsinki. As an added value, this would 
also liberate the CSCE from the burden of unsettled German problems.110
In July, the Finnish Government came out with an official proposal to 
open the multilateral preparations on 22 November 1972.111 Although the 
US was reluctant to fix a precise date at this stage, the discussion in NATO 
made it obvious that a postponement of the MPT was no longer realistic. 
The Auswärtiges Amt argued that any attempts to change the date would 
have caused serious damage to the credibility of the Federal Government. 
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In particular, with explicit reference to the declarations of intent agreed in 
Moscow in 1970, a postponement would have brought about severe dif-
ficulties in the West German-Soviet relationship.112
Brandt’s letter to Brezhnev on 10 August speaks volumes about the sit-
uation. On the one hand, the Chancellor referred to the timing of the CSCE 
preparations in the latter half of November as a given. On the other hand, 
he tried to persuade the Soviet leader to understand the positive impact 
an inner-German treaty would have on the conference preparations, if the 
Basic Treaty was concluded before the MPT.113 In a similar fashion, Bahr 
told the Bonn Group ambassadors that he considered 22 November, the 
opening day of the MPT, to be a decisive deadline in the inner-German 
negotiations. After that the GDR would be a stronger and more difficult 
negotiating partner.114 Thus, although the FRG had not yet officially re-
plied to the Finnish suggestion, by early August at the latest the MPT date 
was fixed in the calculations of the Federal Government.
When Bahr met Erich Honecker in East Berlin in September, he openly 
told the East German leader that the FRG wanted to conclude the inner-
German negotiations by early November. Honecker, although stressing 
that there were limits to the flexibility of the GDR, curiously implied that 
he would do everything he could to ensure a victory for the current SPD–
FDP Coalition Government in the forthcoming West German elections on 
19 November.115 A few days later, Bahr told the Bonn Group that there 
was reason to believe the GDR also wanted to conclude the negotiations 
on the Basic Treaty before the CSCE preparations.116 
In early September 1972, the general reluctance of the West Germans to 
impose new preconditions on the CSCE and their particular caution when 
dealing with the potential hosts of the conference led to a minor confron-
tation with the Allies. When the Finnish Government had initialled an 
agreement on establishing diplomatic relations with the GDR, discussion 
in the NATO Council turned to possible countermeasures by the FRG 
concerning the Finnish role in the CSCE preparations.117 The instruc-
tions sent from Bonn to the West German NATO mission for this purpose 
were clear. In the view of the Auswärtiges Amt, there should be no direct 
consequences whatsoever, neither on the timing and the location of the 
MPT, nor on the level of representation at those talks. The CSCE and the 
bilateral Finno-German relationship should be kept apart. Moreover, the 
instructions underscored that other Allies should also refrain from using 
Deutschlandpolitik as an argument for postponing the MPT. The site of the 
CSCE proper was a different story. The FRG had never favoured Helsinki 
for the main conference, and now the reservations had grown further.118 
In the heated debate in the NATO Council, a number of Allies accused 
the FRG of excessive flexibility. All of a sudden the FRG seemed to be pre-
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pared to tolerate a GDR Ambassador at the CSCE preparations, something 
the Allies had for years helped Bonn to prevent.119 In defence of the West 
German position, van Well wrote from Bonn that the FRG did not want to 
undermine Finland in its attempts to strengthen its neutrality. The Federal 
Government had considered its response carefully, and was prepared to 
pay the price of short-term tactical losses in the interest of a broader West-
ern perspective. For the time being, the focus of the FRG’s policy should 
be to minimise disturbance of the inner-German talks.120 The reaction in 
the Alliance was puzzled, and the West German NATO Ambassador him-
self strongly opposed these instructions, which in his view took the GDR 
excessively into account.121 According to a British telegram, there was a 
lot of talk in the corridors of NATO about the ‘feeble’ attitude of the FRG. 
Even Secretary General Luns had described the West German behaviour 
as ‘really extraordinary’.122 
 As Bahr again argued in October, it would naturally have been opti-
mal if the Western Alliance as a whole had been able to make the CSCE 
or even the conference preparations conditional on the conclusion of the 
Basic Treaty. But, in Bahr’s view, the hands of the West had been tied ever 
since the entry into force of the Berlin Agreement. At this stage, a new link-
age could no longer be established.123
During the final stretch of the negotiations for the Basic Treaty, there 
was only one instance when the FRG was prepared to use the CSCE card. 
On 6 November, as the signature of the agreement establishing diplomatic 
relations between Finland and the GDR was becoming imminent, State 
Secretary Frank instructed the mission in Helsinki to tell the Finnish Gov-
ernment in clear terms that a premature recognition of the GDR would 
have an adverse effect on the Finnish potential to host the actual CSCE.124 
But on 8 November this problem ceased to exist, as Bahr and his East 
German counterpart Michael Kohl, after almost sixty meetings since June, 
initialled the Basic Treaty between the two German states. The Finnish 
Government was quick to draw conclusions from this. On 9 November it 
sent out the official invitations for the multilateral preparatory talks for 
the CSCE, to be opened two weeks later. On 14 November the Federal 
Republic confirmed its participation in the MPT.125
By the autumn of 1972, Bahr had come a long way from the linkage 
plans he had drafted over three years earlier. Although the Basic Treaty 
was, in the end, accomplished just in time before the MPT, the timing can 
hardly be attributed to a consistently implemented West German strat-
egy. Indeed, from the spring of 1972 onwards, the CSCE–Deutschlandpoli-
tik linkage was not merely ineffective from the Bonn perspective – it had 
turned against its authors. Instead of the FRG luring the GDR to the ne-
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
1971–72: Towards a European Peace Order?   |   161
gotiating table with the promise of a CSCE, the pressure was on Bonn to 
settle its relations with East Berlin before the conference. 
It is difficult to pin down any actual concrete concessions that the FRG 
might have made in the inner-German negotiations due to this pressure. 
The CSCE as such was not an issue in the talks.126 There also may well 
have been Soviet pressure on the GDR to conclude the negotiations. None-
theless, it seems that the wedding comparison put forward by Brandt in 
his memoirs, quoted at the beginning of the introduction of this book, was 
not perfectly accurate. Instead, if one necessarily wants to force a marital 
analogy on the development, that of a shotgun wedding might be more 
appropriate. As the estimated due date, 22 November 1972, drew closer, 
the FRG had no choice. A timely inner-German arrangement was the only 
respectable option.
Certainly, the FRG was not keen on assuming the role of the difficult 
partner blocking European efforts at détente with selfish demands. How-
ever, rather than a fear of isolation, the genuine reason for the erosion of 
the ‘linkage’ strategy was the changing West German perception of the 
CSCE per se. From Bonn’s perspective, the substantive elements of the con-
ference began to outweigh its instrumental value, even when it came to 
Deutschlandpolitik.
Europeanisation of Ostpolitik
One of the most striking characteristics of the West German CSCE policy 
from autumn 1971 onwards was the idea of multilateralising or ‘Euro-
peanising’ Ostpolitik. As has been argued in the preceding chapters, this 
approach had implicitly been in the making for some time, but after the 
conclusion of the first stage of the Berlin Agreement in September 1971 it 
was pursued in a more vigorous and conscious manner than before. 
The Federal Republic clearly wanted more from the CSCE than just 
symbolism. In the memoranda of the Auswärtiges Amt the CSCE was seen 
as a logical continuation of the European détente which had been initi-
ated with the Moscow Treaty. In this broader framework, the FRG was 
to pursue an active and evolving ‘strategy of cooperation’. In the long 
term, the goal of this strategy was a ‘European peace order’. For the time 
being the military alliances were necessary ingredients of the existing ‘se-
curity system’ in Europe, but in the future a peace order could possibly 
be built upon it – and surpass these alliances. Freer movement of people, 
ideas and information as well as increased economic cooperation were 
medium-term goals in the West German strategy.127 
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In the West German thinking, only a ‘Europe of cooperation’ would be 
able to safeguard lasting peace on the continent. A peace order overcom-
ing military blocs and the Cold War, and securing lasting stability and co-
operation between countries with different social systems, would be more 
than simply an ‘absence of danger’. Moreover, the CSCE unit of the Aus-
wärtiges Amt noted, the goal of safeguarding peace in Europe ultimately 
outweighed all other interests of the FRG, including that of German unifi-
cation. This was in line with the declared objective of the Federal Govern-
ment to work towards a state of peace in Europe, in which the German 
people could in free self-determination reclaim its unity – a formulation 
familiar from the ‘letter on German unity’ in 1970. The CSCE, if properly 
prepared, was seen as a suitable forum for jointly developing basic ele-
ments of European détente, later possibly leading to the peace order and 
a gradual overcoming of the division of Europe.128 
It is worth noting that these considerations of the peace order were 
not just the subject of idealistic Sunday speeches, but were also seriously 
advanced on the operative level. In the Auswärtiges Amt, the CSCE was 
broadly seen as a means to the desired end. The planning staff of the For-
eign Ministry constituted an exception rather than the rule, when it in 
October 1971 expressed its strong reservations on the ‘utopian’ references 
to a European peace order.129 Here it is important to remember that the di-
rect influence of the planning staff on Auswärtiges Amt policy was far more 
limited under Dirk Oncken than it had been under Egon Bahr. The British 
embassy in Bonn later reported that Auswärtiges Amt officials had made a 
habit of pointing to Brandt’s Nobel Prize speech in Oslo in December 1971 
as their ‘source of inspiration in working for a CSCE’. In the UK view, the 
idea of an eventual European peace pact contained in the speech was a 
‘nebulous concept’, but Brandt’s thinking clearly indicated that the pres-
ent agreements were not an end but rather the beginning of a dynamic 
process on East–West détente.130 
The EPC was increasingly seen as the best framework for the imple-
mentation of the German cooperation strategy in the CSCE context. In 
the West German view, the members of the EC, seeking support from the 
other NATO members, should take the initiative in making attractive and 
balanced offers for active economic cooperation between East and West, 
ranging from increase in trade volumes to energy cooperation. At the 
same time, the West Germans were no longer prepared to limit European 
cooperation to issues strictly within the competence of the EC. Instead, the 
Auswärtiges Amt argued in September 1971, EPC members should attempt 
to coordinate their CSCE positions as broadly as possible, speaking with 
one voice whenever possible. This also applied to topics that were primar-
ily a NATO responsibility.131
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Indeed, in Bonn the EPC began to overtake NATO as the preferred 
framework of CSCE preparations. Until the spring of 1971 NATO had 
clearly been the number one forum for Western CSCE deliberations, but 
by the autumn of 1971 the EPC was in the ascendancy. Although NATO 
continued to be in charge of preparing the principles governing relations 
between states and the general procedure of the conference, and the Bonn 
Group had a certain privilege when it came to the question of borders and 
all kinds of legal formulations relating to the four-power rights, there was 
a growing tendency in the EPC to expand its CSCE work to cover all the 
issues involved.
As the Auswärtiges Amt saw it, the latest NATO document on the CSCE 
from May 1971 left plenty of room for improvement. This was particularly 
the case since NATO members had not been able to agree on a long list 
of specifics on the principles governing relations between states. In ad-
dition, a number of questions on economic, scientific, technical, cultural 
and environmental cooperation remained open. The attempts to resolve 
these differences within NATO were proceeding far too slowly for West 
German tastes – an ‘agreed document’ by the end of 1971 did not seem 
likely. In contrast, the development in the EPC framework had been rapid. 
CSCE preparations among the Six had already in some areas overtaken 
those within NATO, and the recent decision to constitute two separate 
EPC working groups on the CSCE promised a further acceleration on the 
European track.132 
At the end of September 1971 the EPC took significant steps towards 
more efficient CSCE preparation. The existing working group was now 
called a CSCE sub-committee, or sous-comité, since its French title was 
used in other languages as well. Following a West German initiative, the 
sous-comité was mandated to define specific interests of the Six at a CSCE. 
In addition, a new body, called an ad hoc group, was established to con-
centrate on the economic aspects of the conference.133
Cooperation here was certainly not unproblematic, and the West Ger-
mans were often frustrated and puzzled by what they saw as French 
stubbornness. ‘Interpreting the French behaviour is not easy’, von Staden 
concluded in his analysis of the EPC experience in October 1971.134 The 
French vehemently opposed the direct representation of the European 
Community and the Commission at a CSCE, whereas the West Germans 
were of the view that the EC was a part of a future peace order, and 
needed to have an appropriate role in the process of East–West coopera-
tion. Moreover, the West Germans argued that any hesitation by the Six 
in this matter would immediately weaken the position of the Community 
in Soviet eyes.135 
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Despite the underlying Franco-West German tension, in agenda ques-
tions progress in the EPC was rapid. Already by late October 1971, based 
on reports by the sous-comité and the ad hoc group, the Political Commit-
tee of the EPC had agreed on its own suggestion for the CSCE agenda, 
consisting of: (1) a code of good conduct and renunciation of force; (2) 
military-political questions, including disarmament; and (3) economic, 
scientific, technical, cultural and environmental cooperation.136 The FRG’s 
main contribution to the EPC discussion was in identifying specific EC in-
terests in a CSCE. A joint West German-Italian working paper underlined 
the importance of cooperation and freer movement. The achievement of 
concrete results in those areas would to a large extent determine whether 
the CSCE was a failure or a success for the West. At the same time, how-
ever, the paper argued that the West had to take political realities into 
account and recognise that the policy of cooperation needed to develop 
within the latitude allowed by the Soviet Union. Above all, the East was 
not to gain the impression that the West sought changes in existing politi-
cal or social systems.137 
The fact that a verbatim quotation of this particular EPC document 
was found in the American archives is no coincidence. The West Ger-
mans were constantly at pains to keep the US informed about the CSCE 
preparations in the EPC, trying to reconcile US and French views on the 
conference.138 However, the attempted reconciliation led to a Franco-West 
German disagreement later in the autumn. Whereas the French wanted to 
maintain strict confidentiality within the EPC, in the West German view 
it was unthinkable to be serving Ireland, as one of the EC applicants, with 
documents before the US.139
The second EPC report on the CSCE, which was approved by the For-
eign Ministers of the Six in November 1971, highlighted the preparedness 
of the members of the European Community to engage in presenting con-
structive, balanced and attractive offers towards the East.140 Although the 
Dutch had had a leading role in drafting the EPC report, they had focused 
exclusively on security issues at the expense of cooperation. The coopera-
tion elements in the report had then to a large extent been inserted by the 
FRG.141 Indeed, the West Germans saw themselves as the decisive engine 
within the EPC when it came to addressing increased East–West economic 
cooperation as an important part of détente.142 
At the same time, the West Germans were increasingly sitting on the 
fence between EPC and NATO. On the one hand, the Auswärtiges Amt 
hoped to have the latest EPC report also distributed to other NATO allies 
as soon as possible, to support the preparation of NATO’s own CSCE re-
port.143 But on the other hand, whereas the FRG strongly supported EPC 
work on the cooperation elements of the CSCE, the West Germans called 
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for discipline in those issues that were also dealt with in NATO, propos-
ing that the results of the on-going NATO discussion should be awaited 
before the EPC intensified its own activity.144 
In the West German view, experience had already shown that consul-
tations in the EPC proceeded more rapidly and led to a more thorough 
harmonisation than in NATO. It was all the more important, therefore, 
to avoid excluding the United States from the preparation of issues such 
as military elements of security or the principles governing relations be-
tween states.145 The visit of Joseph Luns, the new Secretary General of 
NATO, to Bonn in November revealed that the NATO secretariat was also 
concerned about the overlapping activities of NATO and EPC in the CSCE 
context.146 An apparent reason for this concern was the sluggish move-
ment on the NATO track during the autumn of 1971. 
As the CSCE discussion in NATO was resumed after the summer break 
in September 1971, the official West German position highlighted the need 
to avoid the most delicate issues at the beginning of the conference. In-
stead, the West should start with an agenda promising short-term suc-
cess, focusing on, for instance, cultural cooperation and youth exchange. 
Although freer movement of people, ideas and information was in the 
long-term interest of the FRG, the Auswärtiges Amt argued that this could 
come about only at the end of a long process.147 
The West German NATO delegation implemented these instructions 
with a degree of reluctance. In fact, the deputy of the West German NATO 
mission privately told his US colleague that the instructions they them-
selves opposed were coming from the working level in the Auswärtiges 
Amt. If the US wanted to influence the West German position, it was best 
to approach the FRG on a higher political level. George Vest from the US 
delegation in NATO recommended taking this course of action, since West 
German ‘persistence in this very soft line of [a] potentially useful freer 
movement item’ was beginning to jeopardise Allied positions.148 This sug-
gestion was taken up by the State Department, and in mid-September 
1971 the US embassy in Bonn presented van Well with a paper outlining 
the ‘substantive and tactical advantages of pushing this item at a confer-
ence’. In order to apply further pressure, the working level of von Groll 
was also approached directly.149
The West German reaction was to defend their position even more vig-
orously.150 On 21 September, the West German delegation in NATO circu-
lated a working paper on freer movement, arguing for a cautious approach:
For tactical reasons, we should be careful that long-term aims should not oc-
cupy the first place on a CES agenda. Otherwise we would run the risk of sharp 
disputes right from the very start of the conference, which would produce an 
atmosphere of irritation and make it very difficult to discuss other items where 
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agreement on concrete results would be possible. Rather should we select con-
crete individual questions in the cultural field where it would be possible to 
make progress step by step.151
In the US analysis, this reinforcement of the West German position was 
seen as unfortunate, causing serious concern about the ability of NATO to 
develop a good bargaining position at the conference. The US embassy in 
Bonn was duly prompted to continue its efforts to change the West Ger-
man attitude.152 In bilateral contacts, the Auswärtiges Amt officials assured 
US diplomats in Bonn that the differences in opinion were tactical rather 
than substantive.153 
But this tactical approach quickly began to create genuine front lines 
within NATO. France sided with the FRG in favouring ‘easier’ subjects, 
with the UK supporting the US in the opposite view, stressing that freer 
movement was the most important trump card the West had.154 In the 
search for a compromise within NATO, the West Germans stressed that 
their order of preference was based on what was achievable, not impor-
tance. The West German differentiation between short- and long-term 
aims was not to be mistaken for a division into first- and second-rate is-
sues, respectively.155 But the Americans were not convinced, criticising the 
FRG for an extensive focus on ‘soft’ issues such as the environment. This 
referred to a West German initiative for a CSCE resolution touching on 
precise and clearly defined problems of air and water pollution.156
In November 1971, however, there was a new and broader surge of 
West German activity in the NATO discussion. First, the FRG presented 
a working paper on principles governing relations between states. The 
paper was tabled jointly with the US delegation, thus demonstrating that 
disagreement on freer movement did not prevent functioning West Ger-
man-US cooperation over other CSCE issues. According to this West Ger-
man suggestion, the declaration issued by the CSCE should consist of five 
sets of principles: (1) equal rights and self-determination of peoples and 
of sovereign equality of states; (2) universal respect by states for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms; (3) non-intervention and non-interfer-
ence in the internal or external affairs of any other state; (4) restraint from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any other state; and (5) peaceful settlement of disputes.157 The 
idea of including human rights in the list of principles was a completely 
new initiative. Introduced in a nonchalant manner in a West German 
working paper in November 1971, the respect for human rights was in the 
end also one of the ten principles guiding relations between states listed 
in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. 
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Only a week after the suggestion for the declaration of principles, the 
FRG made its next contribution in NATO. Reflecting Bonn’s concerns 
about the inadequate attention given to security issues so far, the Federal 
Republic made a CSCE agenda proposal of its own. Consisting of three 
major parts – principles, cooperation and security (including military as-
pects) – the West German suggestion was practically identical to the one 
agreed in the EPC framework a few weeks earlier. Additionally, the West 
Germans wanted the next NATO report on the CSCE also to address the 
relationship between the CSCE and MBFR.158 The FRG apparently wanted 
to intensify the substantive CSCE preparation in the West, calling for more 
emphasis on security from NATO, and more emphasis on cooperation 
from the EPC.
On the NATO track, however, progress in the autumn of 1971 was slow. 
Soon after the West German agenda proposal in mid-November, the latest 
CSCE study of the Senior Political Committee was circulated. The initial 
idea of this report on ‘negotiating approaches’ was to be an operational 
outline of Alliance positions from the perspective of a negotiator, for di-
rect use in the opening round of multilateral talks. However, the report 
had to admit that while there was some agreement on the basic approach, 
differences of opinion between the Allies remained in basically all key 
areas. Moreover, several aspects, such as the precise Western proposal for 
a CSCE agenda and the question of the relationship between the CSCE 
and MBFR, were not addressed by the report at all. These omissions were 
particularly underscored by the West German delegation.159 
Regardless of its apparent failings, this NATO report was able to iden-
tify four potential agenda items of the conference: (1) principles govern-
ing relations between states; (2) freer movement and cultural relations; (3) 
economic, technological and scientific cooperation; and (4) cooperation to 
improve the human environment. On the principles, the Allies agreed that 
contradicting the Brezhnev Doctrine was one significant goal of any future 
declaration, and that it should contain at least the principles of sovereign 
equality, non-intervention, non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of 
disputes. But as the British delegation noted, the Alliance was ‘nowhere 
near agreement’ on the text of a declaration on principles.160 
As far as freer movement was concerned, the SPC report pointed out 
that ‘[i]n developing Western proposals …, one of the principal difficul-
ties lies in finding a suitable balance between the politically more difficult 
issues such as radio jamming and exit visas for Soviet and East European 
nationals and the relatively easier issues such as intensification of per-
forming arts exchanges.’ This balance had clearly not yet been found.161 
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The NATO Council spent a couple of sessions at the end of Novem-
ber trying to iron out central controversies regarding the report, but no 
progress was made. The West German push for the inclusion of MBFR on 
the CSCE agenda did not receive sufficient support.162 When the NATO 
Foreign Ministers met in December, they could only take note of the SPC 
report and urge a rapid settlement of the remaining differences.163 
In fact, the most advanced part of the NATO study focused on eco-
nomic, technical, scientific and environmental cooperation. This was facil-
itated by the extensive groundwork done in the EPC on these items. With 
the EC Six, Norway, Denmark and the UK already on board, these issues 
were far less controversial in the NATO framework. Feeding the coopera-
tion topics into the NATO discussion had obviously paid off. 
Another lesson learned from the process in NATO was that there was a 
clear opening for a West German lead. In his telegrams to Bonn, Ambas-
sador Krapf urged the FRG to take a more active role in the CSCE prepa-
ration. In Krapf’s view, the discussion in NATO had revealed that none 
of the Allies had developed a convincing concept of how best to pursue 
its own interests in the CSCE. Krapf argued that a ‘clear and consistently 
presented CSCE concept’ of the Federal Government would enable the 
FRG to take the lead within the Alliance.164 West German positions were 
already considered to be decisive in all central questions of a future CSCE 
– principles governing relations between states, freer movement and 
economic cooperation. ‘None of the other NATO members has its fun-
damental interests so directly affected by the CSCE as we do. … From 
this perspective, we should attempt to commit the Alliance to our optimal 
positions.’165 In its immediate reaction to Krapf’s initiative the Auswärtiges 
Amt merely reiterated known positions.166 But the experience in NATO 
in the autumn clearly planted the seed for the more active West German 
CSCE policy, which developed in the spring of 1972.
Meanwhile, frustrated by the inefficiency of the NATO mechanism, 
State Secretary Frank made a surprising proposal during his visit to the 
US in late November 1971. Frank suggested establishing a coordination 
instrument for the MBFR and CSCE policies of the West, based on the 
example of the Bonn Group. This instrument could be used to avoid open 
controversies of Western states in the actual CSCE, and to guarantee the 
cohesion of the Alliance policies for the next five to ten years. The US re-
sponse was reserved, pointing out that the subject matter of the existing 
Bonn Group was a special case, but that the CSCE consultation could not 
that easily be taken out of the NATO framework into a smaller circle.167 
Frank’s idea was obviously a non-starter, but symptomatic of growing 
West German frustration.168 
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During his visit to Washington, Frank also presented West German 
ideas on general rules for the conduct of East–West cooperation, calling for 
a realistic approach. ‘One should start with proposals that have a chance 
of being fulfilled. For example, one cannot demand that the Berlin Wall 
be torn down.’ In Frank’s view, this gradual approach of realistic steps 
also applied to the freer movement items.169 Whereas Frank’s interlocu-
tors in the State Department were sceptical of the step-by-step approach, 
Henry Kissinger in the White House seriously doubted the whole concept 
of the CSCE and asked Frank openly to explain why the Europeans were 
insisting on its preparation. Frank pointed out that faced with constant 
Soviet pressure for a conference it was impossible for the West always just 
to say ‘no’.170 For the Federal Republic, however, saying ‘no’ was also an 
important part of the CSCE policy. This defensive approach served the 
fundamental principle of keeping the German question open.
In Defence of the Eastern Treaties and Bonn’s Sovereignty
‘Our goals in the conference were solely defensive’, Günther Dahlhoff, 
a CSCE desk officer in the Auswärtiges Amt in 1969–72, later told the au-
thor.171 This was indeed an important characteristic of West German CSCE 
policy, but by no means the only one. In another interview with the au-
thor, Klaus Blech, head of the Deutschlandpolitik unit in the Auswärtiges 
Amt from the spring of 1971, more accurately stressed the dual nature 
of the FRG’s policy on the CSCE. Firstly, it was essential for the Federal 
Republic to make sure that the ‘last word in the German question had not 
been spoken’. The German question had to be kept open, and the two-
state solution that was about to be formed needed to be understood as a 
temporary modus vivendi. But secondly, assuming a continued division of 
Europe and Germany, the FRG wanted to spare no efforts in alleviating 
the consequences of that division for the people, particularly in the two 
German states.172
Keeping the German question open had also been the guiding prin-
ciple of the negotiators in the bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union and 
Poland. Now that the preparations for the conference were accelerating, 
Bonn’s CSCE policy also gained a defensive flavour. The accomplishments 
of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties had to be protected. Simultaneously, 
the sovereignty of the FRG, to the extent that the limits posed by the post-
war arrangements allowed it, was also increasingly emphasised by the 
West Germans in the multilateral Western frameworks. 
In order to avoid turning the CSCE into a conference about German 
affairs, the Auswärtiges Amt preferred regulating the relevant issues in 
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advance with the Bonn Group. Two thirds of these questions were rela-
tively unproblematic. When it came to the participation of the GDR in the 
conference or formulations on European borders in the CSCE context, the 
interests of the FRG were usually not in conflict with those of the Three 
Powers. But in the third aspect, the delicate interplay between four-power 
rights and the ‘principles governing relations between states’, the Auswär-
tiges Amt was worried. 
Von Groll pointed out in September 1971 that it was important not to 
let the CSCE undermine the four-power rights regarding Berlin and Ger-
many as a whole, but from the West German point of view it was at least 
equally important to hold on to the ‘full powers of a sovereign state’ guar-
anteed to the FRG in the ‘general treaty’ in the 1950s.173 In other words, 
the existing rights of the four powers should not be expanded in the CSCE 
context at the expense of the FRG, neither accidentally nor consciously. In 
a Bonn Group meeting in October 1971 the West Germans stressed that a 
specific confirmation of quadripartite rights at the CSCE, as suggested by 
the US, could imply that the principles agreed on in the conference would 
not fully apply to the Federal Republic.174
This was a real concern for the Auswärtiges Amt. In a memorandum to 
State Secretary Frank in October 1971, Political Director von Staden em-
phasised that whereas the idea of consultation in a small circle could at 
first seem attractive, the activity of the Bonn Group in the CSCE context 
would create the possibility for the three powers to enlarge their influence 
over the FRG. In von Staden’s view, the essential question for the FRG 
was whether the engagement of the Bonn Group would help the West 
Germans strengthen their grip on Euro-Atlantic development or increase 
the risk of further limits to West German sovereignty.175 
For the time being, the FRG was content with keeping the Bonn Group 
on board, since it ensured that none of the Deutschlandpolitik-related is-
sues were raised by the US, the UK or France in broader Western discus-
sion without a preceding consultation.176 Indeed, the FRG began to see 
the Bonn Group as a control mechanism for the relationship between the 
CSCE and Deutschlandpolitik, filtering out statements by the three powers 
that were seen as in conflict with West German interests.
At the end of October 1971, the Bonn Group agreed that disclaimer texts 
regarding the participation of the GDR in the conference were ‘highly de-
sirable’. Such a disclaimer, stressing that participation in a conference to-
gether with the GDR did not imply its recognition, was to be issued in 
replies to the conference invitation as well as in remarks at the multilateral 
preliminary phase and the conference proper. The issue of borders, then 
again, was to be covered in a separate statement on quadripartite rights 
and responsibilities – preferably issued jointly with the Soviet Union.177 
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The Auswärtiges Amt was satisfied with the state of play, since this position 
safeguarded the necessary flexibility for the FRG.178 
In order to reach the goal of integrating the CSCE into West German 
East–West policy, Frank argued in October 1971, the FRG needed to com-
plement its efforts for more cooperation with a defence of legal positions 
that would not exclude eventual German unification. It was therefore 
essential to avoid ending up with multilateral regulations resembling a 
peace treaty, the more so since such formulations had just been avoided in 
the bilateral Moscow and Warsaw Treaties.179 The key embassies were in-
structed in detail along these lines. To preserve the specific characteristics 
of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties as well as the modus vivendi character 
of the East–West policy of the FRG, the CSCE should only issue a declara-
tion on the renunciation of force, not sign an agreement. An outright rec-
ognition of existing borders in Europe, as suggested by the Warsaw Pact, 
was out of the question.180 
In the Bonn Group, the West Germans were increasingly concerned 
about the reference to borders in a future CSCE. Blech told his colleagues 
that the FRG’s first preference would be to completely avoid it, but given 
the level of Soviet insistence, this was unlikely to succeed. If the accep-
tance of, or respect for, existing borders was to be addressed at the CSCE, 
the West Germans wanted in some way to transfer the relevant qualifica-
tions made in the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties in this respect to the mul-
tilateral level, including the letter on German unity. Blech admitted that 
the Auswärtiges Amt had so far not been able to develop a concept on how 
this should be done.181 
Nevertheless, the standard CSCE background papers in the Auswärtiges 
Amt were amended with stronger language stating that the important bor-
der issues had already been settled in the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties 
bilaterally and should not be dealt with at a CSCE.182 A ‘recognition’ of 
the status quo borders in Europe was impossible for the FRG, but as a fall-
back position ‘respect’ for borders might be conceivable.183 The option of a 
renunciation of violent change of borders was also raised.184 
In the beginning of December, the Bonn Group agreed on a new formu-
lation regarding borders, which corresponded perfectly with West Ger-
man desires. According to the Bonn Group paper, the initial Allied position 
should be to decline to treat the border issue in a CSCE. If, however, some 
treatment of the issue in the CSCE texts became unavoidable, ‘utmost care 
should be given to their formulation in order to avoid the impression of 
an anticipated peace settlement on the basis of the present territorial status 
quo’. In particular, the West should agree only to respect, rather than to 
recognise, the existing borders. Moreover, the Bonn Group suggested, ‘the 
NATO members together, or the FRG alone, might also wish to consider 
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the possibility of a separate statement on “German unity” similar to the 
one delivered to the USSR when the FRG–USSR treaty was signed.’185
With the support of the Bonn Group, the defensive West German pos-
ture held in the autumn of 1971. The core message was crystallised in State 
Secretary Frank’s discussions in Washington. As Frank stressed, for the 
FRG it was essential that the CSCE could not become a substitute for a 
peace treaty – the issue of the peace treaty as well the final regulation of 
the German question had to be kept open.186 A gradual and peaceful over-
coming of the status quo had to be maintained as an option.187
A New Flow of German Activity 
In early November 1971 the Federal Government in Bonn for the first time 
discussed the CSCE as a separate agenda item in the cabinet meeting, as 
Foreign Minister Scheel briefed his colleagues about the state of play in 
Western preparations.188 Scheel’s speaking notes for the cabinet meeting 
were still remarkably non-committal, stressing that no final positions on 
the contents of a possible CSCE could at this stage be taken.189 The Auswär-
tiges Amt wanted to keep its cards close to its chest. This was also apparent 
in the briefing given to the Bundestag Foreign Policy Committee.190 
But in early December 1971 the preparations in Bonn were raised to 
a completely new level, as the Auswärtiges Amt hosted an inter-ministry 
meeting on the CSCE, thus for the first time directly including the Chan-
cellery and the Economics and Defence Ministries. The participants agreed 
that a consolidated position of the Federal Government on the CSCE was 
needed, and that the preparation of a formal presentation to the cabinet 
(Kabinettvorlage) should begin immediately.191 At the same time, the per-
sonnel arrangements were also given further attention. The Auswärtiges 
Amt began to consider strengthening its mission in Helsinki with a CSCE 
expert, since the most significant coordination at any conference was 
likely to occur on the spot.192 
Most importantly, the increased attention given to the CSCE in Bonn 
was reflected in a remarkable expansion of West German activity in the 
Western agenda preparations. As its NATO Ambassador had suggested 
in late 1971, in February 1972 the Federal Republic suddenly adopted an 
active role on all fronts. In NATO, having submitted a joint paper with 
the US on the principles guiding relations between states the preceding 
autumn, the FRG delegation now amended that with a new paper of their 
own.193 In the same meeting the West Germans also announced their forth-
coming contribution on freer movement and cultural relations.194 As far 
as security issues were concerned, the West Germans again stressed their 
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strong preference for addressing some elements of military security at a 
CSCE.195 Moreover, the NATO discussion on the procedure of the multi-
lateral preparations was already based on West German suggestions.196 
West German initiatives were equally prominent in each of the topics of 
importance dealt with in the EPC machinery. For example, the discussion 
on economic cooperation in the ad hoc group in February was guided by 
the West German working paper on industrial cooperation, which was of 
particular interest to the FRG.197
The UK was astonished by this avalanche of West German contribu-
tions. ‘[N]early all the work the Committee has so far done has been 
based on a succession of German drafts. Inevitably they are considerably 
amended and this is tiresome for the German delegation but it does en-
sure certain advantages for the German point of view’, noted the British 
NATO mission in February 1972.198 In March, Rodric Braithwaite at the 
FCO reported being ‘struck by the importance which the Germans attach 
to the Conference. They seem to regard it as the only way of carrying on 
the “East/West dialogue” once the present round of Ostpolitik negotia-
tions is finished.’199 
The exceptional size of the West German bureaucratic effort put into 
the CSCE gave the FRG a competitive edge, and for others it was increas-
ingly difficult to keep up with the flow of documents from Bonn.200 Von 
Groll’s unit in the Auswärtiges Amt had half a dozen officials concentrat-
ing entirely on the CSCE, a luxury which other NATO and EPC members 
did not have at this stage. Braithwaite noted that this explained why ‘it is 
now the Germans who are making the running in NATO and in the EEC 
Political Committee in the mass production of memoranda.’201 The West 
Germans had taken the lead in Western preparations. 
According to the British view, there were still shortcomings in the West 
German CSCE policy. In the opinion of FCO officials, a lack of clear politi-
cal guidance from ministers in the FRG was reflected in contradictory ten-
dencies on the working level, particularly between the ‘hard-faced men’ 
in the NATO unit of the Auswärtiges Amt as opposed to von Groll’s ‘soft-
ies’.202 Braithwaite said in retrospect that the West Germans were at times 
so badly organised and at loggerheads in internal rivalries that it was a 
genuine problem for the UK to find out what they were up to with regard 
to the CSCE.203
Braithwaite’s criticism was of course not fully unfounded. The internal 
rivalries and conflicting positions of West German officials reflected the 
magnitude of the change in the foreign policy of the FRG that was in prog-
ress. Not everyone in the Auswärtiges Amt agreed on the new course, and 
individual frustrations were often vented in unofficial discussions with 
Allied colleagues. However, as unprofessional as this sometimes was, it 
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did not adversely affect the overall dynamism and direction of West Ger-
man CSCE policy. Moreover, firmer political guidance was on its way. In 
the end, as Kenneth Dyson has argued, the political control of the CSCE 
policy was in fact much closer in the FRG than in the UK.204 
The preparation for the cabinet presentation on the CSCE, kicked off in 
December 1971, had taken longer than expected. Originally planned for 
the cabinet agenda in January, not even first tentative drafts of the material 
were available before March.205 The Auswärtiges Amt had at first wanted to 
give the cabinet a thorough presentation of the conference preparations 
as well as to receive a negotiating mandate for the CSCE. But in the end, 
the Chancellery view prevailed, and only a more concise set of guidelines 
was to be delivered for cabinet approval.206 Moreover, von Staden pointed 
to the danger of leaks, and underscored therefore that all references to 
tactical considerations were best left out of the guidelines and arguments 
made only on a factual basis.207 
On 25 April 1972, Foreign Minister Scheel sent the first draft of the 
CSCE guidelines to the Chancellery. In his introduction, Scheel stressed 
that rather than setting rigid formulas, the idea behind the paper was to 
provide ‘points of orientation’ for an active West German role in Western 
preparations as well as in the multilateral East–West negotiations. More-
over, the guiding principle of any West German policy in the CSCE had 
to be to avoid any commitments that affected the modus vivendi charac-
ter of Ostpolitik or could be used to create anything resembling a peace 
treaty.208 Presenting the final CSCE guidelines at the cabinet meeting on 
16 May, Scheel stressed that the FRG was not out to provoke anyone at the 
conference – the West Germans were aiming at genuine improvements, 
not propaganda events. Naturally, their own interests had to be defended 
vigorously if necessary.209 
The guidelines paper approved by the cabinet on 16 May 1972 laid out 
the cornerstones of the CSCE policy of the FRG. According to the paper, 
circumstances were now suitable for a successful CSCE contributing to 
détente in Europe, a conference in which the Federal Republic would play 
an active role. The guidelines emphasised four main agenda areas: (1) the 
principles governing relations between states; (2) military aspects of se-
curity; (3) ‘improvement of communication’ or freer movement; and (4) 
cooperation in various areas.210 
The CSCE guidelines declared that the West German preparations con-
tinued to be coordinated by the Auswärtiges Amt, which was also to lead 
a new inter-ministry working group on the CSCE, to be set up before the 
multilateral preparations started.211 Already in preparation for the cabi-
net discussion, the Auswärtiges Amt had produced a massive package of 
documents, elaborating the eighteen-point guidelines paper with fifteen 
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annexes, all together covering well over one hundred pages. In all, the 
package revealed an already rather sophisticated stage of preparations 
for the CSCE, ranging from considerations on individual agenda issues 
to personnel planning for West German delegations at the multilateral 
preparations and the CSCE proper.212
The most important agenda items raised in the guidelines will be ex-
plored in more detail below. Before moving on to them, however, a few 
words on the role of the parliamentary opposition in West German CSCE 
policy are in order. For the conservative wing of the CDU, the whole CSCE 
project had been seen for a considerable time as a dangerous undertaking 
for the Western democracies in general and for the Federal Republic in par-
ticular, giving the Soviet Union an unprecedented opportunity to increase 
its influence in Western Europe.213 Admittedly, there were also more mod-
erate voices in the ranks of the Christian Democrats.214 But the harshest crit-
ics were the vocal ones, none more so than the leader of the Bavarian CSU, 
Franz Josef Strauss, who openly attacked the CSCE policy of the Brandt 
Government in the Bundestag plenary in February 1972. In response, the 
Chancellor pointed at the active agenda preparations undertaken within 
NATO as well as in the EPC. Were the Christian Democrats really question-
ing the policy of the complete Western Alliance, Brandt asked.215 
At the cabinet meeting discussing the CSCE in May 1972, Scheel specifi-
cally asked for approval to make the key documents in the CSCE pack-
age available to the leadership of the Christian Democrats on the basis 
of confidentiality.216 A few weeks later, in an internal memorandum sent 
to the CDU leader Rainer Barzel, one of the key foreign policy figures of 
the party, Georg Kliesing, admitted that although the CSCE was the most 
dangerous part of Soviet strategy in Europe, the conference could no lon-
ger be avoided. Instead of a policy of self-isolation, the CDU needed to 
try to make the most of the situation. In order to safeguard West German 
interests, it was an important parliamentary task of the CDU/CSU group 
to push the Federal Government to give clear answers on its CSCE policy. 
So far, Kliesing argued, the basic position of the Federal Government was 
at least unclear, if not outright dubious. For the Christian Democrats, the 
tendency of the Government to see the CSCE as a continuation of its Ost-
politik and perhaps even as an opportunity to act as a bridge, merging 
Ostpolitik and Westpolitik, was a ‘disastrous development’.217 
In August 1972, Barzel wrote a letter to Scheel, thanking the Foreign 
Minister for the CSCE material he had sent over, as a result of Barzel’s 
enquiry to Brandt in June. Barzel criticised Scheel for the omission of ‘freer 
movement’ from the list of CSCE topics contained in one of the Auswärtiges 
Amt documents he had received. In Barzel’s view, that item should con-
stantly be pushed to the top of the CSCE agenda by the West Germans.218 
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In fact, the practice of the Auswärtiges Amt in sending CSCE material to 
the opposition leader was remarkably restrictive. The documents Barzel 
received in the summer of 1972 were of a very general and unclassified na-
ture. That had also been the case earlier, when Barzel had asked for brief-
ing material on the CSCE prior to his trip to Moscow in December 1971.219
Indeed, for the CDU it was difficult to engage in an effective opposition 
policy when it had only a very partial picture of what was going on in 
the CSCE preparations. Admittedly, the opposition was naturally preoc-
cupied and overstretched with the bilateral Ostpolitik, and could only af-
ford a marginal interest in the future conference at this stage.220 But above 
all, even during the final stretch before the convening of the multilateral 
preparatory talks, the CSCE was very much a government issue, prepared 
by a small bureaucratic circle of officials and diplomats. It was these of-
ficials that led the West German surge in the Western preparations of the 
conference substance in the spring of 1972. 
Peaceful Change, Self-Determination of  
Peoples and Military Security
In their NATO contribution in February 1972, the West Germans stressed 
that a CSCE declaration on principles governing relations between states 
needed to reflect the real possibilities of improvement of the East–West 
relationship, manifest the will to détente and promote concrete détente 
measures in the future. At the same time, two pitfalls had to be avoided – 
the impression of a substitute peace treaty for Germany and the creation 
of euphoria in the public opinion of NATO member states. Finally, the 
declaration needed to find the balance between actively pursuing Western 
interests in the conference and not unnecessarily hurting the sensitivities 
of the Warsaw Pact.221
In this working paper on the declaration of principles the FRG for the 
first time introduced the concept of ‘peaceful change’, which was later to 
become a central element of the CSCE. The West Germans argued that in 
combining the necessary respect for basic rights (equality and self-deter-
mination of peoples; sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political 
independence of states; human rights and basic freedoms of individuals) 
with the principles particularly important for the West (non-interference 
in internal and external affairs of other states; non-use and non-threat of 
force; peaceful settlement of disputes), the concept of peaceful change was 
essential: ‘it should be clear that choice of means to effect peaceful change 
is up to the parties involved, that coercion is ruled out and that settlement 
must be between sovereign equals.’ 
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But in spite of this insertion of a potentially dynamic element, the gen-
eral tenor of the West German working paper was extremely cautious, as 
witnessed by this section:
The Western draft of a document on the principles of international relations 
should, for the time being, not contain appeals to general noble values (such 
as human values, welfare of humanity, elimination of all sources of conflict, 
solidarity of mankind, etc.) since they would detract from the sober and busi-
nesslike approach of the Alliance ….222
This was a particularly controversial paragraph in the West German paper, 
and not all delegations agreed with it in the SPC discussion.223 Based on 
the exchange of opinions, the NATO Secretariat circulated a revised ver-
sion of the West German paper. This new draft was amended with a ref-
erence to the borders issue, reflecting West German interests and earlier 
Bonn Group agreement. If the Warsaw Pact were to press for the inclusion 
of a statement on borders in the CSCE declaration on principles, the Al-
lies should only agree to it if the formulation was limited to ‘respect’ or 
‘inviolability’ instead of ‘recognition’ of borders, if quadripartite rights 
for Germany as a whole and Berlin were safeguarded, and if Warsaw Pact 
countries made ‘major counterconcessions on matters of interest to the Al-
lies in other aspects of the negotiations’.224
The Deutschlandpolitik specialists in the Auswärtiges Amt saw the dec-
laration on principles to be of great value to the West, stressing that at-
mospheric improvements could bring substantive improvements in their 
wake. From the perspective of the FRG, an important objective at a CSCE 
was for its agreement on principles to have a ‘stabilising or buttressing’ ef-
fect on the inner-German modus vivendi. But in April 1972 the Auswärtiges 
Amt was firmly opposed to any references in that declaration to the Mos-
cow and Warsaw Treaties – the bilateral treaties needed to remain intact 
and unaffected by it.225
The NATO work on the CSCE substance in the spring of 1972 culmi-
nated in the report of the SPC which was distributed on 16 May. In their 
introductory notes to the report, Secretary General Joseph Luns and the 
Chairman of the SPC, Jörg Kastl, admitted that the Council had not been 
able to reconcile the differences of opinion in a variety of areas. In fact, 
hardly any of the areas covered in the report were without remaining 
contentious questions. Luns and Kastl stressed that the need for a con-
sensus was urgent, in particular regarding the overall tactical negotiating 
approach of NATO.226 
Despite the level of disagreement, the SPC report of 16 May managed 
to give a broad overview of the situation, both in terms of substance and 
procedure. On substance, the report was divided into nine dossiers – (1) 
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principles governing relations between states; (2) certain military aspects 
of security; (3) freer movement of people; (4) freer movement of informa-
tion and ideas; (5) cultural relations; (6) economic cooperation; (7) coopera-
tion in applied science and technology; (8) cooperation in pure science; and 
(9) cooperation to improve the human environment – each consisting of a 
confidential ‘guidelines paper’ for internal use and a more general ‘agenda 
paper’ for appropriate use with non-Allied governments, supported with 
relevant documentation. Moreover, the report tackled the questions of pro-
cedure and Allied consultations during the multilateral preparations.227 
A reading of the SPC report makes it obvious that the West German 
efforts during the spring of 1972 had paid off. Although a general Allied 
consensus on the CSCE approach was still distant, numerous West Ger-
man ideas had been efficiently fed into the NATO document. This was par-
ticularly the case in the dossier on ‘principles’, where the West German 
concerns on quadripartite rights, a substitute peace settlement, and the 
‘respect’ or ‘inviolability’ – as opposed to ‘recognition’ – of borders were 
fully taken into consideration. The concept of peaceful change, introduced 
by the West Germans in their working paper a few months earlier, was 
also included.228 The only drawback in the dossier, in the West German 
view, was the inability of the Alliance to agree on the inclusion of the self-
determination of peoples as well as human rights in the list of principles.229 
Both principles were of profound importance for the foreign policy of 
the FRG because of their direct implications for the inner-German rela-
tionship. Over the summer of 1972, at the same time as the negotiations for 
the Basic Treaty started, the Deutschlandpolitik element in the CSCE policy 
of the FRG became even more dominant. Von Groll stressed that the re-
percussions from the CSCE on the inner-German problems were of the 
utmost importance for the Federal Republic. The quintessential question 
in this respect was, in von Groll’s view, to what extent it would be possible 
to advance Deutschlandpolitik goals multilaterally through the CSCE.230 
Human rights and the right of self-determination were a case in point. 
When the key officials of the Auswärtiges Amt and the FCO met in Bonn for 
bilateral Anglo-West German consultations on the CSCE in June, the West 
Germans again insisted on the inclusion of self-determination and human 
rights in the declaration of principles. Since this had been one of the un-
resolved questions in the last SPC report, the West Germans suggested 
working on it at first trilaterally, in an Anglo-West German-US format. 
The British agreed to this, although they pointed out that further opposi-
tion to the inclusion of self-determination was to be expected from the 
Turkish and Canadian delegations, with their own minority issues.231 The 
West Germans followed up this initiative in July, and approached the UK 
and US delegations in NATO. The West German plan was to draft a joint 
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paper on ‘principles’, to be tabled before the SPC reconvened to resolve 
outstanding differences. Both Allies welcomed West German leadership 
in this issue.232 West German embassies in Ottawa and Ankara were also 
instructed to ask directly for Canadian and Turkish support. The main 
West German argument was that a failure to include self-determination in 
the declaration of principles would deal a significant blow to the achieve-
ments of Ostpolitik, retroactively diminishing the importance of the ‘letter 
on German unity’.233 
As it turned out, the West Germans did not succeed in this endeavour 
before the start of the multilateral talks. But during the actual CSCE, both 
human rights and the self-determination of peoples were negotiated into 
the Final Act. Importantly, however, the way in which Bonn addressed 
the issue in 1972 was illustrative of the new flexibility of West German 
multilateralism. Depending on the question at hand, suitable ad hoc alli-
ances could be sought out to win over support for West German interests. 
Although this was not a completely new invention in the diplomatic his-
tory of the Federal Republic, as a conscious and consistent West German 
strategy the forging of issue-driven coalitions within the West was cer-
tainly novel. 
In the CSCE context, the relationship between the EPC and NATO was 
an example par excellence of an alliance within an alliance. In 1972, the 
West Germans were increasingly willing to use the EPC as a means to ar-
rive at consensus in the broader NATO framework. In issues concerning 
economic cooperation there was a clear-cut division of labour – the EPC 
outweighed NATO. Therefore, the West German delegation in the EPC 
ad hoc group pointed out in January that in these questions preference 
should be given to arriving at common positions within the EPC; coordi-
nation with other NATO partners was secondary.234 But the extent of co-
ordination of European CSCE positions began to cause uneasiness in the 
North American NATO partners.235 In response, the West Germans gave 
assurances that all fears of the EPC consultations disturbing preparations 
on the NATO track were unfounded. Instead, the two procedures were 
mutually supportive.236
In fact, however, the EPC consultations had already for quite some time 
exceeded their original mandate which was to focus on issues directly fall-
ing within the competence of the EC. In retrospect, a senior French dip-
lomat referred to the EPC as a ‘factory of ideas’ for NATO in the CSCE 
process.237 In May 1972, the Auswärtiges Amt admitted as much, noting 
that the EPC was increasingly also acting as a general ‘clearing house’ for 
specific European interests and aspects of the complete subject matter of a 
CSCE, particularly in issues that were controversial in NATO.238 
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The Federal Republic was particularly active in making use of this 
‘clearing house’. It was also successful in enhancing the circumstances 
for it, downgrading the classification of documents concerning NATO 
preparations for the economic aspects of the CSCE as well as enabling 
the Commission representatives in the ad hoc group to see confidential 
NATO documents.239 The coordination of policies in the EPC and NATO 
was further facilitated by the fact that participants in the EPC meetings 
were the very same officials who were responsible for instructing their 
NATO representatives.240
Even with the ascendancy of the EPC, there was still one element of 
the Western CSCE preparations that was firmly in the hands of NATO 
– that of military security. As has been pointed out in preceding chap-
ters, the Federal Republic was keen on establishing a strong connection 
between the CSCE and MBFR. In 1971–72, this aim was vigorously pur-
sued by the Chancellery. While Brandt acknowledged that the specifics of 
MBFR needed to be addressed in a separate forum, in his meetings with 
Brezhnev, Pompidou, Heath and Rogers he consistently raised the im-
portance of including elements of military security on the CSCE agenda. 
The FRG wanted more from the conference than just normalisation of 
East–West relations and increased trade – at a conference on security one 
also needed to talk about security. ‘A general disarmament is the ideal’, 
Brandt told Brezhnev in September 1971.241 In February 1972, Brandt told 
Pompidou that the main West German emphasis at the CSCE would be 
on two points – on the declaration on principles and on the restriction of 
troop movements.242 In May, Brandt stressed that he fully agreed with De-
fence Minister Schmidt on the absolute necessity to discuss MBFR at the 
CSCE.243 All of this contradicts Christoph Bluth’s argument about Brandt 
losing interest in MBFR after the signature of the Eastern treaties.244
For Helmut Schmidt, MBFR was particularly important as a Western 
quid pro quo for the Eastern CSCE. As witnessed in the preceding chapter, 
Schmidt had earlier argued strongly for keeping the two projects separate. 
Already in November 1971, however, his US colleague reported a complete 
turnaround in Schmidt’s position. Now the West German Defence Minister 
saw a combination of the CSCE and MBFR as a valuable means to ensure 
French participation in MBFR.245 This became apparent in the preparation 
of the CSCE guidelines of the Federal Government in May 1972. The mate-
rial prepared by the Auswärtiges Amt argued for the need to address ‘certain 
military aspects of security’, such as principles and criteria for MBFR, at a 
CSCE.246 This was not sufficient for Schmidt, who insisted on a last-minute 
amendment of a more substantial section on MBFR in the guidelines. Scheel 
accepted this, but pointed out that other NATO members were unlikely to 
agree to a closer connection between the CSCE and MBFR.247
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On the working level, the US and France had long been the main op-
ponents of establishing a link between the CSCE and MBFR. Ironically, 
their motives for this were the reverse of each other – whereas the US 
was sceptical of the CSCE, France resisted the idea of MBFR altogether. 
The West German counterargument was that the inclusion of elements of 
military security on the CSCE agenda would help to avoid the creation of 
a ‘false sense of security’, resting only on Soviet promises, the renuncia-
tion of force and recognition of borders.248 In March 1972, first signs ap-
peared that the French might after all be willing to accept the discussion 
of ‘secondary security policy measures’ at a CSCE.249 But the US and West 
German positions remained far apart.250
This was reflected in the SPC report on the CSCE in May. References in 
the report to MBFR and confidence-building measures were all extremely 
non-committal and merely ‘illustrative’ in nature, and there was no agree-
ment on a possible joint MBFR declaration to be issued at the confer-
ence.251 Nevertheless, the West German NATO Ambassador was confident 
that consensus on the inclusion of confidence-building measures on the 
CSCE agenda was within reach.252 Accordingly, Scheel continued to push 
for this in the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting at the end of May 1972. 
Scheel pointed out that the Western governments needed to avoid any 
euphoric tendencies and impressions that the CSCE would make it pos-
sible for the West to relax its defence efforts. MBFR and the CSCE should 
be firmly linked together, and elements of military security needed to be 
discussed in the CSCE.253
After the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, the Auswärtiges Amt 
noted with satisfaction that the formulations in the final communiqué, 
referring to ‘the examination at a CSCE of appropriate measures, includ-
ing certain military measures, aimed at strengthening confidence and in-
creasing stability’ was sufficient to meet the West German demands to 
have elements of military security discussed at the CSCE.254 And indeed, 
in September 1972 NATO members agreed that advance notification of 
troop movements and manoeuvres as well as exchange of observers were 
suitable confidence-building measures to be taken up at the CSCE.255 Al-
though differences in opinion between member states still remained on 
the agenda and guidelines papers for these confidence-building measures, 
circulated in October, the Federal Republic had successfully managed to 
include military elements on NATO’s CSCE agenda.256
This was to a large extent due to the persistence of the Chancellery, 
which by now considered MBFR to be the decisive forum of détente. When 
Bahr visited Moscow in October 1972, his discussions with Brezhnev and 
Gromyko, as far as they dealt with the CSCE, were exclusively about the 
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relationship of the CSCE and MBFR. In Bahr’s view, it was MBFR that was 
concretely about détente and about safeguarding peace. 
Détente in Europe cannot be solved at a CSCE, because it cannot be done with-
out the reduction of the military potential. … The improvement of the political 
atmosphere will make practical decisions in the military area possible. But if 
these practical decisions do not follow, the political atmosphere will take a turn 
for the worse again.257
On a more tactical note, Bahr saw the role of the CSCE in this as giving 
all interested participants an opportunity to have their say about issues 
of military security. That would in turn make it easier to discuss the hard 
MBFR issues in a separate, smaller circle.258 This argument had been put 
forward by the MBFR unit in the Auswärtiges Amt for some time. If the 
smaller NATO allies, as well as neutral and non-aligned countries, were 
given the impression that they were not excluded from the development 
of security policy in Europe, it would be easier de facto to exclude them 
from the actual MBFR negotiations.259
The strong emphasis given to MBFR in the Chancellery was also visible 
in Brandt’s reluctance to address one of the quintessential questions of the 
CSCE, freer movement, in his discussions with Allies. Although his UK and 
US interlocutors brought up the topic and the issue figured prominently 
in the speaking notes prepared for Brandt, he preferred to focus on other 
CSCE issues – cultural relations and the environment on the one hand, and 
military security on the other.260 On the working level in the Auswärtiges 
Amt, however, the question of freer movement could not be avoided.
Freer Movement: Change through Rapprochement?
Speaking to a Social Democratic audience in February 1972, State Secretary 
Frank pointed out that while the general CSCE policy of the FRG consisted 
of avoiding changes to the modus vivendi and of striving for more security, 
cooperation and freedom of movement in Europe, the ‘egoistic core’ of that 
policy was the improvement of inner-German relations.261 Nowhere was 
this more apparent than in the field of freer movement. In addition to the 
Deutschlandpolitik connection, freer movement is also an illustrative exam-
ple of the overall CSCE tactics of the Federal Republic, a cautious approach 
emphasising long-term evolution instead of short-term revolution.
In the spring of 1972, the correct way to approach freedom of move-
ment in the CSCE framework became a particularly important issue for 
the FRG. Already at the end of 1971, the Auswärtiges Amt began to pay 
more attention to the freer movement elements in the CSCE as a potential 
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development with direct repercussions for Deutschlandpolitik. Agreements 
on freedom of movement on the European level could turn out to facilitate 
the desired ‘human relief’ (menschliche Erleichterungen) – the small improve-
ments in people’s daily lives which had been outlined in the Brandt-Stoph 
meeting in Kassel in 1970 – in the inner-German relationship.262
It was precisely this special relevance for the inner-German situation 
that led the Federal Republic to argue for a non-confrontational tactical 
approach in the freer movement question. In the West German view, max-
imum freedom of movement of people, ideas and information in Europe 
was an essential long-term goal but one which could only be achieved 
after a long and probably difficult process. A debate on the principles of 
freedom of movement at the outset of a CSCE could endanger the whole 
East–West dialogue. Instead, an improvement of cooperation one step at 
a time, beginning with concrete issues where agreement was conceivable, 
was seen as the most promising route to greater freedom of movement in 
all areas in the long run.263 
In January 1972, when challenged by the US, the Auswärtiges Amt de-
fended this position adamantly. The US embassy in Bonn reported that 
the West Germans ‘stressed their preference for limiting freer movement 
to cultural exchange at this point, arguing that this served their particu-
lar interests vis-à-vis the GDR’. Interestingly, the FRG officials had also 
expressed their concern that the GDR could use any ‘lowest common 
denominator’ resolutions on freer movement at a CSCE as a ‘maximum 
threshold’ in the inner-German relationship.264
The budding controversy with the US over this issue was certainly be-
hind the German decision to begin also addressing it in the EPC frame-
work. In early January 1972 Jürgen Diesel, a deputy head of the political 
department of the Auswärtiges Amt, had stressed that agenda items related 
to freer movement should be discussed primarily in NATO.265 But leading 
the West German delegation in the meeting of the EPC sous-comité a week 
later, Diesel spoke in favour of an intensive discussion of freer movement 
within the EPC, since NATO had so far not been able to agree on the ap-
proach to adopt. At least the Six should speak with one voice on this issue 
in the NATO framework. Due to its special importance for the inner-Ger-
man relationship, the topic should not be discredited by introducing con-
troversial questions such as radio jamming or exit visas at the beginning of 
the CSCE. Instead, cautiousness and patience were called for. Diesel also 
promised that a West German working paper on freer movement would 
be prepared in the near future for discussion in the EPC – before its sub-
mission to NATO.266 As the EPC deliberations continued in February, the 
French joined the FRG in arguing that the West should not propose freer 
movement as a specific agenda item of the CSCE. Rather than confronting 
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the East with that topic early on, it would be better to seek improvements 
piecemeal when negotiating about cooperation in particular fields.267 
For the US, the development of the West German position was worry-
ing. The idea of a working paper on freer movement and cultural relations 
was a further sign of a continued West German ‘effort to de-emphasize 
freer movement and stress cultural relations’.268 These worries grew dur-
ing the spring of 1972, although the West Germans gave assurances that 
the FRG did not wish to remove freer movement from the CSCE agenda. 
Officials in Bonn argued that it was in the West German interest to have 
freer movement as a key element of the Western position at the conference 
– but the best way to do it was to highlight freer movement in the general 
umbrella declaration on principles and then supplement it by more spe-
cific references in each of the various sections on cooperation.269 
The US officials were not convinced. The West German position had 
been marked by ‘hesitation and ambiguity’ to begin with, and was now 
moving to an even softer direction. If the FRG was prepared to drop freer 
movement as a specific agenda item altogether, it would put it in direct 
opposition to the US, which had ‘consistently emphasized concrete issues, 
not vague declarations’.270 Visiting Washington, von Staden maintained 
that the US, France and the FRG were in complete agreement on substance, 
only disagreeing on the question of procedures. Although the question 
of freedom of movement was a problem in every aspect of a CSCE, von 
Staden argued that at the conference ‘one should start with things that can 
be done and follow a step-by-step approach’.271
This negotiating approach was something that the FRG argued for 
across the board. Starting with maximum Western demands of compre-
hensive scope would be ‘very off-putting to the Soviet side and perhaps 
lead to negative results’. Instead, the West Germans wanted to begin the 
conference by keeping options as open as possible. In the British analy-
sis this line resembled the negotiating technique of Bahr, who liked to 
operate ‘from a position of fluidity’.272 The UK embassy saw this ‘Bahr 
flavour’, now prevalent in the Auswärtiges Amt, as aiming ‘to engage in 
negotiations, to avoid frightening the other side, to see what emerges, and 
to be committed to pursuing only that which emerges’.273 Fascinatingly, 
in the CSCE context the West Germans were implementing this non-con-
troversial tactical method on two levels – first within the West in order to 
have NATO then adopt the method for the East–West talks.274 Intended 
as criticism of Bahr, these British observations are astonishingly accurate 
descriptions of the West German approach. 
But the reluctance of the FRG to openly confront the Soviet Union on 
freer movement was also motivated by a perception of its limited abilities 
to actively promote change. Publicly, the Federal Government stressed the 
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positive prospects of an evolutionary development opened up by a CSCE 
and the principle that an improvement of the situation in divided Europe 
needed to improve the situation of the divided German nation.275 But be-
hind the scenes, the West Germans were ‘very conscious of the dangers 
which might arise if the FRG appeared to be putting German policy before 
European policy’.276 
And appearances aside, West German leverage was perceived to be 
limited. This is strikingly clear in a memorandum von Staden sent to 
Frank in mid-March 1972, worth quoting at length. Although von Staden 
concluded the passage with a reference to reunification, ‘hoping for long-
term changes possibly making it look conceivable’ was hardly a statement 
for an active policy towards that end. Rather, it was about coming to terms 
with the status quo that prevailed:
Neither the economic nor the political (let alone the military) potential of the 
Federal Republic allows us to strive for a change in the political landscape in 
Central and Eastern Europe. In this respect we have to be static. Therefore, 
in the relationship to the East and particularly the Soviet Union, we have set 
ourselves the goal[s], 1) to mitigate the situation in Europe and to make peace 
more secure through renunciation-of-force treaties and the Berlin arrangement, 
and 2) to create a climate of security in Europe …, in the hope that 3) long-term 
changes could relativise systemic antagonisms and make reunification appear 
conceivable.277
Implementing this combination of tactics and strategy on the working 
level, and encouraged by first experiences from handling the issue in the 
EPC, the West Germans submitted an updated position paper on freer 
movement to the EPC sous-comité in March 1972 – over two weeks be-
fore tabling the same document in NATO. More explicitly than before, the 
paper made the argument for the exceptional position of the FRG:
Inadequate freedom of movement is the number one problem of our divided 
country. It is particularly in this field that it will have to be seen to what extent 
the détente to which we want to contribute with our policy can become a real-
ity. Therefore, none of the other countries participating in a CSCE is so directly 
affected as the Federal Republic of Germany by the discussion of ‘freer move-
ment’ at the conference.278
The paper went on to argue that freer movement was a significant basic 
element for any real progress in the East–West relationship – and vice 
versa, progress in the freedom of movement was the most important and 
concrete yardstick for the achievements in détente and cooperation. Pre-
cisely because of the importance of the issue, the West Germans argued, it 
was essential for the West to approach it in as effective a manner as pos-
sible. Instead of confronting the East with rigid demands and ‘spectacular 
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moves’, the West ought to develop a long-term concept with prospects of 
tangible and practical results. Rather than focusing on a potentially pro-
vocative separate declaration on freer movement, the West would be bet-
ter advised to include the topic in a general declaration of principles as 
well as to ensure that the principle of freer movement was an integral part 
of all areas of East–West cooperation.279
After a lively discussion in the EPC sous-comité, the West German ap-
proach found relatively broad support. Most of the EPC members agreed 
that by formulating the CSCE agenda so as to make it acceptable to the 
East, the West would also be able to speak freely about freer movement at 
the conference. In contrast, a polemical approach during the preparations 
could lead to the complete exclusion of the issue from the CSCE. The West 
Germans, in turn, supported the French proposal, according to which the 
freer movement items should be referred to as ‘cultural cooperation, devel-
opment of contacts between persons and dissemination of information’.280 
After the EPC meeting, the West Germans were confident that common 
ground could be found in the NATO framework.281 But as it turned out, 
the controversy with the US was anything but over. In late March, the US 
mission to NATO reported of a ‘potentially troublesome development’ in 
the EPC, regarding the French proposal to change the titles of the freer 
movement items. A member of the West German NATO delegation aggra-
vated the situation, constantly telling his US and UK colleagues privately 
that he felt the instructions from Bonn to support the French in this were 
misguided, and even encouraging the Allies to lobby Bonn to change the 
West German position.282 
The official West German position presented in NATO, arguing for the 
need to avoid polemics, led to consternation not only in Washington, but 
also in the Netherlands and the UK. The Dutch argued that there was ‘no 
need for us to treat the other side with kid gloves – they would certainly 
not pull their punches’.283 The British, who referred to the West German 
position as ‘feebleness’ and ‘an exceedingly wet line’, tried to figure out 
the motives behind it. ‘It may be that something more substantial (e.g. the 
hope of some special advantage in inner-German relations) lies behind 
this attitude. But if so the Germans have not brought their allies into the 
secret.’284 Later, van Well suggested to a US diplomat in Bonn that sup-
porting the French in the question of the titles of the freer movement items 
had been a tactical decision, an attempt to pull France deeper into the 
concept of NATO instead of Franco-Soviet bilateralism.285 This, of course, 
may have been just a convenient explanation to give to the Americans in 
order to calm them down.
Nonetheless, apparently the West German effort to win over the EPC 
members before addressing the issue in NATO had not been such a com-
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plete success as the FRG had thought. On 7 April, the West Germans finally 
circulated their freer movement working paper in NATO. For the US, it 
confirmed their worst fears about West German willingness to drop freer 
movement as an agenda item at the CSCE.286 The stalemate in NATO was 
further exacerbated by the West German decision to express their reserva-
tions on the title as well as the contents of an agenda paper on freer move-
ment circulated by the international secretariat.287 In a Council meeting on 
25 April, the disagreements were voiced more loudly than before, the West 
German Ambassador favouring as neutral a wording as possible, and the 
US Ambassador warning the Alliance of the consequences of backing away 
from its own insistence to deal with freer movement at the CSCE.288 
In a handwritten remark on the West German report from the meeting, 
von Groll noted that there was a need for new instructions, stressing that 
nobody in Bonn wanted to remove the freer movement items from the 
agenda or reduce their importance. Instead, the question was only about 
the right way in which to present these issues.
We want to avoid a confrontation in the multilateral preparations, to formulate 
the topics under the title ‘freedom of movement’ for the agenda in such a way 
that the other side can also agree to them – otherwise there is a risk that the 
items will not appear on the agenda at all.289
To overcome the difficulties with the US, von Groll’s unit in the Auswär-
tiges Amt argued that it would be useful to convince the US of the posi-
tive broad impact the CSCE would have on détente – on NATO as well 
as on Deutschlandpolitik.290 In a further effort to mend fences, the US and 
the FRG agreed that they would improve their advance consultations on 
CSCE matters, to avoid situations where the West Germans supported 
positions known to diverge from US ones without previous warning.291 
In their contacts with the US delegation in Bonn, West German officials 
continued to emphasise that the freer movement issue ‘should be the cen-
terpiece of discussion at the conference itself, although presented in a non-
polemical manner’.292
The Auswärtiges Amt also increasingly highlighted the importance of 
the inner-German aspect of freer movement. Although the FRG wanted 
to avoid the appearance of pushing purely its own national interests in 
NATO, it was in repercussions for inner-German relations that the Federal 
Republic was primarily interested. Concrete progress in the area of freer 
movement in the CSCE could produce provisions with a binding effect 
on the GDR, in turn helping to improve the conditions for movement of 
people between the two parts of Germany. This was the main reason why 
Bonn wanted to have the topic introduced in a non-controversial manner 
at the CSCE. ‘It was simply too important to the FRG for it to be handled in 
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any polemical fashion.’293 Because of the connection with Deutschlandpoli-
tik, the Federal Republic considered even the smallest of improvements in 
the field of freedom of movement to be better than none at all.294
Moreover, the West Germans were apparently serious about the se-
mantics concerning the freer movement items. Reflecting the discussion 
in the EPC and NATO, there were last-minute changes in the language on 
freer movement in the CSCE guidelines of the Federal Government. The 
original versions proposed by the Auswärtiges Amt had still referred to 
‘freedom of movement’.295 But on 12 May, the relevant sections in the final 
version were replaced with ‘improvement of communication’.296
This question was again addressed in the NATO Council on 10 May. 
The US and the Netherlands argued for maintaining the old titles of freer 
movement, whereas France and the FRG, this time supported by the UK 
and Denmark, called for a less polemical compromise formula, which 
would also be acceptable to the East – ‘development of contacts between 
persons’ rather than ‘freer movement of people’, ‘expansion of the dis-
semination of information’ rather than ‘freer movement of ideas’. The dis-
agreement between the two camps remained unresolved.297 
These disagreements notwithstanding, the freer movement dossiers of 
the SPC report in May did identify a number of specific measures to be 
covered at the CSCE. Many of these measures also held direct promises 
for the inner-German relationship, in particular the ‘removal of arbitrary 
obstacles to the exit of individuals and their families’ and the ‘lifting of 
restrictions on marriage and the reuniting of families’. Suiting the prefer-
ences of the Federal Republic, the need for a gradual approach was under-
lined. The report also recognised certain limits to which it would be best 
to adhere: 
Not included in the list of measures … is the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, 
largely because the Allies believe it would be counter-productive to make such 
a far-reaching proposal during initial multilateral talks. Partly for public opin-
ion purposes, however, the Allies will not wish to overlook the existence of the 
Berlin Wall, the East’s most graphic and best-known barrier to freer movement 
of people.
The NATO dossier on the freer movement of ideas and information 
also strikingly resembled the West German approach, particularly this 
observation:
[T]he Allies will need to pursue this proposal with particular sensitivity and 
a good sense of timing, bearing in mind Western public opinion which will 
expect us to emphasize the importance of freedom of information. A frontal at-
tack on these repressive practices internally within the East would be unlikely 
to produce any favourable results. On the other hand, a long-term campaign 
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of quiet persuasion, suggesting a few modest steps … to bring the Eastern ex-
ternal practices more in line with generally accepted international behaviour, 
could lead to significant improvements over the present situation.298
But the question of the titles for the freer movement items on the CSCE 
agenda was a persistent one. The EPC Political Committee invited the 
Foreign Ministers to take a stand on the issue in their meeting at the end 
of May. The West German compromise solution was to maintain the for-
mulation ‘freer movement’ in the catalogue of principles under general 
human rights and individual basic freedoms, but to use ‘development of 
contacts’ on the conference agenda and in the titles of the CSCE commis-
sions. No resolution was found, however, and the question was moved on 
to the NATO Foreign Ministers.299
Prior to the ministerial meeting of NATO, the US had clearly under-
stood Bonn’s argument on avoiding unnecessary polemics on freer move-
ment because of the potential value of the item for the inner-German 
relationship.300 But this did not change the US view. Secretary of State 
Rogers underlined that ‘for NATO to compromise on this issue in form 
or substance and to do so on its own initiative would weaken the Western 
position on its most advantageous issue in CSCE before the conference 
even started.’ Rogers himself planned to press Scheel on this at the quad-
ripartite dinner before the Foreign Ministers’ meeting.301 
But Scheel was not prepared to change the West German position. In 
his speech at the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Scheel underscored 
that the crucial importance of freer movement, particularly for the FRG, 
was the reason why it should be ‘discussed as realistically as possible with 
the aim of securing practical improvements, not as a philosophical dis-
pute’. Insisting on the inclusion of a controversial agenda item on freer 
movement would be tactically unwise.302
Since both the FRG and the US were persistent in their positions, the 
question of freer movement remained controversial all the way to the 
autumn of 1972. On the bilateral West German-US level, during Henry 
Kissinger’s visit to the Olympic Games in Munich, Scheel and Frank tried 
to convince him that the West German ‘objective was not to lose the sub-
stance but to avoid formulation of the agenda item in such a way as to 
make it ipso facto unacceptable to the Eastern side’.303 
But no agreement was found. As a result, NATO had to enter the MPT 
without an agreed tactical position on freer movement. The two dossiers 
on freer movement from May 1972 were not updated in the run-up to the 
multilateral preparations, and the NATO steering brief for the MPT, issued 
on 7 November, explicitly referred to internal divisions within the West 
in this context.304 Consequently, NATO negotiations about the suitable 
line continued during the Dipoli talks. While this may have been harmful 
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for the cohesion of the Alliance, it did prevent the worst-case scenario of 
the FRG – an East–West confrontation about freer movement at the very 
beginning of the conference preparations. As the CSCE negotiations got 
under way, the West Germans were able to keep alive their idea of a long-
term evolutionary approach to the improvement of personal contacts.
Berlin as a CSCE Location?
If one searches for case studies reflecting the pursuit of West German 
national interests in the CSCE preparations, German as the official con-
ference language as well as the seating order at the conference are two 
obvious – and illuminating – examples.305 Here I will highlight a third, 
less known element. A particularly intriguing case in West German CSCE 
deliberations was the idea of finding a role for Berlin as a CSCE location, 
either for hosting parts of the actual conference or as a site for a possible 
permanent body established for the follow-up of the CSCE. 
As has been pointed out in Chapter 2 above, Egon Bahr had already in 
the summer of 1968 toyed with the idea of having the organs of a ‘pan-
European security system’ seated in Berlin. Over two years later, in No-
vember 1970, the idea surfaced for the first time in the CSCE context, 
when Bahr, meeting the Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister, suddenly 
suggested that hosting a permanent CSCE secretariat in Berlin might be 
a good idea. When asked in which part of the city, Bahr replied: ‘both’.306
Later on, the idea was picked up by the US. In March 1971, Secretary 
of State Rogers raised Berlin as a potentially attractive CSCE site from the 
Western point of view. Berlin could offer psychological compensation for 
the gains otherwise made by the East in the conference. Rogers stressed 
that before tabling the idea in NATO, the issue should be discussed in 
the Bonn Group.307 The US embassy in Bonn was instructed accordingly, 
and in the Bonn Group meeting on 29 April 1971 all participants agreed 
that the idea of a CSCE in Berlin, hosted by the Berlin Senate, was worth 
considering.308 Von Groll, whom the US embassy had kept well informed 
in advance, saw the idea in a positive light, but argued that for the time 
being it was best not to include the non-members of the Bonn Group in 
the discussion.309
This American initiative had focused on the site of the actual confer-
ence. But during Brandt’s visit to Washington in June 1971, Bahr returned 
to his thought of Berlin hosting a permanent body created by the CSCE. 
Bahr asked for US support for this idea, which would give the city ‘a much 
needed boost’. The State Department was happy to back the idea, but had 
doubts of its chances of being approved by the Soviet Union.310 Brandt’s 
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handwritten notes for the Crimean meeting with Brezhnev in September 
1971 suggest that he had at least been prepared to discuss the idea of Ber-
lin as a site for the permanent body.311 However, no reference to this issue 
is made in the official West German protocol of the meeting. 
Although it would be an overstatement to speak about a campaign in 
favour of it, in the autumn of 1971 Berlin as a CSCE site was certainly given 
serious consideration in Bonn – and in Berlin. During his visit to Paris in 
October, Horst Grabert, the SPD Senator from West Berlin, suggested his 
city as a potential site either for the CSCE or a follow-up organisation. The 
French Foreign Minister Schumann reacted with interest but noted that 
the choice of Berlin might send unwanted signals concerning the status of 
the city, referring to the potential in claiming its neutral character.312
In the official Auswärtiges Amt view, the whole question of the estab-
lishment of a permanent body was premature in the autumn of 1971. The 
issue should only be addressed in due time at the conference itself.313 But 
regarding the possibility of Berlin as a venue for the conference or parts 
of it, the German Foreign Ministry was divided. For Blech’s Deutschland-
politik unit, the idea was dubious from the start. Although it could bring 
much needed prestige for the city, the identity of the actual host would 
be anything but clear. Instead of the FRG, the Three Powers – or even the 
Four, including the Soviet Union – would be legally responsible for it. This 
would unnecessarily underline the special status of Berlin and the limited 
sovereignty of the FRG. Since the idea of sharing the meetings between 
East and West Berlin was unlikely to succeed, the choice of West Berlin 
alone could additionally be interpreted as a sign of it being a neutral is-
land, rather than comparable to ‘normal’ cities of the Federal Republic.314
But Blech’s views were contradicted by von Groll. The head of the CSCE 
unit in the Auswärtiges Amt saw several advantages in holding a part of the 
CSCE in Berlin – beyond the mere prestige impact it could also ensure cor-
rect East German behaviour at the CSCE and increase the overall chances 
to overcome the division of the city. Von Groll admitted that Berlin was 
hardly suitable for a spectacular opening of the CSCE, but could well be 
considered as a site for some of the commissions working on specific items 
or as the location of a permanent body.315 
State Secretary Frank followed von Groll’s suggestion and raised this 
on his visit to the United States in November 1971. At the end of a discus-
sion at the State Department, Frank offered Berlin, but this time only the 
Western half of the city, as the location of a permanent machinery of the 
CSCE. In Frank’s view, West Berlin was still also a suitable candidate for 
the CSCE proper, as an alternative to Helsinki and Geneva.316 In Decem-
ber, however, von Groll noted that Helsinki was de facto already chosen 
to be the site of the MPT, whereas Vienna and Geneva were the leading 
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candidates for the CSCE proper. Although von Groll stressed that the vi-
ability of Berlin as an alternative location should be carefully analysed, the 
idea seemed to die down.317 
Enter Egon Bahr. In March 1972, commenting on a Chancellery mem-
orandum on the CSCE state of play, Bahr was disappointed to see that 
the West German interest in a permanent body to be established by the 
CSCE was not mentioned. In response, the author of the memorandum 
referred to an Auswärtiges Amt paper on the continuation of the East–West 
dialogue after a CSCE, which had been delivered as a West German con-
tribution to the EPC in late February. This paper had decisively opposed 
the establishment of a single permanent body by the CSCE, since it would 
prematurely set the new West European institutions in competition with 
a pan-European body.318 
Bahr was not satisfied, and suggested to the Auswärtiges Amt that he 
should meet with State Secretary Frank to settle the differences. Bahr 
stressed that a permanent secretariat would be necessary for a continued 
East–West dialogue after the CSCE. The character of such an East–West 
mechanism would by its very nature, and due to the participation of the US 
and Canada, not threaten the institutions of the EC. Moreover, Bahr under-
scored, the FRG had ‘an interest in getting such a secretariat to Berlin’.319 
In his response, von Staden argued that whereas the Auswärtiges Amt 
was not in principle against establishing a permanent machinery, such a 
decision should only be taken further down the road, not before it had 
been established that Western agenda interests were sufficiently repre-
sented at the conference.320 Internally, von Staden also expressed his con-
cern at being committed by a premature declaration of willingness to have 
a possible secretariat in Berlin.321 Accompanying von Staden in Washing-
ton, von Groll told his interlocutors that the FRG strongly favoured the 
existing Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) as the forum for post-
CSCE discussion on East–West cooperation, rather than any new perma-
nent machinery established by the CSCE.322
But Bahr insisted adamantly on Berlin as a site for the possible per-
manent body. When the early versions of the cabinet presentation on the 
CSCE guidelines were discussed within the administration in April 1972, 
Bahr made sure that the Chancellery expressed its reservations accord-
ingly. In general, the Chancellery admitted that there was widespread re-
sistance in the West against establishing new institutions. Nonetheless, it 
argued, some commissions with limited mandates could continue their 
work after the CSCE, and Berlin should be an option for hosting them.323 
Due to the Chancellery intervention, the option of offering Berlin as a lo-
cation for a possible follow-up institution was explicitly kept open in the 
final version of the CSCE guidelines.324 
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The main problem with the candidacy of Berlin was that the general 
idea of a permanent follow-up institution of a CSCE had at that time no 
support at all in the West, neither in the EPC nor in NATO. The allies of 
the FRG saw a permanent body merely as an opportunity for the Soviet 
Union to meddle in West European affairs. Faced with this situation, von 
Staden argued in late May 1972 that it would be senseless to continue 
insisting on such an institution.325 Slowly, thus, the Berlin idea began to 
evaporate from the active CSCE policy of the FRG. The conclusion of the 
Berlin Agreement also played a role here. In retrospect, Bahr explained 
that Berlin as a CSCE site would have helped to stabilise the city politi-
cally. When the quadripartite agreement entered into force, this need for 
additional stabilisation receded.326 
Nonetheless, after a new Soviet proposal in October 1972 the question 
of a permanent body was suddenly again on the agenda.327 The Auswär-
tiges Amt was quick to remark that in return for Eastern concessions in 
other CSCE areas, the West would probably have to reconsider its position 
in this issue. Von Staden stressed that the West German attitude towards 
a permanent body was among the most positive ones in the West – not 
least due to certain national interests concerning the location of such a 
follow-up organisation.328 When the Federal Republic entered the CSCE, 
the Berlin option continued to be available for use in case it was needed.
Avoiding Bilateralism
As we have seen in this chapter, during the years 1971–72 the West Ger-
man CSCE policy became a truly multilateral affair, diverging on several 
separate yet parallel routes. The development of the Western CSCE prepa-
rations in this increasingly multilateral direction had obviously served the 
West Germans well. It gave the FRG the opportunity to approach their 
allies on the most suitable forum and in the most advantageous constella-
tion, depending on the issue. But although a large amount of West German 
CSCE policy was issue-driven in this sense, there was also an interesting, 
overarching line of thinking in Bonn, which saw multilateralism as a value 
in its own right.
The rapid increase in West German CSCE activity on all multilateral 
fronts was no coincidence. Towards the end of 1971, the Auswärtiges Amt 
began to see an inherent value in dealing with European questions on 
a multilateral level. The essential questions of security and cooperation, 
such as MBFR, principles of relations between states, and freer movement, 
were already on the European agenda – with or without a CSCE. Without 
a CSCE, the risk of a dynamic ‘multiplication of East–West bilateralism’ to 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
194   |   A State of Peace in Europe
tackle these issues was on the rise.329 The CSCE was a means to steer and 
limit this development and replace it with an approach that better suited 
the West German concept – that of controlled and gradual change, with 
the necessary degree of adaptation.330 Interestingly, the White House also 
made similar calculations on the risks of rising bilateralism in the autumn 
of 1971. To avoid that development, Helmut Sonnenfeldt recommended 
that the US should be prepared to take the risks inherent in the CSCE, the 
conference Sonnenfeldt himself referred to as ‘the entire ghastly affair’.331 
For the West Germans, the CSCE opened anything but ghastly perspec-
tives. Instead, having to a large extent exhausted its bilateral options to 
promote détente, aiming at joint solutions was the best way forward. In 
November 1971, this led to a disagreement with the French about the na-
ture of the NATO study on CSCE negotiation approaches. Whereas the 
French considered the study to have merely an illustrative character, the 
FRG insisted on developing a common Alliance position for the confer-
ence.332 France insisted on its view that the SPC could only formulate 
‘examples’ of Alliance positions, against the US and West German views 
calling for genuinely harmonised joint NATO positions.333
In the West German view, leadership from the Federal Republic was ur-
gently needed to steer the NATO discussion towards agreed positions. The 
alternative, individual French, US and UK policies at the CSCE, would make 
it extremely difficult to defend West German interests in a complicated mul-
tilateral conference. Common NATO negotiating positions, coordinated and 
harmonised as far as possible, were in the West German interest. Naturally, 
essential interests of individual member states should be respected – such as 
the modus vivendi character of the Ostpolitik of the FRG.334
In January 1972, the US proposed that work should be started on draft-
ing general ‘agenda papers’, combining Allied views on each issue poten-
tially on the CSCE agenda, in order to arrive at common Alliance positions 
in the CSCE. The FRG considered this to be a time-consuming approach 
and would rather have seen the SPC directly drafting formal texts of CSCE 
declarations and agreements, since this would have been a more efficient 
way towards common positions.335 As a compromise, the SPC decided to 
address the open questions with a mix of guideline papers, agenda papers 
and, where appropriate, specific draft texts of declarations.336
West German reservations about the concept of ‘agenda papers’ contin-
ued all the way until the spring.337 In late April, the West Germans main-
tained their general reserve on all of the agenda papers annexed to the 
SPC report on the CSCE, because the contents of the more operative guide-
line papers were still unclear. In fact, the West Germans argued that the 
NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in late May should reach agreement on 
the guideline papers and issue a separate declaration setting out the basic 
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views of NATO on the CSCE. The British FCO considered this to be ‘a very 
bad idea’: firstly, since such a document would be considered prematurely 
as the opening bid of the West at the conference, unnecessarily tying their 
hands before the negotiations had even started; and secondly, because 
such an Allied consensus would be extremely difficult to arrive at.338 
In the Auswärtiges Amt, the idea of a separate CSCE declaration of 
NATO Foreign Ministers was taken seriously. In early May 1972, von 
Groll drafted a proposal for such a declaration, based on the West German 
CSCE guidelines soon to be presented to the cabinet. The text of the decla-
ration ran along familiar West German lines, presenting the CSCE as a first 
step of a long-term development rather than as a static element.339 But in 
the end, lack of support for such a declaration forced the FRG to give up 
the idea before the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Bonn. At the same time, 
the West Germans also lifted their general reservation on the concept of 
agenda papers, although maintaining their preference for the adoption of 
NATO guideline papers, to be seen as binding background documents.340
The SPC report in May 1972 for the first time raised the idea of a ‘steer-
ing brief’ of the Alliance, possibly serving as guidance on tactical consid-
erations in the negotiations.341 The Auswärtiges Amt was enthusiastically 
in favour of this. For such a steering brief, the West Germans argued, it 
was important to formulate negotiating positions in a fashion that would 
represent the essential Western interests while at the same time avoid-
ing counter-productive provocations and confrontations.342 In bilateral 
contacts with the French, the FRG tried to sell the idea of unified West-
ern positions at the CSCE. From the West German perspective, that was 
particularly important in the case of the declaration on principles, where 
a joint draft text, agreed by all NATO members, would be an extremely 
useful point of reference in the negotiations. If the West were to enter the 
conference without precise expectations and with conflicting opinions, the 
whole endeavour would be too risky. In the worst case the whole CSCE 
could end in a failure. ‘We need to agree on a common line to take. In view 
of the multilateral preparations, we need to be clear on what we can or 
cannot say’, von Staden argued. But the French were adamant, refusing to 
agree to binding joint positions, let alone common texts.343
In late May, Scheel strongly urged his NATO colleagues to work out a 
common negotiating position for the multilateral CSCE preparations.344 
This had become a central characteristic of the West German CSCE ap-
proach. Accordingly, when the Auswärtiges Amt in June 1972 listed five 
operative priorities in the preparation of the multilateral talks, Western 
coordination, as comprehensively as possible, was on the top of the list. 
The three following priorities were the usual suspects: a catalogue of prin-
ciples reflecting the specific Deutschlandpolitik interests of the FRG; mili-
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tary aspects of security; and communication and exchange, the by now 
established euphemism for freer movement. Interestingly, the final point 
on the list signposted the protection of the role of the European Commu-
nity at the conference as a particular West German priority.345
The role of the EC, and particularly that of the Commission, had been 
the subject of a long tug-of-war between the FRG and France in the EPC. 
In the West German view, East–West cooperation could only be success-
ful if the EC participated in the discussion appropriately from the begin-
ning. Whenever the recommendations and decisions issued by the CSCE 
touched on EC competences, the Community should be represented by 
the member state holding the Council Presidency.346 The French stub-
bornly resisted this for a long time as an excessive signal of communality. 
Finally, in October 1972 the French indicated willingness for a more con-
structive approach, as they made a proposal for the CSCE agenda, to be 
agreed as a common EPC position. For the FRG, this was a breakthrough, 
testifying to the ability of the EPC to arrive at harmonised positions.347
There were also limits to the West German enthusiasm for the EPC. In 
September 1972 von Staden stressed that one should not move too many 
elements of the CSCE preparations to the EPC at the expense of NATO, for 
a simple reason. ‘Our most important ally is not a member of the Ten.’348 
On the other hand, von Groll argued that the CSCE preparations in NATO 
and in the EPC had had a positive impact on the general nature of the 
US-West German relationship. ‘The Federal Republic is, more than before, 
valued by the US as an independent and mature partner and an important 
member in the EC. … The US increasingly sees the Federal Government as 
the main representative of its interests within the EC.’349 Indeed, the dis-
agreements over freer movement and the tactical CSCE approach had not 
prevented the development of a more balanced US-West German partner-
ship within the multilateral framework. Rather, the more assertive West 
German posture, supported by the role of the FRG as a mediator between 
the EPC and NATO, had probably contributed to it. 
But no amount of West German mediation could erase the inherent ten-
sion between the EPC and NATO, which flared up again only a few days 
before the MPT in Helsinki. The Nine finally found common ground on 
the CSCE agenda proposed in the latest reports of the sous-comité and the 
ad hoc group.350 But when the EPC members presented their report to 
the NATO Council on 17 November, it resulted in very sharp exchanges 
of opinion, with the non-EPC members arguing that the EPC paper devi-
ated from preceding NATO agreements, particularly in the case of freer 
movement.351 The EPC was therefore once again a step ahead of NATO. 
As far as the CSCE agenda went, NATO had to enter the MPT in Helsinki 
without a consolidated position.
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Concerning the ability of NATO to reach common CSCE positions in 
the autumn of 1972, the first genuine test was the disclaimer text regard-
ing the participation of the GDR. In August, the Bonn Group agreed to 
attempt to persuade other NATO members also to use the disclaimer lan-
guage in their responses to the Finnish MPT invitation.352 In October, this 
disclaimer text, stating that ‘the acceptance of the invitation or participa-
tion does not affect the legal position that [the Government] has hitherto 
adopted in questions arising out of the special situation in Germany’, was 
finalised in the Bonn Group and presented to the other NATO allies.353 
After the Finns had extended their invitations on 9 November, however, 
the Scandinavian NATO members slipped away from the united front, 
arguing that a reference to the Finnish memorandum of November 1970 
would be sufficient and that a separate disclaimer was not necessary.354 
On 13 November the other NATO members agreed to use the Bonn Group 
disclaimer in their responses, but Denmark, Norway and Iceland declined 
to do so. This ended the discussion in NATO.355 The Federal Republic for-
mally accepted the Finnish invitation on 14 November, naturally includ-
ing the disclaimer in its response.356 
The first version of the NATO steering brief for the multilateral pre-
paratory talks and the CSCE was circulated by the SPC on 7 November 
1972. This ten-page paper was an operative document, drafted in order to 
assist the representatives of NATO members in the multilateral negotia-
tions – but only as a guide, not as a rule. The steering brief left a reason-
able amount of flexibility and full freedom for national decision-making 
for each government, but highlighted the importance of close consultation 
between the Allies during the negotiations.357 
More specifically, the steering brief listed three positive and five defen-
sive aims for the West at the conference. The positive aims were: (1) se-
curing genuine improvements in reducing the barriers within Europe; (2) 
achieving appropriate confidence-building measures relating to the levels 
of armed forces in Europe; and (3) increasing the freedom of manoeu-
vre of the East European countries by reducing the scope of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine. The defensive aims, meanwhile, were: (1) maintaining Western 
unity; (2) avoiding unjustified reactions undermining public support for 
necessary defence efforts; (3) persuading Western public opinion of the 
need for caution at the CSCE; (4) frustrating any attempts to slow down 
Western European integration; and (5) refuting Soviet concepts of peace-
ful co-existence and of the inapplicability of principles of equality and 
non-interference to relations between states with different political and 
social systems.358
On the tactics to be used at the multilateral preparations, the steering 
brief closely followed the West German preference to see the prepara-
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tions as ‘a step-by-step process which is controlled by governments at all 
times and which does not follow a fixed timetable’. As to the agenda of the 
CSCE, further study in NATO was still needed, but the document pointed 
out that it was probably to the Western advantage to propose an agenda 
based on four areas – (1) questions of security; (2) principles governing 
relations between states; (3) freer movement and cultural relations; and 
(4) economic and technological cooperation. In the closer elaboration on 
the security elements, the reference to a joint declaration on MBFR was 
bracketed, since consensus on that West German pet project had not been 
achieved. As far as freer movement was concerned, the steering brief ar-
gued strongly for maintaining it as a separate agenda item, in addition to 
its being included in statements of ministers, in the declaration of prin-
ciples, and in all other appropriate agenda items.359
On 16 November, the NATO Council agreed that the delegations in 
Helsinki would receive the steering brief as guidance before the Foreign 
Ministers had discussed it in their December meeting. Moreover, the 
Council agreed that the coordination of the NATO members’ policies in 
the MPT would continue not only in Brussels but also on the spot in Hel-
sinki, in an ad hoc ‘open-ended group’.360 
On the opening day of the multilateral preparations, the NATO Council 
convened to discuss the draft declaration on principles. Although a consid-
erable amount of time had been spent on its preparation, numerous dis-
agreements remained.361 The revised version of the draft was circulated on 
30 November 1972, superseding the earlier NATO dossiers on principles.362 
This version of the NATO draft for a ‘Declaration on guiding principles 
for relations between the states attending the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe’ still contained several square brackets, but was the 
closest thing to a common position the Alliance had so far produced in the 
CSCE context.363 There was still work to do, but in terms of avoiding bilat-
eralism, the West Germans had ample reason for satisfaction.  
Conclusion
By the autumn of 1971, the time when the CSCE could only be regarded 
as a Soviet propaganda act was definitely over. Since the conference was 
inevitably going to take place, the West could no longer just ponder de-
fensive reactions to Warsaw Pact initiatives. The CSCE needed to be filled 
with substantive content, meeting Western interests. In the year leading to 
the opening of the MPT in Dipoli in November 1972, this was visible in the 
mounting preparatory work for the CSCE carried out in the West. 
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With the momentum for the conference growing, prospects for post-
poning the conference with unilateral linkages rapidly diminished. Ac-
cordingly, the Federal Republic decided to settle for the fulfilment of 
the final multilaterally agreed Western precondition for the CSCE – the 
conclusion of the Berlin Agreement. Rather than attempting to establish 
a further precondition for the conference and insisting on a preceding 
inner-German agreement, the FRG agreed to adapt its bilateral timetable 
to the multilateral one. Linkage was no longer an option.
Indeed, the decision-makers in Bonn had come to the conclusion that 
West German interests were most effectively pursued multilaterally, first 
within the West in preparation of the CSCE, and ultimately in the confer-
ence itself. The idea of the CSCE as a long-term process became a guiding 
principle of the West German approach to the conference. Instead of using 
the CSCE for polemics in the hope of short-term gains, the Federal Re-
public wanted to avoid confrontation and engage in cooperation, hoping 
for small-scale and long-term improvements, not least in the relationship 
between the two German states. In addition, the accomplishments of bilat-
eral Ostpolitik had to be defended at the conference. The German question 
needed to be kept open. 
Many of the substantive initiatives the Federal Republic made in the 
Western conference preparations remained unresolved by the time the 
CSCE participants convened in Finland in November 1972. Over time, 
however, all of the essential West German ideas found their way into the 
Helsinki Final Act. In several ways, then, the CSCE was more than a con-
tinuation of Ostpolitik by other means. The multilateral CSCE policy was 
not suddenly invented after the bilateral treaties had been completed – 
there had been a West German CSCE policy all along. It had gone through 
an evolution, focusing first on linkage with bilateral negotiations, then 
on small substantive steps in East–West cooperation and on defending 
the West German position in the principles governing relations between 
states. But the essential aim of the West German CSCE policy was con-
stant: it was there to amplify Ostpolitik.
By the onset of the multilateral preparatory talks and the actual confer-
ence, the FRG had established itself as a key player within the West. With 
effective multilateralism, it could influence the position of the Nine and 
NATO from within. As we will see in the following chapter, its national 
interests had by no means disappeared. By contrast, when it came to 
Deutschlandpolitik-related issues at the CSCE, the FRG was now prepared 
to defend its interests more assertively than before.
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Chapter 6
1972–75
Deutschlandpolitik at the Conference
(
IllustratIon 6: Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (left) with  
US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Miesbach, near Munich, on 6 July 1974. 
Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, B 145 Bild-00119464,  
Photographer: Ludwig Wegmann.
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For us the CSCE will be the foreign policy priority at least for the year 1973. We 
stand before the task of playing a political role at the conference. The confer-
ence alone will certainly not bring us security; NATO provides us with security. 
The conference will also hardly bring about more cooperation than the current 
situation would generate in any case. And yet, the conference holds for us the 
chance to emerge on a large international stage for the first time on an equal 
footing and with full voting rights.  
– West German State Secretary Frank in an internal meeting at the 
Auswärtiges Amt, November 19721
It is an indispensable goal for us to achieve the insertion of the comma. 
– West German talking points regarding ‘peaceful change’, 21 February 19752
When the multilateral preparatory talks (MPT) were opened in Novem-
ber 1972, none of the participants seated in the Dipoli conference hall in 
Espoo, on the outskirts of the Finnish capital Helsinki, can have foreseen 
how long a road they had just embarked on. The Dipoli talks alone lasted 
from 22 November 1972 to 8 June 1973. Divided into four intense and at 
times difficult rounds, these preparatory talks ultimately led to an agree-
ment on the agenda, structure and rules of procedure for the actual con-
ference. This final product of the MPT, the twenty-page Helsinki Final 
Recommendations, or the ‘Blue Book’, turned out to be of essential impor-
tance during the CSCE that followed.3 Everything that was included in the 
recommendations had to be addressed, nothing that was excluded could 
be addressed. All agenda items were attached to committees or sub-com-
mittees with specific terms of reference – the texts of which had been furi-
ously fought over during the months in Dipoli. According to the agreed 
three-stage conference model, the Blue Book was endorsed and approved 
by the Foreign Ministers in Stage I of the CSCE, held in Helsinki from 3 
to 7 July 1973. The second stage was to be held in Geneva, the third and 
concluding stage again in Helsinki.
In the organisational structure it set out for the second stage of the con-
ference, the Blue Book followed the notorious idea of ‘baskets’ developed 
during the MPT. For Basket I, dealing with questions relating to security 
in Europe, there was Committee I and two subcommittees, addressing the 
list of principles governing relations between states and confidence-build-
ing measures, respectively. For Basket II, dealing with cooperation in the 
fields of economy, science and technology, and the environment, there 
was Committee II and five separate subcommittees. For Basket III, deal-
ing with cooperation in humanitarian and other fields, there was Com-
mittee III and four subcommittees, including one on human contacts. The 
question concerning the follow-up to the conference, referred to as Bas-
ket IV, received its own working group. With the addition of the general 
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Coordinating Committee, a special working body dealing with the Swiss 
proposal on the peaceful settlement of disputes, a working group on the 
Mediterranean and a few other administrative bodies, the total number of 
organisational elements for Stage II was a staggering twenty-one.4
Small wonder, then, that by comparison with the already burdensome 
Dipoli talks, Stage II of the CSCE turned out to be of an entirely different 
magnitude still. Following the framework of committees and subcommit-
tees set out in the Blue Book, the over 400 delegates who gathered in Ge-
neva on 18 September 1973 to open the second stage of the CSCE were in 
the end stuck there in frustratingly cumbersome negotiations for almost 
two years, until 21 July 1975. During the five rounds of Stage II, there were 
altogether 2341 official meetings, with countless additional informal meet-
ings in various formations.5 Just one example are the constant caucuses of 
the Nine in Geneva, often decisive for the development of Western posi-
tions. Since the conference did not have a secretariat of its own, there is no 
central archival record of it. The Prague office of the OSCE holds all the 
official documents submitted and registered at the committee meetings, 
but no records of the meetings as such were kept. However, the paper trail 
in individual countries is breathtaking. In the German archives, there are 
altogether 1168 official reports sent by the FRG delegation from Geneva 
during Stage II. When one combines the German records with similar re-
ports from other relevant archives, the result is an extremely dense nar-
rative documenting, for most of the time, very little movement. During 
the weeks and months in Geneva, the pace in the negotiations was often 
invisible to the bare eye. Accordingly, public interest in the CSCE in the 
West, not particularly high to begin with, soon faded.
Whereas time in Geneva often seemed to stand still, the international 
Western framework surrounding the CSCE underwent dramatic changes 
in the years 1973–75. The cohesion of the transatlantic alliance was shaken 
by a series of events, arguably kicked off by Kissinger’s controversial ‘Year 
of Europe’ speech in April 1973, leading to a considerable amount of en-
ergy being spent on the drafting of a new Atlantic Charter. The energy 
crisis and the escalating situation in the Middle East further contributed to 
tensions in the transatlantic relationship. Meanwhile, European foreign-
policy coordination was intensified, not least due to the declared goal of 
a European Union by the year 1980. In terms of personalities, there was a 
complete change in leadership in all the most important Western capitals – 
over a period of less than five months in 1974, Pompidou died, Brandt and 
Nixon resigned and Heath lost an election. Hence, none of the signatories 
of the CSCE Final Act in August 1975 on behalf of France, the FRG, the 
US and the UK – Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Helmut Schmidt, Gerald Ford 
and Harold Wilson, respectively – had been in office when the Geneva 
negotiations began. 
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The true heroes of the CSCE process were, without doubt, the mid-level 
civil servants doing the invisible legwork in the committees and subcom-
mittees in Geneva. For most of the time, these CSCE specialists were able 
to operate with a fairly high degree of independence, often even writing 
their own instructions. Yet there were also moments when decisive turn-
ing points in the CSCE required interventions from high politics. In ret-
rospect, these intersections give a fascinating picture of the importance 
attached to the subject matter at the time. What kinds of CSCE issues did 
the Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government get involved with dur-
ing the conference? In this final chapter, instead of presenting a compre-
hensive chronological narrative of all the twists and turns in the various 
conference phases, I will focus only on a select few cases showing where 
the primary national interests of the FRG lay in the CSCE. Each of these 
cases, in its own way, highlights the critical link between the conference 
and West German Deutschlandpolitik. The first of them is the bizarre story 
of the seating order in Dipoli.
Alphabet Diplomacy in Dipoli
In the afternoon of 22 November 1972, the delegates of the thirty-four 
states participating in the MPT – Monaco only joined later to round up 
the number of CSCE participants to thirty-five – were in for a surprise. Ar-
riving for the opening session of the MPT at the Dipoli conference centre, 
they found that the delegations were seated around the table according to 
the French alphabet. Although French was one of the official languages of 
the conference, up until that moment the Finnish hosts had consistently 
used English, and the English alphabetical order, in the preparations dur-
ing the past months. Correspondingly, also the official list of participants, 
printed in the week leading to the opening of the MPT, listed the delega-
tions along the English alphabet. 
Yet at the very last minute – quite literally, since the organising commit-
tee was engaged in the endeavour for most of the night between 21 and 
22 November – the Finns had gone through the trouble of reshuffling the 
seating order and printing new name cards of the delegations in French. 
In the end, this hasty procedural rearrangement proved to be permanent. 
As one can see in those memorable images of Helmut Schmidt and Erich 
Honecker sitting next to each other before the signing of the CSCE Final 
Act in the summer of 1975, the French alphabet prevailed all the way 
through the conference. But why did this sudden change on the eve of 
the MPT come about? At first sight the incident, in spite of its peculiarity, 
hardly seems to merit further investigation. Yet, given a closer look, the 
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story behind the linguistic switch from English to French actually is a case 
in point about the overriding importance of Deutschlandpolitik for West 
German CSCE policy. 
For as the representatives of the FRG saw the situation, the placement of 
delegations in Dipoli was anything but a trivial detail. It was directly con-
nected with the omnipresent German question. As early as March 1972, 
the Auswärtiges Amt stressed to the Finnish Government that regardless of 
the language used in the CSCE context, the Federal Republic wanted its 
delegation to be listed and seated under the letter referring to the national 
element in its name, whether D for ‘Deutschland’, A for ‘Allemagne’ or G 
for ‘Germany’. The Finns, in response, suggested using English and plac-
ing both German states under G, with the labels ‘Germany, Federal Re-
public’ and ‘Germany, Democratic Republic’. This suited the Auswärtiges 
Amt, which considered the case to be settled once and for all.6 
Therefore the astonishment in Bonn was all the greater when, half a 
year later, in October 1972, the Finns suddenly hinted that they would 
be seating the Federal Republic under F and the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) under G.7 This was obviously unacceptable to the Aus-
wärtiges Amt, since the arrangement would have left the GDR to appear 
as the representative of Germany, whereas the defining characteristic of 
the FRG would have been its form of government, the federal republic. 
Consequently, the Auswärtiges Amt instructed the West German mission 
in Helsinki to object to this strongly, arguing that it was common interna-
tional practice to allow each country to decide for itself the name it wanted 
to be called.8 The first priority was to be placed under G, preferably as 
‘Federal Republic of Germany’, but if necessary, ‘Germany, Federal Re-
public of’ was also acceptable.9 But the Finns remained adamant. In spite 
of repeated requests from the Federal Republic during the weeks preced-
ing the opening of the MPT, the Finns refused to place both German states 
under the letter G.10 
This left the West German decision-makers in a difficult position. As we 
have seen in the preceding chapters, one of the key principles of the Fed-
eral Republic’s policy during the CSCE preparations had been to avoid 
open disagreements, between East and West as well as within the West. 
This was considered even more important when it came to the German 
question. From the Bonn perspective, the ‘German quarrels’ had to be 
kept out of the multilateral conference, at almost any cost. This was also 
evident in the row over the Dipoli seating order. While instructing the 
head of the mission in Helsinki to continue to press for a solution on West 
German terms, von Staden added that ‘our paramount interest is to avoid 
controversy in this question’.11
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Indeed, although the seating order was a fundamental question of prin-
ciple to the Federal Republic, all by itself it did not really have anything 
to bargain with. Threatening with unilateral withdrawal from the confer-
ence over such an apparently trivial matter was hardly an option, since it 
could easily have led to the failure of the whole conference, with the FRG 
left to blame for it. Fear of renewed isolation, diluting the recent gains in 
the freedom of foreign-policy manoeuvre, was constantly present in West 
German considerations.
Unwilling to act alone, the Federal Republic decided to turn to its West-
ern allies for help. On 20 November, only two days before the MPT were 
scheduled to begin, Scheel raised the subject at the ministerial meeting of 
the EC in The Hague. Scheel’s colleagues unanimously pledged to sup-
port the FRG in its insistence to be seated under G.12 At a North Atlantic 
Council meeting in Brussels on the following day, the remaining NATO 
allies, equally unanimously, were also brought on board.13 
Now, with the backing of its allies secured, the FRG could afford to 
raise the stakes. On 21 November, the Auswärtiges Amt informed Soviet 
and Finnish representatives in Bonn a well as the Finnish Government in 
Helsinki of the new, firmer line, authorised by Foreign Minister Scheel. 
The delegation of the Federal Republic would refuse to take part in the 
MPT the following day unless its requests on the seating order were met. 
The Finns were left in no doubt that all of the FRG’s allies were behind 
this position.14 At the end of the day, then, the Finns had no choice but 
to succumb to this West German ultimatum.15 Bonn’s gamble, only made 
possible by multilateral Western backing, paid off. 
The subsequent switch from English to French was purely cosmetic, a 
face-saving measure of the Finnish hosts. Contrary to what John Maresca 
has suggested, I have not found any evidence supporting the idea that it 
would have been the West Germans themselves who demanded the use 
of French.16 The Finnish officials involved have in retrospect taken full 
and appropriate credit for the decision to choose French. Somewhat curi-
ously, however, they have argued that this was the only way to meet the 
demands of the Federal Republic.17 From a purely technical point of view, 
it seems, the original idea of ‘Germany, Federal Republic’ and ‘Germany, 
Democratic Republic’ would have served the same purpose just as well.
But what truly mattered was that the West Germans got their way, get-
ting themselves seated according to the national element of the name of 
the country. The fact that the two German delegations ended up sitting 
next to each other was merely a by-product of this achievement. With the 
choice of French, this simultaneously put the two German states at the top 
of the list, under A (‘Allemagne, République Fédérale d’’ and ‘Allemande, 
République Démocratique’).
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This seating arrangement, symbolising the inner-German rapproche-
ment, naturally produced wonderful photo opportunities over the course 
of the conference. For the purposes of this book, however, the story be-
hind the small-scale alphabetical diplomacy in November 1972 is also 
an illuminating example of two broader characteristics of the conference 
negotiations in the following years. First of all, the row over the seating 
order in the MPT is a symbol of the central importance of the inner-Ger-
man relationship to the whole CSCE process – and vice versa. Second, it 
gives an idea of the way in which the FRG depended on building alliances, 
whether they were institutionalised such as the EPC or NATO or less for-
mal ad hoc alliances, often with one or all of the Bonn Group powers. 
In this particular case, the Federal Republic was able to combine the 
two elements favourably. Faced with a problem directly connected with 
both the inner-German relationship and the CSCE, the FRG made efficient 
use of multilateral means to pursue its national interests. Frank told the 
head of the Finnish trade mission in Bonn a few days after the start of the 
MPT that he had seldom seen the European partners so united behind the 
Federal Republic.18 But as Frank’s statement suggests, this was clearly a 
special case. Whereas the seating order was a high-ranking question of 
national interest for the FRG, the Allies had no fundamental issues in-
volved and could thus easily support Bonn. In more controversial ques-
tions, however, taking the lead in the Alliance could be more challenging. 
Moreover, with the opening of the multilateral conference, the playing 
field had become wider, now also including all Warsaw Pact countries as 
well as the neutral and non-aligned states. Navigating in this environment 
was not always easy, as is well illustrated by the case concerning the pos-
sibility of peaceful change of frontiers.
Peaceful Change, Act 1: Defending the Moscow Treaty 
The question regarding the inviolability of frontiers as opposed to the pos-
sibility of changing them by peaceful means turned out to be one of the key 
battlefields in Geneva. This was hardly surprising, given the fundamental 
interests at stake. On the one hand, the main motive of the Soviet Union to 
initiate the CSCE in the first place had been to confirm the status quo, the 
postwar borders in Europe, that is. On the other hand, safeguarding the 
option of peaceful change of frontiers was the most important cornerstone 
of West German Deutschlandpolitik, given the Federal Republic’s central 
political aim of creating ‘a state of peace in Europe in which the German 
people can regain its unity in free self-determination’. As has been shown 
in the previous chapter, the FRG first introduced the concept of peaceful 
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change to the Western CSCE preparations as early as February 1972. A col-
lision between the two approaches was thus unavoidable, sooner or later. 
What is surprising, however, is the way in which the dominant focus 
on peaceful change completely overshadowed all other elements of Bas-
ket I in West German thinking. Naturally, on the working level the FRG 
engaged actively in all efforts of the Nine and NATO, contributing to the 
preparation of joint positions. Thus, the main successes for the Nine in 
Basket I, the inclusion of human rights and fundamental freedoms on the 
one hand, self-determination of peoples on the other hand, in the list of 
ten principles as individual items were major breakthroughs for the FRG, 
as well. The FRG also wanted to build some kind of bridge between politi-
cal and military security, and was therefore keen on pushing the adop-
tion of the confidence-building measures such as advance notification of 
manoeuvres and troop movements. Yet these issues were at no point in 
time pursued with anything close to the same vigour as details relating 
to peaceful change. The latter were the ‘special preoccupations of the Ger-
mans’, as the head of the UK delegation observed at the end of the MPT.19 
As soon as the Dipoli talks got started, the threat of a stalemate on the 
issue of inviolability of borders became apparent. The Soviet Union was 
pushing for a separate principle of inviolability of frontiers as the most 
prominent result of the conference. Interested as he was in a rapid conclu-
sion of the preparatory talks, leading quickly to a prestigious CSCE sum-
mit, Brezhnev attempted to resolve this on the highest level. Brezhnev’s 
message to Brandt, signalling some Soviet flexibility in the labelling of 
agenda items in return for Western concessions on the list of principles 
was conveyed through Bahr’s back channel connections in mid-January 
1973. Similar messages had also been sent to Nixon and Pompidou.20 
Reporting from Helsinki, the head of the West German MPT delegation, 
Guido Brunner, was afraid that a ‘renegotiation of the Moscow Treaty’ 
was looming.21  
In Bonn, the legal experts of the Auswärtiges Amt were equally wor-
ried. An independent reference to the inviolability of borders in the CSCE 
could dangerously be interpreted as excluding the possibility of ‘peace-
ful change’.22 In late January von Staden laid out the main arguments of 
the FRG: inviolability of borders had to be subordinate to a more general 
principle of refraining from the use of force, otherwise the CSCE could 
jeopardise the carefully constructed modus vivendi architecture of the bi-
lateral Ostpolitik treaties.23 Accordingly, in early February 1973, the West 
German representatives in NATO firmly underlined the importance of 
dealing with ‘inviolablility of borders’ together with other ‘principles of 
relations between states’, and more particularly in direct connection with 
the principle of non-use of force.24
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Finding common ground with the Allies in a question this sensitive 
was crucial to the FRG, because acting alone could become problematic. 
The West German delegation had already experienced this in late January, 
when Brunner stood out in Dipoli, being the only Western delegate pub-
licly opposing a selective Soviet proposal on the contents of the declara-
tion of principles. A series of Soviet complaints about Brunner’s behaviour 
followed in February, from Falin in Bonn as well as from Gromyko in 
Moscow. In the Soviet view the West German delegation had challenged 
the inviolability of borders despite the agreement reached on it in the 
Moscow Treaty.25  
The West Germans saw this differently. It was the Soviet Union that 
tried to reinterpret the Moscow Treaty in the multilateral framework. Both 
Frank and Bahr stressed to their Soviet counterparts that the FRG was not 
willing to violate any borders but neither would it accept attempts to de-
part from the modus vivendi nature of the Moscow Treaty.26 Soviet efforts 
to feed in formulations that the FRG had rejected in 1970 were apparent in 
texts it circulated in Dipoli, with absolutely irreversable positions on ter-
ritorial integrity and inviolability of borders.27
At first Bahr, always the maverick, would have been prepared to pro-
voke a conflict over the borders issue in the conference. If necessary, such 
a minor crisis could then be defused at the highest level between the FRG 
and the Soviet Union – a slightly more flexible West German approach to 
this question could be used as tit-for-tat in exchange for Soviet influence on 
the GDR in the inner-German problems regarding humanitarian issues.28 
However, the more careful Auswärtiges Amt line prevailed. The Soviet 
efforts had to be stopped, but the means for achieving this needed to be 
found in the multilateral toolbox. In early February 1973, the Auswärtiges 
Amt ruled that a direct bilateral West German-Soviet confrontation in Bas-
ket I, concerning the principles, had to be avoided. In the future the FRG 
needed to coordinate its positions better with the Allies, always making 
sure that in the particular question of borders the main burden should not 
fall on the FRG.29 Support was promptly sought, in the Bonn Group, in 
NATO and in the EPC.30 Cleverly, the West Germans employed differenti-
ated tactics and argumentation in each framework. 
In order to mobilise the Bonn Group, the FRG argued that anything 
hinting at a use of the CSCE framework as a substitute for a post-war 
peace treaty with Germany would also impede the interests of the Three 
Powers. Here a suitable point of reference was a resolution of the UN Gen-
eral Assembly on friendly relations between states from October 1970, that 
is, from after the Moscow Treaty. The FRG argued in the Bonn Group that 
a declaration of the CSCE should not go beyond what was agreed at the 
UN, neither in easing the use of violence to change borders nor in restrict-
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ing the possibility of peaceful change.31 In the EPC, on the other hand, the 
West German argument of choice was the political finality of the Euro-
pean Community, since the pursued European Union could also amount 
to border changes.32 
The EPC, then again, was increasingly seen as the most promising route 
to influence decision making in NATO. The efforts to find a more discreet 
link between the principles of ‘inviolability of frontiers’ and ‘refraining 
from the use of force’ were first discussed in the EPC sous-comité. When 
this line was presented to the NATO allies, the positive response surprised 
the West Germans.33 At the end of February, Diesel declared in a hand-
written note to State Secretary Frank that in the CSCE context the EPC was 
already de facto able to ‘pre-programme’ (vorprogrammieren) the NATO 
positions.34
Regardless of the tactical approach applied, the key West German goal 
remained the same: to avoid a reinterpretation of the Moscow Treaty, to 
keep open the possibility of peaceful change and not to contradict the 
Deutschlandpolitik goals. This line was confirmed between Brandt and 
Scheel in mid-February 1973 and again in a cabinet meeting on 25 April.35 
The CSCE and the Moscow Treaty had to be kept at a distance. As the West 
Germans saw it, a simple multilateralisation of the bilateral treaties with-
out the multilateralisation of the indirect reservations concerning those 
treaties (in particular the letter on German unity) was not acceptable.36
Before the start of the fourth round of the Dipoli talks, the declaration 
of principles continued to be the main bone of contention between East 
and West. For the FRG, the inherent link between refraining from the use 
of force and the inviolability of frontiers was crucial. In his handwritten 
instructions, State Secretary Frank stressed that the Allies should be left 
in no doubt about the primary importance of this matter. The FRG could 
only support a declaration of principles if the idea behind the letter on 
German unity – peaceful change – was anchored into the document in 
some way.37 
Bahr conveyed this view to Kissinger in Washington in late April, 
stressing that compromises on the issue of borders that might be accept-
able to some Allies would be detrimental to the FRG, since they would 
hollow out the Moscow Treaty and even the Basic Treaty. The borders 
issue was an absolute priority for Bonn – if an agreement corresponding 
to the basis of the Moscow Treaty was not reached, the FRG would not 
participate in the CSCE at all. Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt gave assurances 
of full support for the West German position. In the question concerning 
frontiers the FRG should be the one to decide what was acceptable to the 
West. Kissinger even went as far as to ask the FRG to inform the US del-
egation in Helsinki on this, since the White House could not keep track of 
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all the manoeuvres going on in the MPT.38 This US support was repeated 
two days later in the Nixon-Brandt meeting in Washington.39
For the time being, however, the Soviet Union could not be persuaded 
in this matter. In mid-April 1973, Brezhnev had again approached Brandt, 
Nixon and Pompidou to call for a rapid conclusion of the MPT, a brief 
committee stage over the summer and a concluding summit in the au-
tumn. At the same time he accused the West of intentional procrastination, 
in particular with respect to the inviolability of borders.40 In his response 
to Brezhnev, Brandt declared that the Federal Government wanted to see 
the close connection between renunciation of force and inviolability of 
borders, as had been apparent in the Moscow Treaty, also reflected in the 
CSCE declaration on principles. The possibility for peaceful change or even 
abolition of borders needed to stay open.41 But as Kissinger reported from 
his discussions with Brezhnev in Moscow in early May, the Soviet leader 
had categorically rejected a connection between the two principles.42
In the end, the Dipoli talks ended in a draw on this particular ques-
tion. There is no explicit reference to any kind of possibility of peaceful 
change of frontiers in the Blue Book. Instead, the Helsinki Final Recom-
mendations list the inviolability of frontiers as one of the principles to be 
addressed in Basket I, directly after the principle of refraining from the 
threat or use of force. This had been the lowest common denominator ac-
ceptable to the FRG, since this could be interpreted as implying at least 
some kind of connection between the two.
The list of principles itself was conclusive after being set in the Blue 
Book. But the Helsinki Final Recommendations left the more precise con-
tents of each principle undefined. It was in this context that the debate 
about peaceful change really began. The FRG insisted on including a ref-
erence to peaceful change in one of the ten principles in the declaration of 
Basket I. Already in his speech at Stage I of the CSCE in Helsinki, Foreign 
Minister Scheel had raised the issue, stressing that the principles to be 
agreed on in the CSCE would ‘leave untouched the possibility of fron-
tiers being changed by peaceful means and by mutual agreement’. True 
to form, Scheel also quoted the formulation of the letter on German unity: 
‘the political aim of the Federal Republic of Germany to help create a state 
of peace in Europe in which the German nation can regain its unity in 
free self-determination’.43 At least the French had been informed well in 
advance about Scheel’s intention to make this reference.44      
As so often before, the FRG wanted to reach its goals in Europe’s name. 
Already prior to the convocation of Stage II in Geneva, France had begun 
to draft its own proposal for a declaration of principles. Alarmed by a pos-
sible departure from a common position, the West Germans were able to 
convince the French of the advantages of a joint approach. France and the 
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FRG agreed that in the opening weeks of the Geneva negotiations the FRG 
would at first deliver its ‘explanatory’ document on non-use of force, ter-
ritorial integrity and inviolability of borders, to be followed by the French 
proposal for a declaration of principles – all closely coordinated, first with 
the Nine, then in NATO. In this coordination, the FRG was also able to im-
prove the French proposal to better meet its needs. When this first Western 
draft of the ‘decalogue’ of principles was tabled on 19 October 1973, the 
reference to peaceful change appeared under the principle of inviolability 
of frontiers.45 At the same time, however, almost all Allies in the Nine and 
Fifteen considered the explanatory document of the FRG on non-use of 
force, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders to be too rigorous 
and maximal as an opening move.46
Nonetheless, the West Germans continued to anchor their essential po-
sition as a European one. The FRG had been the initiator of a new EPC 
paper on objectives and strategies of the Nine at the CSCE which was 
prepared during the early autumn of 1973. This joint effort of the EPC 
sous-comité and ad hoc group was presented to the political committee 
and approved by the Foreign Ministers in November.47 Reading the docu-
ment, the German impact can easily be detected – essential FRG interests 
are well represented in it. In the document, the Nine clearly stated that 
their main goal in all Basket I principles with a territorial aspect was to 
defend the possibility of a peaceful change of frontiers.48 
At the same time as the FRG was working to guarantee Allied sup-
port in the negotiations in Geneva, it had no qualms about discussing the 
peaceful change issue bilaterally with the Soviet Union. During Scheel’s 
visit to Moscow in November 1973 he gave assurances to Gromyko that 
the FRG was prepared to address the question of inviolability of borders 
in Geneva in the same spirit as had been the case in Moscow in 1970. There 
it had been clear that the possibility of peaceful change did not contradict 
the principle of inviolability.49 The Soviets, on their behalf, continued to 
complain to Brandt and high-level officials in Bonn that the West German 
delegation in Geneva was attacking the inviolability of borders which had 
been agreed in the Moscow Treaty.50
The Soviet complaints were tactical in nature, for on the ground in Ge-
neva, there had been no major confrontations. In fact, there the situation 
remained more or less unchanged until the spring of 1974. The principle 
of inviolability of borders as such was not controversial, but there was no 
progress towards agreeing on a suitable reference in the final document to 
the possibility of peaceful change, neither in Geneva nor in the correspon-
dence between Brandt and Brezhnev.51 With the FRG taking its turn as the 
rotating EC president for the first six months of 1974, the Nine naturally 
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held on to the agreed strategy, stressing the need to keep the option of 
peaceful change explicitly open.52
By March 1974 the delegations in Geneva had finally managed to for-
mulate a text draft for the principle of inviolability of frontiers. Brunner 
wrote an upbeat report, arguing that the danger of a reinterpretation of 
the Moscow Treaty seemed to be over. The version also suited the FRG 
because it contained a bracketed sentence referring to peaceful change, al-
though the final placement of this sentence was still open to discussion.53 
At the meeting of the Federal Security Council on 3 April, Brandt con-
firmed that there were positive signals regarding peaceful change, both 
from Geneva and from Kissinger’s recent trip to Moscow.54 Yet this posi-
tive feeling was premature.
Peaceful Change, Act 2: Enter Genscher
5 April 1974 was a crucial date for West German CSCE policy. In spite 
of continued efforts to coordinate positions with the NATO and EPC 
allies, the FRG was suddenly isolated in the subcommittee focusing on 
principles. Having been unable to agree on a final text on inviolability of 
frontiers with a reference to peaceful change, the subcommittee, under 
increasing pressure to achieve tangible results, now separated the two. 
While registering the new text on inviolability, the subcommittee also pre-
sented, on a separate piece of paper, a formulation to be later placed in 
‘one of the principles’: 
The participating states consider that their borders can be changed only in ac-
cordance with international law through peaceful means and by agreement.55 
This formulation had been acceptable to the FRG in the French draft, when 
it was connected to the principle of inviolability of frontiers. Yet ‘floating’ 
alone, it was extremely problematic. Now that the eventual placement of 
the sentence was left open, it seemed to allow for peaceful change ‘only 
in accordance with international law’, thus making international law an 
additional condition for peaceful change rather than peaceful change an 
inherent consequence of international law. The only positive aspect from 
the West German perspective was that this marked the first time that the 
Soviet Union had agreed to an explicit reference to peaceful change in 
a negotiated text.56 To underline its reservations, the FRG registered a 
disclaimer in Geneva, stating that the final formulation of the peaceful 
change clause depended on its placement.57
What followed from this decision of the subcommittee in Geneva on 5 
April 1974 was a truly peculiar battle that in all lasted for eleven months. 
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The minuscule details of this one ‘floating sentence’ on peaceful change 
were vigorously debated and negotiated, not only by the CSCE delega-
tion in Geneva or by legal experts in Bonn, but also in a series of high-level 
meetings of foreign ministers and heads of government. The option of 
peaceful change was an essential national interest of the FRG. Now it was 
at stake, and it was fought for with the weapons of language and gram-
mar, of syntax and insertion of commas. 
On 30 April 1974 Scheel wrote to Kissinger, stressing the primary im-
portance of ‘peaceful change’ for the FRG. It was absolutely essential that 
the declaration of principles was not at odds with the goal of creating the 
‘state of peace in Europe’ referred to in the letter on German unity. If the 
Soviet Union rejected the inclusion of the ‘floating sentence’ in the princi-
ple of inviolability, West German interests could also be met by including 
it in the principle of sovereign equality. This, however, would require a 
reformulation of the sentence from its current restrictive and negative sig-
nificance into a more positive one, expressly stating that peaceful change 
of frontiers was possible.58   
At the same time, first attempts to repair the damage were taken in the 
EPC framework. At a special meeting of the EPC sous-comité in Geneva the 
Nine confirmed their view that the logical place for peaceful change was 
in the principle of inviolability. This position should be defended for as 
long as possible, although being able to maintain it to the end was highly 
unlikely. Other options, such as adding it as an eleventh principle, as a 
general statement or as a disclaimer between the principles of inviolabil-
ity and territorial integrity, were all considered unsuitable. There was no 
common understanding on the fall-back position – the FRG preferred in-
cluding it in the first principle, that of sovereign equality.59 
Above all, the FRG’s allies in the Nine were reluctant to make signif-
icant changes to the formulation of the floating sentence. They did not 
agree with the FRG’s fear that the formulation, if not directly linked with 
inviolability of frontiers, might remain too general, enabling the Soviet 
Union to claim that the principle of inviolability outweighed peaceful 
change. Although there were slightly more favourable signals from the 
EPC meetings later in May, the isolation of the FRG in the Nine in this 
issue was not completely resolved.60 
Meanwhile, the resignation of Brandt and the election of Scheel as the 
federal president had ushered in a change in government in Bonn. Chan-
cellor Helmut Schmidt and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 
while underscoring elements of continuity in West German foreign policy, 
also brought along new nuances. In the CSCE context it was actually a lot 
more than that, since Genscher immediately took a keen interest in the 
CSCE issues. His style in intervening in the CSCE was decisively more 
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energetic and hands-on than that of his predecessor. Moreover, then as In-
terior Minister responsible for the Basic Law, Genscher had in 1970 played 
an important role in drafting the letter on German unity. The minister, 
himself a native of Halle, now in the territory of the GDR, had a direct 
interest in safeguarding the peaceful change option.61 As the UK officials 
duly noted, in Genscher’s view the FRG delegation in Geneva had given 
away too much, too easily.62
With Genscher at the helm of the Auswärtiges Amt, the normal EPC 
route was not considered sufficient in the defensive battle. In addition, a 
rapid involvement of the Bonn Group was necessary. West German senior 
officials had discussed this already in mid-May, but in early June van Well 
and the new state secretary, Walter Gehlhoff, decided to seek support for 
the West German position from the Bonn Group, with an explicit wish for 
the ambassadors to raise the issue at the highest levels in their capitals.63 
On 7 June Gehlhoff met the UK, US and French Ambassadors in Bonn 
and pointed out that the decisive stage in negotiating the text of the dec-
laration on principles was at hand in Geneva. The FRG supported the 
results achieved so far on sovereign equality, refraining from the use of 
force, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity. Taken as such, 
however, they could jointly be interpreted as excluding the possibility of 
peaceful change. Therefore it was essential that an appropriate placement 
and formulation for a text on peaceful change was found. Gehlhoff argued 
that this was important because of the future European development, the 
German national option and the rights of the Three Powers. Hence it was 
in the common interest of the FRG and the Three, and they should coor-
dinate their positions in the Bonn Group formation quickly and closely 
already prior to the next caucus meetings of the Nine and the Fifteen in 
Geneva, so that a new formulation could be registered before the second 
drafting round of the declaration. Gehlhoff stressed that this matter was of 
essential importance to the FRG in general and to Foreign Minister Gen-
scher in particular. The project was to be kept strictly confidential, only 
between the Bonn Group members.64  
Gehlhoff’s appeal was well received, and an intensive session of Bonn 
Group consultations on aspects in the CSCE affecting Germany and Ber-
lin was opened on 10 June. The goal was to achieve a joint Bonn Group 
position before the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Ottawa a week 
later. The West German contribution to these talks concerned – naturally 
– peaceful change. As the FRG argued, the need for reformulation of the 
text that had been registered in Geneva on 5 April depended on its place-
ment. The best option, inclusion of peaceful change in the principle of 
inviolability, would in all likelihood be blocked by the Soviet Union. An 
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inclusion in sovereign equality, something the Soviet Union had indicated 
to be a possibility, would require larger changes to the text, to which the 
Soviet Union would probably not agree, either. Therefore efforts should 
be concentrated on including it in the principle of territorial integrity. A 
completely separate principle on peaceful change was not included in the 
Helsinki recommendations and was therefore out of the question.65 Gen-
scher and van Well made this point to Kissinger in a meeting in Bavaria 
on 11 June.66 
The Bonn Group talks were brought to a successful close on 13 June. 
For the West Germans, this solution paid off – the FRG was to a very large 
extent able to get its positions accepted. The French and the US had been 
cooperative to begin with, but the UK was at first reluctant, arguing that 
the topic of peaceful change should only be dealt with locally in Geneva. 
The UK had grown increasingly frustrated by the promotion of West Ger-
man special interests, involving ‘erratic and sudden changes of direction’, 
often embarrassing to their allies.67
In the end, the UK resistance was also overcome. The result of the Bonn 
Group consultations was brought to the four Foreign Ministers, meeting 
for their traditional dinner (Deutschlandessen) on the margins of the NATO 
ministerial meeting in Ottawa. The discussion between the four Foreign 
Ministers was not easy, though. Here it was Kissinger, in particular, who 
stressed that it was a serious matter to reopen a text that had already been 
registered in Geneva. When Genscher referred to the West German reser-
vations that had also been registered, Kissinger retorted that nobody had 
supported the FRG in this.
With strong support from his French colleague, Genscher underscored 
the dangers of referring to ‘international law’ in the context of ‘peaceful 
change’ and emphasised that no government of the FRG could, even if it 
wanted to, sign anything if peaceful change was not clearly addressed. In 
Genscher’s view the Soviet Union was also completely aware of this, they 
simply wanted to have a third attempt to overcome these well-known res-
ervations, after having failed at it with the Moscow Treaty and with the 
Berlin Agreement. Finally the three ministers agreed to support the West 
German view. The first choice would be to include peaceful change in the 
principle of inviolability, but if this was not possible, then the text should 
be reformulated in a positive way to suit another principle. In their joint 
declaration, the four Foreign Ministers declared that it was ‘necessary that 
the CSCE Declaration of Principles contains an appropriate passage on the 
peaceful change of frontiers and be such as not to affect in any way Quad-
ripartite rights and responsibilities concerning Berlin and Germany as a 
whole’. The delegations of the Bonn Group countries in Geneva would be 
instructed accordingly.68
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After the direct involvement of Genscher and the Bonn Group, the 
leeway the German delegation in Geneva had enjoyed was dramatically 
restricted in this issue. When Brunner in late June reported from his dis-
cussions with the local Bonn Group setup on their speculations about a 
formulation the Soviet Union might accept, the Auswärtiges Amt quickly 
tightened its leash. Local initiatives in informal talks in Geneva could 
jeopardise the valuable Bonn Group consensus. The delegation should 
only operate on instructions from the capital.69 However, Brunner’s report 
also raised Genscher’s interest. The minister wanted to know whether the 
possible compromise formulation discussed in Geneva – ‘the participating 
states consider that, in accordance with international law, their frontiers 
can be modified by peaceful means and by agreement’ – would be accept-
able to the FRG. The legal experts in Bonn had no objections.70 
In spite of their initial arguments in Ottawa, the link between Genscher 
and Kissinger proved to be decisive in handling the issue of peaceful change. 
The Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow in early July 1974 was the first 
turning point. Directly after Kissinger’s return from Moscow he met Gen-
scher twice, first at the Dusseldorf airport and again a few days later, on 6 
July, this time in Miesbach, close to Munich, on the eve of the football World 
Cup final. Briefing Genscher on his discussions in Moscow, Kissinger told 
him that Gromyko had, as expected, again rejected the West German wish 
to include peaceful change in the third principle, concerning inviolability of 
frontiers. However, Gromyko had signalled that the Soviet Union was pre-
pared to have a reference to it in the first principle, that of sovereign equal-
ity. Kissinger had told him that this required a reformulation of the sentence 
and wrote his improvised suggestion on a piece of paper:
In accordance with international law the participating states consider that their 
frontiers can be changed through peaceful means and by agreement.
Kissinger had stressed to Gromyko that this was a US proposal, which still 
needed to be discussed with the FRG. Genscher considered this to be an 
important improvement, but would have wanted to see it complemented 
with ‘and nothing in this declaration shall affect that right’. In Kissinger’s 
view, however, achieving this additional formulation was very unlikely. 
In the end, the West German side agreed to this and hoped that Kissinger 
would continue to discuss the details of peaceful change bilaterally with 
the Soviet Union, rather than Genscher with the Soviet Ambassador in 
Bonn. Kissinger agreed to take the matter to Ambassador Dobrynin im-
mediately after his return to Washington.71 
In effect, then, Genscher had outsourced the defence of this fundamen-
tal national interest to the US. As a result of the Miesbach meeting between 
Genscher and Kissinger, the FRG position was based on the formulation 
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the US secretary of state had spontaneously written in Moscow.72 Van 
Well informed the West German CSCE delegation about the agreed US–
Soviet route. The delegation in Geneva should, meanwhile, abstain from 
any new initiatives in the field of peaceful change.73 Meeting in Paris on 
11 July 1974, the EPC political directors concurred with this procedure 
and contents on peaceful change.74 Genscher also won the support of his 
French colleague for this method.75 After the FRG specifically urged the 
US to do so, the US delegation officially registered the Kissinger formula 
on peaceful change on the final day before the summer recess of the Ge-
neva negotiations, 26 July 1974.76 But the story was not over with that, 
because there was as yet no official Soviet reaction.
Peaceful Change, Act 3: Commas for the National Interest
Already over the summer 1974, the trench lines in this legal-lingustic bat-
tle had become clear. As the legal experts of the Auswärtiges Amt summed 
it up, the further up in the sentence the reference to international law, the 
better for the FRG, the further down, the better for the Soviet Union.77 
Soviet attempts to move it further towards the full stop ensued in Septem-
ber. To complicate things further, there were soon not just one, but several 
contradictory Soviet responses making the rounds. At least in part this 
was due to conscious efforts to sow division in the Western ranks.
When Genscher met Gromyko in Gymnich on 15 September, the Soviet 
Foreign Minister avoided giving a straight response to the Kissinger for-
mula. He acknowledged being familiar with it and pointed out that not 
everyone in Moscow was happy about it.78 In the following week, dur-
ing the General Assembly of the UN, when foreign ministers were gath-
ered in New York, Gromyko referred to this discussion in his meeting 
with Kissinger. In a classic attempt of divide and rule, the Soviet Foreign 
Minister claimed to his US colleague that the West Germans referred to 
the formulation registered in Geneva as a US draft, signalling that the US 
was the only obstacle in the way of solving the peaceful change issue. In 
his own meeting with Kissinger, Genscher gave assurances that the West 
German position remained unchanged. Kissinger and Genscher agreed 
that the Nine would support the US-registered formulation on peaceful 
change. If the Soviet Union objected and requested the old formulation, 
the West could accept this on the condition of its inclusion in the principle 
on inviolability of frontiers.79 Completing the triangle of meetings in New 
York, Genscher firmly underscored to Gromyko that the formulation on 
peaceful change was a fundamental interest of the FRG. In response, Gro-
myko formulated a new suggestion: 
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The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accor-
dance with international law, only through peaceful means and by agreement.80
When Chancellor Schmidt paid a visit to Moscow in late October 1974, 
Brezhnev again pressed for a rapid conclusion of the CSCE. Schmidt 
believed that the end was near, and stressed that the FRG had only one 
vital interest in the CSCE: the formulation on peaceful change of frontiers 
needed to have the same status as other principles.81 In the simultaneous 
meeting of Foreign Ministers, Genscher pointed out that there were con-
tradictory versions of the Soviet proposal making the rounds. Gromyko 
confirmed that the version he himself had delivered in New York was 
false, the correct Soviet proposal stated that frontiers could be changed 
‘only in accordance with international law’. Van Well intervened and told 
the meeting that the Kissinger formulation registered in Geneva was the 
common position of the Nine and the Fifteen, not a unilateral US or West 
German position. The Soviets retorted that naturally everyone would fol-
low the West Germans on this.82 Later, van Well accused the Soviets of 
having done all of this on purpose to isolate the FRG.83
Meanwhile the pressure on the FRG was also growing from the US 
side. There were repeated demands for a stronger West German owner-
ship of the floating sentence. State Department officials pointed out that 
the US having presented the formulation on peaceful change, as agreed by 
Genscher and Kissinger, as a proposal of its own in Geneva on 26 July had 
been an ‘accident’. The Europeans should take responsibility of their own 
demands and count only on silent US support.84 During his visit to Mos-
cow in late October 1974, Kissinger had told Brezhnev that the US could 
approve all solutions to the declaration of principles as long as they were 
acceptable to the FRG.85 The same degree of flexibility was conveyed in 
the Vladivostok summit between Ford and Brezhnev in late November. In 
the West German analysis this was further evidence of US ambiguity – Al-
liance solidarity was increasingly outweighed by a need to accommodate 
the Soviets in the CSCE in return for progress in SALT and MBFR.86
This ambiguity was finally cleared away on 6 December 1974, when 
Genscher discussed the CSCE with Kissinger in Washington. Kissinger, 
who was personally not in the least bit interested in the matter and con-
sidered its minute details ‘totally ridiculous’, declared that the US was 
willing to take the heat from the Soviet Union in the question of peaceful 
change, so that the FRG could step aside from the line of fire. In Kiss-
inger’s view all the problems in this regard during the autumn were due 
to Soviet misinformation.87 The specialists of both foreign ministries were 
tasked to consult each other on the tactics for the final stretch.88 
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As a result of these US-West German consultations, which were contin-
ued in January 1975, the preferred option was the formulation registered 
in Geneva on 26 July 1974, but two fall-back options were formulated, 
each moving the attribute ‘according to international law’ a step further 
towards the end of the sentence. Genscher himself weighed in, empha-
sising that he had serious doubts about the inclusion of the word ‘only’, 
also if used in the context ‘their frontiers can be changed only by peaceful 
means’. Hence, the West  Germans were not willing to accommodate the 
fourth option that contained this word.89
The FRG had agreed to the US maintaining contact with the Soviet 
Union in this issue, but the West Germans were not consulted in advance 
about the US decision to suddenly deliver the first agreed fall-back option 
to the Soviet embassy in Washington on 21 January: 
The participating states consider in accordance with international law that their 
frontiers can be changed through peaceful means and by agreement.90 
While the Soviet response to this US proposal was pending, the FRG turned 
to its European allies. Having learned from the past mistake of being left 
isolated in Geneva in April 1974, the FRG had since then constantly made 
certain that it had the support of the Nine for the current formulations on 
peaceful change.91 In mid-February 1975, van Well told US Ambassador 
Hillenbrand in Bonn that if necessary, the FRG, with the support of the 
Nine, was prepared for a confrontation with the Soviet Union over peace-
ful change. The timing of this confrontation was decisive: under no cir-
cumstances should the West agree to a second reading of the declaration 
of principles before the issue of peaceful change was resolved.92 The same 
message was delivered by Blech, whom Genscher had handpicked to lead 
the FRG delegation in Geneva in November 1974, to a leading member of 
the Soviet delegation. Despite Soviet attempts to the contrary, the West 
Germans did not engage in bilateral negotiations with them on the text 
on peaceful change. Instead, Blech pointed out, the West was expecting a 
Soviet response to the latest US proposal.93
The response finally came from Gromyko on 17 February, when he met 
Kissinger in Geneva. In this meeting the Soviet Foreign Minister made yet 
another counter-proposal:
The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed in accor-
dance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.
Although Kissinger suspected that the placement of the reference to inter-
national law might be problematic, he promised to consult the Allies and 
get back to the Soviets on this suggestion. In the US analysis, the disap-
pearance of the word ‘only’ was a major Soviet concession.94
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The Auswärtiges Amt was still not completely satisfied. Although the ab-
sence of ‘only’ was a step in the right direction, the latest Soviet proposal still 
contained dangerous elements. For the FRG, all changes of frontiers were 
in accordance with international law, if they occurred by peaceful means 
and by agreement. There was no need for a third condition, that of being in 
accordance with international law. Therefore the FRG preferred a previous 
version where the reference to international law was further up. If that was 
not to be achieved, the FRG could, however, accept the Gromyko proposal 
with one final modification. The FRG would need to insist on the insertion 
of another comma, between the words ‘changed’ and ‘in accordance’. This 
was a formulation, when included in the first principle, covering sovereign 
equality, that the FRG could defend in the EPC and in NATO:
The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accor-
dance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.95
The West German response was delivered through bilateral US-Soviet 
contacts. A week later, on 1 March, it was confirmed through the same 
channel that the Soviet Union was willing to accept the West German ver-
sion with the additional comma.96 Van Well informed his colleagues in the 
Nine about this on 3 March, so that an agreement could be quickly reached 
in NATO as well, before confirming the formulation to the Soviet Union.97 
The West German delegation in Geneva was instructed accordingly on 4 
March. In van Well’s view, after agreement of the NATO caucus, this new 
formulation in connection with Principle 1 should be registered by the US 
delegation on behalf of the Fifteen.98 On 10 March the Soviet Union con-
firmed its agreement to the same formulation in a Russian version.99 The 
US delegation registered the formulation officially on 17 March. 
This registration finally ended the battle over peaceful change. As pe-
culiar and petty as the details behind the development of this one sen-
tence may seem, to the Federal Republic it was the essence of the whole 
CSCE. The rest of the sixty-page Final Act absolutely paled in compari-
son with these less than two dozen words and the two commas included. 
From the perspective of Bonn, the option of peaceful change was directly 
connected with the ‘state of peace in Europe’ the FRG wanted to create. 
The floating sentence, once it had found its place in the declaration of 
principles in the Final Act, left a small back door open for the possibility 
of German unification.
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Basket III: Human Contacts 
Basket III, with its provisions for cooperation in humanitarian fields, was 
another topic of particular importance to the FRG. As we have seen in 
preceding chapters, in the Western conference preparations the FRG had 
constantly defended a careful step-by-step approach. Instead of provok-
ing conflicts with the Soviet Union and thus endangering the inclusion 
of humanitarian issues on the conference agenda altogether, one needed 
to choose a less aggressive tone. For the FRG, Basket III was not a sym-
bolic tool to be used for propaganda purposes. On the contrary, in the 
inner-German context Basket III could amount to something very tangi-
ble. Avoiding controversies in this area was essential for the FRG because 
of the people-to-people contacts between the two German states. Finding 
common ground in the multilateral context might further help in facilitat-
ing these contacts on the ground. It was precisely due to these Deutsch-
landpolitik reasons that improving contacts between people was one of the 
main ideas of West German CSCE policy.
Consequently, ‘human contacts’ was the topic of the first major sub-
stantive intervention the West German delegation made early on in the 
MPT in Dipoli. Presenting this proposal to his fellow heads of delegation 
in the Dipoli plenary in February 1973, Brunner underlined that a key 
concept of détente was to make existing frontiers more permeable, not to 
set new limits to contacts, nor to get rid of any social systems. Personal 
contacts were one of the three pillars of détente, equally important as se-
curity and cooperation.100 When it came to the discussion of Basket III 
items in the EPC and NATO, the FRG volunteered to take a leading role in 
preparing the Western position on human contacts, an element of Basket 
III which in the West German view had received too little attention. In 
particular, it was the question of reunification of families that the FRG was 
interested in. The task of preparing this West German contribution was 
given to the same civil servant in the CSCE unit of the Auswärtiges Amt 
who had already a few years earlier developed the first operational draft 
on human contacts.101 
On 25 April 1973, at the opening session of the fourth Dipoli round, 
the FRG delegation appealed for much more progress in Basket III. It was 
precisely in this basket where the results of détente could be of their most 
concrete use for individual citizens. In the West German view the goal 
should be to achieve practical means of cross-border contacts and cooper-
ation in spite of the different systems.102 In this regard the MPT produced 
a desired result, since the West, in no small part due to West German ef-
forts, managed to secure a place for ‘human contacts’ as the first separate 
agenda item in Basket III of the Blue Book. Despite Dutch willingness to 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
234   |   A State of Peace in Europe
confront the Soviet Union openly in drafting the terms of reference for 
Basket III, the more realistic line the FRG had called for, focusing on the 
achievable, prevailed in the caucuses of the Nine and NATO in Dipoli.103
As the Foreign Ministers convened in Helsinki for the opening Stage I 
of the CSCE in July 1973, the FRG delegation circulated two text proposals 
for Basket III, formulations for a resolution on reunification of families on 
the one hand, and on improvement of working conditions of journalists 
on the other.104 These two elements hence formed the basis of West Ger-
man efforts in Basket III; all other issues were of secondary importance. 
As soon as Stage II was opened in Geneva, the Soviet Union began to 
lobby for an extremely restrictive preamble for the text concerning human 
contacts and exchange of information. As Gromyko told Scheel in Mos-
cow in October 1973, the Soviet Union had nothing against agreements 
in this field as long as they did not contradict national sovereignty, the 
principle of non-interference in internal affairs and the internal legislation 
of each country.105 This would, in effect, have made all formulations that 
followed null and void. Working against these attempts to neutralise the 
contents of Basket III was defined as one of the main goals of the Nine in 
the EPC document on CSCE strategy and objectives, which was drafted 
during the autumn of 1973.106
Regardless of Soviet stagnation in Geneva, the West Germans, for their 
part, were not too concerned. In mid-December 1973 van Well told the in-
terministerial CSCE working group in Bonn that in spite of the problems 
encountered in Basket III so far the mere fact of the humanitarian issues 
being on the conference agenda had already been useful. Having a mul-
tilateral reference point made it easier to address the same topics bilater-
ally with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries.107 The same 
realism was reflected in an internal ‘argument catalogue’ on the uses of 
the CSCE for the West that von Groll drafted in early 1974. For von Groll 
it was crystal clear that the CSCE was not going to be suitable for use as 
an instrument forcing the East to change its system. The West could only 
hope to mitigate the East–West confrontation by increased contacts.108
In its role as the rotating EC President for the first half of 1974, the FRG’s 
influence on Western decision making was even stronger than usually. 
Since the Nine had evolved to become the major Western actor in Geneva, 
the importance of this role had not escaped the Soviet attention either. In 
January 1974 Brezhnev, who was increasingly frustrated with the slow 
process towards a summit-level Stage III, wrote to Brandt, repeating the 
well known Soviet reservations on Basket III. Expansion of contacts and 
exchanges could only occur with respect to non-interference in internal 
affairs and to sovereignty, laws and customs of each country. In his re-
sponse, Brandt gave assurances that the FRG was not interested in creat-
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ing controversy, and that the aim of Basket III was not to touch on internal 
structures of participating states. Brandt also promised to instruct the 
West German delegation in Geneva to continue working constructively.109 
This was not enough for the Soviet Union. When Bahr visited Moscow 
at the end of February, Brezhnev accused the FRG of the procrastination 
of the Nine in Geneva. In Brezhnev’s view, not all petty things could be 
solved at the same time, one should focus on the big issues. Was it not 
enough, as a first step, to cooperate and not to wage war, the Soviet leader 
exclaimed. Brezhnev demanded a more active role of Chancellor Brandt in 
highlighting the importance of progress in the CSCE.110 
Brandt did not exactly raise his profile in CSCE issues as a result of 
Brezhnev’s demands. But when it came to the assessment of the impor-
tance of Basket III in general, neither Brandt nor Bahr thought too highly 
of it. When the CSCE was discussed in the Federal Security Council in 
early April, Brandt argued that the CSCE should not turn into a perma-
nent event. Prolonging Stage II because of Basket III issues was, in Brandt’s 
view, useless, since there was not much meaningful to be expected from 
Basket III.111 In fact, already a year earlier, in May 1973, both Brandt and 
Bahr had pejoratively referred to the CSCE as the ‘cultural pages’ (Feuil-
leton), whereas MBFR was the more important and serious business.112 
In Foreign Minister Scheel’s order of priorities the CSCE in general 
figured higher up, but he was not prepared to go to extremes on Basket 
III either. The focus remained on facilitating ‘human contacts’, nothing 
more ambitious or provocative. As far West German objectives in Basket 
III were concerned, Scheel wrote to Kissinger in April 1974, it was in par-
ticular due to public opinion that there needed to be tangible results in the 
improvement of ‘human contacts’.113 Scheel’s successor agreed with this. 
In the NATO ministerial meeting in Ottawa in June 1974, the new Foreign 
Minister Genscher argued that in Basket III ‘we owe it to our people that 
we achieve improvements for individuals’.114 
Meanwhile, the FRG delegation in Geneva was growing thoroughly 
frustrated with Soviet intransigence in Basket III. It was unacceptable to 
have the left hand destroy what had just been achieved with the right 
hand, von Groll wrote, referring to the restrictive preamble pushed by 
the Warsaw Pact time and again, in effect neutralising all achievements 
in the operative texts.115 Speaking for the Nine, Genscher articulated this 
disappointment in a statement in early June 1974. The CSCE could be an 
important milestone in détente, but this required following the Helsinki 
final recommendations. The Nine had shown flexibility in the declara-
tion of principles, therefore the Foreign Ministers of the Nine were disap-
pointed at the lack of progress in important topics such as improvement 
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of human contacts and dissemination of and access to information, as well 
as confidence-building measures.116
In private discussions, however, neither Genscher nor Chancellor 
Schmidt were too keen on all of the positions the Nine held in Geneva. For 
instance in early July 1974, at a high-level meeting with their Belgian coun-
terparts, Schmidt and Genscher showed understanding for Brezhnev’s de-
sire to conclude the CSCE rapidly. In Schmidt’s view the West should not 
lose further time in Geneva with unimportant problems. Instead, it should 
make up its mind on which issues were of absolute importance to it. ‘A 
change in the Soviet constitution will certainly not be achieved by wishes 
expressed in Basket III’, Schmidt said.  Genscher concurred, arguing that 
the West should drop half of its demands in Basket III. One should differ-
entiate between information and human contacts – the number of Western 
newspapers sold at Soviet kiosks was hardly as important as a minimum 
level of improvements in personal contacts, something that directly con-
cerned the inner-German relations.117
With the Nixon–Brezhnev summit in the summer of 1974 the pressure 
for concluding Stage II mounted. In their joint communiqué in early July, 
the US and the Soviet Union agreed on a very positive wording regarding 
the CSCE and favoured its final stage taking place at an early date, with 
the assumption that the results would permit the CSCE to be concluded 
at the highest level. To intensify the negotiations in Geneva accordingly, 
Kissinger urged the Fifteen to come up with a list of eight or ten essential 
points the West required for the conclusion of Stage II.118 
Meeting Kissinger directly after his return from the Moscow summit, 
Genscher quickly made the distinction in West German priorities clear: 
for the FRG, humanitarian issues were far more important than exchange 
of information. Genscher and Kissinger also agreed that the preamble of 
Basket III could contain a reference to ‘respect for laws and regulations’, 
but nothing further on political, economic and cultural restrictions. More-
over, Genscher proposed that the FRG would take the initiative in defin-
ing Western essentials, first convincing the current EPC President, France, 
to have the Political Committee of the Nine draw up the list, then to have 
it delivered to the NATO Council, and finally to have the delegations of 
the Fifteen in Geneva instructed accordingly.119
The paper that came out of the consultations of the Nine in early Sep-
tember 1974 took many West German amendments into account, and 
listed the following issues as particularly important in Basket III: (a) im-
provements in reunification of families, marriages, travel and movement 
of people; (b) better access to foreign news and improvement of working 
conditions of journalists; (c) better access to books and cultural exchange.120
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At the highest level, however, patience with the Geneva negotiations 
was wearing thin. When Schmidt visited Moscow in late October 1974, 
Brezhnev again pressed for a rapid conclusion of the CSCE. Schmidt be-
lieved that the final stretch was indeed approaching. To facilitate this, 
he told Brezhnev, he had instructed the FRG delegation in Geneva to act 
with restraint in the controversial issues in Basket III. The FRG had only 
one vital interest in the CSCE: the principle of peaceful change.121 In a 
confidential one-on-one discussion, Schmidt added that the excessive am-
bitions of individual diplomats were to blame for the current problems 
in Basket III. He, Schmidt, was against these artificial measures and had 
instructed the West German delegation not to engage in any further activi-
ties in Basket III. He promised to undertake everything to make sure that 
the CSCE was concluded successfully and soon.122
Indeed, there was not much West German activity in Basket III to speak 
of during the final months of the Geneva talks. Efforts were concentrated 
on peaceful change and confidence-building measures. Above all, as soon 
as the agreement on the text concerning reunification of families was 
reached on 2 December 1974, the main goal of the Federal Republic had 
been achieved.123 In mid-January 1975 the Auswärtiges Amt concluded that 
all the humanitarian questions most important to the FRG, in particular 
the reunification of families, were closed in a relatively satisfying manner. 
Its other pet project, the facilitation of working conditions of journalists, 
was still an unresolved issue, but the FRG no longer saw any essential 
problems in Basket III. Completing the negotiations on Basket III might 
still be delayed due to French interests in the realm of culture, but this 
suited the FRG well, giving it time to concentrate on its own fundamen-
tal interests in Basket I.124 In their own analysis, the French had already 
admitted that with the West German needs satisfied, there was not much 
help to be expected from Bonn in pushing for further Soviet concessions 
in Basket III.125
As Stage II in Geneva was about to be closed in July 1975, the European 
Council gave a declaration on the CSCE. In it, the Nine highlighted the 
importance of the conference results, yet regretted that not as much had 
been achieved in the field of freedom of movement as had been desired.126 
For the FRG, however, the results in Basket III were completely sufficient. 
Its expectations had been limited to begin with. As one of the key officials 
in the Auswärtiges Amt formulated it in March 1975, the CSCE was not an 
instrument for the West to force systemic changes in the East – instead, 
the task of the conference could only be to agree on common rules for 
peaceful cooperation.127 For the FRG, Basket III was not about scoring pro-
paganda victories or about high-profile human rights cases like Saharov 
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and Solzhenitsyn. Instead, the FRG was interested in achieving concrete 
steps to improve the situation of ordinary people, above all in divided 
Germany. The formulation on ‘human contacts’ agreed in the multilateral 
context was a valuable reference point for the day-to-day bilateral rela-
tionship with the GDR. 
But of course not all West German attempts to use the CSCE for Deutsch-
landpolitik purposes were successful. A living proof of failures is the final 
brief storyline of this chapter, the stubborn effort to find a role for Berlin 
in the CSCE.
Follow-up and Berlin
Egon Bahr’s idea of using Berlin as a CSCE location, already discussed in 
the previous chapter, continued to resurface during the early years of the 
conference proper, often following the ebbs and tides of the overall politi-
cal situation concerning the vulnerable situation of this city. At a meeting 
of the interministerial CSCE working group in Bonn in January 1973, von 
Staden once more referred to the idea of Berlin as a conference location. 
At that moment the situation, neither in terms of the Berlin question nor 
in terms of the negotiations in Dipoli, was not suitable for pushing this. 
Should the circumstances change, however, von Staden was willing to 
take the idea again to the Bonn Group.128  
In late January, von Groll devoted an extensive memorandum to the 
potential role of Berlin as hosting some parts of the CSCE or its possible fol-
low-up bodies. Weighing up the pros and cons of having one of the actual 
CSCE stages held in Berlin, either West Berlin or ‘greater Berlin’, von Groll 
came to the conclusion that in all scenarios the negative aspects seemed to 
outweigh the positive ones. Yet as far as having a CSCE follow-up machin-
ery meet in West Berlin was concerned, the situation was different – von 
Groll saw many potential benefits in it.129 By contrast, the legal department 
of the Auswärtiges Amt strongly argued against the use of Berlin in this 
context, both as a conference location and as a seat for a follow-up body.130
The fact that this was seriously considered in Bonn at all is interest-
ing, given that the official position of the FRG concerning the follow-up 
to the CSCE at the time remained unchanged: follow-up should only be 
discussed when the conference results were clear. However, in the event 
of the creation of a permanent body or committee, the Federal Govern-
ment continued to maintain the option of offering Berlin as its site.131 
During the spring of 1973, Bahr constantly advocated Berlin in internal 
discussions in Bonn, arguing that a permanent follow-up body located in 
Berlin would not only increase attention to the divided city but also con-
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solidate US presence in Europe, due to its role as one of the Four Powers 
responsible for Berlin.132 Bahr also raised the issue in Anglo-West German 
consultations in early March 1973, stating that he would rather see a pos-
sible follow-up body in Berlin than in any other location.133 Sir Thomas 
Brimelow from the FCO informed Kissinger about this a few days later in 
Washington, noting that ‘history shows that Bahr is a persistent man when 
he has an idea in his head’.134
In a cabinet meeting focusing on the CSCE in early June 1973, Scheel 
also referred to the role of Berlin. Due to difficult status issues, the FRG 
had refrained from offering Berlin as a location for one of the conference 
stages. The same reasons also posed difficulties on a potential use of Berlin 
as a seat for a possible follow-up body. Nonetheless, the option was still 
kept open.135 
Further testimony to this option being alive was one of the texts that 
the FRG submitted at Stage I in Helsinki in July 1973. The West German 
paper on scientific cooperation suggested creating a scientific forum – in 
West Berlin. This suggestion had already been agreed on in advance with 
the Bonn Group, thoroughly discussed in the EPC and also preliminar-
ily consulted with the Soviets. Referring to this suggestion, Diesel and 
Brunner both argued that it was important to ‘get something for Berlin’ 
from the CSCE.136 Scheel’s speech in Helsinki also included a thinly veiled 
reference to Berlin: ‘Would it … be too much to ask whether this very Con-
ference does not afford an opportunity to outline in one form or another 
Berlin’s new role as the symbol of détente in the heart of Europe?’137
When Bahr visited London in late October, he told his British interlocu-
tors that the FRG had no direct interest in establishing a CSCE follow-
up body. On the other hand, it might provide opportunities to tie the US 
closer to Europe as well as give its possible seat, Berlin, an additional ele-
ment of psychological security.138 In December, the interministerial CSCE 
group in Bonn discussed a potential Berlin seat for two bodies possibly 
established by the CSCE: in addition to a science forum there was now 
also talk about an information centre on technological cooperation.139 And 
as late as January 1974, von Groll declared it as an agreed West German 
position that as part of the conference follow-up the FRG would attempt 
to achieve such a new organisation – not a political body but a specialised 
agency – in West Berlin, in order to contribute to the international ‘visibil-
ity’ of the city and to counter Soviet attempts to isolate it.140
On 20 November 1973 Bahr spoke in Paris about his idea, but by then 
the French had already decided that the West Germans should be discour-
aged of whatever temptations they might have regarding the institutional-
isation of the CSCE in West Berlin.141 In early 1974, the Nine unanimously 
dismissed the idea of a political body with general responsibilities as a 
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follow-up formation. This was spelled out in the document on ‘Les suites 
de la CSCE’ of the sous-comité, endorsed by the Political Committee and the 
Foreign Ministers. Instead, it envisioned an interim period of three to four 
years after the conference before a reassessment of follow-up needs was to 
be made.142 In late February, Bahr wrote to Scheel to protest against these 
developments in the EC consultations. In Bahr’s view the establishment 
of a permanent CSCE follow-up body in West Berlin was in the national 
interest of the FRG.143 In his response, Scheel told Bahr that not a single 
Western country favoured a permanent body, and not even the East se-
riously demanded a permanent seat for follow-up any more. The Nine 
and the Fifteen had been very reluctant to discuss follow-up at all, and 
changing that in the current negotiating situation was very unlikely. It 
was not possible for the FRG to suddenly dismiss Western solidarity over 
this issue.144
On 3 April 1974, when the CSCE was discussed in the Federal Security 
Council, Bahr made his final appeal for Berlin as a location for the follow-
up body.145 In vain, since this was also the last time it was heard of. With 
Brandt’s resignation in early May and Bahr’s departure from the Chan-
cellery, the main – and often the only – advocate of this idea had left the 
scene. There were also other reasons for the disappearance of the Berlin 
proposal. In late spring 1974 the situation in Berlin was extremely tense 
due to the West German decision to establish the federal environmental 
agency in West Berlin. In the Soviet view, this was a violation of the Ber-
lin agreement. Additional problems concerning Berlin were the last thing 
that the new government of Schmidt and Genscher wanted. But above all, 
by the spring of 1974 there were no longer any prospects for gaining Al-
lied support for a follow-up body in Berlin. The potential benefits for the 
situation on Berlin were clearly outweighed by the risks of insisting on 
the idea. Accordingly, the brainchild of Bahr was permanently forgotten. 
Conclusion
Thirty-five heads of state and government were in the limelight during 
the hot summer days in Helsinki in July and August 1975, when the Final 
Act of the CSCE was signed. Yet at least among the Western leaders the 
enthusiasm had its limits. Few of them had been directly involved in the 
negotiations or even too interested in them – in Kissinger’s words, one 
would have had to be a Talmudic scholar to fully understand all the nuts 
and bolts of the text of the Final Act. Schmidt and Genscher, however, had 
all reason to be satisfied with the result. The fundamental West German 
interest, the possibility of peaceful change of frontiers, had been success-
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fully defended. In this defensive battle, assertive involvement at the high-
est levels had been required, but these efforts had ultimately paid off. 
As has been shown above, when it came to the core interests of the 
Federal Republic, Schmidt and Genscher did not hesitate, if necessary, to 
take a few steps back from the regular CSCE method of Western caucuses 
in the EPC and NATO frameworks. In the legal-linguistic trench war over 
the formulations concerning peaceful change, the CSCE specialists in Ge-
neva and Bonn were sidelined and the key decisions were taken in the 
Genscher–Kissinger–Gromyko triangle.  
At the same, this was only the tip of the iceberg – and the exception to 
the rule. The bulk of the sixty-page Final Act was the result of the expertise 
and perseverance of countless civil servants in the committees and sub-
committees in Geneva. Here the West German role had not been as visible 
as one could have expected after the preparatory phases. In the vast major-
ity of the issues covered by the Final Act, the FRG had done its homework 
already pre-emptively, during the run-up to the Dipoli talks. Having influ-
enced the agenda decisively already in advance, the FRG could afford to 
take a slightly less outspoken role in those issues where its major priorities 
had already been inserted into the Western preparations. Whenever the 
EPC coordination ran according to Bonn’s plans, West German interests 
were pursued in Europe’s name. It was only in issues with direct relevance 
to Deutschlandpolitik that a more active approach was called for.  
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The Federal Republic of Germany has always regarded the renunciation of the 
use or threat of use of force as the basis of its policy. This also applies to changes 
of frontiers. Frontiers are inviolable; but one must be able to change them by 
peaceful means and by agreement. It remains our aim to work for a state of 
peace in Europe in which the German nation will regain its unity through free 
self-determination.
– Chancellor Schmidt’s speech in Helsinki, August 19751 
The Federal Government approves the results of the conference, continuing 
the policy of the Federal Republic to safeguard peace. This policy obliges us to 
promote détente. This policy obliges us to use the opportunity of the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe steadfastly and without illusions 
for the people in divided Germany, for the people in divided Europe and for 
safeguarding peace on the continent.
– Foreign Minister Genscher to the Bundestag, July 19752
This book has charted the prehistory of the CSCE from the viewpoint of 
the Federal Republic. As outlined in the introduction, the main aim has 
been to analyse the role of the FRG in the intra-Western preparations of 
the conference, with the final chapter focusing on the practical implemen-
tation of these preparations in the conference. At the same time, an at-
tempt has been made to participate in and contribute to broader scholarly 
discussions on the history of détente, of the CSCE and of West German 
foreign policy. This conclusion first summarises each of the preceding 
chapters, and then moves on to discuss wider implications of the key find-
ings of this book for existing and future scholarship.
Chapter 2, covering the years 1966–69, focused above all on the domes-
tic controversies in Bonn. In the Grand Coalition, foreign policy issues 
were increasingly contentious. All the parties represented in the Bunde-
stag – the coalition partners CDU/CSU and SPD as well as the opposition 
FDP – talked about a ‘European peace order’ as a long-term goal, guid-
ing the way forward from the impasse resulting from the anachronistic 
Hallstein Doctrine. As it turned out, the SPD and FDP definitions of such 
a peace order were converging, whereas the CDU/CSU, in particular after 
the Prague invasion in 1968, found less and less common ground with the 
Social Democrats. Well before the federal election of September 1969, then, 
the writing was on the wall for a Social-Liberal Coalition. 
This became apparent also in the CSCE context. In the spring of 1969, 
after the Warsaw Pact issued its so-called Budapest Appeal for a confer-
ence, Foreign Minister Brandt began to take a more forthcoming view of 
the CSCE, whereas Chancellor Kiesinger maintained his sceptical attitude. 
Although these internal disagreements prevented the formulation of a co-
herent government line, the Grand Coalition years were significant for the 
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formation of the West German CSCE policy. Its essential characteristics were 
developed in Brandt’s Auswärtiges Amt. Egon Bahr was particularly active in 
arguing for the use of the CSCE as leverage, linking West German participa-
tion in the conference with preceding progress in bilateral Ostpolitik. On the 
other hand, Brandt himself showed interest in the agenda of the conference, 
possibly enabling gradual steps towards a European peace order. 
These blueprints were to a large extent implemented immediately in 
the first year of the new Brandt Government, which was dominated by the 
negotiation of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties. Regarding the CSCE, the 
‘linkage’ approach prevailed in 1969–70. As Chapter 3 argued, the plans to 
link bilateral Ostpolitik with CSCE preparations materialised in the Bahr–
Gromyko talks in Moscow in the spring of 1970. The strong West German 
commitment to support preparations for a CSCE contributed in part to 
the historic West German-Soviet agreement. Applied through Moscow, 
the linkage also seemed to have an impact on the GDR. At the same time, 
however, the Moscow Treaty of August 1970 was a clear watershed for 
this policy. The bilateral bargaining chip which could only be used once 
had now been spent. 
Meanwhile, first studies preparing the ground for a Western CSCE po-
sition were launched in NATO. By mid-1970, these ideas for a conference 
agenda began to take shape, consisting of principles governing relations 
between states, freer movement and increased East–West cooperation, as 
well as military elements of security. For the FRG, the last topic was of 
particular importance, and the majority of West German efforts was spent 
on trying to ensure the inclusion of MBFR on the CSCE agenda. This focus 
on MBFR overshadowed other elements, but there were also first signs 
of a particular West German interest in freer movement as early as in the 
autumn of 1969. Nonetheless, the Auswärtiges Amt was somewhat slow in 
genuinely discovering the potential of working through multilateral fora 
in the Western CSCE preparations. 
This transition to multilateralism in the years 1970–71 was the central 
theme of Chapter 4. In terms of the linkage, multilateralisation was a nec-
essary reaction to the changed situation after the Moscow Treaty. Aban-
doning the idea of a link between an inner-German treaty and the CSCE, 
the FRG decided to turn its attention to the Berlin Agreement as an es-
sential but only precondition for the conference. There was a discernible 
French influence in the arrival at this position. However, as the conclusion 
of the first stage of the Berlin negotiations approached in 1971 and France 
attempted to pave the way for a CSCE even before the final agreement, the 
FRG did not waver. For Bonn, the full Berlin precondition was not nego-
tiable, and due to West German steadfastness that was also maintained as 
a NATO position. 
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From autumn 1970 onwards, there was new momentum in the multilat-
eral CSCE preparations within the West. NATO stepped up its own efforts 
to outline an agenda for the CSCE. In this framework, the West German 
approach was at first predominantly defensive. The hard-fought bilateral 
achievements of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties had to be safeguarded 
in the multilateral setting, in particular regarding the potentially prob-
lematic repercussions of an agreement on borders. More generally, it was 
vital for the FRG to keep its Deutschlandpolitik options open. As before, 
elements of military security continued to top the West German wish list 
in the CSCE preparations conducted in NATO. But gradually, the FRG 
started to develop an interest in the cooperation aspects of the conference. 
This change coincided with the emergence of a completely new frame-
work, European Political Cooperation, in the autumn of 1970. After initial 
hesitation, the FRG began to make full use of the EPC, alongside NATO, 
in its increasingly effective multilateral CSCE policy within the West. This 
was a result of a new level of activity in Bonn in the spring of 1971, as the 
Auswärtiges Amt finally began to get its act together. Now the FRG devel-
oped its step-by-step approach, arguing for the need to avoid unnecessary 
controversies at the beginning of East–West contacts. 
As the opening of these East–West contacts drew near, the original 
‘linkage’ plans began to turn against their authors. Chapter 5 argued that 
in 1971–72 the approaching multilateral preparatory talks of the CSCE in-
creased pressure on the FRG to conclude the inner-German negotiations 
in time. The Brandt Government tied its hands conclusively in Septem-
ber 1971, when it decided that the Berlin Agreement was to remain the 
only precondition for the CSCE. An active linkage with the inner-German 
treaty was no longer an option. By December 1971 this was also locked in 
as a joint NATO position. In the summer of 1972, when the date for the 
MPT in Helsinki was already fixed for late November, the FRG opted to 
pursue a Basic Treaty with the GDR before that. In a remarkable reversal 
of Bahr’s initial plan, he was now himself under pressure to conclude the 
inner-German negotiations by a set deadline. 
However, in the period covered in Chapter 5, the ‘linkage’ approach 
had already been completely outweighed by the conference agenda in 
West German deliberations. In the year leading to the Dipoli talks, the 
CSCE policy of the FRG turned into a multi-faceted interplay of defen-
sive and offensive efforts in Western multilateralism. Deutschlandpolitik 
became the common denominator for these endeavours. Whereas the de-
fence of the achievements of Ostpolitik was necessary in particular to keep 
the German question open, the emphasis on a gradual process approach, 
avoiding excessive polemics, was designed to alleviate the consequences 
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of division and to achieve small steps in the inner-German relationship. 
Freer movement was a case in point. 
In 1971–72, the CSCE policy of the FRG was increasingly Europeanised, 
as the EPC proved to be a more effective forum than NATO. By late 1971, 
the FRG discovered an opening for a West German lead in both Western 
frameworks. This opportunity was seized vigorously, with an unprece-
dented burst of West German initiatives. In November 1971 the FRG was 
the first to suggest human rights as one of the principles governing rela-
tions between states, and in February 1972 the West Germans introduced 
the concept of peaceful change. By early 1972 the CSCE preparations in 
the West were dominated by West German working papers for virtually 
all possible agenda items. When the Federal Government approved the 
West German guidelines for the CSCE in May 1972, the FRG had clearly 
assumed the leading position within the West. Naturally, not all of the 
West German goals were achieved, but this lead was further consolidated 
in the subsequent attempts to arrive at joint Western negotiating positions 
for the MPT. 
Finally, Chapter 6 showed how the FRG could enjoy the fruits of its 
extensive preparatory work with relative ease and distance during the ac-
tual conference, as far as the bulk of the CSCE topics were concerned. The 
Western agenda had to a large extent already been set before the start of 
the MPT in Dipoli, with an active West German influence. During the con-
ference itself the FRG delegation no longer stood out due to an extraordi-
nary amount of national contributions or registered texts submitted to the 
committees. Rather than being a signal of passivity or detachment, how-
ever, this only underscores the effectiveness of the European method from 
the West German perspective. When the coordination of the Nine worked 
smoothly, and as long as West German ideas were sufficiently represented 
through common EPC positions, this suited the FRG perfectly. 
It was only when fundamental national interests were endangered that 
the more assertive face of West German CSCE policy was revealed. Issues 
with direct relevance for Deutschlandpolitik were simply too important 
to be left for European coordination alone. In these matters the political 
leadership in Bonn became directly involved in the search for the most 
effective means to defend West German interests. Also here, alliances and 
resolutions were primarily sought in the EPC and NATO frameworks. But 
if those were not adequate, the FRG did not hesitate to turn bilaterally to 
the US for assistance, as was the case with peaceful change. In the defence 
of Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik, form followed function. 
* * *
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Over the course of these chapters, this book has produced a range of 
new findings which are significant beyond the scope of this particular 
topic. The first important contribution to scholarship is simply the breadth 
of the body of evidence used in the research. Building on recently released 
documents from more than fifteen archives in eight countries, the book 
has been able to take an exceptionally thorough look at the multilateral 
European détente in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The complex interplay 
between NATO, EPC and the Bonn Group has not been studied in this 
detail before. In doing so, this book has underscored the importance of 
looking beyond the bipolar surface of Cold War and détente. It has also 
helped to highlight the interconnectedness of European integration and 
European détente. Nonetheless, this study has only been a first step. Fur-
ther research is urgently needed to arrive at a more comprehensive under-
standing of the intra-Western dynamics of the Cold War. 
Turning to the particular case at hand, the most obvious argument car-
rying the story in the book is that regardless of the original plans, West 
German CSCE policy soon shifted away from the approach emphasising 
instrumentalisation, linkages and short-term tactical considerations. In-
stead, the substance of the CSCE as part of a long-term strategy, based 
on the concept of a European peace order, overtook the earlier delibera-
tions. This book has argued that the link between these two approaches 
was Deutschlandpolitik. As soon as the prospects of improving the inner-
German situation within the CSCE rather than outside it were realised, the 
FRG, which had been the main obstacle to the CSCE, became its main pro-
ponent in the West. As soon as Deutschlandpolitik interests were involved, 
the political leadership in Bonn was vigilant. 
The evolution from ‘linkage’ goals towards agenda concerns also high-
lighted the parallel nature of Ostpolitik and the CSCE, which is a further 
novel contribution of this book. As pointed out in the introduction, one of 
the few blind spots in existing scholarship on West German foreign policy 
has been the early interaction between bilateral and multilateral policies. 
This book has argued that instead of being just the multilateral corona-
tion for Brandt’s bilateral achievements, the CSCE accompanied Ostpolitik 
throughout the period covered here. Admittedly, as has been pointed out 
in Chapter 3, the West Germans were also at first slow to identify all the 
opportunities inherent in the conference. But once the bureaucratic ma-
chinery in Bonn began to move, the CSCE turned out to be an ideal frame-
work for pushing the limits of the sovereignty of the Federal Republic. 
Regarding the West German role in the West, this book has pointed out 
that at first, unwillingness to offend its major allies continued to limit the 
FRG’s actions. The West Germans were constantly alert to their position 
vis-à-vis the Three Powers. Of these three, the relationship with the UK 
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was fairly unproblematic – in spite of the often stinging internal remarks 
by FCO officials about their West German colleagues, the official line in 
London was to follow the West German lead in the CSCE. But in a latter-
day version of the Gaullism-Atlanticism dilemma, the Federal Republic 
often found itself in a difficult spot between the US and France. As has 
been shown in the preceding chapters, at the best of times this led to help-
ful West German mediation within the Alliance, at the worst of times to 
hesitation and incoherence in the West German line. Only in the case of 
peaceful change did the FRG choose a direct bilateral channel with the US.
With the ascendancy of the EPC, the inherent tension between Paris 
and Washington became even more apparent in the EPC–NATO relation-
ship. In the beginning, the FRG was the most loyal of European NATO 
members, opposing any tasks for the EPC that overlapped with the top-
ics already discussed in NATO, even seeing itself as the US’s advocate in 
the EPC. Over time, however, the FRG began to pursue its own interests 
more assertively and take the lead in the making of Western CSCE policy. 
Accordingly, the FRG was also prepared to risk disagreements with the 
major Allies in matters it considered important, such as the Berlin precon-
dition in the case of France, and the freer movement approach in the case 
of the US. 
The rapid West German learning process in the uses of multilateralism 
has been a central theme in this book. Depending on the issues involved, 
the FRG sought different constellations within the West. As early as in 
1969, the Bonn Group was engaged as a control mechanism, filtering out 
problematic Deutschlandpolitik-related CSCE questions in advance. In the 
spring of 1972, particularly in the context of freer movement, the West 
Germans increasingly utilised the EPC as a clearing house to arrive at joint 
positions for NATO discussions. When it suited its interests, the FRG also 
forged ad hoc alliances, such as with the US and the UK in order to per-
suade Canada and Turkey to give in on the question of self-determination 
of peoples and human rights in 1972. With all these options to choose 
from, the multilateral framework broadened the West German room for 
manoeuvre.
Moreover, this discovery of multilateralism was a broader phenom-
enon, going beyond being an effective tool in individual cases. One of 
the essential arguments of this book has been that from the perspective 
of Bonn, the multilateral nature of the CSCE was valuable in itself. Well 
before the actual conference in 1973–75, the West Germans saw the CSCE 
as a means for the Federal Republic to control European détente, acting 
as an antidote to a potentially dangerous rise of bilateralism. As has been 
argued in Chapter 5, by early 1972 at the latest the FRG began actively to 
pursue jointly agreed negotiating positions of the West for the East–West 
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negotiations. Having itself already gained most of what was to be gained 
from its own bilateral Ostpolitik, the FRG stood only to lose if its allies 
were to approach the East individually.3 In contrast, the CSCE platform 
provided the FRG with its first opportunity to operate in the international 
sphere on an equal footing with others. Therefore it was crucial for the 
FRG to raise all future détente efforts to the multilateral level. Effective 
multilateralism helped the FRG safeguard its essential national interests 
and defend the accomplishments of Ostpolitik. There were also exceptions 
to the rule, though, as we have seen in the final chapter. When the inner-
German relationship and the distant prospect of unification were some-
how involved, the FRG did not hesitate to revert to bilateral arrangements 
if necessary.
The general multilateralisation of détente was accompanied by a par-
ticular feature of the CSCE process. Intensifying CSCE consultations in 
the various Western constellations saw the influence of individual offi-
cials rise to unprecedented heights. Although major policy changes still 
required a high-level blessing, in the CSCE context a large number of im-
portant decisions were actually taken on a fairly low level. In the EPC and 
in NATO, the CSCE was the playing field of a handful of foreign ministry 
officials. Enjoying a fairly high degree of independence, individual mid-
dle-rank officials specialising in CSCE affairs were able to punch above 
their weight and exert a formidable influence in Western CSCE policy for-
mulations. This characteristic, typical of the CSCE process throughout the 
Geneva phase in 1973–75, has been referred to in existing literature often 
enough.4 The novel aspect of this book, however, has been to show how 
far advanced this ‘bureaucratisation’ of the CSCE in the West was already 
well before that. And in fact, as the involvement of Genscher shows, dur-
ing crucial phases of the Geneva years politicians were back in the CSCE 
with a vengeance.
During the preparatory phases, however, direct political intervention 
in the work of CSCE officials was rare in all the Western countries, but 
nowhere was this phenomenon more apparent than in the FRG. The pre-
ceding chapters have made it clear that in Bonn, in striking contrast to the 
Chancellery-driven bilateral Ostpolitik, the CSCE preparations were firmly 
in the hands of individual diplomats in the Auswärtiges Amt. This resulted 
partly from the general nature of the CSCE discussion in the West, but 
also from the particular German circumstances. As soon as Brandt moved 
from the Auswärtiges Amt to the Chancellery in 1969, his interest in the 
substance of the CSCE began to fade. Whereas Chancellor Brandt saw 
concrete disarmament projects such as MBFR as the most important form 
of multilateral détente, he doubted whether the CSCE would amount to 
much more than a talking shop. In this, he was supported by Bahr, who 
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had from the outset had a rather cynical approach to the security con-
ference. Accordingly, the few direct interventions the Chancellery made 
in the CSCE policy of the FRG during the Brandt era were always either 
about MBFR or an instrumentalisation of the conference – Bahr’s pet proj-
ect of Berlin as a CSCE host being a particularly exotic example. 
Thus, it was the Auswärtiges Amt where the substantive CSCE policy 
was made. After a weak start in office, Foreign Minister Scheel began to 
make his presence felt, but his direct involvement in the specific details 
of the CSCE preparations was by necessity limited. Individual officials 
did most of the spadework. In the specific case of the CSCE, these efforts, 
which may have appeared minuscule to outside observers, had large-scale 
political ramifications. Moreover, in the small and exclusive bureaucratic 
circle responsible for the CSCE, the enthusiasm of certain individuals 
played a major role. This was witnessed by the qualitative and quantita-
tive change in West German efforts following the entry of Götz von Groll 
and Jürgen Diesel to the scene in 1970–71, responsible for the CSCE and 
EPC, respectively. Their activity on the working level was supported fur-
ther up in the chain of command in the Auswärtiges Amt, above all by Po-
litical Director Berndt von Staden and State Secretary Paul Frank.
In the previous chapters, Allied insinuations of a lack of coherence 
in the West German CSCE position occasionally popped up. They were 
not wholly unfounded, for there certainly were several curious episodes 
caused by solo acts without explicit instructions, most notably those of 
Ambassador Grewe with MBFR in March 1970 and of Bahr with the Berlin 
precondition in November 1971. Moreover, when clear instructions did 
exist, certain officials, particularly in the West German NATO mission in 
Brussels, made a habit of protesting against them in private conversations 
with Allied colleagues. There is no doubt that this criticism and gossiping, 
usually coming from the more conservative wing of the Auswärtiges Amt, 
undermined the credibility of West German policy to a certain extent. But 
from late 1971 onwards the sheer volume of the West German CSCE effort 
outweighed these credibility problems. 
In the end, then, the policy conceived by the handful of officials in the 
Auswärtiges Amt was consistent and coherent enough to ensure a leading 
role for the FRG in the Western CSCE preparations. This book has argued 
that in 1970–72, von Groll, Diesel, von Staden and Frank, to name the key 
players, created a West German approach to the CSCE which bears a strik-
ing resemblance to the ideas put forward by Brandt and Bahr in 1966–69. 
In terms of strategy and ideology, Brandt’s earlier ideas of a European 
peace order were taken more or less literally on the working level, con-
stantly affecting concrete policy decisions as a declared long-term goal. In 
terms of tactics and pragmatism, Bahr’s negotiating approach of engaging 
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the other side and hoping for small steps as a result of rapprochement, 
rather than presenting controversial maximal positions, became almost 
an article of faith for West German CSCE policy. Thus, there was both a 
Brandt flavour and a Bahr flavour in the mix, setting a prime example of 
the interaction of ideas and interests. Ironically, these influences came in 
with a delay, without any direct involvement from the Chancellery. 
Furthermore, the fact that only a small circle of officials was truly on 
the inside of the CSCE preparations in the years this book mainly covers 
ensured the relative exclusion of the parliamentary opposition and public 
opinion from the equation. Pressure on the West German officials from 
the conservative parliamentary opposition was limited because it had its 
hands full with the bilateral Ostpolitik. Pressure from the left-wing and 
radical segments of public opinion was virtually non-existent, since the 
FRG was clearly engaged in détente efforts already. During the forma-
tive years of the conference, the CSCE was prepared in a niche, isolated 
from external influences. When the CSCE was exposed to a broader public 
awareness in 1973, it had already acquired a life of its own. 
* * *
Finally, there is the quintessential question about the overall nature of 
détente, the CSCE, and West German foreign policy. Were they in es-
sence aimed at continuity or change? From the perspective of 1989–90 it 
appeared that the CSCE had been a miraculous agent for change. Since 
the CSCE Final Act retrospectively appeared to have made an enormous 
contribution to the implosion of the Warsaw Pact, to the end of the Cold 
War division of Europe and to German reunification, it was also seen as 
a colossal success for the FRG. This book has argued, however, that seen 
from the perspective of the 1970s the CSCE was indeed a West German 
success, but one of an entirely different nature. 
Already before the multilateral preparatory talks of the CSCE opened 
in November 1972, the FRG had managed to get a firm grip on most of 
the central goals it had set itself in the conference. But in the short term, 
those goals were very cautious. Fundamental change, if any, was envis-
aged only as occurring in the very long term and only by consensus with 
the other side. The key argument of this book is therefore that during the 
early preparations of the CSCE, West German policy was primarily aimed 
at making the Cold War more bearable, not at overcoming it. Those im-
provements that were pursued were expected to occur within the Cold 
War framework.
This becomes evident with a closer look at the dual nature of West 
German CSCE policy. The inviolability of borders, leaving the option of 
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peaceful change open, as well as the refusal to engage in anything resem-
bling a substitute peace treaty, leaving the German question open – these 
defensive elements kept open the possibility of change, but did not ac-
tively pursue it. In the field of cooperation, where the FRG was proactive 
rather than defensive, the West German initiatives focused on cautious 
small steps and on avoiding unnecessary disputes. Economic cooperation 
and an increase in personal contacts in all walks of life were seen as suit-
able first steps in a long-term process, leading to East–West rapproche-
ment and small-scale practical improvements. 
This West German approach, blunting the more confrontational sug-
gestions of some Allies, was an important contribution to ensuring that 
the ‘softer’ elements of security and cooperation ended up on the CSCE 
agenda. Although precisely these elements turned out to have a subver-
sive effect in the long run, there were no immediate revolutionary aspi-
rations behind this strategy at the time. Engaging the East in a common 
process was considered to be a valuable aim in itself, but nobody could 
foresee where the process would lead. 
None of this is to be understood as a moral verdict on West German 
CSCE policy. Nor is it to side with the contemporary Cold Warriors in 
accusations of appeasement, let alone Finlandisation. Instead, this book 
has aimed to put West German CSCE policy in the years 1966–75 in its 
historical perspective. In that era, focusing on keeping options open and 
on pursuing small-scale improvements was arguably the most intelligent 
policy option available for the FRG. But that was a far cry from actively 
pursuing fundamental change, from overcoming the status quo, or from 
striving for German unification.5 
Instead, as one of the West German diplomats told the author, the idea 
of a European peace order and the improvements in personal contact that 
were pursued in the CSCE were increasingly seen as a substitute for Ger-
man reunification (Wiedervereinigungsersatz). ‘Although the idea of reuni-
fication was kept alive, there was no active policy for reunification.’6 Paul 
Frank, State Secretary of the Auswärtiges Amt for most of the period cov-
ered in this book, confirmed that the main idea was to improve the situa-
tion of the people in the GDR.7 For his part, Bahr underscored that in the 
early 1970s nobody thought that an agreement could change the Soviet 
system or make democrats out of communists. What one could reason-
ably expect from the CSCE was just to make the East–West conflict more 
civilised and more manageable. ‘Helsinki was a miracle’, Bahr added.8
Quite apparently, then, there is a pressing need for further scholarship 
to break free from the way in which the end of the Cold War continues to 
influence our perceptions of the preceding decades. This book has, for its 
part, hinted at a demand for further research on the history of détente, the 
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CSCE and West German foreign policy without prejudices based in the 
events of 1989–90. Without the benefit of hindsight, the seating of the two 
German delegations next to each other at the CSCE was not only a symbol 
of East–West and inner-German rapprochement. It also seemed to imply 
that the division of Germany and Europe was a permanent state of affairs. 
This was also ‘a state of peace in Europe’, but not yet the one that the FRG 
was pursuing. 
Notes
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